Torts Learning Questions - Set 3 Flashcards
To show breach of duty, a plaintiff may rely on evidence of any of the following except:
A
Res ipsa loquitur
B
Violation of a statute
C
A “Good Samaritan” law
D
Custom or usage
C
A “Good Samaritan” law has nothing to do with breach of duty. It refers to a statute exempting licensed doctors, nurses, etc., who voluntarily and gratuitously render emergency treatment, from liability for ordinary negligence. Hence, it would not be used to establish breach of duty.
To prove breach of duty, it must be shown what in fact happened, and (based on these facts) that the defendant acted unreasonably. Proof of what happened may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Other matters may also be offered into evidence to establish the standard by which defendant’s conduct is to be measured, such as: 1. Custom or usage; 2. Violation of an applicable statute; and 3. The circumstantial evidence doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Which of the following is not required for a statutory standard of care to apply in a negligence case?
A
The statute must have been designed to prevent the type of harm that occurred
B
The statute must state clearly what standard of conduct is expected
C
The statute must provide for a civil penalty
D The plaintiff must be in the class intended to be protected by the statute
C
The standard of care in a common law negligence case may be established by proving the applicability of a statute that provides for a criminal penalty, NOT a civil penalty. If the statute applies, the statute's specific duty will replace the more general common law duty of due care. If the statute in question provides for a civil remedy, the plaintiff will sue directly under the statute: i.e., it is not a common law negligence case. For a statute to apply, the specific duty imposed by the statute must be clearly stated. The plaintiff also must show that: (i) She is in the class intended to be protected by the statute; and (ii) The statute was designed to prevent the type of harm that the plaintiff suffered.
If a statute providing for a criminal penalty is applicable to a common law negligence case, a clearly stated specific duty imposed by the statute will replace the more general common law duty of care.
Most courts hold that violation of an applicable statute __________.
A
raises a rebuttable presumption as to duty and breach
B
raises a rebuttable presumption as to breach
C
is negligence per se
D
is only prima facie evidence of negligence
C
Most courts still adhere to the rule that violation of an applicable statute is “negligence per se.” This means that the plaintiff will have established a conclusive presumption of duty and breach of duty by showing a violation of the statute. (The plaintiff still must establish causation and damages to complete the prima facie case for negligence.) For a statute to apply in a negligence case: (i) The plaintiff must show that she is in the class intended to be protected by the statute; and (ii) The plaintiff must show that the statute was designed to prevent the type of harm that the plaintiff suffered. The minority view holds either that: (i) a rebuttable presumption as to duty and breach arises, or (ii) the statutory violation is only prima facie evidence of negligence.
When a statutory standard of care replaces the common law duty of care in a negligence case, the defendant’s lack of compliance with the statute will be excused if:
A
The defendant otherwise exercised due care
B
Violation of the statute causes more danger than compliance
C
Compliance with the statute is beyond the defendant’s control
D
Violation of the statute would result in a civil infraction instead of a criminal one
C
A violation of an applicable statute may be excused if: (i) compliance with the statute would cause more danger than a violation (e.g., a defendant drives onto the wrong side of the road to avoid hitting children who dart into his path), or (ii) compliance with the statute would be beyond the defendant’s control (e.g., a blind pedestrian crosses against a light).
Violation of the statute will not be excused if violation of the statute causes more danger than compliance; this misstates the rule stated above.
It is not correct to state that violation of the statute will be excused if violation of the statute would result in a civil infraction instead of a criminal one; rather, the statute itself supplies the remedy rather than damages through a common law negligence action. The defendant will not be excused for violating the statute.
Violation of the statute will not be excused if the defendant otherwise exercised due care. When a statute is applicable, the ordinary standard of due care is replaced by the standard of care established by the statute.
While driving his car down the road, the defendant, who had no history of heart problems, experienced a heart attack. The defendant’s car crossed the center line of the highway, in violation of a motor vehicle statute, and headed directly at a car driven by the plaintiff that was exceeding the speed limit. The plaintiff, seeing the defendant’s car heading toward him, swerved to avoid the collision. In so doing, the plaintiff’s car spun out of control and crashed into a ditch, causing the plaintiff injury. The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for the injuries sustained in the accident. The jurisdiction retains traditional contributory negligence rules.
Will the plaintiff prevail?
A Yes, because the defendant’s act was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s car to swerve.
B Yes, because the defendant violated a statute by crossing the center line.
C No, because the defendant had no prior history of heart trouble.
D N, because the plaintiff was exceeding the speed limit.
C
The plaintiff will not prevail because the defendant had no history of heart problems. For the plaintiff to prevail in a claim against the defendant, the plaintiff must show (i) duty, (ii) breach of duty, (iii) actual and proximate cause, and (iv) damages. While drivers owe a duty of care to other drivers on the road, a driver would not be deemed to have breached that duty if he had a surprise heart attack while driving, given that he had no history of heart trouble. (A) is wrong because the fact that the defendant’s car was a cause of the accident does not establish breach of duty. (B) is wrong because violation of an applicable statute, which may sometimes establish breach of duty, will be excused where compliance was impossible. Here, because the defendant suffered a sudden heart attack, he was unable to comply with the motor vehicle statute. (D) is wrong. The facts do not establish whether the accident would have happened regardless of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence, but the trier of fact will not reach that issue because the plaintiff will not be able to establish the prima facie case.
On the way home from a nightclub, a passenger began yelling at the designated driver claiming that he was not taking the best route back to her house. The driver disagreed and contended that his route was the quickest. The passenger impulsively grabbed the steering wheel, causing the car to swerve and strike a pedestrian, injuring him. At trial, the pedestrian established that the driver’s license had expired the day before the accident. The driver’s traffic record qualified him for an automatic renewal of his driver’s license, but he had forgotten to submit it in time. A statute in the jurisdiction makes it an offense to drive a vehicle on any public road in the state without a valid driver’s license.
Will the pedestrian prevail?
A Yes, because the driver violated a statute by driving without a valid license.
B Yes, because the driver failed to control his passenger.
C No, because the driver did not start the argument.
D No, because the passenger’s action was the proximate cause of the injury.
D
The pedestrian will not prevail because the passenger’s grabbing of the wheel is the negligent conduct that caused the pedestrian’s injuries. To establish a prima facie case for negligence, the following elements must be proved: (i) the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant to conform to a specific standard of conduct for the protection of the plaintiff against an unreasonable risk of injury; (ii) breach of that duty by the defendant; (iii) the breach of the duty by defendant was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury; and (iv) damage to plaintiff’s person or property. Here, the driver’s actions were an actual cause of the pedestrian’s injury because, but for the driver’s driving and the passenger’s grabbing the steering wheel, the injury to the pedestrian would not have happened. However, the driver’s actions were not a proximate cause of the injury because the passenger’s grabbing of the steering wheel was a superseding intervening force. A superseding force is one that serves to break the causal connection between the initial wrongful act and the ultimate injury, and itself becomes a direct immediate cause of such injury. Thus, the first actor would be relieved of liability from the consequences of his antecedent conduct. The passenger’s conduct in suddenly grabbing the steering wheel was an unforeseeable intervening force creating an unforeseeable harmful result, and thus constituted a superseding force. Consequently, the driver would be relieved of any negligence liability since the passenger’s actions were the proximate cause of the accident. (A) is incorrect. A clearly stated specific duty imposed by a statute may replace the more general common law duty of due care when (i) the plaintiff is within the class to be protected by the statute, and (ii) the statute was designed to prevent the type of harm suffered. The statute probably does not apply here because it is intended to keep unsafe drivers off the streets, and there is no indication that the driver is an unsafe driver, or that any driver could have prevented the injury when the passenger grabbed the steering wheel. Even if the statutory standard were applicable, a violation means only that plaintiff will have established a conclusive presumption of duty and breach of duty. It does not, however, establish causation or damages. Here, the fact that the driver does not have a valid license is not the proximate cause of the pedestrian’s injury, as discussed above. (B) is incorrect because the driver had no way of knowing that the passenger would grab the steering wheel. The driver’s conduct will be measured against that of the ordinary, prudent, reasonable person who drives a vehicle. An ordinary, prudent, reasonable person would not have foreseen that one of his passengers would impulsively grab the steering wheel, and therefore there are no special safety precautions that the driver should have taken as part of his duty of care toward pedestrians. (C) is incorrect because, even if the driver had started the argument, this would not justify the passenger’s grabbing of the steering wheel. In either case, the passenger’s actions rather than the driver’s would be considered the proximate cause of the pedestrian’s injuries.
To fight drug abuse, a state enacted a statute forbidding the selling of model airplane glue to anyone under the age of 18 except in small quantities in prepackaged model kits. Violation of the statute was penalized by fines or, in cases of multiple violations, possible imprisonment. The statute also required that all elementary and secondary schools licensed by the state provide comprehensive drug education programs. Neither the legislature nor the courts of the state have abolished the common law tort defense of assumption of the risk.
The owner of a hobby shop in the state sold a large tube of airplane glue to a 15-year-old boy who reasonably appeared to be at least 18 years old. The boy had received drug education in his school, as mandated by the statute, including coverage of the dangers of glue sniffing. The boy understood the anti-drug instruction, but he wanted to experience it for himself. The boy sniffed the glue repeatedly and suffered permanent brain damage.
If the boy’s parents file suit on the boy’s behalf against the store owner, for whom is the court likely to rule?
A For the boy, because the store owner violated the statute when she sold the glue to the boy.
B For the store owner, because the boy is not a member of the class of persons meant to be protected by the statute.
C For the store owner, because the boy was aware of the danger when he sniffed the glue.
D For the store owner, because the boy could reasonably have been mistaken for an 18-year-old by the store owner.
A
The boy will prevail because the store owner’s violation of the statute resulted in the boy’s injuries. The applicable standard of care in a cause of action can be established by proving the applicability to that action of a statute providing for a criminal penalty. If this is done, a clearly stated specific duty imposed by the statute will replace the more general common law duty of care. For the statutory standard to be applicable, the plaintiff must show that (i) he is within the class intended to be protected by the statute, and (ii) the statute was designed to prevent the type of harm that the plaintiff suffered. Here, the statute clearly prohibited the transaction that took place between the boy and the store owner. It establishes the standard of care because the boy is a minor purchasing a large quantity of model airplane glue, and the serious injury he suffered from sniffing the glue was one of the harms that the statute was designed to prevent. The effect of establishing a violation of the statute is that a conclusive presumption of duty and breach of duty is established. The boy should then be able to establish that the store owner’s sale of the glue was the actual cause and proximate cause of the boy’s injuries, completing the prima facie case of negligence on the store owner’s part. (B) is incorrect because minors such as the boy who were experimenting with glue sniffing were a primary target of the statute. (C) is incorrect because the boy’s assumption of the risk is not a defense under these circumstances. The facts indicate that the state has retained the common law tort defense of assumption of the risk. Under this defense, a plaintiff will be denied recovery in a negligence action if he either expressly or impliedly knew of the risk of injury and voluntarily proceeded in the face of the risk. However, courts refuse to permit an assumption of risk defense in some situations because of public policy considerations. When a statute applies and is enacted to protect a class, members of that class will not be deemed to have assumed any risk. Here, even though the boy was aware of the danger when he voluntarily sniffed the glue, the statute was enacted to protect minors such as the boy from the dangers of glue sniffing. Thus, the store owner cannot rely on assumption of risk as a defense. (D) is incorrect because the statute does not provide for a reasonable mistake to excuse its violation. If the common law duty of reasonable care were applicable here, the reasonableness of the store owner’s mistake would be relevant. However, the statute’s specific duty replaces the more general duty of reasonable care, and violation of a statutory standard will only be excused where compliance would cause more danger than violation or would be beyond the defendant’s control. Neither situation is indicated here, so the statute applies.
A state child safety statute required children under eight years of age to be in a government-approved car seat when riding in a motor vehicle. A father was driving to a ballgame with his seven-year-old child, who was buckled in the back seat with a regular seat belt. The father did not notice when the child unbuckled himself and started climbing into the front seat. The child grabbed the steering wheel “to help daddy steer,” causing the car to swerve into the other lane and collide with another motorist’s car. The motorist was seriously injured from the collision; the father and his child were unhurt.
The motorist sued the father to recover damages for her injuries. At trial, the motorist presented evidence of the statute, her injuries, and the facts stated above. At the conclusion of the proofs, both parties moved for a directed verdict.
How should the trial judge proceed?
A Grant the motorist’s motion, because the father’s violation of the statute constituted negligence per se.
B Grant the father’s motion, because the motorist offered no evidence that the statute was intended to prevent the harm that occurred.
C Deny both motions and submit the case to the jury, because the jury could find that the father is liable for his child’s negligent conduct.
D Deny both motions and submit the case to the jury, because the jury could find that the father breached his duty of care owed to the motorist.
D
The court should deny both motions and submit the case to the jury, because the jury could find that the father was negligent in not preventing his child from grabbing the steering wheel. Under ordinary negligence principles, the father owed a duty to other motorists to maintain control of his vehicle. The jury could find that the father breached this duty of care by not noticing when his child unbuckled the seat belt and started climbing into the front seat, and not preventing the child from grabbing the steering wheel. Hence, the case should go to the jury for a determination of whether the father was negligent. (A) is incorrect because the facts do not establish that the statutory standard of care is applicable to these facts. The precise standard of care in a common law negligence case may be established by proving that a statute providing for a criminal penalty applies to the particular case. If that is done, the statute’s more specific duty will replace the more general common law duty of care. Violation of the statute establishes negligence per se—a conclusive presumption of duty and breach of duty; the plaintiff must then establish causation and damages to complete the prima facie case of negligence. To prove that the statutory standard applies, the plaintiff must show that (i) she is in the class intended to be protected by the statute, and (ii) the statute was designed to prevent the type of harm that occurred. Here, the statute likely was intended primarily to protect children from injuries caused by not being properly restrained in a vehicle involved in a collision. The motorist has presented no evidence that the statute was intended to protect her from the harm that she suffered. (B) is incorrect because even though the motorist did not establish that the statute applies to her claim, she has presented facts sufficient to allow the jury to find that the father breached the common law duty of care that he owed to other motorists. (C) is incorrect because the father is not vicariously liable for his child’s negligent conduct at common law. Any liability of the father in this case would arise from his own potential negligence in failing to control his child while driving.
