UN ORGANS Flashcards

1
Q

ICJ: role

A

judicial role, its judgements and decisions are guided by international law rather than international politics

independent and neutral body

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2
Q

ICJ:
ineffectiveness/ structural limitations

A
  1. advisory is non-binding so member-states can disregard without repercussions
    = lacked enforcement
  2. non-compulsory arbitration means ICJ can only arbitrate disputes where all the implicated parties consent to ICJ arbitration:

only 51 member states signed Optional Clause 36 (compulsory arbitration)

  1. enforcement depended on UNSC
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3
Q

ICJ:
examples of ineffective ADVISORY

A

1974 Western Sahara:
ruled that there were no legal ties between the territory of Western Sahara and Morocco or Mauritania

disregarded
- tripartite agreement between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania drawn up
- Algeria protested the outcome
- military confrontation between Algeria and Morocco

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4
Q

ICJ:
examples of non-compulsory ARBITRATION/ rejection of OPTIONAL CLAUSE 36

A
  1. 1984 Nicaragua Affair
    USA withdrew its consent to compulsory jurisdiction by ICJ in 1985, and vetoed when matter was brought up to UNSC later on
  2. Spratly Islands
    China vehemently opposed any attempt to use ICJ to arbitrate the dispute
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5
Q

ICJ:
examples of how enforcement is dependent on UNSC/ great powers

A
  1. Iran Hostage Crisis:
    resolved by negotiations between US and Iran
  2. Corfu Channel:
    Albania rejected ICJ judgement and refused to pay compensation to the UK
    -> UK withheld gold looted from Albania by Axis powers that was later retrieved by the Allies
  3. 1984 Nicaragua
    if judgement is against any on of the P5, any resolution could be vetoed
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6
Q

ICJ:
examples of effectiveness and conditions required

A

[conditions required]
both parties must consent to submit the case for court’s jurisdiction
more successful in resolving border delineation and use of oceans and waterways

  1. Preah Vihear temple
  2. Frontier dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali
  3. Ligitan-Sipadan between Malaysia and Indo
    -> ruled that they belong to Malaysia
  4. Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia
    -> ruled for the first time in legal history that states could be responsible for genocide (2007)
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7
Q

UN REFORMS:
examples in the 1950s-60s

A
  1. 1950 Resolution 377A Uniting for Peace Resolution — UNGA
    (-) invoked only 10 times from 1950-1997
    (+) existence was useful when UNSC was deadlocked:
    eg. 1956 Suez Crisis, 1960 Congo
    (-) Britain and France viewed UFP as illegal and refused to pay the dues required for PKOs that were not carried out by the UNSC (UNEF I and ONUC)
  2. 1956 Chapter 6 1/2 for Peacekeeping under Dag Hammarskjold — UNSG
    (+) despite an unarguably unconducive Cold War climates, suggested cause for optimism
    (+) crucial reference point that formalised and guided the UN’s role in maintaining international peace and security over a series of conflicts since then
  3. 1965 expansion of P5 to P10
    (+) gestured a need and willingness for greater representation of UN members in matters of international peace and security
    (-) post-65 reform efforts remain abysmal as both the Veto System and UNSC composition have arguably remained anachronistic
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8
Q

UN REFORMS:
1990s (post CW climate)

A
  1. 1992 Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) — Agenda for Peace under BBG — UNSG
    (+) streamline and improve capacity to plan, conduct and manage PKOs
  2. 1993 United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS)
    (+) secure personnel and material resources required
    (+) improve UN’s capability for rapid deployment:

by 1999, 76 member states had confirmed their willingness to provide standby resources

58% of the pool of resources could be deployed within 30 days

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9
Q

UNSG:
factors for effectiveness

A

✅ competency
- personality/ charisma — relationship with great powers and member states
- usage of good offices

❌ incompetency

🚫 structural limitations
main decision making body in the UN was UNSC (article 27 of veto)
(article 99) recommend conflicts to UNSC to attend to
-> UNSG has to work with/ be subservient to the UNSC and UNGA

  1. great power politics
  2. political will of member states
  3. operational constraints of PKO
  4. nature of conflict
  5. international climate
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10
Q

UNSG
✅ examples of competent leaders:
DAG HAMMARSKJOLD

A

usage of good offices

  1. negotiated release of US pilots imprisoned in Beijing in 1955, went to Beijing and mediated in the background, nearing the trust of Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai
  2. Suez Crisis: skilfully arranged a face-saving option for all three major powers to withdraw their forces from the Suez Canal and established a basis of cooperation for Egypt with UNEF patrols that
    worked smoothly for a decade
  3. Congo Crisis: intervened personally to persuade Katanga to accept UN troops, prevent Soviet military support to the radical faction of the Congo (can use for CA)
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11
Q

UNSG
✅ examples of competent UNSG
DE CUELLAR

A
  1. Afghanistan:
    Visited region in April and August 1981 to conceptualise Geneva Accords and end hostilities
    end of Cold War and Soviet internal problems
  2. Central American conflicts:
    Active role in mediating El Salvador conflict, brought about resumption of dialogue between government and guerillas in December 1989
    ending of Cold War — during 2nd Cold War, Reagan’s administration covertly supported and illegally funded numerous factions in the civil wars that plagued Central America in the 1980s

(can use 1. and 2. for CA):
Superpowers were more influential in determining the eventual change in UN fortunes in Afghanistan and Central America.

  1. Namibia 1989-1990:
    Played a key role in the ceasefire of 1988 between the PLA of Namibia and the apartheid South African government, oversaw the creation of UNTAG which facilitated peaceful elections and independence for Namibia in 1990
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12
Q

UNSG:
❌ examples of INCOMPETENT UNSG
TRGYVE LIE

A

impartial and pro-west during Korean War, poor relationship with superpowers:

Lie strongly supported the US-led UN coalition and rallied international opinion by labelling North Korea as aggressors

-> USSR perceived him as a tool of US foreign policy, hence USSR vetoed his re-election.

UNSG is supposed to work with and win the trust of member states, especially great powers. But the Soviets openly attacked him for his pro-US bias and refused to work with him,

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13
Q

UNSG:
❌ examples of INCOMPETENT UNSG
BOUTROS BOUTROS GHALI

A

NO CHARISMA:
Often described as imperious, arrogant, abrasive, haughty and was not the most diplomatic, Boutros Ghali often clashed with superpowers.

  1. SOMALIA 1992-1994:
    Clashed with the USA over the extent of US involvement, was blamed by Clinton for the death of 18 US soldiers in Mogadishu in 1993.
  2. RWANDA
    Failed to act in the Rwandan Genocide (500 000-1 million massacred). Could not persuade UNSC to act do anything.
  3. BOSNIA
    Kept getting into fights with the UNSC and the US on how to best proceed with the mission, reluctant to approve NATO bombing in Bosnia to create the safe zones US wanted, contributing to the mess of the mission.
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14
Q

UNSG
🚫 examples of INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE (CW)

A
  1. TRYGVE LIE & 1946 IRANIAN CRISIS/ 1948 BERLIN BLOCKAGE (both vetoed by Soviets):
    brought up matter of Soviet troops overstaying in Iran to the UNSC, but vetoed by Soviets.
  2. U THANT & 1962 CMC/ VIETNAM WAR:
    - superpowers did more in the negotiations (CMC)
    - was opposed to the Vietnam War, tried to mediate and arrange peace talks between Washington and Hanoi which was rejected by Johnson administration. Publicly criticised US conduct of the Vietnam War, led to US marginalisation of UNSG.
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15
Q

UNSG
🚫 examples of NATURE OF CONFLICT

A
  1. HAMMARSKJOLD & 196O CONGO:
    intra-state, host state identity unclear whereby the factionalism of parties involved led to the impartiality of UNSG being compromised. Accused of being pro-West and superpower rivalry infested UNSG’s reputation — Khrushchev attacked him in GA speech, pointing to his attempts to prevent Soviet military support to Lumumba’s faction. Eventually killed in plane crash
  2. KURT WALDHEIM & Arab-Israeli conflict (1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR)
    Unable to bring any lasting solutions to the conflict. It was the US and the diplomacy of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and later President Jimmy Carter that produced the first breakthroughs in the Camp David Accords that established peace between Egypt and Israel.
  3. KURT WALDHEIM & 1979 IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS
    Waldheim flew to Tehran to negotiate the release of hostages but the Ayatollah refused to see him.
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16
Q

UNGA: role/ function

A
  • forum to discuss and debate international issues (Chapter IV, Article 10 of UN Charter)
    ‘ineffective talkshop’
    -> criticism slightly unfair since GA was not meant to be an executive body but instead a deliberate one which aims to discuss issues of international concern
  • 1 vote 1 country (Chapter IV, Article 18)
    -> representation and voice
    -> diplomacy as the means to resolve conflicts instead of resorting to armed conflict
  • make “recommendation”: “non-binding resolutions” (structural limitation):
    required 2/3 majority requisite so countries need not abide by GA resolutions
17
Q

UNGA effectiveness

A

initially

  1. Resolution 377A Uniting for Peace Resolution
    - useful when UNSC was deadlocked in 1956 Suez
    (CA):
    - invoked only 10 times (1950-1997), not recognised by great powers — Britain and France)
    - effective action? - Congo, Lebanon
    - Korean War: USA foreign policy, GA dominated by pro-West majority (USA circumvented UNSC and peace enforcement nature of the whole operation made it seem less like a UN operation and more like a US-led war to serve its own CW foreign policy objectives)
  2. Resolution 1514 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People
18
Q

UNGA ineffectiveness (reasons)

A
  1. bloc politics and North-South divide (composition)
  2. marginalised by USA’s unilateral hostility
  3. detente, UNSC’s return to the forefront
19
Q

UNGA ineffectiveness
BLOC POLITICS leading to NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE 1970S (structural limitation, large composition of GA)

A

continuity: of inefficiency and inertia in decision making: ridiculously. long sessions

-> inefficient decision making, bloc politics and disunity among its own members

due to increased membership brought about by decolonisation tide:
- newly recolonised states desired to win their economic security and redefine the rules of the economic world order which they claimed was unfair and detrimental to them
- new nations impose their own concerns on UNGA’s agenda
- LDCs often submitted incoherent, offensive resolutions and allegations that offended the Western countries (+ third world debt crisis)
- slow and wasteful decision making (nothing was achieved up through the 1980s)
- conflicting interests of LDCs and DCs clash as seen in bloc voting: DCs voted against the anti-liberal proposals by the Third World
- resolutions take a long time to be passed due to voting blocs

  • 1996 46th session went up till the eve of the opening of the 47th session
20
Q

UNGA ineffectiveness

MARGINALISED BY USA’S UNILATERAL HOSTILITY

A

USA regarded the GA as anti-America and the Third World’s “soap box” made the US unable to command majority of the votes in the GA, turned to UNSC as its primary arena to direct its foreign policy agendas:

  • 1971 GA recognised PRC instead to Taiwan
    = USA suspected collusion between the Third World and the Soviets
  • 1974 GA granted the Palestine Liberalisation Organisation (PLO) “observer status”
  • 1988 GA recognised “Palestine”
    = USA accused GA of being anti-Israeli

[results]
- 1985 Kassebaum-Solomon Agreement: asserts that voting rights should be in proportion to financial contributions, challenge 1 vote 1 country principle
- reduce contribution to UN budget from 25% to 20%

21
Q

UNGA ineffectiveness

DETENTE and UNSC’s return to the forefront

A

After 1962 CMC, superpowers entered a period of Detente marked by dialogues regarding disarmament and arms control.

USSR exercised less vetoes, signalling the revival of the role of the SC + use examples of PKOs in the 1960s

  • 1960 CONGO (UNSC deployed ONUC)
  • 1964 CYPRUS (UNSC established UNFICYP)
  • 1978 LEBANON (UNSC responded with UNIFIL)
22
Q

UNSC: role/ function

A

decision-making body:
(article 25) “binding resolution” — every UN member state obligated to follow UNSC instructions

*only organ with the authority to issue non-binding resolutions

23
Q

UNSC structural limitations

A

(article 27) VETO power + membership of P5
- superpower abuse (Britain and France veto in 1956 Suez Crisis)
- great power politics manipulation (even post-CW)
- allowed UNSC to supersede the other 2 organs

24
Q

UNSC ineffectiveness :
COLD WAR — UNSC deadlocked through superpower rivalry and abuse of veto

A

initially 1940s-50s

USSR vetoed 80 times between 1946-1955:
- 1946 Iranian Crisis: Western dominated UNSC was heavily against USSR = Soviet boycott over perceived unfair treatment
- 1948 Berlin Blockade
- 1956 Hungarian Revolution

superpowers directing, UNSC absent
- 1962 CMC
- Vietnam War
#continued up till the 1980s: 2nd Cold War (Reagan Doctrine)
Both superpowers overtly using its veto privilege to dismiss resolutions that threatened their interests:
- 1968 Prague Spring, Soviet veto on any draft resolutions
- 1986 USA in Nicaragua and Iran Contra Affair
- 1980-1988
- 1979 USSR in Afghanistan + USA’s support of mujahideen rebels
UNSC impotent throughout, superpowers were the driving forces in escalating and de-escalating conflict — Gorby’s willingness to end the CW by withdrawing Soviet troops in 1987

25
Q

UNSC ineffectiveness :
POLITICAL WILL (outside of CW rivalry)

A
  1. Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988: despite passing resolutions, the UNSC did not come to Iran’s aid and repel Iraqi invasion

Swift action was driven by economic interests when it involved highly strategic oil-producing regions where concerned all great powers immediately. Compared to the Gulf War, other major threats to international peace such as
- 1994 Rwandan Genocide
- 1992 Somalia civil war
- 1990s Kosovo
-> garnered substantially less attention, until things reach a very bad state, by which time it was arguably too late to avert a major disaster

26
Q

UNSC effectiveness
during COLD WAR (detente) — increase in superpower cooperation

A

1965 reform: revise membership from P5 to P10
- willingness to make structural changes

  1. 1960 CONGO: SC deployed ONUC to restore peace and order to the area
  2. 1964 CYPRUS: SC established UNFICYP to create a butter between the rival Greek and Turkish communities which achieved its mandate in curbing violence and maintaining law and order, even extended mission in 1974 when Turkey invaded the island

(CA): Vietnam War, CMC, 1968 Prague Spring

27
Q

UNSC effectiveness
AFTER COLD WAR — era of greater international cooperation, strong political will

A

new reforms:
- 1992 Agenda for Peace

veto:
longest period of no vetoes between 1990-1993
+ gorby’s rise (1985)

pkos:
1. 1990 GULF WAR (SC immediately condemned invasion, liberated Kuwait within a month by Feb 1991)
2. 1992 CAMBODIA: UNTAC (monitored ceasefire and took over administration)
3. 1999 EAST TIMOR: UNTAET
- further expansion of PKO mandates to include peace building efforts signalled a more cooperative approach among member states

CA: rwanda, somalia