TORT Flashcards
A man has a heart attack at home and his wife calls for an ambulance. It takes the ambulance four hours to arrive as all local ambulances are dealing with a multiple car crash. The local Ambulance Service has recently suffered cuts in funding. By the time the ambulance arrives, the man is dead. Which of the following statements is most accurate regarding whether a duty of care was owed to this man by the ambulance service?
A duty of care was not owed as policy reasons justify the delay.
A duty of care was owed given the severity of his illness.
A duty of care was owed to arrive within a reasonable time.
A duty of care was owed to arrive as soon as possible given the proximate relationship between the man and ambulance service.
A duty of care was owed as operational failures have led to the delay.
A duty of care was owed to arrive within a reasonable time.
Correct:There is clear precedent that on acceptance of a 999 call by the ambulance service, they owe a duty of care to respond within a reasonable time (Kent v Griffiths & Others[2000] 2 All ER 474).
While the other options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
A duty of care will always be owed on acceptance of the 999 call by the ambulance service (Kent v Griffiths & Others[2000] 2 All ER 474). Whether policy reasons (cuts in funding) are the cause of the delay is an argument relevant to breach of duty.
There is established precedent for the ambulance service owing a duty of care on acceptance of the 999 call (Kent v Griffiths & Others[2000] 2 All ER 474), so the courts would not have to discuss whether there was a proximate relationship between the claimant and defendant.
A duty of care will always be owed on acceptance of the 999 call by the ambulance service (Kent v Griffiths & Others[2000] 2 All ER 474). Whether operational failures are the cause of the delay is an argument relevant to breach of duty. For example, should they have sent one of the ambulances at the car crash to the man having a heart attack?
A duty of care will always be owed on acceptance of the 999 call by the ambulance service (Kent v Griffiths & Others[2000] 2 All ER 474), regardless of the severity of the illness. Decisions made regarding who to prioritise would be an argument relevant to breach of duty.
A woman is in a supermarket when she collapses from a heart attack. The store manager puts a call out over the tannoy system asking if there is a doctor present. A customer hears the announcement and being a nurse comes forward and tries to help. The nurse fails to put the woman in the recovery position and the woman later dies.
Which of the following statements is the court most likely to agree with in relation to duty of care?
The store manager owed the woman a duty of care as he took steps that suggested he had assumed responsibility for her welfare. The nurse owed a duty of care once she started to help.
The store manager did not owe the woman a duty of care as he omitted to help her. The nurse owed a duty of care once she started to help.
The store manager owed the woman a duty of care as he was in a position of responsibility. The nurse owed a duty of care once she started to help.
The store manager did not owe a duty as he could not foresee the harm. The nurse owed the woman a duty of care as she assumed responsibility for her welfare.
The store manager did not owe the woman a duty of care as they were strangers. The nurse, as a qualified medical professional, owed a duty to assist.
The store manager owed the woman a duty of care as he took steps that suggested he had assumed responsibility for her welfare. The nurse owed a duty of care once she started to help.
Correct. Had the store manager done nothing then no duty of care would be owed. However, as he made an announcement over the tannoy he has arguably taken steps that suggest he has assumed responsibility for the woman’s welfare (Barrett v Ministry of Defence [1995] 1 WLR 1217). The nurse owed a duty of care once she started to assist (Barrett v Ministry of Defence).
While the other options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
Even if the claimant and defendant are complete strangers, a duty of care can be owed where the defendant assumes responsibility for the claimant’s welfare. The fact the nurse was a qualified medical professional does not mean she owed a duty to assist. The duty only arose once she started to assist.
The store manager’s position at work did not mean he owed a duty.
A reasonable person would be able to foresee personal injury if a woman collapsed.
The store manager has not omitted to help her. He has taken steps that suggest he has assumed responsibility for her welfare.
Two friends are in a sailboat. The boat begins to sink and the two friends shout ‘help’ repeatedly to Friend A who is watching from the shore. Friend A hears them but does nothing to help them as he cannot swim.
Which of the following statements best describes whether a duty of care was owed by friend A to the two friends?
Friend A owed a duty of care to assist once he heard the two friends shouting for help.
Friend A owed a duty of care as he/she could foresee the risk of personal injury.
Friend A owed a duty of care to assist as Friend A had assumed responsibility for the welfare of the two friends.
Friend A did not owe a duty of care as there was nothing he/she reasonably could have done to help given he/she could not swim.
Friend A did not owe a duty of care, his failure was one of omission.
Friend A did not owe a duty of care, his failure was one of omission.
Correct
Correct. As a general rule, the law of tort does not impose a duty of care for a mere failure to act (Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241). None of the exceptions to this general rule apply.
While the other options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
It does not matter that Friend A heard the two friends shouting help. Friend A would only owe a duty of care once he started to assist and had assumed responsibility for their welfare.
The fact pattern does not suggest that Friend A assumed responsibility for the two friends – he/she omitted to do anything.
Friend A may well have foreseen the risk of personal injury if he or she did nothing. However, a duty of care would not be imposed on this basis alone. There would have to be some kind of ‘proximity’ between the parties.
The fact that Friend A could not swim is irrelevant. Friend A was not obliged to help his/her friends even if he/she could swim.
The door to an off licence is left unlocked one night by a cleaner. Some youths enter, consume large quantities of alcohol and cause lots of damage. When leaving the off licence, the youths vandalise the expensive garden ornaments belonging to the neighbour of the off licence. This has never happened before.
The cleaner owes the off licence a duty of care as he/she created the dangerous situation.
The cleaner owes the off licence a duty of care as the damage to the off licence was reasonably foreseeable.
The cleaner does not owe the off licence a duty of care as this would be unfair, unjust and unreasonable.
The cleaner owes the off licence a duty of care due to their contractual relationship.
The cleaner does not owe the off licence a duty of care as she is unlikely to be able to pay any damages.
The off licence does not owe the neighbour a duty of care as they could not foresee the damage caused by the vandals.
The cleaner owes the off licence a duty of care due to their contractual relationship.
The off licence does not owe the neighbour a duty of care as they could not foresee the damage caused by the vandals.
Correct. The cleaner has omitted to lock the door. As a general rule in the law of tort, no duty of care is owed for an omission (Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241). However, this case falls within one of the exceptions to the general rule and Stansbie v Troman [1948] 2 KB 48can be relied on as precedent. The cleaner has failed to perform a quasi/contractual obligation.
The off licence would not owe the neighbour a duty of care because they could not foresee the property damage caused by the vandals. The facts are comparable to Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241. Geographic proximity will not be enough to create a duty of care between the off licence and neighbour. There needs to be a closer relationship (see exceptions) for a duty of care to be imposed for a failure to prevent a third-party cause harm.
While the other options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
The damage to the off licence was reasonably foreseeable to the cleaner. However, the courts would not have to consider this as there is precedent they can rely on in relation to the cleaner owing the off licence a duty of care.
Geographic proximity will not be enough to create a duty of care between the off licence and neighbour. There needs to be a closer relationship (see exceptions) for a duty of care to be imposed for a failure to prevent a third-party cause harm.
The courts have precedent to rely on in relation to the cleaner owing the off licence a duty of care, so they would not have to consider whether it was fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty. If they did consider policy, arguably it would be fair to impose a duty on the cleaner. See above regarding geographic proximity.
The off licence probably does not owe a duty of care, partly, because they would not have foreseen the damage caused by the youths (Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241). However, given there is precedent, it is irrelevant that the cleaner would be unable to pay damages. The cleaner would owe a duty of care.
The cleaner might owe a duty based on the fact that they created the danger by leaving the door unlocked, Stansbie v Troman [1948] 2 KB 48. However, the off licence does not owe the neighbour a duty of care simply because they were responsible for the cleaner. This does not fall into any of the exceptions for a failure to prevent a third-party causing harm.
A police informant is claiming damages for negligence by the police. It is alleged that the police negligently left the informants contact details unattended in a police car which was stolen, and eventually reached the criminal against whom the informer had given evidence. The criminal broke into the informers’ house and physically assaulted them.
Which of the following statements best describes the principal reason why the police might owe the informer a duty of care?
A duty of care is owed because it is fair, just and reasonable.
A duty of care is owed because the police assumed responsibility for the informant’s welfare.
A duty of care is owed because the informant is an identifiable victim.
A duty of care is owed because the police created the source of danger.
A duty of care is owed because the informant has suffered a personal injury.
A duty of care is owed because the police assumed responsibility for the informant’s welfare.
Correct
Correct: This answer best reflects why the Court of Appeal imposed a duty of care in the case of Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria (No.2), The Times, 25 May 1999 (same facts as the fact pattern). The police assume responsibility to protect informers against the criminals they give evidence about. Informers should not be considered like other members of the public; they have a special relationship with the police.
While the other answer options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
It would be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care but this would not be the principal reason for imposing a duty (rather it would support that conclusion). The focus would be on whether the police had assumed responsibility for the claimant’s welfare (proximity).
Whilst being an identifiable victim certainly supports the argument for imposing a duty of care, recent case law suggests that not only must the claimant be identifiable, but the police must also have clearly assumed responsibility for the claimant’s welfare (Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] 1 AC 874 , CN and GN v Poole Borough Council [2019] UKSC 25).
Whilst creating the source of danger could support the argument for imposing a duty of care, this argument was not emphasised in Swinney and focus seems to be on assumption of responsibility.
It is likely that in this scenario a duty of care would be owed for personal injury, but not for any property damage or economic loss. However, the fact the informer has suffered personal injury is not the reason why a duty would be owed.
A householder carries out some trivial repair work on her property, including the door handle on her front door. The handle has not been fixed properly. When the householders’ friend comes over, he pulls the handle and it comes off in his hand. He falls backwards and sprains his wrist.
Which of the following statements best describes the standard of care owed by the householder?
The standard of care expected of the householder would be that of the reasonable man.
The standard of care expected of the householder would be that of a reasonably competent carpenter.
The standard of care expected of the householder would be that of a reasonable homeowner.
The standard of care expected of the householder would be that of a reasonably competent professional carpenter.
The standard of care expected of the householder would be that of a reasonably competent amateur carpenter.
The standard of care expected of the householder would be that of a reasonably competent amateur carpenter.
Correct
Correct. The facts are very similar to the case of Wells v Cooper [1958] 2 QB 265 in which the defendant fixed his doorknob. When the claimant opened the door, the doorknob came away from the door and the claimant slipped, fell and injured himself. There were two standards to choose from, that of the reasonably competent professional carpenter and that of the reasonably competent amateur carpenter. The Court of Appeal held the defendant to the standard of the reasonably competent amateur carpenter, which was lower than the standard expected of a professional. The job in question was a trivial domestic replacement. Had the job been something more ambitious, the standard might have been different.
While the other answer options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
Given that the householder was carrying out trivial repair work, it would not be appropriate to hold her to the professional standard. It is unlikely that special skills and expertise were needed.
It is not incorrect to say that the householder would be held to the standard of the reasonable man, but it is more accurate to say that of the reasonably competent amateur carpenter. The standard of care attaches to the act (Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1987] QB 730).
The same reasoning applies to the inaccuracy of a reasonable householder. This is too broad.
It is important to make it clear whether the standard is amateur or professional, as this will affect whether or not there has been a breach of duty. Less will be expected of the amateur carpenter.
A patient develops permanent spinal curvature after undergoing routine surgery to his back. The surgeon has used the ‘Slice and Dice’ technique which carries a 15% risk of spinal curvature. The newer ‘Plice’ technique, as very recently highlighted in ‘Cutting Edge Weekly’ medical magazine, carries only a 5% risk of spinal curvature. However, the surgeon was not aware of it.
Which of the following statements best describes breach of duty in relation to the surgeon?
It is reasonable to expect the surgeon to keep up to date and he therefore should have used the ‘Plice’ technique. It was recently featured in ‘Cutting Edge Weekly’ magazine and it carries a 10% lower risk of spinal curvature.
It is reasonable to expect the surgeon to keep up to date and informed about all innovations such as the ‘Plice’ technique, by whatever means necessary.
It is unreasonable to expect the surgeon to have been up to date about the ‘Plice’ technique, when the ‘Splice and Dice’ technique has had an 85% success rate so far.
It would be unreasonable to expect the surgeon to have known about and implemented the new ‘Plice’ technique whilst conducting the routine back surgery. This was only recently featured in Cutting Edge magazine; it is a weekly magazine and is not a mainstream medical journal.
It is reasonable to expect the surgeon to attempt to minimise all risk. As such the surgeon should have been aware and employed the ‘Plice’ technique as it was featured in ‘Cutting Edge Weekly’ magazine.
Correct. It would be unreasonable to expect the surgeon to know about every new medical development. The courts recognise that it would be too onerous to expect medics to have to keep up to date with all the very latest treatments and procedures pursuant to Crawford v Governors of Charing Cross Hospital, The Times, December 8, 1953. Nevertheless, they must take reasonable steps to ensure they are up to date with mainstream developments especially with the availability of information online (Gascoine v Ian Sheridan & Co and Latham [1994] LS Law Med 437). In addition, the name of the magazine suggests it is providing the very latest information, insights and innovations in the medical field rather than being a mainstream journal. The fact that it is a weekly journal means that it might be burdensome to expect a medic to keep up with the pace of a weekly journal.
While the other answer options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
Medics must take reasonable steps to ensure they are up to date with mainstream developments (Gascoine v Ian Sheridan & Co and Latham [1994] LS Law Med 437) but it is too onerous to expect medics to keep up to date with all the very latest treatments (Crawford v Governors of Charing Cros Hospital, The Times, December 8, 1953).
It would be unreasonable and too onerous to expect a medic to keep up to date with the very latest innovation and to have to implement this new ‘Plice’ technique, as proposed or highlighted in the weekly magazine, in particular, one labelled ‘Cutting Edge’ (Crawford v Governors of Charing Cross Hospital, The Times, December 8, 1953). So although it is correct to state that the surgeon does not have to keep up to date with the new ‘Plice’ technique, the reasoning i.e. that the other has a 85% success rate, is incorrect.
It is correct to state that surgeon should attempt to minimise all risk, however, it would be unreasonable and too onerous a burden to expect the surgeon to keep up to date with the very latest innovation and to have to implement this new ‘Plice’ technique, as proposed or highlighted in the weekly magazine, in particular, one labelled ‘Cutting Edge Weekly’ (Crawford v Governors of Charing Cross Hospital, The Times, December 8, 1953).
The surgeon should keep up to date with all mainstream developments per Gascoine v Ian Sheridan & Co and Latham [1994] LS Law Med 437); but to expect the surgeon to have implemented the latest ‘Plice’ technique, despite it carrying a lower risk, would be unreasonable and too onerous a burden (Crawford v Governors of Charing Cross Hospital, The Times, December 8, 1953). The comment that the surgeon should be up to date by whatever means necessary is not a legal requirement.
A footballer attends hospital seeking medical treatment for his injured knee. The doctor recommends surgery. The footballer is asked to sign a consent form before the procedure, which he does. The footballer does not ask, and is not told, of the risks of the surgery. In fact, there is a 1% risk of permanent nerve damage. The operation is carried out without error by the doctor. The footballer develops permanent nerve damage and can no longer play football.
Which of the following best explains the legal position in relation to the potential breach of duty by the doctor?
A doctor has a duty to inform a patient of any risk over 10%. As the risk of permanent nerve damage was only 1%, the doctor has not breached his duty of care.
As the footballer freely signed the consent form before the surgery, there can be no breach of duty for failure to advise on the 1% risk of nerve damage.
The doctor performed the surgery without error and so there is no breach of duty. Further the footballer did not ask about the risks of the surgery and there was therefore no duty on the doctor to inform him of such a small (1%) risk.
The footballer will have to show that a reasonable body of medical men carrying out this medical procedure would have informed him of the 1% risk of nerve damage. If this is established the doctor will have breached his duty of care.
The doctor had a duty to inform the footballer of all material risks of the surgery. The 1% risk may be small, but it would still be material to a footballer. The doctor is in breach of duty.
The doctor had a duty to inform the footballer of all material risks of the surgery. The 1% risk may be small, but it would still be material to a footballer. The doctor is in breach of duty.
Correct
Correct. A doctor owes a duty to inform a patient of all material risks associated with a procedure and of all reasonable alternatives (Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015[ SC). The test of materiality applies and requires a doctor to consider what the particular patient would consider material and what a reasonable person in the patient’s position would consider material. In this case a footballer would clearly consider permanent nerve damage a material risk and he should have been informed of this.
While the other options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect, which should be self-explanatory following the feedback above on why this answer was correct. Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015[ SC confirms that the Bolam test has no application to a failure to warn of the risks.
A receptionist at a car factory would occasionally walk pass other employees whilst they were working with spray paint. Those working with the spray paint were provided with masks as the employer was aware of the risk of lung cancer from prolonged exposure to the paint. The receptionist contracts lung cancer. Since the receptionist was diagnosed, medical science has concluded that even occasional exposure to the paint increases the risk of lung cancer.
Which of the following statements best describes breach of duty in relation to the employer?
A reasonable employer may not have been able to foresee the likelihood of harm, but given there was some knowledge of the risk of lung cancer and given the ease of precautions (provision of face masks for all employees exposed to the paint), the exposure was in breach of duty.
A reasonable employer would not have known that there was a danger to those who did not have prolonged exposure to the paint, and therefore failure to take precautions against such exposure was not a breach of duty.
A reasonable employer would have provided all employees with any level of exposure to the paint with masks, given the magnitude of potential harm and the ease of precautions, and is thus in breach of duty.
A reasonable employer would not have taken precautions against such exposure as the risk of lung cancer was so low. Such exposure was therefore not in breach of duty.
A reasonable employer would not have taken precautions (provision of face masks) as this was disproportionate to the likelihood of harm. The exposure was therefore not in breach of duty.
A reasonable employer would not have known that there was a danger to those who did not have prolonged exposure to the paint, and therefore failure to take precautions against such exposure was not a breach of duty.
Correct. The courts must assess the defendant’s actions against the knowledge in the industry at the time of the alleged breach (at the time the receptionist was exposed to the paint). This is known as the ‘state of art’ defence (Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 QB 66). The employers did not know about the risk of lung cancer from occasional exposure to the paint at the time of the breach and would not, therefore, be expected to take precautions against an unknown risk.
While the other answer options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
Whilst the courts will balance likelihood of harm against practicality of precautions when assessing breach (Wagon Mound (No. 2) [1967] 1 AC 617), there must be some foreseeability of harm in order for there to be a breach (Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850) and there was none here.
As above, whilst the courts will balance magnitude of harm against practicality of precautions when assessing breach (Wagon Mound (No.2) [1967] 1 AC 617), the magnitude of harm must be foreseeable (Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] AC 367) in order for there to be a breach and it was not here.
The risk of lung cancer was not low. It was not known at all (in relation to occasional exposure).
Taking precautions against an unknown risk would be considered disproportionate (Latimer v AEC Ltd [1953] AC 643) but there was no foreseeable likelihood of harm.
A father has recently become reconciled with his daughter after a long period of estrangement. As a result, he makes an appointment with his experienced solicitor to amend his will to include a legacy of £100,000 to his daughter. He sees a trainee solicitor instead and instructs him accordingly. One month later, the father dies of a sudden heart attack. Due to pressure of work, the trainee solicitor had not amended the will.
Which of the following statements best describes the standard of care owed by the trainee solicitor?
The standard of care is that of the reasonable man as the trainee solicitor was not professing to be a qualified solicitor.
The standard of care is that of a reasonably competent trainee solicitor.
The standard of care is that of an experienced private client solicitor as an experienced solicitor should have been overseeing the trainee solicitor.
The standard of care is that of a reasonably competent solicitor.
The standard of care is that of the ordinary reasonable man exercising and professing to be a private client solicitor.
The standard of care is that of the ordinary reasonable man exercising and professing to be a private client solicitor.
Correct
Correct. The standard for a professional is the standard of the ordinary reasonable man exercising and professing to have that special skill, which on the facts is that of a qualified private client solicitor (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582). It is irrelevant that the person conducting the work was a trainee solicitor as the standard of care is objective and attaches to the ‘act not the actor’ (Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1987] QB 730).
While the other answer options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
As mentioned above, it is irrelevant that the person conducting the work was a trainee solicitor as the standard of care is objective and attaches to the ‘act not the actor’ (Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1987] QB 730). Here the act was the act of a solicitor (drafting wills).
It is not incorrect to say that the standard would be that of a reasonably competent solicitor, but it is more accurate to say that of a reasonably competent private client solicitor. Solicitors specialise in particular areas of law and the courts will be concerned with what a reasonable body of private client solicitors would have done, in the same way that the courts differentiate between, for example, GPs and surgeons.
It does not matter that a more experienced solicitor should have been overseeing the trainee solicitor. It is the trainee solicitor that has potentially been negligent and he will be judged by the standard of a qualified solicitor (see above). In any event, level of experience is not really relevant to standard of care as the person need not possess the highest expert skill at the risk of being found negligent. It is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular profession.
A patient attends A&E with a severe headache. A doctor briefly examines the patient and tells them to stay in the waiting room, where the patient has a seizure and dies. Medical evidence suggests that if the doctor had treated the patient properly, there was a 40 per cent chance of living.
Which of the following statements best describes whether the patient’s estate can claim damages from the doctor for the patient’s death?
The patient’s estate can claim damages from the doctor because the negligent failure to treat the patient materially increased the risk of the patient dying.
The patient’s estate cannot claim damages from the doctor because the seizure was a natural cause of death.
The patient’s estate cannot claim damages from the doctor because the ‘but for’ test is not satisfied.
The patient’s estate can claim damages from the doctor because the negligent failure to treat the patient materially contributed to the patient’s death.
The patient’s estate can claim damages from the doctor because the negligent failure to treat the patient reduced the claimant’s chances of surviving.
The patient’s estate cannot claim damages from the doctor because the ‘but for’ test is not satisfied.
Correct: But for the doctor’s breach (briefly examining the patient), the patient still would have died at that time and in that way on the balance of probabilities (Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital [1969] 1 QB 428). There was only a 40 per cent chance that the patient would have lived if the doctor had examined the patient properly i.e. there was a 60 per cent chance that the patient would have died even if the doctor had examined the patient properly and not been negligent.
While the other answer options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
Factual causation cannot be satisfied for personal injuries based on loss of chance (Hotson v East Berkshire Health Authority [1987] AC 750). Where the risk of damage without the breach is 50 per cent or more, the claimant will fail to establish factual causation.
The material contribution test does not apply here. This is not a case where medical science cannot establish the probability that ‘but for’ the breach the death would not have happened. Medical evidence confirms that there was a 60 per cent chance of death even without the breach.
Just because a seizure can be a natural cause of death this does not mean that factual causation will fail. The question is whether the seizure would have happened but for the breach on the balance of probabilities (Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital [1969] 1 QB 428).
The material increase in risk test does not apply here as currently this is confined to industrial disease cases, namely mesothelioma and lung cancer caused by exposure to asbestos (Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd & Others [2003] 1 AC 32).
A man is in a car accident and suffers a head injury. On arrival at hospital, the man is not seen by a doctor for five hours. After seeing the doctor, he is immediately referred for an MRI (a type of scan producing images of inside the body), but there is a further delay of two hours. He is left brain damaged. Medical evidence suggests that the car accident, the first delay and second delay were all capable of contributing to his brain damage.
Which of the following statements is most accurate regarding factual causation in relation to the man’s brain injury?
Factual causation cannot be established as it cannot be shown that ‘but for’ the breaches (two delays) the man would not have suffered brain injury.
Given the car accident and two delays were all capable of causing or contributing to the brain injury, the material contribution test is satisfied.
Factual causation fails as it could have been the car accident, not the breaches (the two delays) that caused the brain injury.
There is a greater chance that the breaches (two delays) caused the brain injury than the car accident so factual causation is satisfied.
The two delays materially increased the risk of brain injury meaning factual causation is satisfied.
Given the car accident and two delays were all capable of causing or contributing to the brain injury, the material contribution test is satisfied.
Correct: This is a case where medical science cannot establish the probability that ‘but for’ an act of negligence (the delays) the brain injury would not have happened, but it can establish that the contribution of the delays was more than negligible (therefore the material contribution test is satisfied) (Bailey v Ministry of Defence [2008] EWCA Civ 883). Medical evidence established that all three causes were capable of contributing to the brain injury.
While the other answer options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
The material increase in risk test does not apply here as currently this is confined to industrial disease cases, namely mesothelioma and lung cancer caused by exposure to asbestos (Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd & Others [2003] 1 AC 32).
Given this is a case where the medical evidence cannot attribute the brain injury to a specific cause, but can say that the car accident and breaches (two delays) contributed to the loss, the courts can depart from the ‘but for’ test and apply the material contribution test (Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613). If the medical evidence had said that it was the car accident OR the breaches which caused the brain injury (not both), then factual causation might have failed on the basis that it could have been the car accident rather than the breaches that caused the brain injury, applying the ‘but for’ test as per Wisher v Essex AHA [1988] AC 1074.
Medical evidence established that all three causes were capable of contributing to the brain injury. It has not been possible to separate out the relative contribution of the three factors, so it is not possible to say that there is a greater chance that the breaches caused the loss.
As explained above, this is a case where the courts might depart from the ‘but for’ test and apply the material contribution test instead (three possible causes and the two delays have made a more than negligible contribution) (Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613).
A woman contracts mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos. Medical evidence has proved that mesothelioma (a type of lung cancer) can be caused by a single asbestos fibre entering the lung. The woman was negligently exposed to asbestos by a previous employer over 40 years ago. She was also exposed to asbestos in the general atmosphere as a young girl, as she lived in close proximity to a factory which used asbestos.
Which of the following statements is most accurate regarding factual causation in relation to the previous employer?
Factual causation fails as the woman cannot show on the balance of probabilities that the employer caused her mesothelioma. The woman could have been exposed to the single fibre as a young girl.
Factual causation is satisfied as there is a chance that the employer caused the woman’s mesothelioma.
Factual causation is satisfied as the employer materially contributed to the woman’s mesothelioma.
Factual causation is not satisfied as there are two possible independent causes and the ‘but for’ test therefore fails.
Factual causation is satisfied as the woman can show that the employer materially increased the risk of her contracting mesothelioma.
Factual causation is satisfied as the woman can show that the employer materially increased the risk of her contracting mesothelioma.
Correct
Correct. It is impossible for medical experts to say which exposure caused the mesothelioma. The ‘but for’ test therefore fails as it cannot be said on the balance of probabilities that the employer caused the woman’s mesothelioma (there is only a 50 per cent chance). However, this is an example of where the courts depart from the ‘but for’ test and apply the material increase in risk test (McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1, applied in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd & Others [2003] 1 AC 32). The employer might well be held liable for damage that it did not cause but this has to be weighed against the argument that people who suffer harm due to their employers’ breach deserve to be compensated. In mesothelioma cases, science is unable to provide the claimant with the means to ever establish factual causation using the ‘but for’ test (unless the claimant worked for only one employer who exposed them to asbestos, which is rare). The courts have therefore concluded that to achieve fairness the ‘but for’ test should be departed from and the material increase in risk test applied. Here it could be shown that the employer materially increased the risk of the woman contracting mesothelioma (given it only takes one fibre to cause the disease).
While the other answer options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
This is a situation (mesothelioma cases) where the courts depart from the ‘but for’ test and apply the material increase in risk test instead(McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1, applied in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd & Others [2003] 1 AC 32). It therefore does not matter that the woman cannot show on the balance of probabilities that the employer caused the mesothelioma.
The employer is liable for the mesothelioma because there is a chance it did cause the disease, but the correct legal terminology is material increase in risk(McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1, applied in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd & Others [2003] 1 AC 32).
The material contribution test does not apply here. As mesothelioma can be caused by exposure to a single asbestos fibre, the woman will not be able to prove on the balance of probabilities that the employer materially contributed (made a more than negligible contribution). The employer may have made no contribution at all to the disease.
There are two possible causes and the ‘but for’ test does fail, but this is an example of where the courts depart from the ‘but for’ test and apply the material increase in risk test instead (McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1, applied in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd & Others [2003] 1 AC 32).
Larry suffers physical injuries as a result of falling from a theme park ride. The theme park had failed to install appropriate safety measures. Larry is taken to hospital where a surgeon operates on him. Larry has an allergic reaction to the anaesthetic and suffers additional nerve damage.
Which one of the following is correct with regard to legal causation?
The actions of the surgeon will break the chain of causation and the theme park will only be liable for Larry’s original physical injuries and not the nerve damage.
The actions of the surgeon will not break the chain of causation but the theme park will only be liable for Larry’s original physical injuries.
The actions of the surgeon will break the chain of causation and the theme park will not be liable for any of Larry’s injuries.
The actions of the surgeon will break the chain of causation but the theme park will remain liable for all of Larry’s injuries.
The actions of the surgeon will not break the chain of causation and the theme park will be liable for all of Larry’s injuries.
The actions of the surgeon will not break the chain of causation and the theme park will be liable for all of Larry’s injuries.
Correct
Correct. The courts are reluctant to hold that medical treatment breaks the chain of causation and will only do so where the treatment is so gross and egregious as to be unforeseeable (Robinson v The Post Office).
While the other answer options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
If the actions of the surgeon did break the chain of causation (which they do not on these facts), the theme park would still be liable for any injuries Larry suffered prior to the surgeon’s act.
The actions of the surgeon are highly unlikely to break the chain of causation because they are not so gross and egregious as to be unforeseeable.
If the actions of the surgeon do not break the chain of causation, the theme park will remain liable for any losses flowing from their breach (physical injuries and nerve damage).
A scaffolder attends a building site where he is working. The day before, his colleague failed to secure some timbers properly. These fall on the scaffolder’s head and cause him to suffer a serious head injury. He had not yet put on his safety hard hat.
What is the scaffolder’s legal position regarding legal causation in his negligence claim against his colleague?
The scaffolder’s failure to wear a hard hat would be considered highly unreasonable and would therefore break the chain of causation. He will not receive any damages for his head injury.
If the scaffolder’s failure to wear a hard hat is considered unforeseeable, this may break the chain of causation.
If the scaffolder’s failure to wear a hard hat is considered unreasonable, this may break the chain of causation, but a court is more likely to deal with this in terms of contributory negligence.
If the scaffolder’s failure to wear a hard hat is considered highly unreasonable, this may break the chain of causation, but a court is more likely to deal with this in terms of contributory negligence.
If the scaffolder’s failure to wear a hard hat is considered unreasonable, this may break the chain of causation.
If the scaffolder’s failure to wear a hard hat is considered highly unreasonable, this may break the chain of causation, but a court is more likely to deal with this in terms of contributory negligence.
Correct
Correct. The scaffolder’s failure to wear a hat might be considered highly unreasonable and therefore break the chain of causation (McKew v Holland). However, this answer reflects the approach of the courts in preferring to reduce the damages of a culpable claimant rather than find that the claimant’s actions have broken the chain of causation.
While the other options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect. (unreasonable is not enough; it has to be highly unreasonable)
A man broke his leg when he was negligently hit by a car. This injury would normally result in a two month absence from work. However, due to a pre-existing condition that he has, his leg does not fully recover and he is also left with a permanent limp.
Which of the following statements best describes what the man can claim from the negligent driver?
The man can claim for personal injury for the broken leg and permanent limp, together with consequential economic loss for his lost earnings from not being able to work for two months.
The man can claim for personal injury for the broken leg and permanent limp.
The man can claim for his lost earnings from not being able to work for two months.
The man can claim for personal injury for the broken leg.
The man can claim for personal injury for the broken leg and consequential economic loss for his lost earnings from not being able to work for two months.
The man can claim for personal injury for the broken leg and permanent limp, together with consequential economic loss for his lost earnings from not being able to work for two months.
Correct: This answer applies the principle that the tortfeasor must take the Claimant as they find them as set out in Smith v Leech Brain [1962] 2 QB 405. Consequently, the driver is liable in relation to both the broken leg and the permanent limp. It also correctly identifies the economic loss as consequential economic loss given that the loss (i.e. the loss of earnings) is as a result of a personal injury (i.e. the broken leg).
While the other answer options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
The explanation above should explain why the other options are incorrect, namely the other options do not allow recovery for all the losses suffered by the man.
A decorator negligently left an oil lamp burning in a woman’s house. The woman was unaware of the lamp and bumped into it by accident. The lamp fell and then exploded, causing the woman to suffer severe burns.
Which of the following statements best describes what the woman can claim from the decorator in negligence?
The woman cannot claim for anything as burns from an explosion were not reasonably foreseeable.
The woman cannot claim for anything as she can only claim for losses that are a direct result of the decorator’s breach.
The woman can claim for personal injury for the severe burns as this loss was a direct result of the decorator’s breach.
The woman can claim for personal injury for the severe burns as damage caused by fire was reasonably foreseeable.
The woman can claim for minor burns as damage caused by a fire was reasonably foreseeable but not from an explosion.
The woman can claim for personal injury for the severe burns as damage caused by fire was reasonably foreseeable.
Correct: This answer applies the principle that once it has been established that the kind of damage is reasonably foreseeable, there is no need for it to be reasonable for the Defendant to foresee the exact circumstances leading up to the damage, as set out in Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837.
While the other options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
The explanation above should explain why the other options are incorrect, i.e. they do not apply the legal principle from Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837. Two of the options refer to ‘direct result’ of the breach. This is the historic test for remoteness which has been replaced with reasonable foreseeability (Wagon Mound No 1 [1961] AC 388).
During a premier league football match, a footballer suffers a broken leg after another player executes a dangerous and serious foul tackle against them.
Which of the following statements best describes whether the player who executed the tackle (‘the defendant’) can successfully rely on the defence of volenti?
The defendant can rely on volenti because the injured footballer consented to the risk of being tackled during a football match.
The defendant can rely on volenti because the injured footballer had the capacity to consent and knew the nature and extent of the risk of harm by participating in the football match.
The defendant cannot rely on volenti because the injured footballer did not expressly consent to the risk of injury.
The defendant cannot rely on volenti because the injured footballer did not consent to dangerous play showing reckless disregard for their safety.
The defendant can rely on volenti because the injured footballer impliedly consented to the risk of injury by playing in the football match.
The defendant cannot rely on volenti because the injured footballer did not consent to dangerous play showing reckless disregard for their safety.
Correct. This is the correct law for volenti in relation to sport.
While the other options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
It is highly unlikely that a participant in sport will be found to have consented to something that happens outside the rules of the game and shows a reckless disregard for their safety (e.g. a dangerous and serious foul tackle).
In order to rely on volenti, the defendant need not prove that the claimant expressly consented to the risk of injury. Consent can be implied. The reason consent has not been implied here is stated in the paragraph above.
Nothing on the facts suggest that the footballer did not have capacity to consent. However, it is highly unlikely that they will be assumed to have known that there was a risk of injury caused by a dangerous and serious foul tackle i.e. by dangerous play demonstrating a reckless disregard for their safety.
A pedestrian is negligently knocked over by a cyclist who was travelling very fast. The pedestrian suffers a serious head injury and is in hospital for two weeks, during which time they cannot work, but they receive contractual sick pay from their employer. They die from their head injuries two weeks after the accident.
Which of the following statements is most accurate in relation to damages that the pedestrian’s estate might receive if successful in a claim for negligence against the cyclist?
The pedestrian’s estate is likely to be awarded compensatory damages, divided into special and general damages. The contractual sick pay will not be deducted from any special damages awarded. The general damages will include a PSLA award.
The pedestrian’s estate is likely to be awarded compensatory damages, divided into special and general damages. The contractual sick pay will be deducted from any special damages awarded. The general damages will not include a PSLA award.
The pedestrian’s estate is likely to be awarded compensatory damages, divided into special and general damages. The contractual sick pay will not be deducted from any special damages awarded. The general damages will not include a PSLA award.
The pedestrian’s estate is likely to be awarded special damages only. The contractual sick pay will be deducted from any special damages awarded.
The pedestrian’s estate is likely to be awarded compensatory damages, divided into special and general damages. The contractual sick pay will be deducted from any special damages awarded. The general damages will include a PSLA award.
The pedestrian’s estate is likely to be awarded compensatory damages, divided into special and general damages. The contractual sick pay will be deducted from any special damages awarded. The general damages will include a PSLA award.
Correct
Correct. Compensatory damages are by far the most common type of damages awarded in the tort of negligence. The aim of such damages is to put the claimant in the position they would have been in but for the defendant’s tortious act, as far as this is possible with an award of money. Even though the pedestrian has died, their estate may bring a claim for any losses suffered by the pedestrian as a result of the accident up to the date of death. This is calculated on the same basis as a normal personal injury award, but no claims can be made for any losses that might have arisen after the date of her death (s.1(2)(a) Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934).
The pedestrian’s estate will therefore be entitled to special damages which cover specifically provabale and quantifiable financial losses, for example, loss of earnings. However, deductions will be made for any contractual sick pay the pedestrian received before they died. This is to avoid the claimant receiving two sums of money for the same reason.
The estate will also be entitled to general damages which will include a sum for the PSLA award (the pain, suffering and loss of amenity award). This award attempts to provide some financial compensation for the effect of the injury. The court would therefore assess the PSLA suffered by the pedestrian from the time of the accident until the date of death.
While the other options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
The explanation given above for why this answer is correct should explain why the other options are incorrect.
A teenage boy is cycling on a narrow country road at a fast pace as he is training for a race. A woman is walking along the road with her dog, which is not on the lead. The dog barks furiously at the cyclist and jumps in front of the bicycle, causing the boy to fall and suffer a broken shoulder.
Which of the following represents the best advice to the woman in relation to defences to a negligence claim by the boy?
The defence of volenti will apply as the boy has chosen to run an obvious and serious risk of harm in cycling at a fast pace on a country lane.
There will be no defence available to the woman as the boy has done nothing wrong.
The defences of volenti and contributory negligence will apply as the obvious and serious risk of harm in cycling at a fast pace has contributed to the harm suffered by the boy.
The defence of contributory negligence will apply as the boy’s actions have contributed to the harm he has suffered.
The defence of contributory negligence will apply to negate any liability of the woman.
The defence of contributory negligence will apply as the boy’s actions have contributed to the harm he has suffered.
Correct. Contributory negligence would probably be argued successfully here as the facts appear to satisfy the two-stage test from Jones v Livox Quarries: (1) the boy has failed to take reasonable care for his own safety by cycling at a fast pace on a narrow country road, and (2) this has contributed, at least to some extent, to the injuries he has suffered. If the court were satisfied that this test was satisfied, they would have the power to reduce the boy’s damages by a ‘just and equitable’ amount: s.1 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945
While the other options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
The given facts are unlikely to satisfy the four-stage test for volenti. Even if the boy has capacity to consent and is taken to have understood that there is a risk of accident when cycling fast on a narrow country road, he will not be found to have consented to the negligence of the woman in failing to control her dog on a public road, ie. the nature and extent of the risk has not been understood. Furthermore, although he has voluntarily run the risk of injury, the risk itself is unlikely to be regarded as such an obvious and serious risk as to satisfy the threshold set for implied agreement to harm: see Morris v Murray.
The speed at which the boy is cycling, given that this is a narrow country road, may be found to show a lack of reasonable care for his own safety, which has contributed to the harm he has suffered. It is not therefore correct to say that the boy has done nothing wrong.
The defence of contributory negligence is a partial defence which operates to reduce the level of damages payable by a defendant but does not negate liability.
A supply music teacher (‘the Teacher’) is sent by their agency, to work at a private school for one week. The Teacher is paid by their agency. The school stipulates that the Teacher must arrive at the school before 9am every weekday. They are free to work elsewhere at the weekends. While the Teacher is setting up the school stage for a music concert, they accidentally drop a music stand on the foot of one of the pupils. The pupil suffers swelling and bruising to their foot.
Which of the following statements is most accurate?
The pupil can bring a claim against the Teacher in negligence and the school in employers’ primary liability as they have failed to provide the pupil with competent staff.
The pupil can bring a claim against the Teacher in negligence and against the agency vicariously.
The pupil can bring a claim against the Teacher directly in negligence and vicariously against the school.
The pupil can bring a claim against the Teacher directly in negligence and vicariously.
The pupil can only bring a vicarious claim against the school if they can establish that the Teacher is an employee of the school
The pupil can bring a claim against the Teacher directly in negligence and vicariously against the school.
Correct: The pupil can bring a claim vicariously against the school because even though the Teacher is unlikely to be deemed an employee of the school as they will not satisfy the test from Ready Mixed Concrete v Ministry of Pensions, they may be deemed to be in a relationship akin to employment with the school (Barclays Bank v Various Claimants). They committed the tort as a result of an activity (setting up the music stage) which they performed on behalf of the school and the school exercised a significant degree of control over what the Teacher did.
While the other answer options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
The pupil would not be able to bring a claim against the school in employers’ primary liability as they are not an employee of the school.
The pupil can bring a vicarious claim against the school if the Teacher is in a relationship akin to employment with the school (not just if the Teacher is an employee of the school).
The pupil cannot sue the agency vicariously. The Teacher is not the agency’s employee nor are they in a relationship akin to employment with the agency. Applying the economic reality test from Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions, it is unlikely that the Teacher will be deemed to be the agency’s employee. The agency is unlikely to exercise the requisite day to day control over the Teacher to render them an employer. In addition, it is unlikely that the Teacher is in a relationship akin to employment with the agency given the five-stage test approved in Barclays Bank.
The pupil would not be bringing a claim against the Teacher vicariously. Vicarious liability is relevant when the claimant sues the defendant for a tort committed by someone else. Here, the Teacher has committed the tort so any claim against the Teacher will be direct.
A yoga instructor employed at a dance academy is asked to cover a Zumba class. The yoga instructor is not supposed to teach Zumba because of a pre-existing knee injury, which their employer knows about. Nevertheless, they agree feeling concerned they may lose their job if they refuse. Halfway through the class the yoga instructor’s knee gives way and their knee has to be operated on. When the yoga instructor returns to work, a colleague laughs at their injury. The yoga instructor gets verbally aggressive and kicks their colleagues’ leg. The yoga instructor has a history of violent mood swings.
The colleague could bring a claim against the yoga instructor in the tort of battery. What other claims arise from these set of facts?
The yoga instructor and the colleague can bring vicarious liability claims against the dance academy.
The yoga instructor and the colleague can both bring direct employers’ primary liability claims against the dance academy.
The yoga instructor can bring a claim in employers’ primary liability against the dance academy. The colleague can bring both a vicarious claim against the dance academy, and a direct claim in employers’ primary liability.
The yoga instructor can bring both a vicarious claim against the dance academy, and a direct claim in employers’ primary liability. The colleague can bring an employers’ primary liability claim against the dance academy.
The yoga instructor and the colleague can both bring vicarious liability and direct employers’ primary liability claims against the dance academy.
The yoga instructor can bring a claim in employers’ primary liability against the dance academy. The colleague can bring both a vicarious claim against the dance academy, and a direct claim in employers’ primary liability.
Correct: the yoga instructor is employed by the dance academy and can therefore bring a claim against them in employers’ primary liability for breach of duty (the duty to take reasonable precautions to ensure an employee’s safety, including safe systems of work) (Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57).
The colleague can bring a vicarious claim against the dance academy for the yoga instructors’ assault. A tort has been committed, by an employee and during the course of employment. In addition, the colleague can bring an employers’ primary liability claim against the dance academy. They are employed by the dance academy and can therefore bring a claim against them in employers’ primary liability for breach of duty (the duty to take reasonable precautions to ensure an employee’s safety, including the provision of safe and competent employees) (Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57).
While the other options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
The yoga instructor cannot bring a vicarious claim against the dance academy. It is the dance academy that has committed the tort and so the yoga instructor must sue them directly.
A crane driver negligently caused personal injury to a woman through their operating of the crane. The crane driver has a contract with the company they work for and this contract describes them as self-employed. The contract stipulates that their working hours are 9am to 6pm and that they must work for the company at least three days a week. They are paid at the end of the month for the number of hours they have worked. They use the company’s crane when working and must wear the company’s uniform. The woman wants to sue this company vicariously for the crane driver’s negligence.
Which of the following statements most accurately describes whether the woman can sue the company vicariously?
It is highly likely the crane driver is the company’s employee, meaning the woman can sue the company vicariously for the crane driver’s negligence. They are likely to be an employee because they have entered into a contract with the company.
It is highly likely the crane driver is the company’s employee, meaning the woman can sue the company vicariously for the crane driver’s negligence. The crane driver is likely to be an employee because the company exerts a high degree of control over the crane driver and the crane driver is paid in exchange for their service.
It is highly likely the crane driver is the company’s employee, meaning the woman can sue the company vicariously for the crane driver’s negligence. The crane driver is likely to be an employee because the company pays the crane driver regularly for the number of hours they work each month.
It is unlikley that the crane driver is the company’s employee, meaning the woman cannot sue the company vicariously for the crane driver’s negligence. They are unlikely to be an employee because the contract states that the crane driver is self-employed.
It is unlikely that the crane driver is the company’s employee, meaning the woman cannot sue the company vicariously for the crane driver’s negligence. They are unlikely to be an employee because the company only pays the crane driver for the number of hours worked rather than a fixed salary.
It is highly likely the crane driver is the company’s employee, meaning the woman can sue the company vicariously for the crane driver’s negligence. The crane driver is likely to be an employee because the company exerts a high degree of control over the crane driver and the crane driver is paid in exchange for their service.
Correct. Applying the multiple factors test from Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions [1968] 2 QB it is likely that the crane driver is an employee of the company despite being described as self-employed. The crane driver receives remuneration in exchange for their personal service, and the company exert a high degree of control over them, requiring them to work for the company three days a week between 9-6 and to wear their uniform. We are not told of any contractual factors (except the label) that are inconsistent with employment, in fact, we are told that the crane driver must use the company’s tools at work. Overall, this suggests the crane driver is the company’s employee and as their employer, the company can be vicariously liable for their negligence committed during the course of employment.
While the other options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
It is correct that the fact the crane driver is paid regularly by the company, this is an indicator that the crane driver is their employee. However, there are additional indicators of the crane driver’s employment status (as discussed above).
The label in a contract as to whether someone is employed or self-employed is taken into consideration when determining employment status, but it is not conclusive. All relevant contractual terms are considered to determine the true nature of someone’s employment status.
The first stage of the test from Ready Mixed focuses on remuneration in exchange for personal service – regular remuneration (not just a fixed salary) is evidence of being an employee. The crane driver must work for the company at least three days a week, so will be receiving regular pay in exchange for their personal service.
Just because the crane driver has a contract with the company, this does not mean that they are an employee. It will be the terms of the contract that determine this, subject to the test from Ready Mixed.
A construction employee is told by their employer that they must wear a safety hat at all times whilst on the construction site. One day they arrive for their shift but have forgotten to bring their safety hat. The site foreman gives the employee a safety hat, but the employee refuses to wear it. The site foreman allows the employee to work anyway. During the employee’s shift they suffer a serious head injury which would have been avoided had they been wearing a safety hat.
Which of the following best explains whether or not the employer has breached its duty of care to the construction employee?
The employer is not in breach of its duty as the construction employee refused to wear the safety hat provided.
The employer is in breach of duty as it has failed to provide safety equipment and safe and competent employees.
The employer is not in breach of its duty as it employed a foreman to try and ensure that a safe system of work was operated.
The employer is not in breach of its duty as it told the construction employee to wear a safety hat at all times.
The employer is in breach of duty as it has failed to operate a safe system of work and to provide safe and competent employees.
The employer is in breach of duty as it has failed to operate a safe system of work and to provide safe and competent employees.
Correct. An employer owes a non-delegable duty of care to its employees both to provide a safe system of work and to operate that system. The foreman is acting on behalf of the company when they fail to operate the safe system in place. The employer can therefore be directly liable for the foreman’s failure to operate the safe system. The question of whether insistence on using safety equipment provided should be resorted to depends on the nature and risk of harm liable to occur if the equipment is not worn. Here the nature and risk of harm is serious and it is probable that insistence on wearing the safety hat was appropriate (Bux v Slough Metals [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 155). In addition, given the foreman allowed the employee to work without a safety hat, the employer has arguably failed to provide safe and competent employees (Black v Fife Coal Ltd [1912] AC 149).
While the other options might sound plausible, they are each incorrect.
The employer has provided safety equipment. The issue is whether the foreman should have insisted on the construction employee wearing the safety hat.
There are circumstances in which it may be appropriate for an employer to insist that an employee wear/use safety equipment. It is often not enough to just provide and tell employees to use safety equipment. Not only must a safe system of work be provided, it must also be operated.