Unit 5 - Bio-Engineering and Nanotechnology Flashcards
What are the similarities and differences between therapeutic and reproductive cloning, as described by Bowring in “Therapeutic and Reproductive Cloning: A Critique”? On what basis is therapeutic cloning widely considered to be morally acceptable? How does Bowring argue that, if therapeutic cloning were considered morally acceptable, it would be difficult to maintain that reproductive cloning is morally unacceptable?
Therapeutic cloning uses embryonic stem cells to potentially cultivate human organs or at least to initiate cell tissue growth for healing, whereas reproductive cloning aims to reproduce an identical organism through artificial means. Both processes use embryo’s in their process’s but therapeutic cloning is designed to help organisms that are already alive whereas reproductive cloning hopes to generate a whole other identical organism. Bowring notes that because treatments derived from human embryonic stem cells require the human embryos by cloning, that scientists and politicians have popularized this distinction between therapeutic and reproductive cloning and have made strong moral cases for the latter (defined as implanting a cloned embryo into a womans womb).
Because therapeutic cloning is often considered morally acceptable because it has the potential to save lives through its potential of tissue repair and potential ability to either create or regenerate organs.
Because therapeutic cloning requires human embryo’s Bowring finds that it is certain that cloned human embyro’s will almost certainly be required for this enterprise to ensure no problems occur with immune system incompatibility. Additionally, if the therapeutic aspect of cloning is the sole function of its moral legitimacy then it would only be consistent that reproductive cloning be legitimate for parents with non-viable gametes who want to have a gentically related child. Cloning embryo’s for therapeutic process in the long term will make reproductive cloning more viable through the gains of scientific practice and would therefore make reproductive cloning more viable through it relieving of the main scientific concerns. Additionally, cloning methods are still more reliable then current IVF methods currently used thereby making it viable.
How does Bowring argue that both sex selection and human cloning raise the same ethical issue?
Both remove the primordial barrier of determination. Like cloning, Bowring notes that the problem is not that individuality will be lost, but rather that respect, recognition, and love of the child will be subverted by expectation that they have ordered a predetermined product. In choosing sexuality, the parents may expect traditional gender roles from their “predetermined” child. In both cases of cloning and sex-selection, adults who invest in their babies design may expect their child to follow a particular life plan, something which is unethically fair to the child.
Critically analyze one of Bowring’s moral arguments against human reproductive cloning. In your answer, be sure to incorporate the most important normative concepts, such as autonomy, in his description of the effects of cloning on the child. Also, be sure to indicate what kind of argument he is making. If necessary, re-read Callahan to refresh your memory about the distinction between utilitarian and deontological moral reasoning.
Bowring argument against designer babies and sex-selection views the act of this intention as a practice of determination. This then allows the parent to form a preconceived conceptualization of the child before birth and give the parent a substantive hand in the child’s destiny.
This argument uses the normative concept of autonomy by acknowledging that tampering with the surprise of normal birth allows a preconception of the child’s destiny to form which is weighted with biological action. Connected with autonomy is the concept of individuality, because tampering with a child’s genes deprives the child of a non-determined birth and takes away from natures role. Also, it is suggested that by removing natures part it tampers a role of unification of man through his being born from nature, thereby making a normative concept of unity being robbed.
Callahan making a deontological argument because he highlights the importance of binding concepts such as unity, individuality, and autonomy. He is in direct conflict with the teleological utilitarianism which would focus on the consequences of designed birth. If he were being teleological he would have to focus on all the possible positive consequences of designer birth and would surely advocate for designed babies which could quite potentially bring greater good for the greatest number (through reduced disease, a more intelligent population, perhaps “balanced families”). However, instead he focuses on the duty we have to respect the autonomy of the unborn and the potential dangers of parents predetermining their child’s destiny., which is deontological.
In “A Genethics that Makes Sense,” Diprose argues that genetic engineering is based, at least in part, on the assumption that sameness among individuals is desirable. What are Diprose’s ethical worries regarding the “effacement of difference?” which is promoted, she argues, by the very theory of genetics?
Because bodies gain their identity in respect to the otherness of other, Diprose argues that removing and/or controlling the differences between bodies will dissolve identity.
Diprose is concerned about the consequences to our notions of self that research in human cloning could have. Through the concept of the “effacement of difference,” Diprose argues that all genetic realizations necessarily express the impulse to mass produce or objectify human beings. Do you agree with the factual claim that this impulse is driving, if not determining, human genetic research? If you agree, do you think the impulse ought to be resisted? If you disagree, what do you think is determining the direction in which cloning research is going?
No, because the alteration of humans through genetics is only one of many expressions that make humans different. Beyond organic bodies preexisting forces already make us varied such as: language its multiple expressions transformations and variations, clothing, culture, and experience to name a few. Additionally, a complete discovery of our genetic make up would not be a qualitatively different objectification of humanity that is already threatened from economic systems, pre-existing philosophies of determinism, and science itself. The body and its unique being-in-the world is a process of the greater world itself and genetics will not likely dissipate culture and the other functions that allow discriminatory process’s to give us our being. If it does it is not from genetics but from the greater process’s of science an technology in general. If we can co-exist as beings-in-the world with science why is the determination of the elements of our body the final dissolvement of being when these proposals have already existed for hundreds of years. The predominance of being-in-the world is the responsibility of being and the field of genetics is another threat to this being that can be confronted from beings.
The determination in which cloning research is going is an expression of mastery over the elements of the genome. This does not necessitate the mass production or objectification of human beings because genetics could never monopolize reproduction nor does its main interest concern production per say. Rather the way cloning research is going is much broader. Much of cloning is concerned with stem cells or the creation of other organs for those who need it. Much like prosthetics therapeutic cloning has the potential to work to accommodate those who are without. Genetics does not only objectifies humans in degree compared to science in general. Additionally, knowledge of the genome does not necessitate determined reproduction but may also be used to benefit everyday medical practices. Although genetics does threaten the objectification of humans through the possibility of designed reproduction, this is a smaller factor into the greater direction of cloning research which seeks greater mastery and knowledge into the human genome, which could conversely be used for medical diagnosis.
How do Moor and Weckert argue that there are ethical concerns with using nanotechnology to extend the human life-span indefinitely? Is their argument teleological or deontological?
They argue that this would produce a massive population increase which would put a huge strain on the worlds resources. This may result in a lack of children relative to the greater population. The young have an innovative energy and are prone to challenge old ideas and solve problems in new ways. Finally, a longer life does may not necessarily be better if the life is a miserable or hostile one, and a prolonged life may become sterile.
Their argument is teleological because they focus on the consequence of strain on the planet from overpopulation, the consequence of lack of innovation from having less young people, and the consequence of misery from a long life. They make no reference to a duty to die out, or a duty to respect the planet, but rather focus on the possible negative consequences of a extended life span.
On what grounds does Bennett-Woods argue there is reason to be concerned about uses of nanotechnology for biological enhancement, even if these possibilities are mostly science fiction?
Enhancement would change our standard notion of health by increasing the standard and thereby making enhancement compulsory which would tarnish the role of the doctor from healer to manipulator, enhancement could lead to sinister notions of strivings for the common good, technological enhancement would become compulsory to compete amongst others, those who are enhance may become a dominant class or those who are enhanced as soilders may become a worrisome category of people, Longer life spans could clog up the job market and would use more resources during their life,
Beyond these factors they generally acknowledge that greater power for people could lead to greater problems and that alterations of people could lead to unpredictable negative consequences. Increased life spans may not actually lead to more happy or productive lives they also note
Some people argue that we can separate research and development from application, and put the brakes on a new technology if it is determined through research that it could be harmful. Moor and Weckert claim, in Section 3 of “Nanoethics: Assessing the Nanoscale from an Ethical Perspective,” that “when new technology provides us with new tools to investigate and control others, we use them . . . That nanochips will be used for spying and control of others is a practical certainty” (306–307). Can you think of any facts that Moor and Weckert have overlooked in coming to this conclusion?
Beyond the technology not being available and the fact that we do not currently know the possibilities of these statements, there are many currently existing technologies that are not used to investigate or control others. Additionally, because it has not been developed it could be made illegal for the development of such technologies, thereby making nanochips used for spying a non-certainty.
Spy cameras are widely available but few people use them to peep on others in the washroom, guns which are widely unrestricted in certain parts of the states are less typically used for the control of others although they certainly can be, and facebook offers a convient platform to bribe, blackmail, and humiliate but is nonetheless rarely used for these purposes.
