Week 5 Flashcards
What is the motivation for Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification?
To better understand adversaries. Attackers versus enterprises: attackers are better at sharing information and identifying problems in the systems. Enterprises don’t reveal their security problems because of legal, protect themselves from competitors.
CAPEC aims to standardise the language and improve communication between enterprises. CAPEC is not a modelling technique. It is a catalogue and does not prioritise attacks. It is largely technically focused.
(see http://capec.mitre.org)
What does the MITRE Corporation do?
Advocates attack patterns to help organisations. It’s a blueprint to discuss specific types of attacks.
What are 3 classifications of attack patterns?
1) architecture - protocols and processes
2) artefact - specifics of the system
3) external
What is STRIDE?
- It’s a framework for thinking, discussing and classifying threats.
- Designed to get software developers to consider common threats when designing and implementing software.
- It supports software development.
- Not a modelling technique.
What does STRIDE stand for?
1) Spoofing : when an attacked masquerades as something it’s not itself.
2) Tampering: attack that modifies some data
3) Repudiation: refers to rejection of responsibility of actions. e.g. purchasing a movie on Sky box movies. It’s important for the enterprise that the individual accepts responsibility that they purchased the movie.
4) Information disclosure: information has been disclosed to some party it shouldn’t be disclosed to.
5) Denial of Service: consuming resources to the detriment of others, e.g. hit the system with zombies.
6) Elevation of privileges: an entity executing at a level that it’s not permitted to.
What are attack trees used for?
Modelling adversary behaviour. Can be considered a formal approach of organising and discussing threats to enterprises.
What are the benefits of attack trees?
They reveal what is crucial to consider rather than what’s perceived to be important.
Acts as documentation for systems.
You can construct numerous attack trees from different perspectives, eg cost, whether it’s intrusive/not.
You can create a library of attack trees that can be used in various instances.
What are the concerns of attack trees?
Sometimes can be incomplete around unknown attacks. They should be supported with research, investigation and peer-review.
What is the root of the attack tree?
The base of the attack and the motivation of the attack. We want to consider all of the branches which can achieve the motivation.
What are sub-goals?
We decompose goals (i.e. the root of the attack tree) into subgoals. It’s basically ways that attackers can achieve their motivation. Subgoals can be decomposed further and further.
What logic do attack trees use?
Attack trees can be “AND” or “OR” gates.
What labels can he give attack trees?
Possible/impossible, based on our research. In this case, possible/impossible are just examples of perspectives. Another perspective could be intrusive or non-intrusive attack.
We can use the relevant AND/OR logic in the attack tree to see whether the adversary’s goal can be achieved.
What is a kill chain?
It is a military concept to determine the anatomy of the attack and anticipate a future attack
What are the phases of cyber kill chain approach?
-Generally from external attacks
1) reconnaissance: attack identifies targets/enterprise vulnerabilities to focus on, e.g via social media.
2) weaponisation - potentially insert malware or deactivate controls within the organisation.
3) delivery - delivering the malicious piece of software into the organisation to exploit the organisation. How are they going to do this?
4) exploitation - exploiting the vulnerability in the system. eg target entry level non-technical staff (HR) and propagate through the network.
5) installation - install more tools and software to gain greater control in the organisation and propagate across the network.
6) command and control (C2) - got control over a system and propagate.
7) action on objectives - get the info out of the organisation and profit on the information.
What are Hutchins et al. 5 defensive steps?
1) Detect attackers exploring the network or accessing systems
2) Deny any attempt to tamper with data
3) Disrupt any outbound transfer of data
4) Degrade the impact on the organisation
5) Deceive the attacker