Tutorial 2 - Mens rea Flashcards
1
Q
R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82
A
- D killed his 3 month old son by throwing him onto a hard surface in a fit of temper
- the judge directed the jury that if they were satisfied that D had realized there was a substantial risk V would suffer serious harm, they could convict him of murder
- D appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal, then appealed to the House of Lords
- Lord Steyn debating where further direction on intention is necessary: “is it necessary to direct the jury that they may only infer an intent to do serious injury, if they are satisfied (a) that serious bodily harm was a virtually certain consequence of the defendant’s voluntary act and (b) that the defendant appreciated that fact?… is such a direction necessary in all cases or is it only necessary in cases where the sole evidence of the defendant’s intention is to be found in his action and their consequence to the victim?”
- Steyn found it necessary to substitute “find” for “infer”
- court found that by using the phrase “substantial risk”, the original judge “blurred the line between intention and recklessness and hence between murder and manslahter”
- for further direction on intention it might be helpful for a jury to ask themselves how probable the consequence was and if D foresaw that consequence
- in rare (mostly murder) cases where simple direction is not enough, the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to infer the necessary intention unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty as a result of D’s actions and that D appreciated that this was the case
- appeal allowed - conviction of murder quashed and substituted for conviction of manslaughter because it was not virtually certain that the baby would die and he didn’t foresee serious harm/death
2
Q
Matthews and Alleyne [2003] Crim LR 553
A
- The test in R v Woollin is a rule of evidence – this means that appreciation of virtual certainty of death or serious harm does not necessary amount to intention for murder in law
- Ds threw V over a bridge into a river (after robbing and kidnapping him), killing him
- they knew that V could not swim but argued that they didn’t intend for him to do
- appealed on basis judge told jury they were must find intention for murder based on the fact death was ‘virtually certain’, rather than they were entitled to - misdirection
- appeal dismissed (despite misdirection) - convicted of murder because they aimed to harm him (to teach him a lesson for not having enough money for them to rob him as much as they’d like) and they foresaw death as ‘virtually certain’ because they were aware V couldn’t swim and left as he was screaming for help
3
Q
R v Moloney [1985] AC 905 (HL)
A
- D and his stepdad had been drinking heavily and decided to have a competition to see who could load and fire a gun the fasted. D won, but in doing so shot his stepfather dead
- argued that his purpose was to win the shooting competition, not to kill him
- the jury (correctly) found that there was no intent (lack of mens rea) - his defence was not the intoxication but the lack of mens rea
- appeal held - the original judge had given too much guidance to the jury on intent, conviction substituted for manslaughter
- convicted of manslaughter - killed him through recklessness by not foreseeing his death when he shot at him
4
Q
Re A (Children) [2001] Crim LR400
A
- 2 conjoined 6 week old twins M and J were to be separated - M could not survive alone and was reliant on J’s blood supply but J could (she couldn’t survive if they stayed conjoined), separation would kill M but save her a few months of pain as J became more active. Parents appealed on basis that the judge had erred in his decision that the operation was in the best interests of both children (they didn’t want them separated for religious regions)
- Appeal dismissed - welfare of both children was paramount, operation was in J’s best interest as it would offer her normal life and a normal life expectancy, also in M’s interest as it would save her pain (withdrawal of J’s blood supply compared to withdrawal of nourishment in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C 789)
- Did not constitute murder of M because the evil inflicted was not disproportionate to the evil avoided and the doctor did not have “murderous intent” but instead wanted to reduce pain, and they were under a duty towards J (judge questioned that if she did not survive it could be seen as manslaughter by neglect, also if they failed to operate it was virtually certain that J would die)
- “She would die, not because she was intentionally killed, but because her own body cannot sustain her life” - her death was not the purpose of the surgery - the purpose was to save J’s life
5
Q
R v Stephenson [1979] QB 695
A
- D (suffered from schizophrenia) lit a fire in a haystack which destroyed it. His illness meant that the didn’t realise that there was a risk to the haystack, so he was not Cunningham reckless as he did not foresee the risk
6
Q
R v Parker [1977] 1 WLR 600
A
- D fined £10 plus 75p compensation to post office for criminal damage to a telephone kiosk. He’d had a terrible evening (overslept, missed train station, charged excess fare) and tried to phone for a taxi, but the phone didn’t work - seen by police to ‘smash down’ a telephone handset onto the dialling box and thereby damage it
- appeal dismissed - he was aware that he was handling a plastic phone and of how much force he was using so if he was unaware of the risk of damage it was because he had closed his mind to the obvious
- “A man is reckless in the sense required when he carried out a deliberate act knowing or closing his mind to the obvious fact that there is some risk of damage resulting from that act but nevertheless continuing in the performance of the act”
7
Q
Elliot v C [1983] 2 All ER 1005 (DC)
A
- 14 year old with learning difficulties set fire to a shed by lighting white spirit - guilty of criminal damage because of caldwell recklessness - a reasonable person would realise the risk
8
Q
R v G and R [2004] 1 AC 1034
A
- 2 boys (11 and 12) went camping without parental permission - set fire to some newspapers in the early morning under a wheelie bin outside a supermarket which then spread and burnt down the shop and adjoining buildings - convicted on the basis the risk would be obvious to a reasonable person - appealed unsuccessfully to the court of appeal (judge said he regretted having to dismiss the appeal due to the laws), then onto the house of lords
- found the idea of caldwell recklessness “is capable of leading to obvious unfairness”
- discussed idea of modifying caldwell recklessness to factor in age but it wouldn’t cover mentally handicapped people and could still lead to misinterpretation
9
Q
R v Hardie [1984] 3 All ER 848
A
- Self-induced automatism caused by drugs not known to lead to aggressive behaviour such as sedatives may provide defence to crimes of basic intent
- D was charged with damaging property with an intent to danger life after becoming upset about a relationship breakdown and taking valium (a sedative), leading to him becoming aggressive and starting a fire in the flat he shared with his ex-partner and her child - judge said that self-administration of the drug did not constitute recklessness
- appealed on the basis he was unaware valium could make him aggressive - conviction quashed
10
Q
DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443
A
- Where the defendant does not have the requisite mens rea due to being voluntarily intoxicated, he is not guilty if the crime is one of specific intent, but is guilty if the crime is of basic intent
- D assaulted police officers whilst intoxicated on drugs and alcohol and was charged with occasioning actual bodily harm
- appealed against judge telling jury to disregard his intoxication when deciding if he had intent or not - because it’s a crime of basic intent not specific intent the direction was correct
- conviction upheld in House of Lords - “drunken intent is still intent”
11
Q
R v Heard [2007] EWCA Crim 125
A
- appellant convicted of sexual assault - while very drunk he exposed his penis and rubbed it on a police officer’s thigh (no recollection of this due to intoxication) and argued that the lacked the intention necessary to constitute an offence in section 3(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003
- judge ruled that the intentional requirement was one of basic intent and therefore voluntary intoxication was no defence
- D doing something he may not have done sober or not remembering it do not inhibit the intentional character of his touching - “a drunken intent is still an intent”
- if he had done it accidentally it wouldn’t be a crime - “a drunken accident is still an accident”
- appeal dismissed - “voluntary intoxication cannot be relied upon as negating the necessary intention” (Judge: Lord Justice Hughes)
- Heard is best understood as a special exception to the general rule that basic intent refers to situations in which intent is required for the mens rea - 2 special aspects of the case - lack of a lesser recklessness-based crime for which D could be convicted (so in order to be liable the offence had to be treated as one of basic intent) and drunken sexual offences are particularly harmful and common in society so protection of the public justifies an exception from the normal rules
12
Q
R v Latimer [1886] 17 QB 359
A
- Laid down the principle of transferred malice: intent need not be against the victim
- D struck a blow with his belt aimed at a man but hit V (a woman) and severely injured her. Convicted of maliciously wounding V
- Conviction upheld - transferred malice
- Lord Coleridge CJ - “It is common knowledge that a man who has an unlawful and malicious intent against another, and, in attempting to carry it out, injures a third person, is guilty of what the law deems malice against the person injured, because the offender is doing an unlawful act, and has that which the judges call general malice, and that is enough”
13
Q
Meli v R [1954] 1 WLR 228
A
- appellants as part of a preconceived plan struck a man over the head, and thinking he was dead, threw his body over a cliff - medical evidence showed that being struck over the head did not kill him, but being thrown from the cliff did - at the time of actus reus (throwing him over the cliff), Ds lacked mens rea - privy council held that they could be convicted of murder because their acts were part of a plan and so could be described as ‘one transaction’
- exception to the coincidence requirement
14
Q
Le Brun [1991] 4 All ER 673
A
- D hit his wife over the head and she collapsed, then he picked up her body to take it inside. He dropped her and she died. At no point was he planning to kill her. It was held that he could be convicted of manslaughter as the hitting and carrying of the body could be regarded as ‘one transaction’ - had he been taking her to the doctor the courts may have decided that there was not one sequence of events (more sympathetic)
- exception to the coincidence requirement
15
Q
Miller [1983] 2 AC 161
A
- D started a fire with his cigarette whilst asleep, then woke up and left the fire as it was, which then set a building alight. Convicted of arson - he set off a chain of events which posed a danger so he was under duty to act to prevent the danger. Once he was aware of the danger and failed to prevent it materialising or mitigate it, the mens rea and actus reus coincide
- exception to the coincidence requirement
16
Q
Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 (QBD)
A
- appellant was driving and asked by police officer to pull over - drove onto officer’s foot and did not immediately move the car when told to - Mr Justice James - “it is not necessary that the mens rea should be present at the inception of the actus reus; it can be superimposed on an existing act” - appeal dismissed and guilty of assault because being on the foot was a continuing act
- exception to the coincidence requirement
17
Q
Attorney-General’s Reference (No.4 of 1980)
A
- D slapped his girlfriend, pushed her down the stairs, put a rope around her neck, dragged her back up the stairs, cut her throat and cut her body into pieces - it was unclear which action caused her death (obviously it was one of them) - Court of Appeal held that as long as the defendant had the necessary mens rea at the time of each of the possible acts that caused the death he could be properly convicted of murder (or manslaughter)
- exception to the coincidence requirement - unclear when actus reus occured
18
Q
Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 - strict liability
A
- D owned a farm and let out rooms to tenants (rarely visited). Unbeknownst to her, a tenant was using the premises to smoke cannabis resin. She was charged with being concerned in the management of premises used for the purpose of smoking cannabis or cannabis resin or of dealing in cannabis or cannabis resin.
- appealed on the basis she didn’t know that was what the tenant used the property for - appeal held because she had no mens rea and the offence was not absolute (because she didn’t know)
19
Q
R v K [2002] 1 AC 462 - shows the courts presumption that an offence is not strict liability
A
- K (26) charged with indecently assaulting a 14 year old girl contrary to section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. He claimed it was consensual and she told him she was 16. Appeal allowed because the prosecution could not prove that he knew she was underage.
20
Q
R v G [2008] 1 WLR 1379 - Human Rights Act 1998 and strict liability
A
- D (15) had sex with a girl under 13 and was convicted of rape of a child under 13, contrary to section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. V told D she was 15 and had consented. D pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a 12 month detention and training order. Appealed on basis that because the offence was strict liability his ECHR Article 6 right to a fair trial had been interfered with, and that it violated his right to private life under article 8 because he was not charged with the lesser offence. Court of appeal dismissed his appeal and he appealed to house of lords
- appeal dismissed - article 6 does not engage with the content and interpretation of domestic substantive law and article 8 does not prevent the state from prosecuting offences which happen at home
21
Q
R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37 - possession offences (strict liability)
A
- appellant charged with possession of a class a drug with intent to supply, having picked up a duffel bag with 2kg of cocaine at a railway station. His defence was that he didn’t know what was in them - appeal dismissed because proof of knowledge that the thing was an article of a particular kind was not needed
22
Q
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