Topic 3 - Land Right Flashcards
Abioye v Yakubu
Principles
It is not right to say that once the customary tenant committed an act which amounted to misbehavior he forfeited his tenancy, even though the overlord had not sought an order of Court. The overlord was entitled to overlook or waive the act of behavior. If he did so, the relationship of the parties continued.
Case Summary
The first plaintiff was the village head of Basanyin village, the other plaintiffs were his chiefs. The defendants were customary tenants, who together with their ancestors, had been in occupation of the land in question for approximately sixty years. The plaintiffs called the disputed land “Gaa Kekere” or “Gaa Oke”. Despite this, and without the plaintiffs’ consent, the defendants erected on the land three huge signboards depicting a different name and suggesting thereby that the settlement belonged to Irapa village. This caused the plaintiffs to seek declaratory orders that the land still belonged to them, that the defendants were mere tenants for purposes of grazing and farming, that no alienation by way of a sale or gift had taken place and that the refusal of the defendants to remove the “offensive” signboards constituted an act of nuisance. The plaintiffs further sought an order that the defendants remove the signboards and, finally, a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from erecting similar structures in future. In turn, the defendants counter-claimed. Declarations were sought that the land customarily belonged to them and that the village be known as “Gaa Irapa”. Furthermore, injunctions were claimed to restrain the plaintiffs from trespassing and from removing the signboards, as well as damages against the plaintiffs for having trespassed on the land, which, the defendants claimed, belonged to them. The cardinal issue to decide herein was whether the provisions of the Land Use Act 1978, in particular Sections 1 and 36 thereof, read together with the definition clauses in Section 50, had abolished the rights of customary owners vis-à-vis customary tenants of land for agricultural purposes. Held: The trial court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs in so far as the declarations relating to title were concerned. The Court of Appeal, however, set that judgment aside, finding, amongst others, that the customary tenant is in fact the “holder” as defined in Section 50 of the Act. The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, and with all seven judges unanimous in their findings, the plaintiffs’ appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal was allowed. The appeal was upheld. Bello CJN of opined that “Notwithstanding the definition of holder under section 50 of Land Use Act, the customary tenant who was to actual possession and using the land at its commencement a beneficiary of customary rights of the occupancy.” One would observe that Act did not expressly divest and extinguish the customary rights of the owner of Agricultural land in non-urban areas as it did in respects of undeveloped land in excess of half hectare, in urban areas. Therefore, with absence of expression provision of the Act divesting the customary owner of his rights to tributes, reversion and the right to forfeiture, section 36 of the Land Use Act ought to be strictly construed so as to preserve the rights of the customary owner.” Therefore, the extent of the Land Use Act was not to equate a land owner with the tenant who is lawfully occupying the land. According to Nnaemeka Agu, all the arguments that the Act expressly abolished customary rights and obligation over agricultural land were inferential. The Act clearly show that it is intended that every interest shall continue such as section 40 which provides that all existing laws relating to registration of title, interest in land or transfer of interest in land shall have effect subject to such modification as will bring those laws in conformity with the Act and its general intendment. Indeed the whole power of renovation of a customary right of occupancy, which include a deemed grant under section 28 of the Act courses the clear implication that such rights survived the promulgation of the Act for if such customary right were abolished by the Act, there would be nothing left to revoke.
Mills v Corporation Colchester
(1867)
the defendant owned an oyster fishery and licenses were granted to apprentices of a certain district to
fish when fees were paid.
However, although the plaintiff was qualified and willing to pay the fee, the defendants refused him a license. It was held that the inhabitants never had peaceful enjoyment of fishing as of right so there was no custom which the inhabitants could enforce.
Ibrahim v Mohammed
Principle: the rights that will be extinguished by virtue of Section 5(2) of the land use act are mere licence or usufruct but not rights which are capable in law of being alienated
Fact:
- Dr. Mohammed (respondent) was granted a C of O in 1977 under the Land Tenure Law.
- Major Ibrahim (appellant) claimed to have purchased the land later, obtaining C of Os in 1987 (for his vendor) and 1988 under the Land Use Act.
- Dr. Mohammed sued for declaration of title, damages for trespass, and an injunction.
- The trial court ruled in favor of Dr. Mohammed, a decision upheld by the Court of Appeal. Major Ibrahim then appealed to the Supreme Court.
- Key Issues and the Supreme Court’s Decision
- Section 5(2) of the Land Use Act: This section states that a new statutory right of occupancy extinguishes existing rights. The appellant argued this extinguished Dr. Mohammed’s earlier C of O. The Supreme Court clarified that this section must be read in context with the entire Act, which aims to preserve existing land holdings. The Court held that a subsequent C of O does not automatically extinguish a prior, valid C of O unless the prior grant is formally revoked according to the Act (Section 28), which requires “overriding public interest,” notification, and potentially compensation. Since this revocation process was not followed for Dr. Mohammed’s C of O, the later C of Os issued to the appellant were deemed invalid. The Court distinguished this case from previous rulings that dealt with conflicts between customary and statutory rights of occupancy, not between two statutory rights.
- Priority and Validity of C of Os: The Court affirmed that determining the priority and validity of the C of Os was central to the case. Because Dr. Mohammed’s C of O was first in time and had not been validly revoked, it held superior title.
Outcome:
The Supreme Court dismissed Major Ibrahim’s appeal, affirming the lower courts’ decisions. The key takeaway is the interpretation of Section 5(2) of the Land Use Act: a subsequent statutory right of occupancy does not automatically extinguish a prior one without proper revocation under Section 28 of the Act. The principle of “first in time” generally prevails when dealing with competing valid C of Os.
Ogunmola v Eiyekole
Principles: the right to acquire land in Nigeria is only available for Nigerians. A foreigner who seeks to hold a land in Nigeria may however set up a company in Nigeria to hold interest in land.
Ogunleye v Oni
This case emphasizes the limitations of the Land Use Act of 1978 in arbitrarily divesting individuals of their land. The plaintiff, relying on a grant from the Osu people and a Certificate of Occupancy (C of O) from the Governor, claimed title to disputed land. The defendant countered that his father had possessed the land since 1936 through an allocation from the Ogboni settlor at Osu.
The court held that the Land Use Act is not intended to be a tool for unjustly seizing land. It affirmed that unless land is compulsorily acquired under Section 28 of the Act for overriding public interest, no one can be deprived of their land without compensation. The court declared the plaintiff’s C of O void, stating it was merely a “piece of paper having no value” because it did not reflect prior existing rights.
The key principles established are:
- Protection against arbitrary deprivation: Land cannot be taken without compensation unless acquired for overriding public interest under Section 28 of the Land Use Act.
- C of O does not guarantee title: A C of O does not preclude the court from investigating the validity of the title claimed prior to its issuance. It serves as evidence of possession or occupation as a holder, not as a definitive declaration of ownership that overrides prior existing rights.
Mora V Nwalusi
Principles
A pledgor may at any time redeem a customary pledge by paying back the loan and the pledgee must vacate or be ejected; Once a pledge always a pledge
Case Summary
There was a dispute arose between two communities, the Amawbia and Awka. The matter was regarding about 250 acres of land taken from the original owners, the Norgu, who were conquered in the war. The Awkas alleged that they laid siege and conquered the land all by themselves, while the Amawbias claimed that they were part of an allied force and that war had been waged by a group of communities. Thus, their share of the spoil was the 250 acres in dispute. The court ruled in favour of the Amawbias, because they were in ‘actual possession’ of the land. Held: It was legitimate for a family to base its ownership of land to act of conquest in the distant past. The rule in customary law is that a person doesn’t necessarily lose his title by merely going out of possession for a long time A pledgee made a coconut plantation on the pledge land. When the pledgee sought to compensate the pledgor’s son, the later refused and wasted on redeeming his late father’s land (South the portion). The pledgee claimed that by sitting and allowing him to improve the land, the pledgor and his successors were estopped from disputing that the pledgee was the owner of the land. Held: The WACA refused to accept that once a pledgee had planted on a piece of land, contrary to native custom, this was conclusion that the land was sold to him not pledged. It is indeed fallacious and contrary to the accepted custom which is equivalent to the English maxim, once a mortgage always a mortgage. However, where the pledgee sells the land to third party, such act will be inconsistent with the owenership rights of the pledgor and if after becoming aware, they stand by while the purchaser incur pecuniary expenses in the honest belief that his title is valid, the pledgor and his successors lose the right to redeem.
Abinabina v Eyinamadu
This West African Court of Appeal case, The Stool of Abinabina v. Chief Kojo Enyimadu, concerned a land dispute where both parties claimed ownership. The appellants (Stool of Abinabina) claimed ownership based on traditional evidence and alleged tribute payments by the respondents. The respondents had been in possession of the land for many years.
The trial judge ruled in favor of the respondents, stating that the appellants needed to show “positive and numerous acts within living memory” to prove ownership. The West African Court of Appeal affirmed this decision.
The appellants appealed to the Privy Council (the highest court of appeal at the time), arguing that the trial judge erred by requiring proof of numerous acts within living memory and by dismissing their traditional evidence.
The Privy Council allowed the appeal, making the following key points:
- Traditional evidence is valid: The requirement for “frequent and positive numerous acts within living memory” to establish title was incorrect. Traditional evidence is a valid form of proof in land ownership cases.
- Point of law can be raised on appeal: Even though the specific legal argument regarding traditional evidence wasn’t raised in the West African Court of Appeal, the Privy Council allowed it because it was a substantial point of law and no further evidence could change its impact.
- Exception to concurrent findings: While the Privy Council generally respects concurrent findings of fact by lower courts, an exception exists when there’s a “violation of some principle of law or procedure.” The trial judge’s incorrect legal standard for proving title constituted such a violation.
- Use of prior evidence: The trial judge improperly used evidence from a prior case involving the appellants’ predecessor without giving the appellants a chance to explain discrepancies.
Because of these errors, the Privy Council ordered a new trial in the Divisional Court. The key takeaway is the recognition of traditional evidence as valid proof of land ownership and the clarification that requiring numerous acts within living memory is an incorrect legal standard.
Nelson v Nelson (1913)
the family decided to use compensation money paid by government upon acquisition of family property for the purchase of another piece of land to replace it. The land was conveyed to the head of the family by a conveyance in English form for an estate in fee simple and subsequently, the head of the family sold and conveyed the land to a third party. In an action to set the sale aside at customary law, the contention by learned counsel for the respondent that since the land was conveyed in English form, the members of the family could not assert their rights under customary tenure, was rejected by the court on the ground that the form of conveyance of the land would not, in itself, attach to the property, incidents of English land tenure so as to alter the status of the said land as family property.
Adewoyin v Adeyeye
Adewoyin v Adeyeye (op. cit) and also Asiyanbi v Adeniji (1966) NMLR 106 the Supreme Court held that the Oni of Ife could not grant land already enjoyed by a family to another person, whether a member of the family or not, without consulting the family, and that any such rule of customary law will be rejected as being contrary to natural justice, equity and good conscience.
Amodu Tijani v Secretary for southern Nigeria
This text discusses the concept of land ownership in native communities and summarizes a legal case concerning land acquisition in colonial Lagos. Key points:
- Native Land Ownership: Traditionally, land was owned communally by the village, family, or community, not by individuals.
- Case Summary: The case involved land in Apapa acquired by the colonial governor. The issue was who should receive compensation and on what basis.
- Court Ruling: The court held that while the state held the radical title, the usufructuary (right to use and benefit) title belonged to the chief on behalf of the community. Therefore, compensation should be paid to the chief as the community’s representative for distribution among its members.
- Compensation Basis: Compensation was based on the chief transferring full ownership to the governor, despite native customs. The Public Lands Ordinance of 1903 allowed the head chief to sell communal land in fee simple, overriding any contrary native law or custom.
Idundun v Okumagba
The plaintiff instituted an action in the High Court, Warri, claiming, inter alia, declaration of ownership of a piece of land and an injunction. The plaintiff’s claim was based partly on traditional evidence and partly, an act of ownership. Held: The Court held that ownership of land may be established in any of the following five ways: 1. By traditional existence in the form of traditional history 2. By production of documents of title which must be duly authenticated. Except where there is a presumption of their proper execution in the case of documents 20 years older more. 3. Acts of persons of claiming the land such as selling, teasing or realign or renting out all in part of the land or family in it or as a portion of it, provided these acts extend for a long period of time and are numerous and part so as to raise a presumption that the person is the true owner 4. Acts of long possession and enjoyed of land 5. Proof of possession of corrected or adjacent land, in circumstances that there is a presumption that the owner of such contiguous land is the owner of the land in dispute.
Buraimo v Bamgbose
Principle: Exclusive possession connotes occupation or physical control of land either personally or through an agent, proxy or servant.
Case Summary
The defendants, who were descendants of an ancestor of the plaintiffs, granted a thirty years’ lease of their overlords’ family property without the prior consent of the head of that family. Held: Affirming the Supreme Court at Lagos, WACA held that the defendants-appellants’ misbehavior constituted such a challenge to their overlord’s rights to the family property as under local law and custom to involve to warrant a forfeiture of their allotments. But it may be that a short lease in similar circumstances would not work such a forfeiture
Ozokpo v Paul
Principle: A person in possession of land is presumed to be the owner until the contrary is proved.
Fact: In Ozokpo v. Paul (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 133) p.494, the case for the respondent is that, her father made a grant of a piece of land to her. It is part of a portion of land given to her father by her grand-father. The land was given to her in 1956. She and her mother farmed on it planting cassava, vegeta-bles, okro, etc. sometime in the 1950s, she saw one Ogbuka developing the said land. In spite of warnings from her and her father, Ogbuka erected a building on the land. Ogbuka sold the house in 1958 to Ozokpo and Ozokpo moved into the house. He took on tenants and then the civil war broke
Ozokpo fled to Portharcourt with his family and abandoned the property leaving behind his personal belongings and documents of title relating to the property. In the absence of Ozokpo, the respondent (Justina Paul) moved into the building and took possession, saying the building was erected on her land without her consent. Ozokpo died before the end of the war. His widow got back from Porthar-court and tried to get the house back. The respondent refused to give up possession. Mrs. Ozokpo applied for and obtained letters of administration to manage the estate of Ozokpo. As the respondent would not give up possession, Mrs. Ozokpo (appellant) took out an action against the respondent for arears of rent in the Magistrate Court in Portharcourt and she got judgment in her favour. The respondent (Paul) paid up arrears of rent owed.
The Court held that a tenant who pays rent to another as landlord with full knowledge of the fact that he was not the sole owner of the property, is stopped from subsequently denying the landlord’s title.
It was dishonest of the respondent to move into the house when Ozokpo died reaping where she did not sow. There is even no evidence that the respondent ever protested to Ozokpo in respect of the property when he was alive.
Tijani v Cole
the court gave judgment in favour of a person in possession where both parties were unable to prove good title to the land
Ayinde v Salawu
Erection of fence or survey pillars in a vacant I enclosed land is a sufwe or y proof of possession
Akinterinwa v Oladujoye
Principle: where two competing party claim to be in possession of the land in dispute, the law ascribe lawful possession to the one with better title.
Fact: The defendant (appellant) trespassed in the plaintiff’s (respondents) premise and brought an action in trespass for damages. Both parties claimed possession, however, the plaintiff had validly purchased the land under the customary law from the defendant’s family.
He had a better title in the land and he was held to be in possession as opposed to the defendants claim. His action in trespass was successful and upheld by the trial court, appeal court and the Supreme Court.
However, the Supreme Court faulted the lower court for giving a declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff since it was not within the claims brought before the court, therefore, the court had no jurisdiction to grant a relief that was not pleaded.
Akpan v Cookery
Principles
Where a stranger enters into land, occupies same and make development for a long period of time adverse to the interest of “the owner”, then the customary law equivalent of adverse possession must apply as a brand of the doctrine of estoppel against the “owner”
Case Summary
The defendant had been in undisputed possession of the land in dispute with the full knowledge and Acquiescence of the claimant for a period of 21 years, collecting rents and granting leases to people. Held: The claimant’s claim to the land in dispute failed because the defendants under the mistaken belief that the land was theirs, had exercised acts of ownership by making agreements with strangers, granting leases and receiving rent without interference, or action taken by the claimant to ask for so many years without interference, or action taken by the claimant to assert their rights under native law and custom. The court held that to give rise to the right of prescription under customary law, the adverse possessor must prove; 1. That he is an adverse possessor, strictly speaking in law and not one who derives his interest from the plaintiff. 2. That he took possession of the land under a mistaken belief that he had title to it. 3. That the plaintiff acknowledged of the adverse possessor, but acquiesced on it (kept quiet) 4. Due to Laches and Acquiescence, the adverse possessor had spent money, developed and adjusted positions, in true belief that he was the real owner 5. That there is no extenuating circumstance negating Acquiescence, as Acquiescence will not apply where the plaintiff’s inaction was due to intimacy, blood ties or family relation 6. That the length of time is fairly large enough to establish a prima facie evidence of Acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff.
Epelle v Ojo
Principles
The defendant must be an adverse possessor strictly speaking in law as opposed to a tenant, a licensee or a person enjoying an occupational right within the title of the plaintiff.
Case Summary
A claim to the title by the plaintiff even through the Acquiescence of the defendant failed because the former was a customary tenant
Nwakobi v Nzekwu, [1961] All NLR 445
Principles
The defence of adverse possessor will not avail any person who enters into occupation of the land knowing it to be another’s or knowing that he has no bonafide claim to it.
Case Summary
The defendants knew that they were trespassers as at the time of entry, they therefore had no right of prescription.
Okiade v Morayo
In a land dispute case, the plaintiff, who bought land in 1924, attempted to sell it through an auctioneer. Due to issues with part of the land being a public street, the sale fell through, leading to legal disputes and the auctioneer holding the conveyance (title deed) as security for costs owed by the plaintiff. J.A. Oshodi paid these costs and received the conveyance. After Oshodi’s death in 1930, his administrators sold the land at auction in 1933, with the defendants purchasing it.
The plaintiff made another attempt to sell the land in 1933, but the defendants, now in possession, prevented the sale. The plaintiff took no further action until 1938. The defendants argued they were valid purchasers, the plaintiff had transferred rights to Oshodi, and the plaintiff was estopped (prevented from claiming) due to acquiescence (implied consent by inaction).
The court held that there was no valid transfer of rights to Oshodi, as there was no evidence the plaintiff authorized him to pay the costs or receive the conveyance. However, the court found that the plaintiff’s inaction from 1933 to 1938, while the defendants built on the land, constituted acquiescence, estopping her from claiming the land from the defendants. The court noted that this estoppel against the defendants did not preclude the plaintiff from potentially recovering the purchase price from Oshodi’s estate. Essentially, the plaintiff lost her claim to the land due to her inaction, despite the lack of a valid transfer to Oshodi.
