U3 AoS 1 - Minds and Bodies Flashcards
Currently missing cards on Nagel
Monism
The theory that everything is made up of one type of thing (Physical or Non-physical)
Materialism
A form of monism: Everything is made up of physical stuff
Dualism
The theory that everything is made up of two types of things (Physical and Non-physical)
Ontology
The philosophical field of “what is there?”
Occam’s Razor
The principle of making things as simple as possible, but not simpler.
Nomological Danglers
Laws which exist so far outside of what we can currently describe. They are strange or “queer”.
What is objection 1?
Objection: If someone who doesn’t know anything about the brain or neurophysiology (an illiterate peasant), yet they can refer to their mental processes (sensations), but do not have the capacity to refer to brain processes, they must be different.
Reply: If x is identical to y, but someone is only aware of x and not y, they can still semantically refer to x, while simultaneously (yet unknowingly) ontologically refer to y. Just because I know the Morning Star, but do not know of the Evening Star or Venus, doesn’t mean that when I say “Morning Star” I am not also referring to the “Evening Star” or “Venus” ontologically.
What is the reply to the illiterate peasant objection? (Objection 1)
If x is identical to y, but someone is only aware of x and not y, they can still semantically refer to x, while simultaneously (yet unknowingly) ontologically refer to y. Just because I know the Morning Star, but do not know of the Evening Star or Venus, doesn’t mean that when I say “Morning Star” I am not also referring to the “Evening Star” or “Venus” ontologically.
What is objection 2?
Objection: The identity-theory is contingent, thus after more scientific advancement could be proven to be wrong.
Reply: Smart concedes that the theory is contingent. However, just because something could be wrong, does not mean it is. All of science is contingent, yet we do not throw it out. We should support the simpler theory (Occam’s razor)
Smart further clarifies his previous distinction between semantic and ontological identity. The Morning Star being the Evening Star is also a contingent proposition, because they do not semantically mean the same thing however through a posteriori knowledge we know ontologically they are the same. If the Fido theory were true, it would follow from “sensations” and “brain processes” having different meanings (semantically) they could not mean (ontologically) the same thing. If the meanings of an expression were what it referred to, ‘sensations’ would not be ‘brain processes’.
What is Fido theory?
The meanings of words come from causal connections. The name “Fido” for your dog, has meaning because it applies to your dog.
What is the reply to the contingent theory objection? (Objection 2)
Smart concedes that the theory is contingent. However, just because something could be wrong, does not mean it is. All of science is contingent, yet we do not throw it out. We should support the simpler theory (Occam’s razor)
Smart further clarifies his previous distinction between semantic and ontological identity. The Morning Star being the Evening Star is also a contingent proposition, because they do not semantically mean the same thing however through a posteriori knowledge we know ontologically they are the same. If the Fido theory were true, it would follow from “sensations” and “brain processes” having different meanings (semantically) they could not mean (ontologically) the same thing. If the meanings of an expression were what it referred to, ‘sensations’ would not be ‘brain processes’.
What is objection 4?
Objection: The after-image isn’t physical but brain processes are, they cannot be the same.
Reply: The after-image is not a brain process. The sensation is. This is ignoratio elenchi (disproving something not posited)
Our sensations are described with material language, not because they are material, but because we do not have the phenomenal language to describe them. Tree are green, the experience of seeing the green tree is not green.
What is the reply to after-images being non-physical yet brain processes being physical? (Objection 4)
The after-image is not a brain process. The sensation is. This is ignoratio elenchi (disproving something not posited)
Our sensations are described with material language, not because they are material, but because we do not have the phenomenal language to describe them. Tree are green, the experience of seeing the green tree is not green.
What is objection 5?
Objection: We can describe brain proccesses/molecular movements in the brain (materially) as swift or slow, straight or circular, etc. but it does not make sense to do the same for sensations.
Reply: The words ‘sensations’ and ‘brain processes’ semantically have different meanings, thus have different logic.
Just as the words “doctor” and “somebody” have different logic. The phrase “the doctor is on the phone” and “somebody is on the phone” mean different things semantically, but an be referring to the same person (the doctor)
What is the reply to brain processes being described as swift or slow, but not sensations? (Objection 5)
The words ‘sensations’ and ‘brain processes’ semantically have different meanings, thus have different logic.
Just as the words “doctor” and “somebody” have different logic. The phrase “the doctor is on the phone” and “somebody is on the phone” mean different things semantically, but an be referring to the same person (the doctor)
