Torts Flashcards
Intentional Torts Generally
General elements: voluntary act (affirmative, not reflexive or unconscious), intent (not motive, “volition” shown by desiring consequences or having purpose to bring consequences or knowing such consequences were substantially certain to occur, children can form intent), actual causation (but for / substantial factor, liable for all consequences)
Transferred intent
Δ intends to commit a tort but instead commits a different tort, commits the same tort against a different person, or both. In those cases, the intent is transferred to the actual tort or person. Applies to battery (during apprehension), assault (during act/intent to contact), false imprisonment, trespass to land, trespass to chattels
Battery
Harmful or offensive contact with Π’s person, where Δ intended such harmful or offensive contact or imminent apprehension of such contact with Π’s person; Δ caused such contact
i. Π’s person: Π or something closely connected to Π. Π need not be aware of conduct. Delayed contact OK
ii. Direct/indirect physical contact offensive to a reasonable person (unless Δ knew Π particularly susceptible)
Assault
Act by Δ creating reasonable apprehension in Π of imminent battery (harmful or offensive contact to Π’s person), where Δ intended such apprehension and caused such apprehension
i. Π must actually suffer apprehension by apparent ability. Words alone rarely create assault (no imminence)
False imprisonment
Intentional confinement of Π to bounded area against Π’s will caused by Δ’s act/omission
i. No reasonable means of escape known to Π. Embarrassment OK. Not by reputational harm or future threats
Shopkeeper’s privilege
A shopkeeper (one tasked with safeguarding) may detain a shoplifter for a reasonable period of time, in a reasonable manner (can also be defense to battery) if the shopkeeper has reasonable suspicion to believe that the detained person committed or attempted to steal store property
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
Extreme and outrageous conduct intended by Δ that causes severe emotional distress (actual damages) (only intentional tort that requires damages)
i. Intent: Intentional or reckless
ii. Conduct exceeds all bounds of decency. Lesser showing enough for certain Δ (“gross insults” by innkeeper, common carrier) or certain Π (children, supersensitive if known to Δ, elderly, pregnant)
iii. Damages: Actual damages from severe emotional distress, not nominal damages, is required
iv. Third parties: Δ intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress and…
1. Δ knows 3P is present + direct victim is a close family relative of 3P (bodily harm not required)
2. 3P’s emotional distress is so bad that it results in bodily harm to 3P (heart attack, stroke, etc.)
Trespass to land
Δ’s intentional act (not necessarily to trespass) causes physical invasion of Π’s real property
i. Physical invasion: Entry by anything tangible (e.g., bullet, pesticide, person), not light, noise or vibrations
ii. Π’s land: Anyone in possession of land (LL, T, APer), which includes surface, airspace, subterranean space
iii. Mistake is not a defense: Δ needs intent to enter land, not intent to trespass
iv. Damages: Not required for intentional entry. Required for negligent, reckless, strict liability trespasses
Trespass to chattel
Intentional interference with Π’s possessory right to personal property (includes pets)
i. Dispossession (direct interference with possession – taking) or intermeddling (damaging)
ii. Conversion: Substantial interference with Π’s possessory right to personal property
1. Substantial interference involves longer deprivation of possessory right, full damages, destruction
iii. Π may recover rental value or full FMV at time of trespass/conversion (damages) or possession (replevin)
Defenses to Intentional Torts
Consent to Δ’s conduct, not to its consequences: Π had capacity + express/implied consent + w/in scope
1. Implied consent to reasonable tortious acts (sports). Presume consent to ordinary societal contacts
ii. Defense of self: Δ may use force reasonably believed to be necessary to avoid imminent harm by Π
1. Reasonable and proportionate to Π’s force if reasonable person would have believed under attack
2. Where there is a duty to retreat (e.g., statute), it only applies when deadly force is being threatened, and there is a safe way of escape. No duty to retreat from home
iii. Defense of property: Δ must first demand that Π stop the conduct before using reasonable force in defense
iv. Defense of others: Δ can defend a 3P from Π’s attack if Δ reasonably believed that the force used is necessary to avoid imminent harm (to the same extent that 3P would be entitled to defend himself from Π)
v. Necessity (property torts only, e.g., trespass to land or chattel)
1. Public necessity: Δ may interfere with Π’s property to protect public from harm (absolute defense)
2. Private necessity: Δ may protect individual interests if threatened harm substantially greater than Δ’s harm. Δ liable for any harm caused. Π liable for any harm caused preventing Δ’s necessary act
NEGLIGENCE
To be liable for negligence, Δ must fail to exercise such care as a reasonable person in his position would have exercised, his conduct must be a breach of the duty to prevent the foreseeable risk of harm to anyone in Π’s position, and this breach must cause Π’s damages
Duty of care
Δ owes a duty not to subject any foreseeable Π to unreasonable risk of injury. Who is foreseeable? Under the Cardozo (majority) view, Δ has a duty of care to Πs in the foreseeable zone of danger (threat of physical danger). Under the Andrews view, Δ has a duty of care to everyone (everyone is foreseeable).
Affirmative Duties
No duty owed to take steps to rescue or aid, EXCEPT where affirmative duty is created by 1) special relationship (parent-child, common carriers, innkeepers, shopkeepers), 2) Δ’s conduct creating the peril, 3) Δ’s undertaking the action for Π’s benefit (attempt to assist), 4) Δ’s creating reliance, 5) contract
Rescuers in Negligence
are per se foreseeable Π: As long as rescuer’s behavior was not wanton, rescued party (Δ) is liable for rescuer’s (Π’s) injuries caused by the rescue
Duty to control 3P in Negligence
1) “dram shop” act (served customer harms another person), 2) special relationship
Negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED)
Pain and suffering is recoverable under bystander action (Π is owed a duty if Π was present at scene (not in zone of danger) + suffered emotional distress + had close relationship with injured person) or direct action ((i) Π was in zone of danger + emotional distress from Δ’s conduct caused physical symptoms (e.g., shock), or (ii) Δ’s negligence created emotional distress)
Standard of care (extent of duty)
Δ owes a duty to act as a reasonably prudent person in same or similar situation (who has Δ’s relevant physical characteristics), absent negligence per se or a special relationship
Negligence per se (statutory)
A statute (including one that provides for criminal penalty) defines the standard if Π is in the class of persons the statute was designed to protect + injury is type of injury statute was designed to protect. An unexcused violation of statute constitutes negligence per se—a breach of duty
EXCEPTIONS: Statute may be excused if it would be more dangerous to follow it or compliance is beyond Δ’s control (unforeseeable, incapable)
Standard of Care for Children
Held to standard of reasonable child of same age, experience, intelligence, unless adult activity
Invitee
Someone who enters land open to public with potential to confer economic benefit
a. Exercise reasonable care to prevent injuries: Inspect + make safe dangerous conditions
Licensee
Someone who enters land not open to public not to confer economic benefit (guest)
a. Duty to warn of or make safe known dangers
Trespasser
Someone who enters land without express/implied consent
a. Anticipated/known trespasser: Duty to warn of or make safe known, artificial, highly dangerous conditions. Cannot use deadly force to defend property
b. Otherwise no duty to undiscovered trespassers
Artificial condition
Duty of reasonable care to entrants and known trespassers
a. If seller sold and vacated the property, his liability continues only until the buyer has had reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and take precautions
Attractive nuisance doctrine
Δ has duty to exercise ordinary care and avoid foreseeable risk of harm (warn and make safe) to children caused by artificial conditions on property if: 1) dangerous condition owner is/should be aware of, 2) owner knows/should know children frequent the vicinity, 3) condition likely to cause injury (b/c Π child’s inability to appreciate the risk—doctrine does not apply to a “bright” child), 4) expense of remedying danger is outweighed by risk
LL-T Duty of Care
LL liable for: common areas (lobby), negligent repairs, known hidden defects, reasonable care to discover and repair defects if LL knows T is going to hold property open to general public
Professionals Duty of Care
Required to possess and exercise the knowledge and skill of a member of the profession in good standing. Medical specialists held to national standard. General practitioners held to local standard
v. Custom or usage may establish standard of care, but a court may find that entire industry is negligent
Breach
Duty is breached where Δ’s conduct falls below level required by the applicable standard of care owed to Π
Negligence per se
Violation of applicable statute (see above). Π must still establish causation and damage
Res ipsa loquitur
creates an inference of negligence (p/f case for jury, deny directed verdict for Δ) where 1) type of accident is typically the result of negligence, 2) accident is attributable to Δ (Δ had sole control of the instrumentality causing injury), and 3) Π did not contribute to the injury. Δ may rebut with evidence