Week 2 - Nuclear Proliferation Flashcards

1
Q

Threatre Nuclear Weapons

A

Nuclear weapons for a localized, tactical area, distinct form strategic nuclear weapons used for globa-scale warfare (short range and yield) - made nuclear weapons acceptable

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Jus in bello

A

justice in war/conduct in war

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Strategic Deterrence

A

Defined as: the act of discouraging an act or event through instilling doubt or fear of consequences

Nukes can be used to prevent conquest from an opponent - if you have to launch then the weapon failed to deter
Escalation ends with MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction)
- to be effective, the threat must promise to do more and thus impose more costs than any benefits that would be gained through the action being deterred

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Nuclear Proliferation

A

Defined as the spread of nuclear weapons and associated capabilities
States acquire nuclear weapons for: perceived need to deter adversaries, domestic policies, national prestige
Potential for “universalized deterrence” - every being in possesion of nukes means hat nobody can use them

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Slowing Nuclear Weapon Spread - Supply Side Controls

A
  • Reduce state access to the technologies and materials for nuclear weapons
  • done through export controls/attacks on nuclear facilities
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Slowing Nuclear Weapon Spread - Demand Side Controls

A
  • Reduce state demand for independent nuclear capability
  • carrots: (positive incentives or rewards used to encourage a state to comply with international agreements or norms related to nuclear weapons) conventional arms transfers, extended detterence, side-payments
  • sticks: economic sanctions, threat of punitive strikes
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Slowing Nuclear Weapon Spread - Normative Controls

A
  • Delegitamize/denormalize nuclear weapons development
  • acts denouncing the military/political value, denouncing military weapons as evil, dangerous, and inhumane
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Vertical Proliferation

A

Defined as the development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by states that possess them
Stifle vertial proliferation through arms control agreements - placing limits on development, production, deployment, and testing of nuclear weapons

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

RLE - Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) 1963

A

Treaty banning nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water
- Primary signatories: USSR, US, UK and Moscow
- Potential violation by Israel/South Africa with the 1979 Vela Incident

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Horizontal Proliferation

A

Defined as the spread of nuclear weapons to new states

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

RLE - 1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

A

Bilateral agreement between the US/USSR to eliminate intermediate range nuclear weapons

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Nuclear Disarmament

A
  • the process of reducing in number or completely eliminating a country’s nuclear weapons
  • Requires a major shift in beliefs about the value of nuclear weapons (conductive international security environment)
    RLE - South Africa voluntarily gave up their nuclear arsenal
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Potential Third Age? Current Situation

A

US/Russia have maintained a similar amount of nuclear weapons and China is rapidly developing (potential arms race)
Trend to reduce weapons - states are still expanding and changing doctrines to be ambiguous and escalatory

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Scott Sagan on Nuclear Weapons Quote

A

Nuclear weapons are more than just tools for national security, they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal struggles - serving as a symbol of modernity and identity

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

The Security Model

A

Realist idea, states build weapons for national security, those who are building national defence want nuclear weapons

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

The Domestic Policies Model

A

States build weapons for international policies and bureaucratic interests, political influences were the major reason for development (the UK/France largely built weapons due to internal domestic pressures)

17
Q

The Norms Model

A

States build weapons due to their value for prestige and national identity - India/Pakistan are largely seen to have built weapons to be percieved as modern

18
Q

How has Nuclear Proliferation changed in the Second Age?

A
  • In the 1st Age - centered around the US/USSR, threat of miscalculation, crisis, bipolar power dynamic
  • In the 2nd Age - more regional instability, even non-state actors possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
    Sagan - we can no longer rely on the nuclear toolkit of the 1st age (evolved into a threat stemming from small regional nuclear weapons exchanges, non-state actor involvement, purposeful use of weapons)
19
Q

Sagan + Pessimists

A

Sagan - central pessimist who argues that nuclear spread makes the world less stable, new nuclear states engage in preventitive war, fail to build survivable forces and may lead to accidents
- Other factors to look at: terrorism, illicit networks, accident, civilian control mechanisms
- Sagan - maintaining peace during the Cold War was more differen thtan it is made seem by Americans today

20
Q

Waltz + Optimists

A

Waltz - beleives that fear of nuclear weapons is exaggerated, more may be better since new nuclear sates can deter other countries
- pessimistic view on responsible states is irrelevant, weapons have spread successfully
- retaliatory nuclear deterrence should remain the bedrock of global nuclear relations

21
Q

Nuclear Latency

A

Defined as states that possess the technology and resources capable of developing nuclear weapons but have no done so yet
- technology for a civilian nuclear program is similar to that needed for a bomb
RLE - Japanese Nuclear Capability
- potential nuclear threat regionally
- Maria Rost Rublee - Japan’s continued non-nuclear status seems puzzling since they have high levels of economic, scientific, and technological development

22
Q

Nuclear Proliferation Efforts

A

Limiting - negotiating nuclear arms control
Preventing - international non-proliferation regime
Defending - active and passive defences

23
Q

Limiting - negotiating nuclear arms control

A

Arms control agreements - limit, regulate, and reduce the threat from global nuclear forces, states seek stability and security and help control use and effects
- manage nuclear relations to enhance deterrence rather than replace it
- 3 aspects of nuclear arms control - limiting the test of weapons, limiting the development/deployment of weapons, limiting the scope for their use

24
Q

The future of Arms Control

A
  1. require the US and Russia to reduce their nuclear supply
  2. multilateralize the nuclear arms control process - involve the UK, China, and France who maintain that they’re operating at a minimum force structure already, how to involve the DPRK, India and Pakistan
25
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Main principles: 1. NWS cannot transfer/assit NNWS with weapons, 2. Assist NNWS with nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 3. must work towards disarmament Debate about the NPT - central mechanism for controlling the global nuclear order since the 1970s Critics: enshrines the status quo, no intention to disarm, has a greater focus on non-proliferation, allows nuclear latency, does not address states outside NPT with weapons - Enforcing: no permanent secretary, relying on international institutions
26
Active Defence
Military systems are designed to neuter a nuclear attack by intercepting bombs/warheads before they hit their targets - Such defences are considered destabilizing since they complicate the credibility of a retaliatory second strike response (deterrence)
27
Passive Defence
- Used after an attack, used to minimize the impact of a nucelar strike on society
28
The Defence Dilemma
active defences are not viewed as essential components of a more nuanced detterence strategy to deal with new types of nuclear threats
29
Asymmetric Strategies
Strategies that employ non-reciprocal means to counter a threat (would counter a conventional threat with a terrorist or WMD threat)
30
Feaver on Waltz's theories
Three problems with Waltz's theory: 1 - cannot explain most nuclear behaviour 2 - his assertion that nuclear command anc dontrol and civil military problems are easily solvable 3 - his nuclear optimism is inconsistent with his structural realism (his assertation the nuclear weapons promote peace while also multipolarity is unstable)
31
RLE - 1994 Budapest Memorandum
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan gave up their nuclear arsenal for International security assurances
32
RLE - Libya under Gaddafi
gave up WMD programs to improve relations with the West and escape sanctions