Warrant Exception for Reasonable Suspicion Flashcards
Terry v. Ohio (SCOTUS 1968)
This case held that the police can stop someone on the street if they have reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity is afoot. This suspicion needs to be more than an inchoate hunch, and must be objective and particularized, and can be based on the officer’s prior experience.
This case also held that, if the people have reason to believe that someone is armed, they can conduct a limited protective frisk and seize anything they feel is a weapon.
What is the difference between a Terry stop and an arrest?
Terry stops are brief detentions, arrests are not. The Court has not put a time limit on when a stop becomes an arrest.
What is the Terry balancing test?
This is balancing test for reasonableness. Government interest (particularly in crime prevention/detection and officer safety) vs. individual interest (safety and privacy)
Limits to a Terry Frisk
In this situation you can only frisk for weapons, you cannot frisk for evidence of a crime.
Adams v. Williams (SCOTUS 1972)
Holding: information provided by an known informant that someone is sitting in a parked car, in possession of a weapon, is sufficient to justify a Terry Stop and Frisk when it is also a high crime area, late at night, and the suspect did not comply with an officer’s request to step out of his car.
Counter argument: there was no information regarding whether the known informant’s prior tips were reliable and the informant did not provide information indicated direct knowledge/reliability. Further, the police had no reason to believe that the suspect was in possession of a gun illegally…he could have had a license.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms (SCOTUS 1977)
Holding: the police have the right to order a suspect out of their car during a traffic stop and this is a deminimus invasion of privacy, a mere inconvenience. Some police think that this is a safer practice
Counter argument: this could actually be more dangerous, and this means that the police can order anyone out of a car whenever they are stopped, regardless of individualized suspicion that they pose a danger to the police.
Maryland v. Wilson (SCOTUS 1997)
Holding: Extends Mimms decision to passengers of cars. So passengers, as well as drivers, can be ordered out of a car whenever a driver is stopped. This is, in part, due to the fact that passengers have a weaker personal liberty case than drivers because whenever the driver is stopped, so is the passenger.
Counter argument: so many stops, this will lead to the aggregation of thousands upon thousands of petty indignities.
Kansas v. Glover (SCOTUS 2020)
Holding: the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a car that he found was registered to a person with a revoked license because it was reasonable/common sense to assume that the person driving the car was the owner.
Rule: an officer can rely on “common sense” to establish reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop until additional facts dispel this suspicion.
Facts: an officer on patrol saw a car, ran the license, and determined that car was registered to a person with a revoked license. He stopped the car solely based on this (no traffic violation). He identified Glover as the driver and the person to who the car was registered.
Counter argument: Sotomayor, it is not reasonable for an officer to assume that a driver is the owner of the vehicle, common sense is not particularized. And, concern with the impact of being stopped.
Can an anonymous tip be the basis for reasonable suspicion?
This support can be the basis for reasonable suspicion but only if it is “significantly” corroborated by officer investigation. There is a lower threshold for the reliability of this type of evidence when it is used to support reasonable suspicion than when it is used to support probable cause.
Can the police rely on informants to establish reasonable suspicion?
If anonymous: need significant corroboration but not as much as for probable cause. Alabama v. White; Florida v. J.L.
If known informant: use this as part of the totality of the circumstances test. Adams v. Williams
Florida v. J.L. (SCOTUS 2000)
Holding: the police were not justified in conducting a Terry frisk of a minor standing by a bus stop relying solely on the tip from an anonymous informant who said the young man would be standing by the bus stop in a plaid shirt. Also there is no carve out that there is automatically reasonable suspicion when it comes to claims that a person has firearms.
Rule: the police need to substantially corroborate anonymous tips before relying on them to establish reasonable suspicion. Describing where a person is and what they are wearing is not “suitable corroboration.”
Navarette v. California (SCOTUS 2014)
Holding: the police were able to rely on this anonymous tip to establish reasonable suspicion of drunk driving because there was sufficient indicia of reliability:
1. They knew specific info including the make, color, license of the car, and that the car drove her off the road, which indicates reliable eyewitness information.
2. The police confirmed the location of the car nearby minutes after the call, which indicates contemporaneousness and thus reliability
3. She called 911 so there could be consequences if she made a false report.
This all distinguished the case from J.L.
Facts: the police received an anonymous tip that a driver was driving dangerously and had run a person off the road. The police followed the car for 5 minutes and did not see any evidence of dangerous driving. They then pulled the car over and found marijuana.
Counter argument: the corroboration here actually confirmed that there was no criminal activity—how could a drunk person drive properly for 5 whole minutes?
U.S. v. Trullo (1st Cir. 1987)
This case confirmed that the police can establish reasonable suspicion based on factors that may have an innocent explanation. They can use the totality of the circumstances to decide whether there is reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
Facts: it was 1pm in the afternoon and the police were in Boston policing a high crime area known as the combat zone. They saw a man come up to another man in a parked car, get into the car, drive around the block and get out. The police suspected a drug deal. They stopped and frisked the driver and found a spring gun and cocaine.
Illinois v. Wardlaw (SCOTUS 2000)
Holding: unprovoked flight upon seeing the police is enough to establish reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
Counter argument: it may be reasonable for an innocent person of color to flee the police given police violence.
Facts: the police arrived in a high crime area and saw the defendant run away. They chased him and conducted a stop and frisk, and found a gun.
Heien v. North Carolina (SCOTUS 2014)
Holding: the police have reasonable suspicion to stop a person even if their suspicion is based on a mistaken understanding of the law. This is only true if their misinterpretation/mistake is reasonable.
Counterargument: Sotomayor, it is not fair that people could be doing everything they can to avoid being stopped by the police and still be stopped by them. Stops are humiliating. This is problematic.