Tutorial 1 - Causation Flashcards
R v Stone and R v Dobinson [1977] QB 354 (CA)
- omission to help when they were under a duty of care met actus reus requirement for manslaughter
- Ds were V’s brother and his mistress - Stone partially deaf and almost blind with no sense of smell, Dobinson “ineffectual and inadequate”
- V came to live with them in a small room with no ventilation, toilet or washing facilities (except a bucket). V was eccentric and had anorexia nervosa - would go days without leaving her room and soon became helplessly infirm. 2 weeks before V’s death Dobinson washed her with the help of a neighbour who advised her to go to social services. Both S and D were advised to get a doctor by police who found V wandering the srteets and made one unsuccessful attempt to find V’s doctor but no other attempts were made to help her (even when social worker visited S’s son) and she then died. Doctors concluded that she probably would have survived if she received help soon after being washed.
- Both charged with manslaughter - convicted after appealing on basis that they took on a duty of care towards her by allowing her to live with them and caring for her in some ways (washing her, providing her food etc) so were obliged to help or summon help when she became infirm, and the breach of this duty was in reckless disregard to her health and welfare
R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161 (HL)
- omission to put out the fire that D started was sufficient to meet the actus reus of arson
- D fell asleep with a lit cigarette which then set fire to a mattress in the unoccupied house within which he was squatting - when he awoke he noticed the fire and did nothing to stop it, just moved to another room. The house caught fire and £800 of damage was done
- charged with arson and appeal dismissed - guilty of arson because he failed to act to stop it and was under a duty to prevent harm resulting, as he created the danger
- “Whether the actus reus of the offence of arson is present when a defendant accidentally starts a fire and thereafter, intending to destroy or damage property belonging to another or being reckless as to whether any such property will be destroyed or damaged, fails to take any steps to extinguish the fire or prevent damage to such property by that fire?”
Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 (QBD)
- omission to remove his car from V’s foot was sufficient to meet the actus reus for assault even if the mens rea was not present when D drove onto the foot
- D drove his car onto a police officer’s foot unintentionally and turned off his engine when the constable told him to remove his car. Convicted of assault. Even though he lacked intention when he first drove onto the foot to harm the constable, this intention arose during the continuing act of being on his foot.
- James J - it is not necessary for the mens rea to be present at the time of actus reus if it is superimposed on an existing continuing act
Speck [1977] 2 All ER 859
child innocently placed her hand on a man’s genital area and he did nothing to remove it or stop her - court labelled it as an act on his part (potentially to ensure a conviction)
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL)
- V was badly injured in the Hillsborough football disaster in 1989 (then aged 17) and suffered brain injuries which left him in a permanent vegetative state - experts found no hope of recovery
- with the concurrence of V’s family and doctors etc, the hospital sought legal declarations that they might lawfully discontinue all life-sustaining treatment and enable V to die over 3 years after the incident
- the solicitor acting on V’s behalf (not his family) appealed twice - unsuccessfully to the court of appeal then to the House of Lords
- appeal dismissed - continuing life-sustaining treatment was not seen as being in V’s best interests (parents said he wouldn’t want to live like that) - the justification for this treatment had gone and so an omission of treatment would no longer be unlawful
Larsonneur (1933) 24 Cr App R 74
- French woman permitted into the UK subject to conditions on her passport - she then had to leave the UK by a certain date, went to leave via Ireland but was brought back here by Irish police
- convicted on a charge that she “being an alien to whom leave to land in the United Kingdom has been refused was found in the United Kingdom,” contrary to Arts. 1 (3) (g) and 18 (1) (b) of the Aliens Order, 1920 - jury found her “guilty through circumstances beyond her own control”
- appealed against conviction - appeal dismissed because she was found here and “deemed to be in the class of persons whose landing had been prohibited by the secretary of state” therefore she was guilty of the offence - deportation recommended
- D was only in the UK because she was forcibly returned there by the Irish police so debate about whether it’s correct to punish her when she performed no voluntary act to put herself in a criminal situation
Dyson [1908] 2 KB 454 (CA)
White [1970] 2 KB 124 (CA)
- but for causation
- Dyson: V dying of meningitis when D injured him, and V died as a result of his injuries - Dyson was liable because but for his actions V would not have died at the time and place that he did
- White: D put poison in V’s drink and V suffered a heart attack unrelated to the poison - V would have died in the same way and at the same time regardless so the poison was not a factual cause of the death
R v Cato [1976] 1 All ER 269
- D injected V with heroin, who then died due to the drugs. D was convicted of manslaughter and of administering a noxious thing, under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.23
- D appealed because the judge did not direct the jury that for him to guilty his contribution to the death had to have been substantial and he had wrongly directed that V’s consent was irrelevant to the charge of manslaughter
- Appeal dismissed - the injection of heroin provided by D was a substantial cause of death and V’s consent is not generally a defence to manslaughter
R v Hughes [2013] UKSC 56
- D was driving on a provisional licence uninsured when V (under influence of heroin and driving erratically) crashed into him and died. D swerved to avoid the collision but V did not try to stop it - there was nothing wrong with D’s driving. D was charged with causing death by driving.
- Judge accepted that there was nothing wrong with D’s driving but felt bound by R v Williams (which ruled that a defendant’s driving did not have to be bad to have caused death by … driving). Prosecution suggested that being on the road uninsured was enough to constitute dangerous driving
- D appealed - appeal allowed because it would not be just to attach criminal responsibility to someone for a death which their actions did not cause - it’s likely V would have still crashed regardless of D’s car being there - Judge: “accepted on all sides that there was nothing Mr Hughes could have done to avoid the collision”
R v Kennedy (No2/2007) UKHL 38
- novus actus interveniens found
- D prepared a syringe of heroin for V (who asked for it) and gave it to V who then injected himself and later died as a result of the heroin
- D convicted of manslaughter for preparing and facilitating V’s taking of heroin - appealed on the grounds that V took the heroin freely, voluntarily and informed
- Appealed and first dismissed (felt that the judge’s direction was correct) but then the Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the case back to the Court of Appeal
- the judge had inadequately explained to the jury that the free, voluntary and informed act of V injecting himself would break the chain of causation between D’s supplying of the drugs and V’s death
- Appeal allowed because V’s taking of the heroin counted as a novus actus interveniens and made D’s preparation of the syringe no longer a significant cause of his death
R v Wallace [2018] EWCA Crim 690
- novus actus interveniens not found
- D threw sulphuric acid onto V (her former partner), leaving him with ‘sustained truly dreadful injuries… terribly disfigured, completely paralysed and in a permanent state of unbearable constant physical and psychological pain that could not be ameliorated by doctors’
- V then travelled to Belgium (where voluntary euthanasia is permitted)with his father for medical treatment, then decided to be euthanised and his life was ended by doctors
- The judge’s decision to withdraw the charge of murder was overturned because V’s death was seen as resulting from his injuries and the suffering caused by D - the jury had to decide if V’s decision to end his life could be seen as ‘voluntary’ (which would make it a novus actus interveniens and therefore make D no longer liable for murder)
- ‘But for’ (factual causation) makes D liable - if it wasn’t for her actions V would not have considered euthanasia
- V’s decision and the doctor’s actions could not be novus actus interveniens - they were bound up with D’s actions and were not voluntary or unfettered, being a direct response to the attack - the appeal to charge with murder was allowed (she was later acquitted of murder but convicted of applying a corrosive substance with intent)
R v Rebelo [2021] EWCA Crim 306
- novus actus interveniens not found
- D ran an internet business selling a food supplement (DNP) claiming to promote weight loss. V (a 21 yo student) purchased some, took 8 and died. DNP is not a licensed medical drug and is seen as dangerous. D was charged with murder. At the trial the defence referenced Kennedy, arguing that the victim had chosen to take the drugs and broken the chain of causation but the prosecution denied that she was acting in a free and voluntary way - evidence she had loss control of her use of DNP. D convicted of unlawful act manslaughter and appealed on the basis that the judge’s direction on the issue of a ‘free, voluntary and informed act’ was incorrect - encouraged jury to consider mental health and whether she was informed and knew the risks
- Court of appeal upheld the conviction - judge was very clear
R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279 (CA)
- D, armed with a shotgun, shot at police officers trying to arrest him for various charges, using his pregnant 16 year old girlfriend as a human shield against her will. Police officers returned fire and the girl was killed. D was charged with murder, then acquitted of murder and convicted of manslaughter. Judge directed the jury that a person is guilty of manslaughter if he intentionally did an act which was dangerous and unlawful and as such caused the death of another person. D appealed on the grounds that the judge should have left it up to the jury to decide if his act in firing at police officers was a substantial, or operative, or imputable cause of death
- The police officers shooting is not seen as a novus actus interveniens because a reasonable act done in the execution of a legal duty cannot be one
R v Field [2021] EWCA Crim 380
- D pretended to be in a caring friendship with V for a few years, then V changed his will to include D (potentially manipulated) and D began covertly drugging V, who died. Cause of death was acute alcohol toxicity and Dalmane (insomnia drug). D accepted that he’d left out the whisky to tempt V (who gave up drinking for medical reasons) but states he didn’t intend to kill him.
- Appeal dismissed - jury rejected D’s account that he wasn’t present when V was drinking whisky. Liable because him leaving out the whisky to tempt V was seen as making a ‘significant contribution’ to the death. Not NAI because V believed he was safe and in the company of someone who cared for him, unaware of D’s manipulative and dangerous intentions - not a free, voluntary and informed act because V was unaware of D’s motivations.
R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 (CA)
- D made unwanted sexual advances towards V whilst driving her in his car, attempting to remove her clothing. V jumped out of the car, terrified, and D was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm for the injuries she then sustained
- Appealed on the grounds that the judge did not direct on the idea of reasonable foreseeability, instead telling the jury that if they believed V’s story to be true then D was guilty - appeal dismissed
- not novus actus interveniens because V was acting in terror so it was not free
medical treatment and novus actus interveniens
medical treatment did break the chain of causation in Jordan [1956] 40 CAR 152
medical treatment did not break the chain of causation in Smith [1959] 2 QB 35
Jordan:
- D stabbed V, who was hospitalized and given a drug which V was allergic to so then died
- court found that the drug killed V especially since the original wound had almost fully healed at the time of death and it should have been known by the doctor that the victim was allergic
Smith:
- D, a soldier, stabbed V, another soldier, in a fight in the barracks. V was dropped twice on the way to medical treatment and doctors failed to realise that his lung was punctured (negligent treatment). D was convicted of murder and his appeal was denied because the wound which D inflicted was still ‘an operating cause and a substantial cause’ (Lord Parker CJ) despite the fact that the wound was not the sole cause of death.
R v Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844 - medical treatment and novus actus interveniens
- Cheshire (D) shot Jeffrey (V) in the leg and stomach during an argument in a chip shop. The victim was hospitalised and placed in intensive care, where a tracheotomy tube was inserted into his windpipe due to breathing difficulty. 2 months after the shooting V died due to a rare but not unknown complication of the procedure (his windpipe had narrowed). A consultant surgeon gave evidence that the leg and stomach wounds were no longer life threatening at the time of death. D was convicted of murder but appealed on the basis that the judge had wrongly directed the jury that only if the medical treatment could be described as reckless could D be said not to have caused the victim’s death
- Lord Justice Beldam - “it is not the function of the jury to evaluate competing causes or to choose which is dominant provided they are satisfied that the defendant’s acts can fairly be said to have made a significant contribution to the victim’s death”
- Appeal dismissed - his actions still made a significant contribution even if they were not the sole (or even the main) cause of death - the negligent medical treatment is not completely independent of his actions so cannot be viewed as a novus actus interveniens and did not break the chain of causation
R v Blaue [1975] 3 All ER 446 (CA) - thin skull rule
- D stabbed V, who later died after refusing a blood transfusion which would have saved her life on religious grounds (Jehovah’s witness)
- acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility - appealed
- Judge directed jury that they had to consider whether stab wounds were still a substantive or operative cause of death
- appeal dismissed - factual causation suggests that both the stabbing and the refusal of the blood transfusion are causes of death however D was not entitled to claim that V’s refusal of treatment because of her beliefs was unreasonable (makes her religion seem unreasonable), so the refusal of the transfusion is not a novus actus interveniens