unit 3 aos 1 - mind and body

Question 1

what is Descartes method of doubt?

Answer 1

Everything he has accepted as fact throughout his life, he is going to question and start again right from the foundation. He must question both things that are not completely certain and things that are blatantly false. So for the purpose of rejecting all his opinions, he will disregard anything which has even the slightest reason for doubt and go straight for the basic principles of knowledge, because if they’re false, so is everything else.

Question 2

why cant Descartes trust his sense?

Answer 2

Everything we know is gathered through our senses, but you cannot trust those that have deceived you even once, and our senses occasionally deceive us (eg. thinking you hear your name). Therefore, we cannot trust our senses

Question 3

why does Descartes consider that he could be dreaming?

Answer 3

When you are dreaming, you have similar experiences to that when you are awake, during those dreams, you don’t know that you aren’t awake, dreams are not real. Therefore, how can we trust that what we experience while awake is real?

Question 4

why does Descartes think he could be being deceived?

Answer 4

he is firmly rooted in his belief in God. How can he know that God has not made it so he thinks he is seeing all this stuff that isn’t really there? But, God is supremely good and wouldn’t deceive him even though he has the ability to.
He will then suppose that a malicious demon is the one deceiving him and every sensory perception he has is not real, but rather the delusions of an omnipotent being.

Question 5

what is Descartes cogito argument?

Answer 5

He enters second meditation with no certainty of anything at all. Now he wonders if he can call his own existence into doubt. He hopes that by attaining one certainty, he can build other certainties to create an indubitable system of knowledge.

He asserts that he can be certain of his existence because:
He conceived that he exists, he is self aware. These conceptions can’t come from nowhere, they need a source.
If he is being deceived by an omnipotent being, you can’t deceive nothing. Therefore, he must exist

Question 6

Descartes has accepted that he exists, but what is he?
What are the four things he considers he could be and why does he refute them?

Answer 6

1. He is not a man because this leads to too many complicated problems about what a man is, and chains of further doubts.
2. He is not a rational animal because this requires a definition of ‘rational’ and ‘animal’ and doesn’t yield any simple truths: it is too complicated.
3. He is not a body because this premise relies on senses, which he knows can’t be trusted. He cannot be entirely sure of the existence of physical attributes, they could merely be the fabrications of an evil demon.
4. He is not a soul: too tenuous and weak. Many complex capacities are attributed to a soul. Too loaded with other features that are dependent on a body.

Question 7

what is Descartes argument that he is a thinking thing?

Answer 7

he only thing he can be certain of is that he is thinking. Thinking is ‘inseparable’ from him. The awareness of the fact he is contemplating this question means he is a thinking thing. He will substantiate this by using his imagination because even if the things he imagines are false, (because they are derived from sensory perceptions, and therefore false) the thoughts of them are real.
Thus he has established the indubitable essence of the ‘I’ in question. He thinks, doubts, confirms, denies, is willing, unwilling and therefore thinking.

Question 8

what is descartes wax analogy?

Answer 8

He has reached a point of certainty regarding his mind in describing himself as a thinking thing, and yet, strangely, it is physical things in the world that he perceives most distinctly.

Pieces of wax can melt and become a puddle, as well as retain different shapes when solid. Descartes proposes that he knows with certainty that melted wax and solid wax are the same thing, even though they have none of the same features when perceived by his senses

Thus, Descartes concludes that he must know the wax through his intellect. The clear truth of the wax is a product of intellect rather than just sensory perception.

Question 9

what is Descartes man in coats analogy?

Answer 9

If you were to see a group of men bundled up in coats and jackets, and can’t actually see their bodies, you can still determine that they are men. However, if he relied on his senses alone to decipher what they are, he would conclude it to be a mass of floating clothes, but his mind understands that it’s men.

The many details not provided efficiently by the senses, are filled in by mental intuition. Just like how if he relied on his senses alone, he would conclude that melted wax and solid wax are different things, but his mind knows the truth. The mind is better at giving him knowledge than his body.

Question 10

why does Descartes think he knows his mind better than his body?

Answer 10

Descartes suggests that as his mind knows things more clearly than his body, he must therefore know his mind more clearly than he knows the physical world. ie. While his sensory perceptions of the wax may be illusory, he cannot doubt that he is understanding those perceptions through acts of the mind.

When we consider the physical world, we can doubt it, but the act of considering it must confirm that we exist and tell us something about our minds. Additionally, he cannot be sure that his body is real as it is perceived through senses, but he knows that his thoughts are real.

Question 11

what is Descartes argument that he is distinct from his body?

Answer 11

Descartes defines his mind as a non-extended, thinking, rational, thing, whereas his body is an extended, non-thinking, irrational thing. He is confident that the mind and body are distinct things/separate substances because he could exist without a body, and only has a certain understanding of his mind, but cannot be certain of his body’s existence.

If these things are separable, at least in the mind of God, then it is reasonable to accept them as being distinct. The fact that he can clearly and distinctly understand them as separate things, is enough to make him certain that they are since they are capable of being separated by God.

Question 12

what is the probability criticism to Descartes?

Answer 12

Only a small percentage of sensory data turns out to be inaccurate, even if it’s just 99.9%, is that not enough? Senses are right 99.9% of the time, why should we completely rule it out over just one mistake?

Question 13

what is Ryles counterfeit objection to Descartes?

Answer 13

A country with no currency would offer nothing to counterfeiters because there would be nothing to make counterfeits of because for counterfeits to exist, they must be counterfeits of something.

Descartes proposes that the fact we can dream suggests that the real world is all merely an illusion. But fake stuff has to be based on something real. If there was nothing real to be replicated in dreams, then dreams wouldn’t exist.

Question 14

what is the burden of proof criticism to Descartes?

Answer 14

Part of Descartes’ propositions relies heavily on the idea that there may be an omnipotent being deceiving him. However, he hasn’t actually proved that omnipotent beings exist. He has doubted and ruled out the existence of other things, so why has he not disregarded the possibility of omnipotent beings. The burden of proof falls on him to prove a demon exists, but he hasn’t actually done this.

Question 15

what is a criticism to Descartes dream argument?

Answer 15

Descartes asserts that you cannot distinguish between being awake and being asleep, yet there are several instances where this is untrue. When you are awake you can contemplate whether what you’re experiencing is real or not, however in dreams you kind of just accept what you are presented with even if it’s absolutely crazy eg. flying or talking to animals, however if that were to happen in real life, you would most certainly be questioning it.

Question 16

what is the disappearing mind objection to descartes?

Answer 16

If the essence of your being is thinking, is Descartes not implying that if you cease to think, you, in turn, cease to exist. It is hardly feasible to suggest that if you stop thinking, you stop existing. Would that mean when you are asleep or knocked out, you are dead. And if you do ‘unexist’ when you’re not thinking, how would Descartes propose that we come back into existence if there is nothing to produce a thought to bring you back?

Question 17

what is the circular criticism to Descartes cogito argument?

Answer 17

Descartes argues that the fact we can conceive of ourselves means we exist (I am, I exist). However, the terms I am, I exist, are dependent on each other and use no external evidence. He claims that if you are thinking, you exist, but is he also saying that if you stop thinking you don’t exist. Eg. trees. Trees can’t conceive of themselves, does that not mean they exist.

Question 18

what is the role of the senses objection to Descartes mind is a better knower than the senses argument?

Answer 18

Descartes suggests that his mind is better at knowing things than his senses are (wax analogy). However, if it weren’t for the role of the senses, what would be left for his mind to contemplate? He wouldn’t be able to mentally scrutinise the wax, if his senses hadn’t informed him of it. Yes his mind is what distinguishes them, but his senses still played a crucial role in knowing the wax.
The main reason we can tell the two pieces of wax are the same seems intuitively to be that we watched once change to the other. As a counter-example, if we found someone who had never before encountered wax, and presented them with the hard piece, then took it away and came back with the melted piece without the change having been observed, they would likely conclude that the two substances are indeed different.

Question 19

what is the problem of interaction criticism to descartes?

Answer 19

How does a non-physical, non-extended mind possibly interact with something physical. Descartes says that mind and body are distinct from each other, yet interact. But how? Descartes hasn’t provided a plausible explanation to this. He did suggest that the mind may be connected to the body by the pineal gland (which we now know is responsible for hormone releases), but how is it possible that any part of the body could do such a thing? For something to do this, it would have to be both material, and immaterial. Descartes suggests that mental and physical are totally distinct, so how would he propose they have interacting and causing effects on one another?

Question 20

what three things does Smart rule out as answers to what is happening when we experience an after image and why?

Answer 20

1. He’s not reporting anything. Perhaps these kinds of reports are the ‘oohs’ and ‘ah’s’ we make when experiencing pain. They don’t actually describe anything.
   Rejection: when we report an afterimage, there is actually something going on. It has a distinct feeling.
2. It’s purely behaviour related. Ie. he’s merely saying he’s seeing it. Eg. exclaiming after images, or calling out in pain. Rejection: sensation of having an after image (unlike experiencing pain) is a peculiar, outlying condition to be in.
   While we can grasp pain as a behavioural category under which humans exhibit similar behaviours, we don’t recognise a similarly stable category of seeing an after image.
3. An irreducibly psychical something. Ie. something that is purely spiritual or of the mind. Not something that can be translated in physical terms and to which no laws of the material world can be applied. (fits with dualism).
   Rejection: uses Ockham’s razor (the most simple explanation is most likely correct). Objects the idea of a nomological dangler. Ie. something beyond the explanations of physics.

Question 21

what does Smart say is happening when you ar experiencing an after image?

Answer 21

he asserts that we may be just experiencing a brain process, meaning that we are experiencing a physical event involving the mechanisms of our physical body.

But if all events in the world are physical, how can CONSCIOUSNESS be explained in physical terms? He argues that you can’t CORRELATE something with itself. You can’t correlate states of consciousness and sensations (thoughts, emotions, ideas, mental events) with brain processes because that would imply they are distinct things. He can’t believe that everything should be explicable in terms of physics and biology except sensations. Such sensations would be nomological danglers.

Question 22

what is Smarts identity thesis?

Answer 22

Smart presents his positive thesis of identity: that sensations are brain processes. He understands the term sensation as any event that involves sensory perception and/or consciousness. His identity theory means that he is interested in identity in the strictest sense of the word ie. absolutely the same in every single way. He is arguing they have a strict identity.
This means that any mental state is identical with some kind of brain state. Eg. pain mental state + neuron firing.

Question 23

What does Smart say about ontological and semantic identity with relation to brain processes?

Answer 23

He is NOT saying that the words after image and pain have identical meanings to the word brain process. Rather he is saying that our reports of sensations are reports of brain processes. He is claiming ontological identity not semantic identity.

Question 24

what is Smarts nations analogy?

Answer 24

To explain this he uses an analogy about nations.
Nations are nothing more than their citizens (just like sensations are nothing more than brain processes).
Nations don’t exist beyond citizens, they can’t be separated.
He cautions that a nation/citizen relationship is not the same as a sensation/brain process relationship. His point is that they demonstrate ontological identity, yet semantically, they have a different logic.

Question 25

what three analogies does Smart use to explain that he is arguing for a strict sense of identity?

Answer 25

Smart then explains that he is arguing for a strict sense of identity between sensations and brain processes. He uses three analogies.

1. Lightning IS electrical discharge (they’re ontologically the same. When lightning occurs there are not two things, there is only one thing ie. a flash of lightning that is described scientifically is electrical discharge). They’re the same thing, in the same place, at the same time.
2. Seven IS the lowest prime number greater than five.
3. The boy IS the general.

Question 26

what does Smart reply to objection one -

an ordinary person can talk about their sensations yet know nothing about brain science. They could talk about the thoughts they are having, but can’t talk about the brain process they are having. Eg. You may know nothing about the chemical composition of H2O, but be able to talk lots about water. Doesn’t that mean the sensations and the brain processes are two very different things?

Answer 26

Smart responds that one’s knowledge of A but ignorance of B does not mean A and B aren’t the same thing. You can call things different names but it doesn’t mean they’re different things.

He uses the analogy of the morning and evening star. People’s observations of these (two different countries at same time for example), doesn’t mean they are not both observations of the same planet Venus. If an individual only ever knew it as the morning star and didn’t know others described it as the evening star, it wouldn’t change the fact that it’s the same thing.

Question 27

what does Smart reply to objection two -

It is only a contingent fact that sensations are brain processes. We cannot know this as a priori truth. It’s possible that scientific theory could advance and change so the current theory about sensations could be shown to be wrong in the future. Therefore, when we report a sensation, we aren’t necessarily reporting a brain process.

Answer 27

There’s no proof that sensations aren’t brain processes. There may be a semantic difference but not an ontological one. He agrees that when we report a sensation we do not mean the same thing as a report of a brain process. But that doesn’t prove that a sensation is not the same as a brain process. The same thing can be said for lightning and discharge, and morning star and evening star. That is the meaning of an expression is not the same thing as what it names.

Question 28

what is the Fido theory of meaning (Smart)?

Answer 28

This theory says that the name fido has meaning because it’s applied to my dog. So if the meaning of an expression were always what it was named, then sure, it would follow that sensations and brain processes would be different things because when we say we have sensation we don’t necessarily mean we have a brain process.. However when i say ‘i have an afterimage’ I don’t mean ‘i have a brain process’ and yet it may still be a brain process. The two expressions are merely referring to the same thing.

Question 29

what does Smart respond to objection four -

The after image is not in physical space, the brain process is. So the after image cannot be the same as a brain process.

Answer 29

Smart calls this objection an ignoratio elenchi. He reiterates that he’s not saying an after image is a brain process, but rather the experience of having an after image is a brain process.

When you have an after image, there are physical events going on in the brain such as electrical impulses, there isn’t actually an orange yellow colour in your brain. We simply describe the after image as yellow and orange because we don’t have the language to express what it is like in terms of brain processes. It is the experience that is reported, not the afterimage itself. He says that this objection is the same as arguing that his after image is yellow-orange but his brain process is not.

Question 30

what is Smarts surgeon analogy?

Answer 30

Surgeon analogy: if it were objected that an after image were yellowy orange but a surgeon looking at your brain would see nothing yellowy orange, he’d reply that it is the experience of seeing yellowy orange that the surgeon is seeing through the electrical impulses.

Question 31

what does Smart reply to Objection five -

the brain process may be slow or swift, but my experience of seeing yellow cannot be so described. Therefore, sensations and brain processes cannot be described. The descriptions we would use for brain processes(fast, slow), are different to those we would use for sensations (yellow, orange)

Answer 31

Our terms for experiences and brain processes may not mean the same thing or have the same logic, yet they may still refer to the same thing. - someone doctor analogy

Question 32

what is the someone/doctor analogy (Smart)?

Answer 32

there are many things we may say about ‘someone’ that cannot be said of ‘the doctor’. Yet this does not mean that when I say there is someone on the phone, it cannot be the doctor. Ie. just because these two expressions have different logics and properties but it does not mean they are not the same thing.

The fact that our semantic patterns are out of step with what we now understand about the nature of things in the world, does not prove anything about the actual nature of things in the world.

Question 33

what does Smart say to objection six -

Sensations are private, brain processes are public. Multiple people can observe a brain process, but it makes no sense for multiple people to observe a sensation. Eg. if you put a brain scanner over someone having a thought, it would pick up the brain processes of neurons firing, but it wouldn’t be able to tell you what the sensation/thought is.

Answer 33

Reports of our experiences have different logic and language compared with the way we speak of material processes in the brain. This simply shows that the language of introspective reports has a different logic from the language of material processes. But that does not mean they aren’t the same.

When we are sophisticated enough there could be potential to say look at a brain process and say someone is having such and such experience, other than introspective reports. You can still identify a brain process while someone is having a thought, you just can’t know what the thought itself is about. A thought still exists in a physical form, regardless of what it felt like or what it is, it’s still there.

Question 34

what is Smarts conclusion?

Answer 34

Smart reflects that the basis of his thesis is empirical in one sense, and non-empirical in another. He says there is certainly empirical evidence to show sensations are not processes of the liver, heart or kidneys. However, empiricism will never solve all disputes about Smart’s identity theory. Eg. If the debate is between Smarts materialism and the dualist theory of epiphenomenalism then no experiment can give us the deciding data.

Question 35

what is Smarts creationism analogy?

Answer 35

for Gosse, earth was created with fossils already in it. As fanciful as this seems to any modern scientist, there will never be one single fossil discovery or observation that will decide the truth of this matter empirically. Although creationists say that the world is 6000 years old yet carbon tests tell us that some fossils are over 65 billion years old, you can’t argue with them and prove them wrong as they will just argue that God placed those fossils to appear there that way.
Rather we need to use Occam’s razor (principle of parsimony and simplicity). Smart sees the creationist/evolutionist debate similar to the materialist/dualist debate. He thinks it’s obvious that the principle of parsimony and simplicity is clearly in favour of materialism and by these principes dualism seems ridiculous. There’s simply no point in arguing with people like that as they will just come up with any fanciful response. You can’t argue with stupidity.

Question 36

what is the authority of science, inductive reasoning, criticism to Smart?

Answer 36

Almost everything told to us by science is through inductive reasoning and is therefore not a leak proof deduction. Inductive reasoning involves seeing something many times and then applying it as a generalisation. For instance saying water boils at 100C because that’s what we have always seen. Yet this is flawed as occasionally water may boil at different temperatures, thus showing that scientific theory isn’t always correct.So just because science tells us sensations are brain processes, there is always the possibility that this doesn’t always apply.
Eg. We say that water boils at 100C because that’s what we have seen a million times. Yet this isn’t always accurate as water can boil at a lower temperature in high altitudes.
Just because science has told us many times that all sensations are brain processes, doesn’t mean this always applies. There is always the possibility that there could be exceptions, which cannot be explained in purely physical terms.

Question 37

what is the scientific blunders criticism to Smart?

Answer 37

Science is consistently revising and changing. Theories are constantly being disproved. Yes science tells us now that sensations are brain processes, yet we can’t completely trust that this won’t one day be disproven. And seeing as Smart’s entire contention relies on this notion, if this were one day proved wrong, Smart’s argument would be completely undermined. Eg, flat earth, Y2K, life on mars, power lines causing cancer.

Question 38

what is a counter argument to the authority of science criticism of Smart?

Answer 38

It’s the best explanation we have right now and it’s a low chance that it is incorrect. Science has progressed and refined and is becoming more accurate. Progress means it gets better; we don’t know yet; science has been right before.

Question 39

what does Nagel say is the biggest challenge to the mind body problem?

Answer 39

Consciousness is what poses a challenge to the mind body problem. Nagel says that ‘reductionists’ claim that everything is material, however, these reductions do not consider consciousness.
They claim that things like the water-H2O problem, lightning-electrical discharge problem, and gene-DNA problem are the same as the mind-body problem (ie. they share ontological identity), but Nagel claims that these analogies are NOT the same, as they do not account for the problem of consciousness. He believes that in order to shed light on the relationship between mind and body, one must address consciousness - and reductionism fails to do that.

Question 40

According to Nagel, what is the impossible task?

Answer 40

consciousness makes finding a solution to the mind/body problem seem hopeless as it is very poorly understood, and most reductionist theories don’t even try to explain it. That is, the most important characteristic of our minds is not understood. It is impossible to account for it because every subjective phenomenon is connected with a single point of view, and objective accounts will only abandon it.

Thus, the impossible task is giving consciousness an objective, physical account.

Question 41

According to Nagel, what is the subjective character of experience?

Answer 41

Nagel notes that consciousness occurs in many levels of life, but no matter how the form varies, the fact that an organism has consciousness means that there is something that it is like to BE that organism. So, according to his view, an organism’s consciousness and the subjective way in which that organism experiences its environment are conceptually dependent.

Nagel also maintains that every subjective phenomenon is connected with a particular point of view for which a physical explanation would not be able to account.

Question 42

why does Nagel say the subjective character of experience makes finding a solution to the mind body problem difficult?

Answer 42

every explanation of the mental must take into account the presence of these phenomenological properties
Nagel also maintains that every subjective phenomenon is connected with a particular point of view for which a physical explanation would not be able to account.

This creates a problem for the mind body problem because if what it is like to be an organism is only known from one point of view, then it seems impossible that we could ever explain consciousness in a way that’s accessible to other beings.

Question 43

what three theories does Nagel say fail to capture the subjective character of experience?

Answer 43

Firstly, this subjective character is not at all captured by reductionist theories as all of them are ‘logically compatible with its absence’. Eg. consciousness could be removed from the concept of mind in Smarts theory, without altering it.

Secondly, it cannot be explained in terms of functional or intentional states since they can be ascribed to robots that experience nothing.

Thirdly, he rejects behaviourism for similar reasons.

Question 44

what is the purpose of Nagels bats thought experiment?

Answer 44

In order to illustrate the connection between subjectivity and point of view and to show the importance of subjective features. He will use an example that clearly brings out the distinction between the two types of conception, objective and subjective.

Question 45

why did Nagel choose bats for his thought experiment?

Answer 45

Bats are close enough related to us that one cannot question whether they have conscious experience
They present a range of activity and sensory apparatus so different from ours that they highlight the problem he wants to pose. Anyone who has seen a bat, knows how much of an alien form of life they are.

Nagel says that if we accept that bats have conscious experience, then there must be something it is like to be a bat.
However, their sensory systems are extremely different from us. Eg. bats perceive the world through sonar or echolocation, which is not comparable to any sense that we humans possess and there is no reason to propose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine. So how can we understand what it may be like to be bat?

Question 46

why did Nagel choose bats for his thought experiment?

Answer 46

Bats are close enough related to us that one cannot question whether they have conscious experience
They present a range of activity and sensory apparatus so different from ours that they highlight the problem he wants to pose. Anyone who has seen a bat, knows how much of an alien form of life they are.

Nagel says that if we accept that bats have conscious experience, then there must be something it is like to be a bat.
However, their sensory systems are extremely different from us. Eg. bats perceive the world through sonar or echolocation, which is not comparable to any sense that we humans possess and there is no reason to propose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine. So how can we understand what it may be like to be bat?

Question 47

why does Nagel say we could not understand what it is like to be a bat?

Answer 47

One could imagine that they have webbing on their arms and can fly around; that they have very poor vision; that they hang upside down all day. Yet, this does not actually tell us what it is like for a BAT to be a bat, it only tells him what it would be like for HIM to BEHAVE as a bat does.

He cannot imagine it as he is restricted to the resources of his own mind, which are inadequate.

Even if we could gradually be transformed into a bat, there is nothing in our current makeup that would allow us to imagine what it would be like.

Question 48

what is nagels martians analogy?

Answer 48

martians (aliens) would have the same difficulty in trying to conceive what it is like to be human. The structure of their minds would make it impossible. But they would be mistaken if they supposed that since they cannot imagine what it is like to be us then we mustn’t have conscious experience, because clearly we do. Likewise, we would be mistaken to say that because we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat, then they must have no conscious experience.

Essentially he argues that this subjective character of experience, while likely stemming from the physical, is one inaccessible through objective facts, just as we can understand all the facts of bat neurology without knowing what it is like to be a bat. However, to deny their conscious experience would be like a Martian denying our own

Question 49

what does Nagel say about facts and conceptual schemes (Nagel)?

Answer 49

He says that his argument so far has implied a belief in the existence of facts that we will only ever have conceptual schemes (ways of organising experience) of. Nagel concludes that there are facts about the bat that are outside the capability of human language to explain. It is possible to “recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.”
We may accept the existence of facts, yet never form more than a conceptual scheme, because we do not understand or comprehend. Ie. we can recognise there is something it is like to be a bat but never actually fully understand it.

Question 50

what does Nagel say about objectivity and subjectivity?

Answer 50

There is a sense in which some phenomenological facts about an organism are objective and can be understood from other points of view. Ie. we don’t have to be bats to understand their biological makeup, so we could have an objective understanding of their physiology. However, they are subjective in the sense that we would not be able to adopt their point of view, and understand these facts in the first person. This creates a problem for the mind-body problem because if the facts of what it is like to be an organism are only accessible from their point of view, then how could the true character of an organism’s experiences be revealed in their physical operations? We could understand in the third person, but not the first.

Question 51

what is Nagels argument analogy about martians and lightning?

Answer 51

We can imagine that an alien without sight may be able to understand a rainbow, lightning, or clouds from an objective viewpoint, although the concepts themselves are connected with a particular point of view that they wouldn’t be able to understand. In understanding phenomena like lightning it is valid to go far away from a human viewpoint because it has an objective character that is not exhausted by it’s visual appearance.

Question 52

why does Nagel say it wouldnt make sense to speak of an objective character of conciousness?

Answer 52

in the case of conscious experience, the link to a certain point of view is much closer. It wouldn’t make sense to speak of an objective character of something without tying it to the point of view of the subject who had the experience.
EG. What would be left of what it is like to be a bat if one removed the subjective viewpoint of the bat?

Yet, if experience did not have some objective aspect (as well as its subjective character) that could be observed by outsiders, then how could we say that an alien, for example, could study mental processes? So experiences may be granted some objective existence.

Question 53

what is nagels problem of psych-physical reduction?

Answer 53

Nagel says we are faced with a general difficulty about psycho-physical reduction. This process of reduction is a move in the direction of objectivity, and away from a human point of view. In these cases, different species can refer to a common reality and only leave behind their species point of view.
However, it does not seem that we can follow this pattern, when it comes to experiences. By pursuing an objective understanding, we are abandoning the species point of view and instead taking up a characterisation of experiences that other species can grasp, and this would take us further away from, rather than closer to, the real nature of experience and is therefore the wrong path to take.

Question 54

what does Nagel say about the word IS?

Answer 54

Nagel anticipates that a physicalist could object that ‘mental states and brain states’ is not incomprehensible , we just need to know exactly which brain states are involved, which comes down to the words ‘is’ and ‘are’, which is simple.
However, Nagel says that the word ‘is’ is deceptive. In statements like X is Y, we know HOW it is supposed to be true, which depends on conceptual or theoretical backgrounds and is not conveyed by the ‘is’ alone.
For example, we may be told that matter is energy, but despite knowing what it means, we are still confused by what makes this claim true because we don’t have the theoretical background of physics.

Question 55

what is Nagels ‘matter is energy’ analogy?

Answer 55

Nagel compares our attempt to understand the claim ‘mental states are brain states’ to ancient Greeks trying to understand ‘matter is energy’. We don’t really know how a physical term and mental term could refer to the same thing because it requires much more than an is. Right now, we are lacking the theoretical background and are very far off knowing how they could refer to the same thing.

Question 56

what is Nagels caterpillar analogy?

Answer 56

Nagel gives an analogy of how we could know something is true without knowing how it is so. There may be evidence for things we don’t understand, For example, suppose a caterpillar was locked in a sterile safe by someone who doesn’t know anything about insect metamorphosis and then weeks later the safe is reopened, revealing a butterfly. If the person knows the safe has been shut the whole time he has reason to believe the butterfly is the caterpillar, without having any idea how this could be. Thus, it is conceivable that we are in such a position with the mind to body identity. Ie. We have evidence that mental events are brain events, without knowing how this could be so because we do not have the theoretical background.

Question 57

what is Nagels conclusion?

Answer 57

we cannot attempt to give physical accounts of mental states unless we first understand how they can have an objective nature.
He proposes that we temporarily put aside the question of the relationship between mind and brain and aim to achieve a more objective understanding of the mind in its own right. To achieve this we will need to devise a new method that is not dependent on empathy or imagination . Although presumably it would not capture everything, its goal would be to describe, at least in part, the subjective experience in a form comprehensible to beings incapable of having those experiences.

Question 58

what is Nagels objective phenomenology?

Answer 58

objective phenomenology would enable basic questions about the physical basis of experience to make more sense. But either way, it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective. Otherwise, we cannot even pose the mind body problem without side stepping the subjective character of experience.

Question 59

what is David Chalmers zombie argument?

Answer 59

Chalmers dubbed questions regarding what consciousness feels like as the hard problem. Ie. he argued that consciousness is a physical phenomenon and thus the hard problem will never be solved in objective physical terms. However, any theory that excludes it is incomplete. Zombie argument - theoretically, a zombie is an exact molecular replica of a human, yet they don’t have consciousness and humans do. Therefore, consciousness must be non-physical.

Question 60

what is Daniel Bennets criticism to Nagel?

Answer 60

Dennet said that the notion of qualia is confusing, hazy, and undeveloped, and we should eliminate this idea as a concept of mind and reconsider these phenomena as properties of an entirely physical consciousness.

Question 61

what is the neurobiology criticism of Nagel?

Answer 61

the work of neuroscience in accurately mapping brain activity to mental states. Eg. We feel emotions like happiness and anger and brian mapping can observe specific parts of the brain firing.

Question 62

what is the neuropharmacology criticism of Nagel?

Answer 62

What about the significant changes in our consciousness that can be created by changes in the brain (i.e. drugs such as antidepressants, drugs that alter our conscious experience)?

brain injuries such as the Phineas Gage case - much of his brain’s left frontal lobe was destroyed, and it reportedly altered his personality and behaviour, thus suggesting that the physical brain is very much associated with consciousness.