Cases Flashcards
Cave vs. Cave, 1880 15 CHD 539
A sole trustee of some funds used them to buy property in the name of his brother Francis Caves. This was a breach of the trust. Francis Caves then created a legal mortgage in favour of A and an equitable mortgage in favour of B on said property. Both the mortgagees did not have notice of the trust. When the beneficiaries of the trust claimed their beneficial right over such property, the question arose as to who would enjoy priority of charge. It was held that A’s legal mortgage had priority over the beneficiary’s equitable interests, but the beneficiaries had priority over B’s equitable mortgage.
M.C. Chockalingam and Ors vs. Manica Vasagam and Ors, 1974 1 SCC 48
Dispossession under §6 of Specific Relief Act | Due process needs to be followed
Even if one has a good title on the property, one cannot dispossess another of it without due process. Hence, ownership over property is not valid grounds to dispossess someone of it and may warrant action under §6 of the act from the person who has been dispossessed.
Ananta Kumar Sarkar vs. Meghu Kurmi, 1957 61 Cal WN 347
Difference between §5 and §6 of the Specific Relief Act
This case differentiated between §5 and §6. While both sections might seem similar, they have a major difference—to claim under §5, one must show title over the property, and to claim under §6, one needs only to prove that they had possession of the property and were subsequently dispossessed. Even those who do not own the property or have title over it can claim under §6.
Kayastha Pathashala vs. Rajendra Prasad and State of UP, AIR 1990 SC 415
Service Contracts Cannot be Specifically Enforced, Exceptions to Rule
On consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is, therefore, clear that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced, and a court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well-recognised exceptions: (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the Statute
Khwaja Mohammad Khan vs. Husseini Begum, ILR 1910 32 ALL 410
Module: Specific Relief [in ref. to §15(c): who may obtain specific performance]
Even a beneficiary of a marriage settlement contract can sue for Specific Performance under §15(c) despite not being a party to the contract. The case is essentially an illustration of the section and its applicability.
Here, there was a marriage settlement (arranged marriage) contract between the fathers of the bride and groom. The agreement was that the groom’s father would pay the bride’s daily expenses. However, he refused to do so after the wedding. The bride (now wife) sued her father-in-law for a specific performance. It was held that she could file the suit even though she was not party to the contract since she was the beneficiary of the contract, which was for her marriage settlement.
Mehboob Ur Rehman vs. Ahsan Ul Ghani, 2019 19 SCC 415
§16(c) Specific Relief Act — Party cannot get Specific Relief if they are not ready and willing to perform their own obligations
Party was not granted specific relief because they were not able to prove that they were willing to perform their own end of the contract. Hence, §16(c) was activated, and the bar on specific relief was applied by the court. (if we are to apply equitable maxims here, this would involve “those who seek equity must do equity”).
Ram Niwas Gupta vs. Mumtaz Hasan and Ors, 2008 17 SCC 362
Effect on Delay on the Grant of Specific Performance
SC held that the case would have to go back to the HC, where the Claimant had sought relief of specific performance, but the HC dismissed it without framing a specific issue on the question of delay or discussing the question.
It held that Specific Performance could only be rejected (if the suit was brought within the limitation period) on two grounds of delay;
due to delay, the third parties have acquired rights in the subject matter of the suit:
in the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay may give rise to the plea of waiver, or otherwise, it will be inequitable to grant a discretionary relief.
Note that is case is before the 2018 Amendment.
LIC vs. Tufan Mandal, AIR 1999 Cal 104
Appears to be a case on the doctrine of clean hands, but could not find any clear indication in any set of notes or the judgment itself.
LIC claimed that the nominee of a policyholder would not be entitled to the benefits of the policy after the G’s death as the G had misrepresented his age when filling out the policy form.
Court — “The evidence of P.W. 1, a doctor, who was a life insurance doctor and examined the assured before the policy was taken, was candid in stating in his evidence that the assured appeared to be aged about 47 years (LIC claimed he was actually 70) when he had examined him. It does not appear that the assured had suppressed his real age at the time of making the insurance policy. It does not appear that any untrue statement was made in answer to the question formed in the policy of insurance by the assured to avoid the policy and/ or there was any breach of promissory clauses by the assured”.
Anil Kumar Singh vs. Jalveen Rosha, AIR 2000 Del 38
Module: Specific Relief (in ref. to §41: refusal of injunction)
Injunction was refused here from instituting legal proceedings.
Plaintiff wanted to buy property from the defendant worth 7 lakh → plaintiff said that he would pay in installments since he didn’t have the entire sum at the time → agreement made → after some time the plaintiff changed his mind about wanting to buy the property and demanded the instalment cheques back, which the defendant refused → plaintiff went to the bank and stopped cheque issuing → cheques bounced when defendant tried to encash → defendant sued plaintiff under negotiable instruments act for cheque bouncing → plaintiff filed for injunction to restrain proceedings regarding cheque bouncing and also from the defendant prosecuting him or suing him in any court of law → Court relied on §41(b) and (d) to deny injunction.
Sloman vs. Walter, 1784 1 BRO C.C 418
Liquidated Damages v. Penalties
Penalty clauses are barred by equity while liquidated damages are allowed. Whether the parties intended the sum as a bona fide pre-estimate of damages, i.e., liquidated damages or merely a security for a possible breach, is a question primarily of intent to be gathered from all the circumstances of the case.
Namdeo Lokman Lodhi vs. Narmadabhai, 1953 SCR 1009
Equitable Protection against Forfeiture
First, it held that notice requirements §111(g) of the TOPA does not apply to suits for forfeiture which have been filed before the TOPA came into effect in 1929. Secondly, and more importantly for our examination, the court held that there can be no equitable relief against forfeiture if there was a habitual non-payment of rent. Forfeiture is valid in such cases.
Debendra Lal Khan vs. FMA Cohen, 1927 SCC Online Cal 286
Relief from Forfeiture under §114 of the TOPA — Discretion of the Court to provide relief
“Now, in exercising the discretion with which it is invested under Section 114 a Court in India is not bound by the practice of a Court of Chancery in England, and I am not disposed to limit the discretion that it possesses. “Those who seek equity must do equity,” and I do not think merely because a tenant complies with the conditions laid down in Section 114 that he becomes entitled as of right to relief. But, in my opinion, the Courts in India in exercising the discretion entrusted to them under Section 114, in the absence of any special circumstances should adopt the rule that prevailed in the old Courts of Chancery, and, subject to any equities that may have arisen between the date of the forfeiture and the application for relief, e.g., where the landlord during that period has re-let the premises to of other persons, or otherwise has dealt with them, or where the conduct of the tenant qua tenant has been such that it would be unreasonable that the landlord should be compelled to keep him a tenant, the Court, provided the tenant complies with the conditions laid down in Section 114, ought to exercise its discretion in the tenant’s favour, and grant him relief”.
Nippon Kaisha vs. Ramjibon, 1938 42 CWL 677 (PC)
A common law lien is possessory and depends on possession, but it also presupposes that the property in the goods has passed. A person cannot have a lien on his own goods.
Forbes vs. Moffat, 1811 18 BES 384
Basically just reiterates the principle of merger: if one person has two interests in a property, the smaller interest gets subsumed within the larger one and ceases to separately exist (contingent on the person’s intention and best interest). In the case, the person had both a charge and ownership over the property. Hence, the charge ceased to exist and ownership is a greater right.
[Under Indian law now, mergers are not automatic and only happen if the person wishes so.]
Jitendra Kumar vs. The Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Limited and Ors, 2013 8 SCC 769
SC said even though the conditions of Order VIII Rule 6 (CPC provisions for legal set off) are nor met, then under equity, good conscience and justice then parties can counterclaim and set off. Here, the Respondents tried to amend their written statements in front of the lower court to include a counter-claim after the limitation period had passed. The HC allowed them to amend their WS as an equitable relief and the SC upheld this.
SET OFF
