UNIT #3 - POLICING 21st CENTURY Flashcards
consider the Murphy (2006) article and identify current practices in policing that are as a direct result of 9/11
(3)
- Increase in police powers
- Community surveillance
- Cost of policing
- Partnership of Community Policing and Homeland Security
(1) Securitizing Canada
(2) Re-Investing in Policing and Security
(3) Expanding Police Powers for National Security
Securitizing Canada (Murphy 2006 article)
(4)
(1) This is the idea that security is an outcome of political and social will.
(2) Essentially it is the process whereby governments and the media present national security threats in a dramatic fashion and persuade the public to demand more security from the government.
(3) In turn the government can legitimize and rationalize conventions and norms in the name of preserving political values and modern ideals.
(4) Additionally the government can (attempt to) appease the public and subsequently aide in justifying the ‘cost’ of policing.
Re-Investing in Policing and Security
(4)
(1) Prior to 9/11 the cost of policing to the public was becoming a topic of concern.
(2) Statistics Canada 2006 reported an unprecedented reduction in numbers of police and the ratio of police officers per capita from 1992-2000.
(3) The extraordinary events of 9/11 serve to remind us that the government is exclusively responsible for providing national security and thereby rejuvenated the funding and expansion of government resources such as policing.
(4) Nevertheless, large scale, dramatic terror events require an evaluation of current methods of prevention and typically lead to some sort of expansion of governmental and police powers.
Expanding Police Powers for National Security
(3)
(1) Murphy describes this as the broadening of the police mandate and a necessary response to the security threat posed by external and domestic terrorism.
(2) He argues that Canada had no overt examples of inadequate police powers, but the federal government (at the time) successfully argued that new police powers were a necessary “better safe than sorry” approach.
(3) Murphy rightly points out that in any other sociopolitical environment these changes would have been regarded as a dangerous assault on Canadian civil liberties.
Securitizing Community Policing (5)
1) community policing and the subsequent problem oriented policing have dominated the policing landscape for nearly 20 years.
2) There was significant emphasis on community partnerships and relationship building.
3) 9/11 and several significant ‘terror’ events since then have, in some ways, transformed some communities into security problems.
4) ‘home grown terrorists’ and the lack of reliable community information make security problems within some ethnic communities a legitimate space for increased surveillance - “the enemy within” as it is referred to.
5) the ‘securitization’ of suspect groups provides powerful rationale for using community policing as a security strategy.
Griffiths outlines how crime prevention initiatives can be categorized in three ways:
1) Primary prevention programs –
2) Secondary prevention programs
3) Tertiary prevention programs
Primary prevention programs
this is the most common prevention type and is designed to alter the conditions that provide opportunities for crime
Secondary prevention programs
these focus on areas that produce crime and social disorder and can be thought of as high risk offenders or high crime areas
Tertiary prevention programs
these focus on adults and youth who have committed crimes and attempt to create programs that will deter or prevent them from offending again
Approaches and Strategies outlined by Griffiths (3)
1) Zero-Tolerance and Quality of Life strategies (proactive policing)
2) quality of life
3) Crime Attack Strategies
Zero-Tolerance and Quality of Life strategies (proactive policing)
Refers to the practice of an order-maintenance approach in specific areas along with high police visibility and presences with the goal of preventing crime from occurring in the first place.
quality of life strategies
target social disruptions that are described as “annoying”, e.g. panhandling, loitering and public drug use, and seeks to disrupt it with police presence and thereby increasing the “quality of life” for others.
What is the Broken Window theory? (2)
1) The strategy began in the 80s in New York.
2) According to this approach leaving a broken window in a neighborhood would cause the quality of life to deteriorate and increase in criminal activity.
Crime Attack Strategies (2)
1) are intended to be ‘proactive’ and they target and apprehend individuals that are considered to be “high risk to reoffend individuals”.
2) Typically these strategies include increased patrol, visibility, proactive patrols and rapid response.
What are some examples of crime attack strategies (4)
1) Tactical-Directed Patrol
2) Targeted High-Risk Offenders
3) Targeted Types of Crimes
4) Community Notification
Tactical-Directed Patrol
involves identifying hot spots and saturating the area with police
Targeted High-Risk Offenders (2)
1) These initiatives focus on intense monitoring of offenders;
2) most often repeat offenders and include programs like HERO (High Enforcement Repeat Offenders) or ROPE (Repeat Offender Program Enforcement)
Targeted Types of Crimes
this involves developing strategies to address specific types of crime and often includes the use of “bait cars”.
Community Notification (2)
1) use the media/social media to inform the public of a potential issue or danger, e.g. offenders on the loose.
2) It should be noted that research has indicated that community notification systems do not increase public safety.
Restorative Justice (2)
1) views crime as holistic, not just the offender but the victim and the community as a whole suffer the consequences of criminal behavior.
2) The focus then is on bringing offender and community together to repair and prevent future criminal activity.
Zero Tolerance (4)
1) High police visibility
2) High enforcement even on minor infractions
3) Focus on social disorder
4) Goal to reduce serious crime
Quality of Life (4)
1) Improve area conditions
2) Target annoyances: panhandling, loitering, etc…
3) High police visibility
4) Goal of increasing public security and police legitimacy
Broken Window (4)
1) Reduce neighborhood deterioration
2) Replace/fix/clean up neighborhood damage quickly
3) Rapid deployment/relentless follow-up
4) Goal of strict order and maintenance, reduce levels of fear
Griffiths outlines four specific challenges faced when planning and implementing crime prevention programs that examine the non-financial costs:
1) Poor planning – the implementation of a program with little to no analysis and lack of clearly stated objectives, or measurable performance indicators. Often there is also the lack of consideration of ‘best-practices’ and previous ‘lessons learned’.
2) Poor implementation – a key feature here is the lack of consideration of where crime prevention should be implemented and who would be best served by which programs.
3) Lack of police support – services vary in the extent to which they integrate prevention into allocation of resources. In some cases prevention is peripheral and in others it is a core activity.
4) Lack of community support – often this is a result of community apathy or distrust of police. The distrust component can be readily evidenced in current arguments around carding and police presences in certain communities.
What is suggested by research studies on crime attack strategies?
The number of police officers does not significantly reduce the levels of serious violent crime