Topic 9 & 10: Market Failure Flashcards

1
Q

‘Invisible hand’

A

Although people act selfishly when producing, selling or buying G and S, they are led by an ‘invisible hand’ to maximise benefits to society as whole

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2
Q

Requirements for efficient markets

A

Clearly defined good

Accurate and transparent info

Clearly defined, transferrable property rights (at any point in time, it is is clear who owns the good)

A system for sharing price info and for making transactions

Many buyers and sellers

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3
Q

Role of gov

A

If we meet of requirements for efficient market: economists argue for limited gov role.
Don’t fix prices (reduces ability of producers and consumers to adapt to circumstances)

Don’t impose quotas or min production levels (let people decide)

If market is efficient, gov actions can only make things worse (even if well-designed)

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4
Q

What do we mean by efficient market?

A

Markets that are Pareto Efficient

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5
Q

Suppose that a particular policy is proposed, proponents need to make the case..

A

a) that free market would fail to deliver best outcomes

and b) that the proposed policy would deliver better outcomes

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6
Q

Market failure

A

Related to whether the market works well to generate benefits for community

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7
Q

Examples of distribution policies

A

Progressive income tax

Welfare payments for unemployed

Decisions to share environmental funding evenly amongst regions

Increasing block tariffs for water

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8
Q

Causes of market failure (poor performing markets)

A

Good is nor clearly defined (e.g. biodiversity)

Lack of info (e.g. buyers can’t determine quality of good)

Absence of clear transferrable property rights (e.g. open access fishery)

Absence of mechanisms for a market (connecting up buyers and sellers, price discovery, standard contracts)

Too few buyers or sellers

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9
Q

Informational problem

A

Ignorance (policy response: R and D)

Information asymmetry (policy response: reverse auction, run extension program )

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10
Q

Externality

A

Economic activity -> impact on somebody other than producer or consumer of good

Impact of third party not reflected in market price of good

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11
Q

-ve externalities

A

Economic action causes cost to 3rd party

Pollution from factories, nutrients or sediments from farms into rivers, clearing native vegetation for housing, airport noise, emissions of CO2 from vehicles

One action can have multiple external costs

Rising sea level-> loss of land, increased drought -> loss of agricultural production, higher temp -> damage to coral reefs, more severe storms-> loss of life

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12
Q

+ve externality

A

Economic action causes benefit to 3rd party

Reducing fertiliser rates, reducing fishing intensity, install scrubbers in factory chimney , create beautiful gardens, planting trees

One action can have multiple external benefits

Plant trees on ex-cropland: reduce soil salinity, carbon sequestration , habitat for wildlife, aesthetic benefits

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13
Q

Optimal abatement

A

MB=MC

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14
Q

Policy for externality: command-and-control regulation

A

Specify level of pollution that cannot be exceeded

Penalise any firm that exceeds limit

Firm tries to choose as little abatement as it can (to save costs). The min it can choose is the regulatory limit

Information requirement: MB abatement, MC abatement

Advantage: simple, well accepted approach

Disadvantage: inflexible

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15
Q

Policy for externalities: Pigouvian tax

A

Tax on each unit of pollution, equal to marginal cost of pollution (or the marginal benefit of abatement) at social optimum

Internalising externality (people generating the externality are made to experience the marginal costs or benefits themselves

Set tax= MB of abatement at social optimum

From firm’s perspective, tax is their MB of abatement

Information requirement: MEC of pollution

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16
Q

Advantage and disadvantage of Pigouvian tax

A

Advantage: generates revenue for gov

Can substitute for other taxes

Creates incentive for innovation

Disadvantage: people don’t like idea of taxes

Requires lot of money to change hands. Polluters pay for all emissions, not just those above accepted amount

17
Q

Policy for externalities: incentive payments -> encourage abatement

A

Set payment= MB of abatement at social optimum

From firm’s perspective, payment is their MB of abatement

Info requirement: MEC of pollution

Advantage: creates incentive for innovation

Disadvantage: high cost to taxpayers

18
Q

Coase Theorem

A

Recognises importance of negotiation

Two parties can agree on allocation of benefits and costs (Pareto optimal), regardless of which party is assigned rights

Requires: transferrable property rights, 0 transaction costs

19
Q

Coase and property rights

A

Externality problem can be viewed as an absence of property rights

If either side has clear property rights (and transaction costs of negotiating not too high) the problem can be solved by negotiation

20
Q

Policy option for Coase and property rights

A

Define and enforce property rights

Example: tradeable pollution permits (emissions trading scheme, creates right to CO2, can be bought by people who place a high value on abatement)

21
Q

Negotiation may be too costly

A

Even with well-defined property rights negotiation itself could be too costly (costs of identifying other pollution victims, communication, coordination, info and legal and admin costs)

22
Q

Implication of high transaction costs

A

Look for ways to reduce transaction costs

If successful-> define property rights

If not successful -> revert to more traditional policy approach (tax, payments, regulation)

Transaction costs apply to those too

Not necessarily worth it: do a BCA

23
Q

Evidence that Coase was right

A

Lighthouse often used as archetype public good

High risks of free riding faced by any shipping company that builds them

Coase found that prior to mid 19th century in England, lighthouses were privately owned, operated and funded

Negotiations between shipping companies were effective

24
Q

Why do we need many sellers?

A

Competition helps to keep P=MC

Means consumption is as high as it can be without costing more than its worth

25
Q

Monopoly

A

Has incentive to cut back on supply in order to raise price and make more profit

Only one seller

-> deadweight loss

26
Q

Policy response to monopoly

A

Regulate to prevent monopoly behaviour

Example: Australian Competition and Consumer Commissions (ACCC)

27
Q

Natural monopoly

A

Businesses that have very fixed costs

Isn’t practical or realistic to have competition

Example: water supply

28
Q

Monopoly: natural resource example

A

OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries)

Exist to agree on reductions in oil supply in order to increase prices — members act in unison to try to create a monopoly

29
Q

Natural monopoly: policy responses

A

Gov takes over supply or

Gov allows monopoly to exist but regulated them tightly to prevent then exploiting consumers