Topic One - Concept Of Land Law Flashcards
Akodu v Omodiji
Principle: A traditional ruler has no more than a life interest in any such land and cannot claim the land as his own or as representing his family property held in trust for himself and the family.
Fact: The Court held that the “Iga” of Chief Oloto is the official residence of any reigning chief and not the personal family property of any one member or branch of the local ruling dynasty.
Oba Adeyinka v Oba Adele
Verity CI held that the limitation of the right of the traditional leader in stool land “arise from the question of whether the right of use is absolute or beneficial.” He went further to state that the right of use is not “free from the usufructuaryqualification of his title as the Oba,” thus he merely holds the land in trust for the heirs to the throne and the community.
Oluwasago v Adebanjo
The case of Alhaji Lamidi Daodu Olowosago v. Alhaji Amuda I. Adebanjo centered around a dispute over a piece of land located along Lagos-Ikorodu Road in Ikorodu, Lagos State.
Background Facts:
The land in question was originally owned by the Aige family. In 1959, the Aige family granted the land to eight individuals, who were children and grandchildren of Chief T.K. Dada, a member of the Aige family. This grant was formalized in a deed of conveyance (Exhibit A).
The plaintiffs in the case, the Olowosagos, claimed to be descendants of Chief T.K. Dada and, therefore, entitled to the land. They argued that the land was family property and that the grant in Exhibit A did not divest the family of its rights.
The defendant, Alhaji Amuda I. Adebanjo, claimed to have purchased the land from two of the grantees named in Exhibit A. He argued that the grantees had the right to sell the land as individual owners and that the plaintiffs had no legal claim to the property.
Key Issues:
Nature of the grant in Exhibit A: Was it a grant to the named individuals as individuals or as representatives of the Aige family?
Rights of the plaintiffs as descendants of Chief T.K. Dada: Did they have any legal right to the land, given that they were not named as grantees in Exhibit A?
Validity of the sale to the defendant: Was the sale valid, considering the nature of the grant in Exhibit A and the potential rights of the Aige family?
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court, in its judgment, held that:
The grant in Exhibit A was a grant to the named individuals as individuals, not as representatives of the Aige family.
The plaintiffs, as mere descendants of Chief T.K. Dada, had no legal right to the land, as they were not named as grantees in Exhibit A.
The sale to the defendant was valid, as the grantees had the right to sell their individual shares in the land.
Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial court and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim.
Archibong v. Archibong
Fact Summary:
This case involved a dispute over land ownership within a community. The core issue was the extent of the traditional ruler’s authority over communal land. The court clarified that while the traditional ruler may have significant influence and control over communal land, they are not absolute owners. The ruler’s role is more akin to that of a trustee, responsible for managing the land for the benefit of the entire community.
Francis V Ibitoye
The plaintiff built a house on the defendant’s land without the defendant’s knowledge or license. The plaintiff had been in negotiate about a sale of land by the defendant to the plaintiff. No contract of sale was concluded but 26 British pounds had been paid by the plaintiff on account of the price of the land. The plaintiff claimed his 26 pounds and the cost of erecting the building. Held: The court held that the principle of Quic quid plantatur solo solo cedit applied “It is trite law that a building erected in the circumstances indicated becomes the property of the land without any obligation upon him to recompense the builder.
Nepa v Amusa
NEPA wrote to the Bale of Idimu who was then the head of the respondents’ family of its intention to enter their land for the purpose of erecting electricity poles. The erection of the poles and the electric wires disturbed the respondents’ land thus rendering the same unsuitable for any development. With the promulgation of NEPA Decree No. 24 of 1972, NEPA concluded that no compensation will be paid to the respondent and the respondent instituted this action. The trial judge gave judgment for the respondent after holding that the word ‘building’ in the contents of section 33 of the NEPA Decree includes land and thus compensation in respect of damage to land is also impliedly. On appeal, the appellants contended that by the provisions of Section 33(1) of the Decree, compensation is payable only in respect of buildings, crops or economic trees and not for deprivation of use of the land Held: The Supreme Court agreeing with the appellant’s position however recognized the principle of Quic quid plantatur solo solo cedit to be good law. It is a general rule of great antiquity and it means that whatever is affixed to the soil becomes, in contemplation of law, a part of it, and is subjected to the same rights of property as the soil itself. Thus, if a man builds on his own land with the materials of another, the owner of the soil becomes in law, the owner also of the building. Similarly, if trees were planted or seeds sown in the land of another, the owner of the soil became the owner also of the trees, plants or the seeds as soon as they had taken. Of course, this general rule of law is subject to any contract entered into by the parties and also to the doctrine and rules of equity. Apart from these exceptions which are not relevant to the case in hand, we are not aware of any general rule of law, and the learned trial judge did not refer to any, which says that the reverse, except as defined in specified statutes, is possible and that a building could therefore, for all purposes, include land on which it is built. We think the learned trial judge was clearly in error in holding, as he did, that the word “building” used in Section 33(1) of the Decree includes “land”. the express provision of Section 33(1) of the NEPA Decree for the payment of compensation for damage to buildings, crops and economic trees only goes to show that no other damage to the land was permissible; but it cannot go to show, in the absence of any clear provision to that effect, that any other damage, such as the one complained of by the respondents in this case, is permissible.
Okokoiko v Esudalu
The Supreme Court held that all improvement made by a pledger on the pledgor’s land belongs to the pledgeor upon the redemption of the land.
Sateng v Darkwa
The WACA took a different approach when it held that any development made on a family land is different and separate from the land itself
Owoo v Owoo
Held that any improvement made on a family land belongs to the family.
Alao v Akani
Any improvement made on a family land belongs to the family.
Etim v Eke
The plaintiffs were customary tenants of the defendants. It was found as a fact that the defendant’s duly consented to the plaintiffs sharing with them the right to harvest palm nuts. The plaintiffs exercised the rights for some years but later the government granted to one A an exclusive right to cut palm nuts on the land. A not only cut a large quantity of palm nuts but also carried those already cut by the plaintiff. In addition he installed a machinery on the land for the purpose of cutting the nuts Held: The Court granted damages for trespass and an order entitling the plaintiff to share in the proceeds of the land.
