U3 AoS 1 - Practice SAC Questions

Question 1

Explain the interaction problem and how it poses a challenge for Cartesian Dualism. (4 marks)

Answer 1

The interaction problem is essentially: how can physical and non-physical things interact with each other? This challenges Cartesian Dualism as we understand there must be some interaction. For example, we know that when parts our (physical) brain get damaged our (supposed non-physical) personality and thoughts can be altered. If our mind is only non-physical, how is this interaction taking place?

Question 2

Explain Smart’s identity theory. (2 marks)

Answer 2

Smart’s identity theory states when we speak of ‘sensations’ and ‘brain processes’ we are referring to the same thing (identity). Semantically, ‘sensations’ and ‘brain processes’ mean something differently, but ontologically they refer to the same thing.

Question 3

Explain the role of the brain in the identity theory and how it relates to mental states. (2 marks)

Answer 3

Mental states are—put simply—brain processes. When we see an after-image, a certain brain processes is happening for ‘seeing after-image’.

Question 4

Explain how Smart distinguishes between sensations and brain processes. (2 marks)

Answer 4

Smart argues when we use the word/s ‘sensations’ and ‘brain processes’ we do not mean the same thing (semantically), however he says we do refer to the same thing (ontologically). If my dog’s name is Mr Hawke, when I say “Mr Hawke” and “that dog”, I may mean something differently semantically, but I am still referring to the same dog.

Question 5

Objection 5 argues that it makes sense to describe a physical brain process as swift or slow, but not a yellowy-orange after image. Evaluate Smart’s reply to this objection. (4 marks)

Answer 5

Smart agrees, we would not call the after-image fast like we could to a brain process, however, this is where the difference between our semantics and ontology takes place. The words of ‘sensations’ and ‘brain processes’ don’t use the same logic, regardless of if they are the same thing. As he would explain we do not have the correct language to express these differences. Smart’s reply is strong, the objection fails in understanding the distinction Smart made from the beginning, a distinction that is universal in our language when we refer to one thing with multiple names.