Brainscape's Knowledge GenomeTM

Browse over 1 million classes created by top students, professors, publishers, and experts.


See full index

pol s 203 > war > Flashcards

war Flashcards

1
Q

war

A

organized use of military force by at least two parties that satisfies a minimum severity threshold

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

uses of force vs. war

A

blockade, mobilization, foreign deployments

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

COW

A

correlates of war project; war = at least 1,000 battle deaths; doesn’t include civilians (genocide, disease, famine) organized use of force

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

3 ways to think about puzzle of war

A
  1. case study 2. math 3. formal way
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

why is war a policy option

A

war used to defend perimeters internally, war used externally; protect and extend sovereignty domestically, requires protecting and extending sovereignty externally

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

case study war example

A

Finland and Russia Winter war 1939: difference between two sides came down to geography, concerned that if Finland was taken over could use as a launching point to threaten Russia, at first attempt to make a deal - Soviet Union decided to take land; both sides came to exhaustion, SU got more than initially bargained for - at same point, showed Nazi Germany SU isn’t strong

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

math

A

lottery when it comes to cost and outcome; never 100% guarantee in winning, can never know how many troops going to lose before going to war

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

formal way

A

war is outside option, cutting off any further discussion

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

normal politics

A

state doesn’t threaten leads to status quo/regular bargaining

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

crisis bargaining

A

state A threaten state B; state B given option stand firm or concede; force is in play - shadow of war; vow to use force if a demand is not met

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

state B concede or stand firm

A

concede leads to concession; stand firm - state A given choice whether to use force (war) or doesn’t use force (back down)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

4 results of bargaining

A

A) status quo/regular bargaining B) concession C) back down D) war

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

greater costs of war =

A

greater range of bargains A would prefer to going to war;

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

bargaining range

A

expected value of war and the costs of war to both sides

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

compulsory power

A

ability of one actor to compel another to act in certain ways (large economies, past investments in military forces, large stockpiles of nuclear weapons give political advantages)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

reversion outcome

A

no bargain achieved, same as status quo sometimes

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
17
Q

bargaining power

A

those actors who would be most satisfied with/most willing to endure reversion outcome

example: economic sanctions, war, U.S. less willing to go along with other countries because expected costs of global climate change to U.S. are lower - geography and economic resources make US better equipped to weather the effects, lower vulnerability = shifts burden to other countries

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
18
Q

deterrence

A

prevent something from happening in the future with force “don’t do this or else”

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
19
Q

mathematical bargaining model of war

A

expectation: probability of winning * value of winning

closer to reality: probability of winning * value of winning - cost

comparison: value (War) > value (concede)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
20
Q

credibility

A

threat that target believes will be carried out; willing to fight long enough

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
21
Q

tying hands, audience costs

A

taking clear, public statements and actions; puts reputation and country on the line, makes it costly to retreat position, risks questioning reputation of future threats; could use retreat against in future elections

audience costs: negative repercussion that arise if a leader does not follow through on a threat - allies come to doubt trustworthiness of country’s threats

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
22
Q

diversionary war

A

external conflict used to salve domestic problems

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
23
Q

two benefits to rally around the flag

A
  1. mass appeal (boost in presidential popularity)
  2. legislative honeymoon: presidents in context of rally have more success getting bills through congress in month after using force
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
24
Q

social identity theory

A

groups identity does not form in isolation: given meaning/structure through interaction with other groups; in-group cohesion increases when group is faced with conflict with out-group

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
25
Q

rally around the flag/diversionary wars affect long term

A

short term boost overshadowed in the end - cohesion (strikes, protests, looting) tends to decline as war goes on

war can be risky - you lose you die (increases losing office if war is lost, Mussolini hung after WWII)

war can lead to worsening internal troubles - ultimate is revolution

26
Q

how diversionary wars impact expected value

A

serious instability/economic distresses reduce war-fighting capacity

probability of winning * outcome of winning (probability goes down)

however, outcome may go up because there is higher incentive

27
Q

diversionary theory of disputes

A

U shape; high domestic unrest = low probability of using force

low degree of domestic unrest = low probability of using force

peak in middle

28
Q

how media impacts diversionary war

A

early in crises government has control over info available, media doesn’t want to be on wrong side holds out - only story coming out is government’s

as more info comes out, critics question leadership, public responds to wider array of information

29
Q

example of diversionary war

A

US embassy bombings by Al-queda in Tanzania and Kenya, kills thousands; 3 days after Clinton admits to affair - US cruise missile attacks against terrorist targets Iraq; approval went up after impeachment most popular period in office

30
Q

Golden Arches theory of war

A

no two countries that both have McDonald’s have ever gone to war; reduce in ice cream sales = call for improvement in addressing crime

31
Q

rally impact on bargaining range

A

adds to state’s payoff - war now more valuable to A, narrows bargaining range with insecure leader A - less room for maneuver

32
Q

pleikus’

A

key incident in escalation of US involvement in Vietnam, Viet-Kong attack on US airbase in 1965, Johnson used as pretext to increase troop presence and bombing campaigns - relatively easy to manufacture rally events

idea that conflicts are lying around waiting to be called upon by leaders for diversionary tactics

33
Q

foreign stance on leader in turmoil

A

kick them when they’re down - Poland attacked revolutionary Russia to take advantage of opportunity

knowing if a leader is going to be conflict prone - not giving them what they want to provoke/respond

countries in turmoil may have least opportunity for conflict right when they are most conflict-prone

probability of B winning goes up; but outcome value for A goes up

34
Q

Robbers Cave experiment

A

recruited 22 12 year old boys into summer camp, split into 2 groups; quickly self-organized became tight-knit internally and competitive on border of rivalry; cut short on threat of violence proves group identity does not form in isolation

35
Q

pavolvian/prudent public

A

Refers to the classical diversionary theory that the public will react instinctively to foreign crises by automatically rallying behind the leader, versus the new idea that the public is actually much more prudent in their rallying efforts and opinions.

36
Q

spurious relationship

A

Apparent causal relationship between two variables actually due to some other common underlying factor.

37
Q

rally effects

A

When in international conflict and the state/leader is successful, the leader, government, and leader’s party all receive boosts in approval rating due to “rallying around the flag”, think George Bush and 9/11

38
Q

democratic peace

A

democracies rarely choose war against one another; but democracies are just as war-prone overall. more likely to settle for a draw, better able to prevail in crisis bargaining, sometimes execute genocidal policies (British hegemony) (manifest destiny, ethnic cleansing of natives)

39
Q

democracy and victory

A

able to prevail in crisis bargaining short of war - more willing to settle for draws; better at selecting wars they’re more likely to win, picking opponents who have liabilities

better morale - democracies try harder, existence of popular and consensual government - gives avg infantryman sense of equality and spirit to his enemies

accumulated capital sustains wars; bigger economies

40
Q

glorious revolution

A

William of orange took English throne from James II in 1688 that insured UK would have a constitutional monarchy that rested most of the power in parliament

41
Q

competence

A

do this or else

42
Q

incentives to misrepresent

A

can create situations of misinformation so that one state may have the upper hand in bargaining, worldwide game of power, bluffing is essential

43
Q

incomplete information

A

can lead to a change in the bargaining range for each party, one state doesn’t know the power and force of another

44
Q

risk-return trade-off

A

states trying to get a better deal for themselves, while also trying to avoid war/conflict

45
Q

bluffing

A

States misrepresent their abilities to the other parties so that they may be able to change the bargaining range, lie about how much force they have can get other states to back down

46
Q

credible threat

A

A threat that the other state will believe and take into account while bargaining. Think Korean War and China’s threat to the US

47
Q

commitment

A

Promises are only credible when it is in best interest of state to carry it out. Because of anarchy states can always renege on agreements

48
Q

costly signal

A

Serves to make threats more legitimate, makes it harder for leaders to back down from threats.

49
Q

Brinkmanship

A

Signaling resolve by using costly actions to provoke war, like moving carrier fleets nearer to other party until deal/war.

50
Q

Audience Costs

A

Penalty to leaders if they escalate conflicts and then are seen as backing down, can lead to ousting from political office.

51
Q

Sunk Costs

A

Pay large upfront costs to show seriousness, like construction of new weapons, and troop movements.

52
Q

Commitment Problems

A

Each party cannot fully trust the other because there is no binding authority for each state to follow.

53
Q

Preventative War

A

A war in which one state anticipates a power shift, so the fight to stop the other party from gaining too much power.

54
Q

Pre-emptive War

A

War fought in anticipation that another is about to attack.

55
Q

First-Strike Advantage

A

Greatly increases one states chances of winning conflict because they have the ability to plan and can take down another states defenses.

56
Q

Offensive vs Defensive Balance

A

When defense has the advantage on offense it is likely that major war will be avoided.

57
Q

Security Dilemma

A

One states securing themselves may drive another state to fear the first state and build their weapons as well, cyclical

58
Q

Prisoner’s Dilemma

A

The idea of two people being arrested and having the choice to rat the other out, optimal outcome is for both to cooperate. Seen in IR with arms races when more often than not both sides defect.

59
Q

Issue Indivisibility

A

When the good fought over cannot be divided it leads to bargaining range practically vanishing, think Jerusalem with Israel and Palestine

60
Q

Diversionary Theory of War

A

The idea that leaders when facing conflict at home will start a foreign conflict that will take attention away from domestic unrest.

61
Q

Rally Effects

A

When in international conflict and the state/leader is successful, the leader, government, and leader’s party all receive boosts in approval rating due to “rallying around the flag”, think George Bush and 9/11

pol s 203 (8 decks)

Brainscape helps you reach your goals faster, through stronger study habits.
© 2024 Bold Learning Solutions. Terms and Conditions