Week 12: Decision-Making Flashcards

1
Q

Enlightenment (18th and 19th century) Views on Judgment and Decision Making: the rational man

A
  • Enlightenment thinkers viewed humans as making rational decisions
  • In legal contexts: weighing up whether a defendant is guilty should be compared against what a “rational man” would do in the circumstances
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2
Q

Current Thinking on decision making

A
  • We now know there are many ways in which humans make poor decisions or behave differently from a rational expected outcome
  • Humans rely often rely on heuristics (Less time and resources consumed)
  • Humans subject to biases due to Systematic errors in our judgments or evaluations
    – we are extremely bad at assigning probability to events!
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3
Q

Herbert Simon on decision making (bound rationality and satisficing)

A

-Bounded rationality: Humans reason and choose rationally, but only within the constraints imposed by their limited search and computational capacities.
-Satisficing: “[U]sing experience to construct an expectation of how good a solution we might reasonably achieve, and halting search as soon as a solution is reached that meets the expectation” (Simon, 1990)

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4
Q

Two major findings from Meehl

A
  1. Clinical prediction (e.g., predictions by clinicians) performs very poorly relative to statistical prediction (e.g., regression models).
  2. Clinical prediction overweights case characteristics and underweights base rates.
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5
Q

Availability Heuristic
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973)

A
  • Events that come to mind more easily are judged as being more probable than events that are less easily recalled
  • The availability heuristic can lead to some very misleading consequences when we estimate probability eg Certain rare events that get a lot of media attention – these often come to mind when we estimate risk of danger
    -availability can lead to an illusory correlation
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6
Q

tests in the experiments of Tversky and Kahneman: availability heuristic

A

Subjects studied lists of ordinary names and celebrity names. They studied both male and female names – the proportions of each were manipulated across the ordinary and celebrity categories but the underlying proportion of male and female names was 50/50
* During the memory test, subjects had to judge how frequent the male or female names were
* Subjects gave higher frequency estimates to whichever gender had the most celebrity names
* E.g., if there were more celebrity male names, but less ordinary male names, subjects estimated that there were more male names

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7
Q

Example of availability of heuristic leading to misleading consequences

A
  • Deaths due to vaccinations: highly publicized, yet extremely rare
  • Deaths from assault weapons: attacks using assault weapons are quite rare – handgun violence is considerably more frequent
  • Deaths from airplane crashes: deaths from car crashes are much more frequent
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8
Q

Why do we use the availability heuristic

A
  • Because we often do not know the true proportions or probabilities!
  • Instead, we approximate these quantities by retrieving examples from memory
    As soon as we use our memories to assign judgments or probabilities, we are subject to memory limitations
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9
Q

The Representativeness Heuristic(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)

A

We make judgments on the basis of resemblance
-how much does an item resemble the stereotype of a catagory

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10
Q

Base-rate neglect

A

-where we ignore base rates (the percentage of a population that demonstrates a certain characteristic) when making assessments, and use other information to make our decision (e.g. representativeness).
-It’s not as if we can’t use base rates but we ignore it even when there is a description given, even if there is no information in that description
* This applies even if there are payoffs given for the correct answer

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11
Q

Why is representativeness heuristic:irrational

A

violation of the conjunction rule of probability
* The probability of two events together (A & B) can never be higher than the probabilities of the individual events (A or B).
-but due to description, we are more likely to choose A & B

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12
Q

Why do we use the representativeness heuristic

A

-we’re bad at estimating probability or correctly weighing prior probabilities with new information
-Tversky and Kahneman argue that we substitute for that with a simpler cognitive operation: resemblance

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13
Q

The Anchoring Heuristic

A
  • When having to estimate a quantity, we always do it with an intuitive reference to something else
  • That reference point is called the anchoreven random numbers can serve as anchors
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14
Q

Experiment on anchoring heuristic even random numbers can serve as anchors

A
  • In one study, subjects were asked to estimate the proportion of African nations in the UN
  • They were given a random number from a spinning wheel. What the subjects did not know is that the wheel only returned 10 or 65
  • 10 group: their median estimates of African nations was 25
  • 65 group: their median estimates of African nations was 45
  • Even payoffs for correct responses did not alter the effect
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15
Q

Why do we use these random anchors

A
  • Again, we don’t know the true frequencies or probabilities, and we need a reference point to make our decisions!
  • Possibility that the number remains in memory due to its recency
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16
Q

Framing effects

A
  • Framing in terms of gains makes subjects prefer risk aversion – going with a sure bet that will avoid losses
  • Framing in terms of losses makes subjects prefer risk taking – preferring options that will lead to greater gains despite the risk involved
17
Q

Loss Aversion

A

-When we weigh up decision options, potential losses in our minds weigh twice as much as gains

18
Q

Why is loss aversion a big deal

A
  • These are highly contrary to expected utility theory
  • Expected utility theory was a standard in economics that argued that we are rational agents that always try to maximize the expected utility
    -According to classical interpretations of expected utility theory, two decisions with the same outcomes should have the same expected utility (e.g., number of people saved)
19
Q

Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)

A
  • The findings of loss aversion and other findings were integrated into a broader theory of how we perceive gains and losses called prospect theory
  • Prospect theory describes a psychometric function
  • A psychometric function is a description of the psychological value or weight given to an objective experience
20
Q

Influence of the Kahneman and Tversky work

A
  • The entire field of behavioral economics
  • Understanding the ways individuals evaluate probabilities, assess risks and rewards, and make decisions in the context of economics
  • Prospect theory has been hugely influential
  • Assumption that it’s no longer tenable to assume that individuals always make decisions rationally!
21
Q

Criticisms of the Kahneman and Tversky work

A
  • Lack of formal modeling
  • Lots of heuristics, but these are applied in post hoc fashion, unclear when which one would be use
  • Lack of a mechanistic theory ( unknow underlying value function)
    -Heuristic usage often can be a good thing
22
Q

Recognition Heuristic

A
  • Gigerenzer included an additional heuristic: that when we are unfamiliar with the options, we often choose the one we recognize the most
23
Q

Fast and Frugal Heuristics

A
  • Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) argue that a hallmark of human decision making is the usage of fast and frugal heuristics
  • Fast – we can use these really quickly and with little deicison time
  • Frugal – they don’t require a great deal of computation or consideration. We simplify the information we need for the problem at hand
24
Q

Fast and Frugal Heuristics example

A
  • State of the art statistical algorithms require heavy computation over as many as 19 predictors
  • Any such formal computation with any problem requires converting each consideration to a “common currency” – usually a probability of an event occurring
    -but doctor requires a maximum of three decisions
    -easy and quick,it performs very well considering the little time it requires to execute
25
Q

Does this imply that we always do better
when we use heuristics?

A
  • Heavens, no!
  • Gigerenzer intended these examples as a counterpoint to the Kahneman and Tverksy work
  • The important consideration is whether heuristics are appropriate for the situation at hand
26
Q

Formal Theories of Decision Making

A
  • Increasingly, there are a number of decision making theories that are grounded in retrieval from memory
  • MINERVA-DM: a process model of decision making based on computational models of global similarity (Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999)
  • Underlying idea is that global similarity of a cue can be converted into the probability of an outcome
27
Q

MINERVA DM

A
  • The model was able to produce the evidence for availability and representativeness heuristics and overweights rare events, all with a common mechanism