I. Mind-Body Problem Flashcards
What is the mind-body problem?
- We seem to talk about and act towards certain entities (TWMs) in fundamentally different ways from other entities (e.g. humans v rocks).
- Both TWMs and -TWMs possess physical properties. Whatever we say about things with minds, they are physical systems.
- Therefore, we could give a complete physical description of a TWM in terms of physico-chemical theories to which we turn for a complete description of -TWMs.
- But such an approach would seem inadequate at providing a complete description of a TWM as our talk and practice reveals.
TWMs present challenges to our scientific understanding of the world in physical terms unless
our talk and practice abt TWMs is mistaken or
we can actually explain them in terms of our broader physical scientific understanding.
What are the distinctive characteristics of paradigm example of TWMs?
- A capacity for instrumentally rational action, explicable in intentional terms,
- A capacity to be in a qualitative state such that it makes sense to ask what it would be like to be in such a state.
(We also hold TWMs accountable and responsible for their actions)
What is an intentional state?
- mental state individuated in terms of what they are about (beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc.).
- AKA propositional attitude
What is a propositional attitude
- other word for intentional state.
- involves the adoption of a particular mental attitude towards an object.
- Some intentional states relate to objects or states of affairs rather than propositions.
-‘fear of the spider in the closet’ v ‘fear that there is a spider in the closet’
-fear of ghosts can exist without the existence of ghosts.
What is the difference between intentional states and other contentful states of physical systems?
- An intentional state cannot be identified with physical relations between the system and the intentional object of its state.
- We cannot consider that intentional states or propositional attitudes indicate anything about their objects because this requires that A and B both exist. Intentional objects need not exist for subjects to be in the relevant mental state (e.g. fear of ghosts).
What is intentional explanation
- We standardly explain and predict the behaviour of TWMs by referencing to their intentional states.
- The primary goal of intentional ascription is to offer such explanations and predicitions.
Example of explanation:
a. Why is Jane walking towards the kitchen?
b. Jane wants a cold beverage.
c. Jane believes there are cold beverages in the fridge.
d. Jane believes the fridge is in the kitchen.
Example of prediction
e. Jane says she wants a cold beverage.
f. predicition: Jane will go to the kitchen.
g. Basis of prediction: c and d.
Such explanations and predictions are intentional. They are our primary way of dealing with TWMs. We do not usually engage in such explanations or predictions for -TWMs.
What characteristic of TWMs does intentional explanation presuppose?
- Instrumental rationality: We assume that TWMs act in a way that will satisfy their intentional states according to their beliefs.
- This assumption allows us to predict and explain the behaviour of a TWM, given the ascription of intentional states to it.
- It only makes sense to ascribe intentional states if we are prepared to assume instrumental rationality since our main reason for ascribing intentional states is to allow us to give intentional explanations and predictions.
What is a qualitative state?
- states of consciousness, awareness
- have a specific quality that the affected organism will experience.
What are some examples of qualitative states?
*Sensations: pain, hunger, warmth, touch, …
*Perceptions: visual, auditory awareness, awareness of states of one’s environement, proprioception (the awareness an organism has of own bodily states or changes in bodily states).
*Affective states: emotions, moods, passions, sweating, accelerated pulse.
Are intentionality and qualitativity of states mutually exclusive properties of mental states?
No
* Emotions are the clearest example of states that can be both intentional and qualitative.
I can be afraid of ghosts whether or not they exist, and there is something it is like for me to experience such a fear.
* Perceptions might also be thought of as both intentional and qualitative (e.g. Macbeth perceiving a dagger that is not there), but the interest in perceptions is their qualitative dimension. The intentionality of perceptions is usually captured by the perceptual beliefs they engender.
Are beliefs qualitative states
No
They are intentional states that have intentional objects. It does not make sense to ask what it is like to have a belief.
Are sensations intentional states?
No
* Sensations are not intentional (e.g. A tickle has no object).
* They can be attributed and individuated according to their presumed cause (e.g. headaches and toothaches are differentiated by their causes).
* But a sensation is not about its cause; its content is the qualitative feeling itself, not some object.
* Sometimes we identify these feelings in terms of what habitually causes them, but this is not ‘aboutness’ or intentionality of the sort we ascribe to intentional states.
* If I report a sharp pricking in my arm though nothing pricks my arms, my sensation is not itself false although I may form a false belief as to its cause.
Do sunflowers and smoke detectors have qualitative states?
No
* There is more to being in a qualitative state than simply standing in some appropriately responsive relation to a state of one’s environment. Being in a perceptual state is different than just registering states of the world with consequent modification behaviour.
* Heliotropic plants register states of their environment and behave in ways that reflect this, but most people do not think it would make sense to ask what it would be like to be a heliotropic plant.
* A smoke detector clearly detects smoke and acts accordingly, but there is no sense in asking what it is like to be a smoke detector.
How can we capture the difference between entities with qualitative states and entities that merely register their environment?
- We might try to capture this distinction in terms of a distinction between
-registering and selectively responding to states of the environment and
-being conscious of the environment - Where a condition for the latter is something like self-consciousness (being aware of one’s own registering of states of the environment).
What are the conditions under which something can be self-conscious?
- Self-consciousness ≠ self-monitoring.
- Kant: Self-consciousness requires that ‘I think’ can accompany all of those internal states of mine that register states of the environment or other internal states.
- It seems that for genuine qualitative states, we require not just a stream of internal registration but also the capacity to unify this stream as our own stream of awareness.
- We unify a stream of internal registrations by connecting states with other states, what we label a ‘train of thought’ or ‘stream of consciousness’.
Husserl on ‘temporal structure of consciousness’ regarding retention and protention: “I can take my registrations of states of the environment as representations of something that exists independently of my representating it—thus as possible misrepresentatrions. Conscious experience is experienced as a subjective path through an objective world.” - It seems that consciousness requires the ability to conceptualize one’s experience, which seems to be the basis for intentional states.
