Topic 4: Foreign policy 1935-40 Flashcards
Reasons for invasion of Abyssinia
During the stressa conference M came to belive B+F would allow the takeover of this territory.
The french FM apparently promised M an “free hand”.
The campaign would:
Satisfy nationalist ambitions
Avenge Adowa humiliation of 1896
Build East Africa
Show Great pwoer status.
Show Hitler Italy was strong
Propaganda
Increase popularity within italy
new markets
Develop colonies for migration.
The LON had also proved weak in preventing expansion
Wal Wal incident
150 Abyssinians and 50 Italians killed.
M authorised construction of fort within Abyssinian territory.
Haile Selassie wanted this removed and appealed for LON support.
In 1935 military build-up continued up to 220,000.
LON did not offer Abyssinia support.
Events of invasion
Hoped for quick victory.
Adowa captured within 3 days (october 6th)
Yet advance generally slow due to a need to build roads as the army moved. M fired generals out of frustration and counter-attacks stalled the advance.
600,000 troops, air power and mustard gas were used to win the war.
Mustard gas was used to attack water supplies and communications.
Addis Ababa assault led to Haile Selassie’s exile.
Victor Emmanuel III declared Emperor of Italian Territories in Africa.
Grew M popularity in Italy. Propaganda emphasised glory of conquest.
Church praised victory as they could spread catholicism.
Negative consequences
Huge expense- 2.5 to 16 billon lire budget deficit increase.
130,000 Italians settled and garrisons were expensive to maingain.
250,000 troops stationed there.
Guerrilla war until 1941
Reputation of brutality, rule in ethiopia was repressive and corrupt.
Impact on European relations
Hoped European powers would accept conquest, this was not the case.
Tensions were not quickly resolved with B+F and M moved closer towards Hitler and Nazi Germany.
Prolonged nature of the war allowed opposition to grow within the League of Nations, particularly after Haile Selassie delived a powerful speech.
B+F needed to support the LON and prevent further expansion by Mussolini. However, they also did not want to push Mussolini further towards Nazi germany and Hitler.
Agreed to support economic sanctions but oil (essential to the economy and war machine) was exempt from sanctions.
B+F proposed a pact allowing M to retain most of Abyssinia with a small independent state would remain, this was condemmed by the public and rejected by mussolini.
The relationship was essentially beyond repair.
Involvement in the Spanish civil war
Opportunity to display growing power of Italy and fascism against communism.
Mussolini provided- 75,000 soldiers, 150 tanks and thousands of planes and pilots.
B+F remained neutral, the USSR provided aid reaffirming the argument the fascist powers were acting against communism.
Performance of Italian troops was ofen poor, they even suffered defeats to international brigades.
Consequences of involvement in spain
Public opinion turned against M and Fascist Italy. Widespread sympathy for the Spanish Republican movement across Europe.
40,000 joined international Brigades.
This close relationship with other fascist powers meant relations were severely damaged.
Yet improved position of fascists in europe, strained relations with the USSR and democracies as B+F did not offer support.
Economic impact of Spanish Civil war
14 billion lire were spent, money Italy could not afford.
Trade disrupted and military strength lost.
When WW2 began Italy was far from prepared.
As with Abyssinia Mussolini belived this would be a short conflict, in reality Italy was heavily involved and 4,000 soldiers were lost.
Improving relations of Germany and Italy
Took place due to:
Worsening relationship between Italy, Britain and France
From 1936 the Italian economy became more dependent upon Germany
Mussolini was becoming more impressed by Hitler personally
M signed the Anti-comintern pact on 6 November 1937 with G+J driven by a hatred of communism. Japan fought china which was supported by the USSR and G and Italy fought republicans backed by the USSR in spain.
By the end of the 1930’s a formal Italian alliance became far more likely.
Mussolini announced the establishment of the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936, a public declaration of friendship.
Sudetenland Crisis
M saw as an opportunity to prove himself a statesman etc.
Recomended munich conference to resolve the crisis.
In reality M provided Hitler a diplomatic avenue to gain the Sudetenland.
Brought the two closer together, Ciano had opposed links to germany initially but began to change his stance after meating with Ribbentrop.
Annexation of Albania
M authorised invasion in march 1939
To emphasise strength to other powers (+G)
Ciano felt Albania could be exploited economically for Italy’s benefit and planned to settle 2 million Italians within Albania.
Italy easily defeated the small Albanian force.
Zog and his family were forced to flee and a Fascist regime was set up.
B+F gave guarantees of military assistance to Greece and Turkey, which again convinced M he had to develop closer links with G.
Pact of steel
1939
Goering reassured M that Italy would not need to enter any war for another 2 to 3 years.
The pact committed Germany and Italy to supporting each other in time of war even if they had not started the war.
Tied Italy to Hitlers foreign policy, HItler went on to ignore M’s wishes to delay a war when he invaded poland.
Neutrality
M used the term “non-belligerent” to explain Italy’s position, which meant that Ialy was supportive of Germany’s actions but was not prepared to join the fighting.
Ciano demanded G send them 17,000 mil vehicles before italy could enter the war.
Why was Italy neutral?
M-R pact- Secret agreement to divide poland and avoid war for 10 years. M portrayed this as a betrayal of the anti-comintern pact to avoid commitments he made under the pact of steel.
Buying time- wanted to see how the war would develop as to not commit to the losing side.
Italy not ready for war- Abyssinia and spain drained Italys already weak forces. Fascist propaganda emphasised strengths but leading fascists knew Italy was not ready.
Mussolini’s aims remained unclear during the “phoney war”. M expected to join on G’s side at some point but had no clear date for this and knew Italy would not be ready until 1943.
