Vote Denial and Vote Dilution Flashcards
Giles v. Harris (1903)
Ala. Legislature scheme is to give everyone before 1903 permanent registration and require literacy tests of increasing difficulty from that point forward. Majority says it is impossible to grant equitable relief here, plaintiff says the scheme is corrupt and yet asks to be enrolled in the corrupt scheme.
Guinn v. United States (1915)
Federal prosecution of the Ok. Election officers for conspiring to prevent black men from registering via an Ok. Constitutional amendment requiring writing a section of the Constitution if not already registered at the time of the 15th amendment. Court rules the grandfather clause violated the 15th amendment, saying the standard itself inherently brought exclusion into existence by being time based. Court used a reasonableness standard; State could not prevent a reasonable justification for time restraints
Gormillion v. Lightfoot (1960)
Concerned a 1957 act by Ala. Legislature to redistrict Tuskegee from a square to a 28-sided figure that conveniently excluded the Black population of Tuskegee. The court found a State’s power to define municipal boundaries, although extensive, is met and overcome by the 15th amendment’s prohibition on disenfranchising on the basis of race. Distinguished from Colegrove in that this is not vote dilution, this is outright vote denial. Ala. Did not provide a legitimate state interest for this scheme
Nixon v. Herndon (1927)
Texas statute prevents Black voters from participating in Democratic primaries. Political issues are just a play on words, private damage can occur from political action. There are limits to a state classifying an action as “rational” it is clear color can not be a classification
Grovey v. Townsend (1935)
After Nixon Tx. Changed law to be affirmative statement that all white registered voters are eligible to vote in democratic primaries. Court found in Grovey that statute didn’t constitute a state action subject to the 14th because it didn’t explicitly exclude anyone.
U.S. v. Classic (1941)
Prosecution of Ca officials who stuffed ballot boxes in Dem. Primary. Court declared participation in primaries to be essential to popular vote and is protected under the 14th
Smith v. Allwright (1944)
Private handling of primaries is a “delegation of state action: subject to constitutional restrictions. Here the state was clearly involved in the private primaries
Terry v. Adams (1953)
Extension of Smith v. Albright but this time focuses on the Tex. Jaybird Democrats claimed their primaries are not held under state regulation and do not fall under 15th amendments. Court finds because the Jaybirds populate from the official voter list, every white voter is automatically a member, which means the parameters are the same as for state run elections. The 15th amendment includes any election in which public issues are decided or public officials selected
Whitcomb v. Chavis (1971)
Marion County Indiana has a statutory scheme creating MMD, suit alleges that statutes invidiously diluted Black voters in Marion county by reducing the effectiveness of their votes from previous SMD. Majority says the validity of MMD is justiciable when it operates to minimize or cancel voting strength of racial minorities. Here there is no evidence this scheme was purposefully enacted to discriminate against minorities, intent matters here. Court is requiring intent.
White v. Register (1973)
District court invalidates Tx. Plan to create MMD in two counties as invidiously discriminatory against racial minorities. MMD are not facially unconstitutional. To prove invidious racial discrimination, plaintiff must show evidence that political processes were not open to participation equally by the group in question
Holder v. Hall (1994)
The Georgia legislature authorized a Georgia county, whose single commissioner performed all legislative and executive functions of the county government, to adopt a multimember commission consisting of five members elected from single-member districts and a chairperson elected at large. The claim under § 2 was a vote dilution claim that the county was required to have a commission of sufficient size that, with single-member districts, blacks would constitute a majority in one district. The Court held that the minority voters’ failure to provide any objective and workable standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark by which to evaluate the challenged voting practice rendered the voting practice unassailable as dilutive under § 2. After Holder you now need a reasonable alternative factor to which the current practice of voting can be measured against, in addition to the totality of circumstances and the Gingles factors.
Johnson v. Degrandy (1994)
Florida SJR-26 creates 40 SMD senate and a 120 SMD House. Degrandy and the NAACP were already challenging the previous plane, amended their complaint to reflect an alleged violation of Section in that this new scheme fragments cohesive minority communities in order to prevent them from forming a politically cohesive and reasonable compact district. Souter finds the first Gingles condition does not require the maximum number of majority-minority districts under Section 2.
Bartlett v. Strickland (2009)
Question here is whether Section of the VRA requires a district to be redrawn in order that a racial minority could elect a candidate of its choice with support from majority crossover voting. Kennedy says Section 2 cannot require crossover districts because nothing in Section 2 grants special protection for minority groups right to form political coalitions, only require protection of opportunity to participate, and allowing this would clash with the 3rd Gingles factor requirement that white majority bloc can usually defeat the minority. Also determining whether a district could function as a crossover would require courts to make determination for which it has no clear standards.
North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory (4th Cir Cert Denied, 2017)
Consolidated cases challenging NC election law, where in 2013 Black voting has reached parity with registration and turnout rates, and legislature responded to Shelby v. Holder with omnibus legislation that restricts the Black vote in 5 ways by its disproportionate affect of them. The legislation here is narrowly tailored, as required by LULAC, but justifications do not cure any of the purported problems. Court uses the Arlington Heights test for proving a facially neutral statute was racially motivated. It need not be the sole or primary purpose and is determined by totality of inferences (Historical background, Context of the decision, departure from normal behavior, Legislative history, Disproportionate impact on a minority group). Once shown the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate law would have been enacted without this factor
Abbot v. Perez (2018)
Texas plans to redistrict in 2011, while still under pre-clearance, in response to 2010 census. District court hears a challenge on Section 2 grounds and because the new maps were not yet precleared, enjoins the 2011 plan and submits maps of its own. Majority finds no vote dilution on grounds that past discrimination flips the burden and counteracts legislative deference. On its face, the legislature’s intent in adopting the court drawn maps was reasonable, it just wanted to end the cycle of litigation as quickly as possible and it was reasonable for them to accept the maps to do that.
