Gerrymandering Flashcards
United Jewish Org. of Williamsburg v. Corey (1977)
Under the 72 plan the Hasidic community resided entirely in one district, but the new plan split the populations among 2 districts in order to obtain a 65% nonwhite majority. Majority was convinced that neither amendment was infringed here because while state used race in a purposeful manner it did not constitute racial slur or stigma. There was no fencing out of white population from participation, nor was white voting strength minimized.
Shaw v. Reno (1993)
NC plan creates one majority Black district and the AG objects on Section 5 grounds, says state could have created one more majority Black district in NC central part of the state. The two districts created were very oddly shaped and split counties and town to create Black majorities. The argument at trial was that strict scrutiny should apply here just as it does with other law motivated by race. O’Connor majority holds a plaintiff can state an EPC claim against apportionment statute by alleging that it cannot be rationally based on anything other than race (An attempt at being “colorblind”).
Miller v. Johnson (1995)
2 years after Shaw, concerns Ga. Preclearance on redistricting where District court used Shaw to determine that race was the predominant factor in redrawing the lines. Kennedy says the map is not narrowly tailored and district court finding was not erroneous. The bizarreness of the shape is a big sticking point for him, and he considers it good evidence of racial gerrymandering. Plaintiffs burden is to show through direct or circumstantial evidence that race was the predominant motivating factor, subordinating race-neutral considerations.
Easley v. Cromartie (2001)
Review of District court ruling that NC legislature used race as a predominant factor in drawing the 12th congressional district. Breyer finds that the actual question is whether the legislature drew the district because of race rather than because of political party (coupled with traditional redistricting considerations). The majority holding here is that partisan balance may have existed, but it frustrated a legitimate political goal, rather than a racial consideration.
Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003)
Deciding whether Ga. State senate redistricting plan should have been precleared under Section 5. New scheme desires to maintain the number of majority-minority districts and increase number of Democrat state seats. Part of the stated goal was to produce more influence districts where Black voters has significant influence to combat packing. U.S. Ag argues that the plan is retrogressive because it created districts where the % of black voting age population dropped precipitously. O’Connor holds that Section 5 does not require states to choose one method over another and safe district increases may increase guaranteed preferred minority candidate with risk of isolating the majority. Section5 leaves room to consider influence/coalitional districts in creating a large number of candidates sympathetic to minority interests even if it means fewer preferred minority candidates
LULAC v. Perry (2006)
Texas after the 1990 census has a Dem majority in both state houses and the governor, 19 of 27 congressional seats. The lines are redrawn, and Republicans win 59% of the popular vote but only get 12 of the 30 seats available. New districts finally drawn in 03, Republicans get 54% of the vote and 21 of the 32 seats. Appellants argue that the new plans move to shift 100k people into another district to protect an incumbent diluted the Latinx vote, while the state argues that the primary purpose is to increase the # of Republican sears and protect the incumbent in the changed district.
Kennedy finds that in EPC claims compactness focuses on the contours of district lines to determine whether race was a predominant factor, but under Section2 the inquiry is vote dilution so compactness is defined differently, compactness for vote dilution is of the minority population not of the district itself. State may not assume from race that voters think alike and will prefer the same candidates. State took away Latinx opportunity because they were about to exercise it to vote an incumbent out, bearing the mark of intentional discrimination that could constitute an EPC violation
Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Ala. (2015)
Non-retrogression does not require the maintaining of some % of minority voters, instead it demands communities must still be allowed to elect their preferred candidate
Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Election (2016)
Const is concerned with unjustified classifications and not shaping results, we must assume that the State interest is compelling.
Court affirm predominance from Miller: We must assess circumstantial evidence of shape and demographics, hard evidence of intent and if that evidence exists, then apply strict scrutiny of important state purpose that was narrowly tailored.
Cooper v. Harris (2017)
Very deferential standard of review to the lower courts finding of race as the predominant factor here subordinating other considerations for D1. It is the plaintiff’s burden to disentangle party and race concerns, ultimately saying here that they did provide evidence clearly implicating race as a motivation.
Karcher v. Daggett (1983)
To prove partisan gerrymandering claim plaintiff would have to prove:
• They belong to a politically salient class
• In the relevant districts, or state, their proportionate voting influence has been adversely affected by the scheme
• Must make a prima facia showing that raises a rebuttable presumption of discrimination
o Via substantial mathematical deviation
o Extensive deviation from political boundaries process excluded diverse viewpoints or openly reflected partisan criteria
• If the state is unable to respond to any of these reasonings a court could properly conclude that the scheme is entirely irrational or motivated by a desire to curtail the affected group
Davis v. Bandemer (1986)
Two part framework for partisan gerrymandering being justiciable:
Must show “predominant intent” by mapmakers to achieve partisan advantage
Must show denial of a chance to effectively influence the political process
Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004)
Question here is whether political gerrymandering is beyond the reach of the politically justiciable questions for SCOTUS. Ultimately determined that yes, it is, but no majority emerges on this. Scalia Plurality overruled Bandemer and finds its framework unworkable, everyone else chips in a standard as well
Scalia in Vieth
Overrules Bandemer
• Says that there should be no parallel to racial gerrymandering because the predominance test is more difficult and disruptive, not suspect class
• The court cannot determine someone’s politics in the same way they can race
• The Constitution does not guarantee participation of a political identity, only participation of a person
Stevens in Vieth
Require courts to consider political gerrymandering t a district level, saying if we can do it for race we can do it here
Race requires strict scrutiny while politics does not, we do have standards for both these things
Souther in Vieth
Plaintiff must show they are:
• A member of a politically cohesive group
• The district of his residence “paid little or no heed” to traditional districting principles
• That there were specific considerations between the district’s deviations from traditional principles and the destruction of the pop. of their group
• A hypothetical district exists which remedies the packing and cracking and deviates less than trad principles
• That the defendants acted intentionally to manipulate the shape of the district in order to pack or crack this group
