V. Identity Theory Flashcards
Who came up with the Mind-Brain Identity Theory?
J. J. C. Smart
What accounts of MD does Smart consider and reject?
1) Cartesian Dualism
2) Logical Beahviourism
What is Smart’s account of mental discourse with respect tosensations?
1) MD is about ‘inner causes’ of behaviour (so agrees with CD).
2) These inner causes arephysicalin nature (so disagrees with CD).
3) These inner causes are in fact identical tobrain-processes.
How would Cartesian Dualism treat the report: “I am experiencing a yellowish-orange after-image”?
P1: When I make such a report, I must be reporting onsomething.
P2: But there is nothingphysicalupon which I could be reporting, since the after-image doesn’t enjoy determinate spatio-temporal existence.
C1: So I must be reporting on somethingnon-physical.
C2: So sensations/qualitative states are non-physical, and must be states of a CM.
What does Smart think of the idea that first-person utterances such as [“I am in pain” are not genuinereportsat all, but sophisticated bits of pain-behaviour]?
- Smart thinks it is very implausible that [first-person utterances such as “I am in pain” are not genuinereportsat all, but sophisticated bits of pain-behaviour].
- When I utter such a sentence in respect of anafter-image(and even in the case of pains), I seem to be able to offer the kinds of more precise formulations that are characteristic of reports of experience in general.
What does Smart believe is the flaw in the CD treatment of the report: “I am experiencing a yellowish-orange after-image”?
- Smart thinks that the flaw in the Dualist argument is inP2: [But there is nothingphysicalupon which I could be reporting, since the after-image doesn’t enjoy determinate spatio-temporal existence.].
- Smart holds that, as long as the sort ofnon-Dualistaccount he will propose remains on the table, as apossibleexplanation of first-person sensation reports, it should be preferred to the Dualist accountunlessthere are conclusive argumentsforDualism.
Why does Smart think we should prefer a physical explanation to CD?
1) Smart claims that physical science is increasingly able to explain the distinctive capacities ofliving physical systemsin physico-chemical terms.
2/ Given growing evidence of the ‘neural dependence’ of mental states, it is reasonable to anticipate that we shall establish numerouscorrelationsbetween
* instances of types of mental state/process, and
*
instances of types of physical/brain state/process.
3) We can anticipate various empirically established correlations of the form:
X* is in BS1 (brain state 1) just in case X is in MSn (mental state n)
*
BP2 (brain process 2) is occurring in X just in case MPm (mental process m) is occuring in X.
What is a law-like correlation?
C1: “Whenever I drive my car in the rain, it stalls.”
We would appeal to C1 in such contexts as:
a)explainingvarious new phenomena (I now recall that my car stalled on Wednesday, and I also recall that it had rained just before I drove it);
b)predictingvarious phenomena when deciding how to act;
c) describing certainhypotheticalstates of affairs, in ‘counter-factuals’.
- we also assume that alawlikecorrelationstands in need of some kind of explanation, whereas an accidental one does not.
What is an accidental correlation?
C2: “Whenever I drive my car while wearing a blue shirt, it stalls.”
Basically, there is no causal relation.
How can we explain law-like correlations?
1) we very often redescribethe correlated events, usually in terms of their constituent or component elements, or in terms of themicroscopicnature of amacroscopicentity.
2) Then we appeal tofurtherlawlike correlations of a more general nature that apply to these constituents.
- Take E1 = I drive my car in the rain.
- Take E2 = My car stalls.
- Redescribe E1 in terms of what is going on in the ignition system - e.g. “there is high condensation on the spark-plugs”.
- Redescribe E2 in similar terms - e.g. “there is misfiring in the ignition system”.
- Appeal then to a ‘law’ [‘lawlike correlation’] of Auto-mechanics - “Ceteris paribus, whenever you have high condensation on the spark-plugs, you have misfiring in the ignition system.”
Of course, we maynowseek an explanation ofthislawlike correlation, presumably in terms of some ‘law’ of electrodynamics.
Presumably we can expect to reach some ‘lawlike correlations’ that arebasiclaws - where all we can say is “That’s the way the universe works”.
What is the identification strategy of explaining a ‘lawlike correlation’?
1/ Whenever we observe a flash of lightning, we also observe (with our measuring instruments) a certain electrical discharge, or
*
2/ Whenever the temperature of a gas changes,
there is a directly proportional change in its MMKE.
Wedon’ttreat these phenomena as correlations betweendistinct events. Rather, we treat them as two different ways of describingthe same event.
In so doing, we postulate anidentityof some kind between the entities or properties described:
a) The lightningisthe measurable electrical discharge.
b) Temp(gas)isMMKE(gas).
In such a case, no furtherexplanationof the ‘correlation’ is called for.
How does Smart view the Cartesian Dualists’ explanation of the correlation between physical states (PS) and mental states (MS)
the Dualist:
*
1/ must view the discovered correlations between PSs and MSs as bothlawlikeandgenuine, but
*
2/ cannot hope to provide anyexplanationof the correlations, and must therefore view them asbasiclaws of the universe:
The ‘redescription’ strategy is not available, because the Dualist holds that MS arenon-physical, therefore they cannot be analyzed in terms of their physical constituents and explained in terms of more basic physical laws.
The ‘identification’ strategy isn’t available, because the Dualist is committed to regarding MS asnon-physical.
Thus we are left with ‘nomological danglers’., ‘irreducible psychophysical laws’.
What is Smart’s proposal for explaining the correlation between physical states (PS) and mental states (MS)?
*Smart’s proposal is that we adopt the ‘identification’ strategy in order to account for the apparent lawlike correlations between mental states and physical (brain) states.
* The identity proposed by Smart pertains to the entities in the world to which our languagerefersin virtue of its meanings.
* Claim: What we have been reporting when we utter first-person sensation statements arebrain-processes.
How does Smart’s claim differ from the Logical Behaviourist approach to MD?
- The Logical Behaviourist appraoch makes claims about themeaningsof words (analysis of concepts).
-“When you say a, you mean {b, c, d}”
-deals with definitions, not referents.
*Smart’s approach makes claims about what words refer to, not what they mean.
-“a turns out to be b”.
-could not have been discovered through analysing themeaningsof words, or through simple reflection onhow we use language[the ‘criteria’ that govern right usage of terms].
-This is a claim abouttypesof sensations andtypesof brain processes, as defined by mental discourse and neuro-science respectively.
How can you disprove the mind-brain identity theory?
Leibniz Law of theIndiscernibility of Identicals requires that:
* For all propertiesP,having-a-yellowish-orange after-image has P just in case brain-process BP27 has P.
So we can disprove the IT for a given type of proposed mind-brain identity if we can find someP such that the mental state/process hasPbut the brain state/process doesn’t, or vice versa.
