unfair prejudice Flashcards
what recomendations led to the up remedy?
the jenkins committee - aruged that there should be a remedy in cases that fell short of illegality
what is the statutory provisions for unfair predudice?
- s994: ‘the company’s affairs are being conducted or have been conducted in a matter that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or some part of its members’
- repeat rather than a reform of s459 of the CA 1989
evaluation of s994
- Kershaw: this provides a potentially expansive remedy for minority shareholders faced with unfair actions/proposed actions of the controlling shareholders, and more generally a remedy for any shareholder that is aggrieved by the conduct of the company’s affairs even where there is no controlling shareholders
- Pettet: the floodgates of litigation were well and truly thrown open, and it was later realised the new remedy was capable of being oppressive towards the respondents.
what does Re Stewarts [1985] say about what consitutes a company’s affairs?
a director’s establishing a rival company, and his diversion of business to this company, were acts falling within the affairs of the company.
‘Conduct of the companies affairs’
wide interpretation
Can controlling shareholders use section 994?
- No exclusion but normally any prejudice they suffer will be remediable through the use of their position and therefore there may not be the element of unfairly prejudicial.
- It is a mechanism for the protection of non-controlling shareholders (not necessarily minority-since often there is equal division of shares).
what is the Judicial Construction of Criteria by which to Judge ‘Unfairness’?
- Legitimate Expectations or Equitable Considerations
- Courts have recognised that the remedy protectsexpectations and not just rights.
- Borrowing from public law ‘legitimate expectations’ of the petitioner, though more recently courts have tended to use the term ‘equitable considerations’.
What are the equitable considerations meriting a judicial response?
- Informal arrangements among the member
- Dividends and Directors’ remuneration
- Other categories of Unfair Prejudice not clearly defined
Informal arrangements among the members
- Arises out of a fundamental understanding between shareholders which formed the basis of their association but was not put into contractual form’
- The court recognises that the totality of agreement is not put into contractual form-could be a desire to avoid transaction costs.
- Most common in the small ‘quasi-partnership’ companies and limited to very small companies
- Most commonly protected is undoubtedly the petitioner’s expectation that he or she would be involved in the management of the company
- Starting point will be the articles and something more will be required to move court from view that basis of association is exhaustively laid out in the articles
O’Neill v Phillips [1999] facts
in the case, the founding entrepreneur who had increasingly built up the business handed over a 25% share of the company to a trusted employee (the petitioner O). Later the petitioner became MD of the company receiving half the profits (the Petitioner was handling the day-to-day business) and there were talks about acquiring one-half of the share capital. However, economic downturn meant that the prospects of the company faltered and founder removed petitioner as MD, took back reins and paid petitioner only salary and dividends on his 25% share.
O’Neill v Phillips [1999] ratio
HL held: The treatment of the petitioner (who resigned) was held not to be unfairly prejudicial because there was no agreement between the parties even at informal level that the petitioner should be entitled to receive half the profits (except so far as he was MD) or that he was entitled to increase his shareholding to one-half.
Comment: contractual approach to assessment of unfairness in the interests of legal certainty but at a cost of limiting scope
Dividends and Directors’ remuneration
Frequent cause of dispute is excessive remuneration to directors and the failure to declare dividends (where petitioner has never been or ceased to be a director).
Irvine v Irvine (No.1) [2007]
- Shareholders, even in small quasi partnership companies, have no automatic right to expect dividends
- There has to be specific additional circumstances
- In this case, the fact that the majority shareholder was paying himself excess numerations was enough
re Sam Weller & Sons Ltd
the court refused to strike out a petition alleging that non-payment of dividends produced a disparity between the petitioner and the respondent as far as their participation in the profits of the company was concerned because the Respondents obtained their return through the payment of directors’ remuneration and other benefits, whilst the petitioners (as non-director) were excluded from any substantial return
Re A Company
- the court used provisions of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers as a guide to what the directors of a target company should do by way of communication with the shareholders, even though the target was a private company and outside the scope of the Code.
- the exclusion of a member form the board of directors amounted to unfair prejudice