week 10 - democratization Flashcards
Bernstein’s methodology - why did communism not collapse?
Russia and China share:
- communist regimes
- new leaders amidst crisis
- determined to revitalize and reinvigorate the ruling parties and redirect their people’s energies in more productive direction
But the results differ:
- ussr: end of CP rule, partition of Union, and loss of superpower status
- China: rising economic and military status which party adapts or leads
China vs USSR: institutionalism
- institutions determine outcomes
- institutions generate self-reinforcing dynamics, path dependence
- change is problematic:
a) powerful external force disrupts path dependence or
b) incremental change - e.g. layering, conversion, drift - depends on strength of forces for change, strength of forces resisting change
USSR
- simultaneous reform in three domains: the economy, the military-industrial complex/foreign policy, and the political system
- soviet wage and pension security discouraged risk taking
- soviet agriculture larger, more industrialized, and more bureaucratized - harder ti dislodge
Gail Lapidus
- successful reform would entail radical changes not only in the organization of the soviet economy….
China
- China is better positioned for economic reforms
- Chinese backwardness: this enabled the country’s leaders to start economic reforms at the periphery
Household responsibility system and township and village enterprises
- partial changes, within context of existing system, that gradually overcome system
Bureaucratic barriers
- a path dependent legacy with impact long after the agricultural sector had become the recipient of huge state subsidies and investments during the Brezhnev era
Timing and sequencing
a) Chinese reforms came after radical and disruptive great proletarian cultural revolution (1966-76)
b) soviet reforms can after stability of Brezhnev and successors
c) soviet economic reforms failed, but China’s brought unprecedentedly Hugh growth rate (10% for 30 years)
Liberal democracy
a) competition or contestation
b) participation or opposition
c) rule of law - civil and political rights
d) the institutionalization of uncertainty (Przeworski)
- protected consultation (tilly)
- democracy is a way in which those who pursue power are consulting with the rest of the population
Democracy - john markoff
- no stable definition, as each round of political struggle changes our conceptions and expectations of democracy
Does democracy come in waves?
- systematic shifts of regime type in a great many countries in a defined stretch of time
- outstripping shifts in the other direction
- if so, then democratization should not just be studied exclusively at the national level, search for common causes
First wave (1828-1926)
a) economic development, industrialization
b) growth of restless new classes
c) war
First reverse wave (1922-1942)
a) Russian revolution
b) Great Depression
Second wave (1943-1962)
a) end WWII
b) delegitimization of authoritarianism
c) economic reconstruction
Second reverse wave (1958-75]
a) underdevelopment
b) crises of development
Third wave (1974 on)
a) legitimacy crisis
b) economic development
c) international support
d) Catholic Church
e) snowballing
Third wave begins with Portugal - causes:
a) failed colonial wars
b) revolt within the military
c) stimulating widespread popular mobilization at home “Carnation Revolution”
Transitions to democracy
- a voluntarist model - agency temporarily supplants structure
- transitions to democracy possible regardless of structural conditions
Transitional actors:
- key: response of elites, as well as masses
- strategic interaction key - involving:
a) hard liners
b) soft liners
c) social moderates
d) social radicals - within the context of imperfect information.
- these actors are not social classes
- democratization depends on the right choice being made
The transition process
a) begins with elite spirit - based on concern over regime legitimacy and durability
b) soft liners reach out to social moderates - offering liberalization of economy, society, limited political change
c) based on soft liners’ belief in the existence of many social moderates, and their willingness to support limited institutional change
Transitions to democracy or dictatorship
- with this opening comes rapid increase in the polarization and mobilization of civil society
- key characteristic of the politics of transition: hope, opportunity, choice, incorporation of new actors, shaping and renewal of political identities
- the resulting interactions will determine whether the transition will lead to democracy or renewed dictatorship
a) if society mobilizes and radicalizes too much, too fats, then repression by hard liners
b) if society insists on more, but remains sufficiently moderate, ten elites may participate in democratization
c) either by elite part of reformist compromise
Case study: Russian democratization
- declining legitimacy of USSR - limits to dictatorship of the proletariat
- weakening of performance based legitimation - declining economic performance:
a) soft incentives
b) inability to shift from extensive to intensive industrialization
c) superpower rivalry imposes costs
Gorbachev as soft liner
- responded to perceive decline in legitimacy of regime
- reformed to preserve:
a) perestroika- restructuring
b) glasnost - openness, publicity
c) arms reductions - to free up resources for reforms - reached out to moderates, but failed to control the results from 1989-91>
a) single party elections
b) end to party’s leading role
c) new parties, associations, multi party elections
d) nationalist revolts, suppresses to modify hardliners
e) Gorbachev opts for soviet presidency
f) Russia communist party forms
g) coup August 1991
