War and Peace Flashcards
What is the Democratic Peace Theory?
The Democratic Peace Theory is the theory that democratically organised political systems in general operate under restraints that make them more peaceful in the relations with other democracies. Democracies are not necessarily peaceful in their relations with other kinds of political systems. There are no clearcut cases of sovereign stable democracies waging war with each other in the modern international system.
The relationship of relative peace among democracies is importantly a result of some features of democracy, rather than being caused exclusively by economic or geopolitical characteristics correlated with democracy
What is Russett’s (1993) definition of an Interstate War?
large-scale institutionally organised lethal violence, with ‘large-scale’ meaning that there are over a thousand battle fatalities
In what ways does the empirical evidence show that the democratic peace theory is true?
Empirical research produced very strong evidence that showed that democracies do not wage war against one another, that pairs of democracies are much less likely than other pairs of states to fight or to threaten each other in militarised disputes less violent than war, that alliances among democracies are extraordinarily robust and that there are comparatively high levels of economic exchange and international trade regimes (Wagner and Hasenclever, 2004)
Most wars given for the exception of the rule that democracies do not go to war with each other do not fit the definitions of either interstate war or democracy (Russett, 1993)
Long-term rival states, with many conflicts of interest between them, have gone to war or had substantial fatal clashes only when one or both of them was not governed democratically, e.g., India and Pakistan have of course fought repeatedly and sometimes bloodily during their history as independent states. Yet no fatalities are recorded in disputes between them during Pakistan’s most democratic periods of 1962– 64 and 1988– 92 (Burke 1973; Thomas 1986; Tillema 1991)
What are the issues with the empirical evidence regarding the Democratic Peace Theory?
- Changing technologies of war may mean that the same types of conflicts lead to fewer deaths. This may mean that if we use the same definition of war over time, we will code less wars over time, when in reality the number of conflicts has remained the same. Issue arises if we are getting both less wars and more democracies over time and assuming that there are less wars because there are less democracies, when if may actually be because methods of war have changed.
- May be overcounting certain dyads, if certain states have been democracies for longer and certain dyads are unlikely to ever have conflict and have bee both democracies for a long time.
- If you expand the definition of war, there may be more counterexamples to the democratic peace.
- Number of 1000 problematic; e.g., Guatemala not many battlefield deaths but still large consequences, also doesn’t count citizen deaths
- the claim that there is a democratic peace rests on a Eurocentric conception of modernity. (Barwaki and Laffey, 2001)
- The universe of supporting cases is small: very few democracies between 1815 and 1945, the possibility of any dyad being involved in a war is small, many dyads unlikely to ever go to war with one another (including many of the democracies which have been democracies for a long time), sample size is small (Layne, 1999)
What is the normative approach to explaining the democratic peace theory?
This theory says that in relations with other states, decision makers will try to follow the same norms of conflict resolution that exist within their political system and will expect decision makers in other states to do the same thing. Therefore, decision makers expect to be able to resolve conflicts by compromise and nonviolence, respecting the rights and continued existence of opponents. Democracies will follow norms of peaceful conflict resolution with other democracies and will expect other democracies to do the same. In contrast there will be more frequent violent conflicts between nondemocracies, and democracies and nondemocracies because in nondemocracies decisionmakers use and expect their opponents to use violence and the threat of physical force to resolve conflict as part of their domestic political processes, and other states will expect this. Democracies may adopt nondemocratic norms in dealing with nondemocracies to avoid exploitation. Democracies may also use the threat of force against states they perceive to be unstable (Russett, 1993)
What are some arguments that the normative approach to the democratic peace theory is correct?
Dixon looks at how international conflicts have been settled in the post– World War II era. Not only does he confirm that conflicts between democracies are much less likely to escalate to lethal violence and to be settled peacefully, but he finds that they are much more likely to be settled by some means of third-party conflict management, such as the use of good offices, mediation, and intervention. Also, all conflicts between democracies were ended either by agreement or by stalemate; none terminated in a settlement imposed by one of them or by a third party. Such a pattern is much more readily explicable by common norms than by characteristics of internal democratic institutions acting as constraint. (Russett, 1993)
This suggests that to use or threaten to use force is not usually normatively acceptable behaviour in disputes between democracies, even in the form of symbolic, ritualized bargaining behaviour. (Russett, 1993)
How might a proponent of the normative explanation to the DP theory respond to counterarguments and how does Rosato respond to these?
Proponents of the normative explanation for the democratic peace theory may respond that the countries being invaded were not sufficiently democratic to be trusted and respected
- While this may sometimes be the case, the regimes that were there prior to the democracies imposing were often more democratic than the ones that preceded them, which were often autocratic, and even so, if the normative approach is correct then the democracies should only fight wars for self-defence and this proves that the democracies are willing and happy to fight wars for reasons other than this.
Democratic peace theorists have tried to repair the logic by introducing a new causal factor: perceptions. In the revised version of the logic, democracies will only trust and respect one another if they consider each other to be democratic.
- This adjustment can only improve the logic’s explanatory power if we can predict how democracies will categorize other states with a high level of confidence and if this categorization is relatively stable. Scholars will therefore always be able to find “evidence” that the other state was not perceived to be sufficiently “democratic” as leaders go about demonizing the enemy.
What is the institutional approach to explaining the democratic peace theory?
This theory says that violent conflicts between democracies will be infrequent because in democracies the constraints of checks and balances, division of power and need for public debate to enlist widespread support will reduce the likelihood of large-scale violence. Democracies will expect other democracies to be the same. In contrast, leaders of nondemocracies are not as constrained as leaders of democracy. Leaders of states in conflict with nondemocracies may then initiate violence rather than risk a surprise attack and democracies in conflict with nondemocracies may initiate large-scale violence to avoid making concessions (Russett, 1993).
What are some counterarguments by Rosato (2003) to the institutional approach to the democratic peace theory?
- It rests on the idea that democratic leaders are more accountable than autocratic leaders when this may not be the case. Evidence shows that democratic and autocratic leaders who have lost war are similarly likely to be removed from office, but autocratic leaders are more likely to be severely punished; autocrats have been removed 35% of the time and punished 27% of the time, while democrats have only been removed 27 % of the time and punished 7% of the time. Therefore, democratic leaders are not less likely to go to war because of expected costs because they are no more accountable than their counterparts. (Rosato, 2003)
- The world’s most militarily active democracies-Britain, France, India, Israel, and the United States-have gone to war 30 times since 1815. In 15 cases, they were the victims of attack and therefore we should not be surprised that publics reacted in a nationalistic fashion or were persuaded to support decisions for war. There are, however, 15 other cases in which one could plausibly argue that it was not obvious to the public that war was in the national interest because there was no immediate threat to the homeland or vital national assets (Rosato, 2003)
- The historical record offers scant support for the claim that the complexity of mobilizing diverse groups in democracies slows decisions to use force. Democratic leaders frequently decide that protecting what they deem to be the national interest requires swift and decisive action. When they believe such situations have arisen they have been able and willing simply to bypass the democratic imperative of open debate and consensus decision making. Democracies are no less capable of carrying out surprise attacks than other kinds of states. (Rosato, 2003)
What is some evidence to back up the institutional approach to the DP theory which supports the idea that the opinions of the electorate do have some impact over the likelihood of going to war?
evidence shows that women are more likely to oppose wars and countries with women’s suffrage are less likely to go to war with other similar countries, showing that the opinion of the electorate may matter in what democratic leaders decide to do (Barnhart et al, 2020).
What are other factors correlated with democracy which may cause democracies not to go to war with other democracies?
Transnational and international institutions make peace: democracies often share institutions which are supposed to provide a means to resolve conflicts peacefully (Russett, 1993)
Distance prevents war: until after WWII democracies were relatively few and far between (Russett, 1993)
Alliances make peace: many democracies share common interests and want to present united front (Russett, 1993)
-Counter: Begs question of if they are peaceful because they are allies, or allies because they did not fight
Wealth makes peace: democracies often wealthy and cost/benefit ratio for war is unpromising (Russett, 1993)
-Counter: What about wealthy, non-democratic countries?
Political stability makes peace: states with stable and durable political systems will lack incentives to externalise domestic discontent with foreign countries, especially when these countries (Russett, 1993)
-Counter: why then do democracies go to war with non-democracies still?
What is the realist argument for why democratic countries have not historically gone to war with other democracies?
International politics is an anarchic, self-help realm; there is no central authority capable of making and enforcing rules on the state, meaning each state is responsible for its own survival, free to define it own interests and means of pursuing them. International politics is fundamentally competitive. (Layne, 1999)
Realist explanations of near misses of wars look at indicators such as:
- the ratio of national interest to democratic respect: the more important the interests a democracy perceives to be at stake, the more likely that its policy will be shaped by realist imperatives rather than by democratic norms and culture
- even in a crisis involving democracies, states should be very attentive to strategic concerns, and the relative distribution of military capabilities between them should crucially—perhaps decisively—affect their diplomacy
- Broader geopolitical considerations pertaining to a state’s position in international politics should, if implicated, account significantly for the crisis’s outcome
What is some evidence to back up the realist theory of why democratic countries have not historically gone to war with other democracies?
In the outcome of the case studies, realism provides the more compelling explanation of why war was avoided. The democratic peace theory appears not have played any discernible role. (Layne, 1999)
In each of the ‘near miss’ situations at least one of the democratic states involved was prepared to go to war because it believed it had vital strategic or reputational interests at stake. In each of these crises, war was avoided only because one side elected to pull back from the brink. In each of the four crises, war was avoided not because of the “live and let live” spirit of peaceful dispute resolution at democratic peace theory’s core, but because of realist factors. Adverse distributions of military capabilities explain why France did not fight over Fashoda in 1898, and why Germany resisted the French occupation of the Ruhr passively rather than forcibly. (Layne, 1999)
What is the suffrage argument by Barnhart et al (2020) relating to the DP theory and what evidence backs it up
Democracies with female suffrage do not fight each other, because women at an individual level have less of a preference for the use of military force, so when these preferences gain political voice in democratic government there are increased political costs for war, thus reducing the likelihood of conflict.
Hypotheses: the adoption of women’s suffrage alongside other democratic institutions makes states less likely to initiate crises than democracies without women’s suffrage or autocracies and the adoption of women’s suffrage alongside other democratic institutions in dyads makes these dyads less likely to engage in conflicts than democratic dyads without women’s suffrage or autocratic dyads.
Institutions enable two pathways through which women’s suffrage influences elite decision makers. The first operates by changing the incentives of elected politicians, making them more responsive to issues that they perceive women care about. The second route to influence is through choosing elites who better represent public preferences
Results provide evidence that the divergent preferences of men and women translate into a substantial pacifying effect when women gain greater influence over national politics through voting. While we cannot rule out theoretically that democratic institutions have other effects that contribute to the democratic peace, we do not find empirical support for numerous competing explanations, including the effects of democratic institutions alone.
Electorates that include women have a lower baseline level of support for conflict but are otherwise largely similar to other electorates. In every region they examined—North America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—the difference in preferences is statistically significant, often at extreme levels.
Overall, the meta-analysis supports the theoretical discussion: women have a lower baseline preference for using force across many contexts and regions; women do not perceive democratic regimes differently than men; and women are less supportive of initiating crises but are overall far from pure pacifists. These findings point to not only a dyadic suffragist peace, but also a monadic suffragist peace with respect to initiation.
The coefficients in both models indicate that all dyadic types, except mixed democratic dyads in which one state has women’s suffrage, are significantly more likely to engage in conflict than joint democratic dyads with women’s suffrage
What is a counterargument to the suffrage argument relating to the DP theory and do Barnhart et al (2020) respond?
It is possible that the timeline of women’s suffrage serves as a proxy for the advent and institutionalization of more cooperative international norms during the interwar period and after World War II.
- analysis of the relationship between time and women’s suffrage indicates that women’s suffrage is not an artifact of historical time period
There is a possibility that women’s suffrage is conflated in one of two ways with the strategic context of a state. On the one hand, states may be, for various reasons, more likely to adopt suffrage following periods of conflict. The results we described, in such a case, might simply be capturing war weariness on the part of recent adopters.
- analysis of the interwar period indicates that significant differences in the dispute propensity of suffragist and non-suffragist democracies existed during this period, suggesting that the results are not explained by differences between pre- and post-World War behavior.
