Unit 2 Flashcards
The Argument from Desire Premise 1
Every natural, Innate desire in us corresponds to some real object that can satisfy that desire.
The Argument from Desire premise 1 Expansion
(a) Innate desires are natural, universal human desires such as food, drink, rest, sex, knowledge, friendship, and beauty.
(b) The opposite are shunned (starvation, loneliness…)
(c) However, mere external desires may not be realized.
The Argument from Desire Premise 2
But there exist in us a desire which nothing in time, nothing on earth, no creature can satisfy.
The Argument from Desire Premise 2 Expansion
(a) This premise requires honest introspection.
(b) The history of mankind argues strongly that there is a deep seated desire that the “world” cannot satisfy.
The Argument from Desire Premise 3
Thus, there must exist something more than time, earth and creatures, which can satisfy this desire.
The Argument from Desire Premise 4
This something is what people call “God” and “life with the God forever.”
The Argument from Desire Premise 4 Expansion
(a) Our most basic need points to a transcendent God who alone satisfies that need!
(b) All humans have three basic needs all of which can be satisfied in Christ.
three basic needs all of which can be satisfied in Christ.
(i) Objective meaning in life.
(ii) Loving union with a reality that transcends us (cf. needs for forgiveness, reconciliation, and moral improvement).
(iii) Understanding of self and the world (Christian WV does this the best).
Lewis Quote from Mere Christianity
“… If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world”
Argument from Desire Criticism 1
How can I know that every innate desire has a real object unless such objects can be empirically identified?
Argument from Desire Criticism 1 rebuttal
(a) Objection presupposes empiricism—we know only by sense perception and then by generalizing by induction.
(b) But, when there is a real connection between the nature of the subject and the nature of the predicate, we know the truth of a proposition by understanding, not mere induction.
(c) The facts of nature—for every innate/natural desire there is a corresponding real object.
Argument from Desire Criticism 2
Some say they don’t harbor any desires for anything beyond this world.
Argument from Desire Criticism 2 rebuttal
(a) I am not happy, but I’m confident with a little more of this and that I will be!
(i) This experiment has failed 100% so far!
(b) I am perfectly happy now!
(i) This is either idiocy or dishonesty!
The Ontological Argument
Truly understanding the notion of a greatest conceivable being entails seeing that such a Being must exist.
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Premise 1
Uses Leibniz’ insight that the concept of the “greatest conceivable being” is coherent and that there is a possible world in which God exists.
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Premise 2
the semantics of possible worlds
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Premise 2 Expansion
(a) A “possible world” is a description of a way reality might be.
(b) A possible world is a conjunction which comprises every proposition or its contradictory, so that it yields a maximal description of reality.(c) Only one of these descriptions will be composed of conjunctions all of which are true—the actual world.
(d) The proposition Kerry is the president of the US is false in the actual world, but could be true of a maximal description of another possible world.
(e) To say that God exists in some possible world is to say that the proposition God exists is comprised by some maximal description of reality.
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Premise 3
Plantinga conceives of God as a being who is “Maximally excellent” in every possible world.
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Premise 3 Expansion
(a) Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.
(b) A being who has maximal excellence in every possible world would have maximal greatness.
(c) Plantinga: There is a possible world where a maximally great being exists.
(d) Thus, this Being must exist in a maximally excellent way in every possible world, including the actual world.
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Formal Outline
(a) It is possible that a maximally great being (O3 God) exists.
(b) If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being in some possible world.
(c) If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
(d) If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
(e) If a maximally great being exists.
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Objection 1
Is the first premise coherent? What warrant exist for thinking “It is possible that a maximally great being exists?”
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Objection 1 Refute
(a) The difference between metaphysical and merely epistemic possibility.
(b) For the OA to fail, the concept of maximally great being must be incoherent
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Objection 2
The construction of parodies: “ a most perfect island” or “a necessarily existent lion.”
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Objection 2 Refute
(a) The properties that go to make up maximal excellence have intrinsic maximum values, whereas the excellent-making properties of thing like islands do not.
(b) Omniscience is the property of knowing only and all truths, while islands can vary in particulars based on taste.
(c) A maximally excellent being is immaterial and transcendent, whereas the nonexistence of lions is conceivable in any number of possible worlds.
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Objection 3
Appeal to a quasi-maximal great being: it is intuitively coherent to conceive of a quasi-maximally great being (e.g. one whose maximal greatness does not include knowledge of truths about future contingents).
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Objection 3 Refute
(a) But maximal greatness is logically incompatible with quasi-maximal greatness because maximal greatness includes omnipotence and the power to refrain from creating and thus there are worlds where nothing other than the maximally great being exists.
(b) Thus if a maximal great being is possible, a quasi maximal greatness is impossible.
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Objection 4
Intuitions unreliable: Our intuitions about modality are a unreliable guide.
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Objection 4 Refute
(a) If after careful consideration we still find it compelling we are within our rational rights to accept the OA.
(b) A posteriori considerations support the a priori idea of maximal greatness.
Leibniz’s cosmological argument Premise 1
Every existing thing has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
Leibniz’s cosmological argument Premise 1 Objection
the principle of sufficient reason is too strong to be plausible.
Leibniz’s cosmological argument Premise 1 Expansion
a. But one ultimately comes to some explanatory stopping point which is a brute contingency.
b. A precludes things which exist inexplicably.
Leibniz’s cosmological argument Premise 2
If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
Leibniz’s cosmological argument Premise 2 Expansion
- The atheist implicitly recognizes this.
2. It includes all physical reality and abstract objects.
Leibniz’s cosmological argument Premise 3
The universe is an existing thing.
Leibniz’s cosmological argument Premise 3 Expansion
It is as much a thing as anything in it (e.g. tree a globe).
Leibniz’s cosmological argument Premise
Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is God.
A conceptualist argument for God’s existence Premise 1
Abstract objects, such as numbers and propositions, are either independently existing realities or else concepts in some mind.
A conceptualist argument for God’s existence Premise 1 Expansion
Assumes rejection of nominalism.
A conceptualist argument for God’s existence Premise 2
Abstract objects are not independently existing realities.
A conceptualist argument for God’s existence Premise 3
Abstract objects are concepts in some mind, then an omniscient, metaphysically necessary being exists.
A conceptualist argument for God’s existence Premise 3 Expansion
Abstract objects cannot be grounded in a merely contingent human mind because there are too many such objects and some exist necessarily.
A conceptualist argument for God’s existence Premise 4
Therefore an omniscient, metaphysically necessary being exist.