Untitled spreadsheet - Sheet1 (2) Flashcards
Lachmere Vs Lady Lachmere [(1735) 25 ER 673]
Maxim: What ought to be done is taken as done. Lord Lachmere agreed to a marriage settlement with Lady Lachmere, committing £30,000 to purchase property for their trustees to manage for the benefit of their children. However, he only provided the funds without purchasing the property. The legal heirs were entitled to the £30,000 based on the maxim.
Maddison v. Alderson (1883) 8 AC 467
Maxim: What ought to be done is taken as done; Doctrine of Part Performance. The plaintiff sought to claim property based on an oral agreement in exchange for housekeeping services. Despite her honest performance, the will transferring the property was invalid as it lacked attestation. The court emphasized the importance of equities arising from contract execution but ruled no part performance was established on Maddison’s part.
Sowden Vs Sowden (1785) 1 Bro. C.C. 582.
Maxim: Equity imputes an intention to fulfill an obligation. A husband covenanted to pay £50,000 to trustees for land purchase as part of a marriage settlement but instead bought land himself and retained it in fee simple. Upon his death, equity presumed the land purchase fulfilled the covenant, and the property was subjected to the marriage settlement’s trust.
Penn Vs Lord Baltimore [(1750) 1 Res Sen 444]
Maxim: Equity acts in personam. A contract for property outside the court’s jurisdiction was disputed. The court held that since the parties resided within its jurisdiction, it could enforce the agreement through in-person jurisdiction.
Ewing Vs Ewing [(1883) 9 AC 34]
Maxim: Equity acts in personam. Executors in England were tasked with handling a will involving property in Scotland. The court held it could grant relief against the executors since they resided within its jurisdiction, emphasizing that equitable jurisdiction could operate in personam.
Dearle Vs Hall (1828) 3 Russ. 1.
The rule determines priority between equitable claims based on notice to the trustee or legal owner. Rule 1: The first claimant to notify the trustee gains priority, provided they had no notice of prior claims. Rule 2: If a later claimant knew of prior claims, they cannot gain priority despite giving notice first. Example: In legacy disputes, the claimant who first notified the trustee without knowledge of prior assignments had priority.
Amritlal Kohli v. Harbans Kohli
Trust extinguished when purpose is fulfilled — §77 of the Trusts Act. A trust for three sons was dissolved after one son passed away and the remaining trustees agreed it had served its purpose. The trust was terminated as the purpose was deemed fulfilled.
Captain Anil Kumar Singh v. Javelin Rosha
Refusal of Injunction under §41 of the Specific Relief Act. The plaintiff sought to stop the defendant from pursuing legal proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act. The court refused the injunction, citing §41(b) and (d), as it would prevent the defendant from pursuing their legal rights.
Gujarat State Financial Corporation Vs Lotus Hotels (P) Ltd. (1983) 3 SCC 379
In the case between Gujarat State Financial Corporation (GSFC) and M/s. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., GSFC had sanctioned a loan of Rs. 30 lakhs to the respondent for the construction of a 4-star hotel but later refused to disburse the loan, citing that the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) declined to refinance it due to pending police inquiries against the promoter, Shri Jaiswal. The respondent approached the Gujarat High Court, which issued a writ of mandamus directing GSFC to disburse the loan. GSFC appealed this decision, arguing that the loan was conditional upon IDBI refinancing and that mandamus could not compel the performance of a contractual obligation. Both the High Court’s single judge and Division Bench ruled that the loan’s sanctioning was not dependent on IDBI refinancing but only impacted the interest rate and commitment charges. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, rejecting GSFC’s arguments. It ruled that as a public authority under Article 12 of the Constitution, GSFC could not back out of its contractual obligations, especially after the respondent had acted on the promise and incurred significant expenses. The Court invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel, stating that GSFC was bound by its promise and that a writ of mandamus was an appropriate remedy to enforce its statutory duty. The Court also held that GSFC’s actions were arbitrary and unreasonable and affirmed that public authorities must act in accordance with fairness and not cause harm through arbitrary decisions. The appeal was dismissed.
Tinsley Vs Milligan [1993] 3 All ER 65 [overruled in Patel v. Mirza]
Ms Tinsley and Ms Milligan purchased a property in which to cohabit as a couple. They used the house as a lodging house, and this joint business provided the bulk of their income. The parties agreed they would be beneficial co-owners of the property, but it was registered in Ms Tinsley’s sole name so as to allow Ms Milligan to make fraudulent claims for benefits with Ms Tinsley’s full knowledge and consent. The relationship broke down, and Ms Tinsley sought to evict Ms Milligan. Ms Milligan counterclaimed for a half share in the property. Ms Milligan was successful in establishing a joint equitable interest in the house. She was able to prove the beneficial interest stemmed from her lawful contribution to the purchase price and not from the unlawful, fraudulent social security claim. There was a clear, common understanding between the parties that they owned the property jointly, in equal shares.
Patel Vs Mirza [2016] UKSC 42
Patel had given Mirza £620,000 to bet on shares in a company using inside information. The agreement between them amounted to a conspiracy to commit the offence of insider dealing contrary to §53 Criminal Justice Act 1993. The inside information did not materialise, and no illegal act was committed. Patel sought to recover the monies, claiming breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Mirza sought to argue that the monies should not be returned to Patel on resulting trust because Patel would have to rely on his own unlawful conduct to establish his interest in the monies. Tinsley v Milligan was the authority to the point that a party could not seek to rely on his illegal conduct to establish an equitable interest in the property, as this would be against public policy. Patel argued the illegal act had not been put into effect, and there was, therefore, no justification to allow Mirza’s unjust enrichment to persist. Patel was successful in his claim to recover the money. The reliance rule in Tinsley should no longer be followed. A claimant will not be prevented from enforcing his claim to the property because it was paid to perform an illegal act unless allowing his claim would be contrary to relevant public policy or it would be disproportionate to allow him to recover.
Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel Vs Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (1985) 2 SCC 35
Where an employee had come before a court of equity after being fired for concealment of material information, equity did not allow any remedy where he had actually concealed a record of past misconduct. SLP dismissed. Held, applying the clean hands doctrine, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal. The irregularity could not regularized.
Allcard Vs Skinner [1887 36 Ch D 145]
It was held that if Ms Allcard had sued to recover the amount of her gift, which had been expended on the fulfilment of the purposes of the Sisterhood at an earlier date, she would have succeeded on the ground of undue influence, but it was her acquiescence that rendered her claim barred by laches. – Although the will of the property was revoked immediately, she did not seek to invoke it till six years after leaving the Sisterhood.
Well Vs Smith (1885) 30 Ch D 192
Where there are two creditors of the same debtor, one creditor having a right to resort to two funds of the debtor for payment of his debts and the other, a right to resort to one fund only, the Court will so “marshal” or arrange the funds that both the creditors are paid as far as possible.
Walsh Vs Lonsdale
A lease was created by an unregistered agreement (so no legal lease under Common Law) under which rent was payable quarterly except if the landlord (respondent) demanded a year’s rent to be paid in advance at one go. The Claimant moved in, started using the property and paid quarterly rent. When the landlord exercised the option and demanded a year’s lease upfront, the Claimant refused to pay, insisting there existed no legal agreement to this effect. However, equity looks to the intent rather than the form and gave effect to the unregistered lease agreement as if it were a legal one under Common Law, too.
