Topic 3: The Rule In Ryland V Fletcher Flashcards
Rylands v Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330
The defendant, a mill owner, had paid independent contractors to make a reservoir on his land, which was intended to supply water to the mill. During construction, the contractors discovered the shafts and passages of an old coal mine on the land, some of which joined up with a mine situated on neighbouring land, belonging to the claimant. The contractors could have blocked up these shafts but did not and, as a result, when the reservoir was filled, the water from it burst through the shafts and flooded the claimant’s mine, causing damage estimated at £937. The defendant himself had not been negligent, since there was no way he could have known about the shafts, and nor could he be held vicariously liable for the contractors, who were clearly not his employees for that purpose. An action for trespass was unavailable because the damage was not direct and immediate, and at the time of the case the tort of nuisance could not be applied to an isolated escape.
Held:
Nevertheless, the House of Lords held that the defendant was liable in tort, upholding the judgment delivered in the lower court by Blackburn J, which defined the rule: “ A person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must do so at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. The justification for this rule, he explained, was that “the person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbour’s reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbour’s privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his neighbour’s alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own . . .”Despite the fact that the courts claimed a clear foundation for the rule in previous cases, these authorities did not go nearly as far as the decision in the case, and it is generally regarded as establishing a completely new principle at the time. In order to succeed in a claim under , the claimant must therefore prove the following: The defendant must control the land from which the problem has come. The defendant must have brought or accumulated something in the course of some “unnatural use” of the land. The thing brought or accumulated must be “dangerous”, meaning likely to do damage if it escapes from the land. There must be an escape of the dangerous thing. There must be damage as a result of the escape.
Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council, [2004] 2 AC 1
The defendant owned a Case water pipe, which carried water from the mains to a large block of flats. The pipe fractured, and huge amounts of water ran along an embankment, which contained the claimant’s gas pipeline. The embankment collapsed, leaving the gas pipeline unsupported. The claimant repaired the damage, and claimed the costs of the repairs under Rylands v Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330.
Held:
Their claim failed, because the House of Lords held that a water pipe was not an unnatural use of land. This in itself was no surprise, but their Lordships went on to talk about how they would decide that a use of land was unnatural. Lord Bingham stated that the phrase “unnatural user” was not very helpful, and that a better question might be whether the defendant was an “ordinary user”. Rylands v Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330should only offer a cause of action where the defendant’s use of the land was “extraordinary and unusual”. However, said Lord Bingham, this test should not be applied inflexibly: “a use may be extraordinary and unusual at one time or in one place, but not so at another time or in another place”. The question to be asked was whether the defendant had done something out of the ordinary, considering the time and place in which he did so. Lord Bingham also stated that the question of whether the defendant’s use of land was of benefit to the community was not relevant, which suggests that the approach used in Rickards and British Celanese is definitely no longer in favour.
Read v Lyons, (1947) AC 156
The plaintiff was employed by the ministry of supply as an inspector of munitions in the defendants munition factory and, in the course of her employment she was injured by the explosion of a shell being manufactured . It was admitted that high explosive shells were dangerous, however there was no evidence of negligence on the defendant’s part.
Held:
The defendant was not liable, as there had been no escape sufficient to render the defendant liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, as the injury occurred on the defendant’s land and not outside it. LORD SIMON defined “escape”, for the purpose of applying the proposition in rylands v fletcher, to mean escape from a place where that defendant has occupation or control over the land, to a place which is outside his occupation or control. Furthermore, the House opined that the making of military supplies in an ammunition factory in wartime was a natural user of land.
Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather, (1994) 1 All ER 53
The defendants had carried out a leather manufacturing business for many years. In the tanning process they had used a particular chemical solvent until 1976, when they changed to another method of tanning. In carrying out the old tanning process there were frequent spillages of the solvent onto the concrete floor, amounting to over a thousand tons of solvent over many years. This then seeped through the concrete floor and into the soil below. It polluted an area where the claimants,a water company, had their pumping station, extracting water for domestic consumption. The pollution was only discovered in 1983 when changes in EC regulations forced the water company to make tests for such pollution. On discovering the problem the water company were forced to move their pumping station further upstream at a cost of over a million pounds. They sued the leather manufacturers for the expenses they had incurred. Held:
The claim failed because the damage suffered was held to be too remote, but the importance of the case lies in what Lord Goff had to say on the issue of unnatural use. He stated that the storage of chemicals on industrial premises was a “classic case of non-natural use”. Just because the activity benefited the community in that it created employment did not render such use of the land natural.
Batchellor v Tunbridge Wells Gas Co, (1901) 84 LT 765
To be liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330, the thing which the defendant brings onto their land must be likely to do damage if it escapes. Held: The Court held that gas is an example of “dangerous things” to be brought onto land.
National Telephone Co v Baker, (1893)2 Ch. 186
To be liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330, the thing which the defendant brings onto their land must be likely to do damage if it escapes. Held: The Court held that electricity is an example of “dangerous things” to be brought onto land.
Hale v Jennings Bros, (1938) 1 All ER 579
Due to the “fooling about” and recklessness of an occupant in a chair-o-plane owned by the defendant, a chair broke away and hit the plaintiff who was the owner of a shooting gallery on an adjoining ground.
Held:
Although there had been no negligence on the part of the defendants, they were strictly liable to the plaintiff under the principle in Rylands v Fletcher, as there was an escape from the chair-o-plane to the store of the plaintiff. The Court held that a “chair-o-plane” ride is an example of “dangerous things” to be brought onto land.
Ponting v Noakes, (1894) 2 QB 281
A poisonous tree was on the defendants land. its branches never extended over the boundary. The plaintiff’s horse reached over the boundary and ate the leaves and died. The plaintiff sued for damages.
Held:
The action did not succeed as there was no escape rather, the animal’s death was due to its own intrusion.
Sochaki v Sas, (1947) 1 All ER 344
Without any negligence on his part, a fire broke out in the plaintiff’s room and spread to and destroyed the defendant’s furniture in another room and spread to and destroyed the defendant’s furniture in another room in the same house. The building was owned by the defendant and the plaintiff was a lodger. It seemed probable that the fire was caused by a spark from the which the plaintiff had left in the fireplace in his room. The defendant counterclaimed for damages.
Held:
He was not entitled to succeed. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor was inapplicable as was that of rylands v fletcher because, by having a fire in his grate, the plaintiff was using his room in an ordinary and natural way.
Noble v Harrison
The branch of a non-poisonous tree growing on the defendant’s land, which overhung on the highway, suddenly broke and fell on the plaintiff’s vehicle passing along the highway. The branch had broken off due to some latent defect.
Held:
The Court of Appeal reversed the original finding in favour of the claimant because the defect could not have been discovered by inspection. A land-owner may become liable for a naturally occuring danger arising on his land if he fails to remedy it within a reasonable time of being made aware of it, or from when he ought to have been aware of it. Rowlatt J said: “a person is liable for a nuisance constituted by the state of his property: (1) if he causes it; (2) if by neglect of some duty he allowed it to arise; and (3) if, when it has arisen without his own act or default, he omits to remedy it within a reasonable time after he did or ought to have become aware of it”. However: “I see no ground for holding that the owner is to become an insurer of nature, or that default is to be imputed to him until it appears, or would appear upon proper inspection, that nature can no longer be relied upon . Growing of nonpoisonous trees is not non-natural use of land. Therefore the plaintiff is not liable.
British Celanese v A H Hunt, (1969)2 All ER 1252
The defendants owned a factory on an industrial estate in which they manufactured electrical components. Strips of their metal foil escaped from the factory and blew onto an overhead cable, causing a power failure which stopped production at the claimant’s factory. Held:
The defendants were held not liable under Rylands v Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330because, given where their factory was sited, theirs could not be called a non-natural use of land. There were no special risks attached to the storage of foil and the use was beneficial to the community. On the other hand, the defendants were held liable in both negligence and nuisance.
Umudje v Shell BP
The defendant, and oil company accumulated oil waste which escaped into the plaintiffs land and caused damages, it was actionable under Ryland V fletcher.
Carstairs v Taylor
Members leaving in a block of flat sharing water from the same source are held to have impliedly accepted the presence of the source of water. It is for a common benefit.
Ruddiman & Co v Smith, (1889) 60 LT 708
A clerk turned on the water tap in a toilet about ten minutes after he had closed from work, and forgot to turn it off before leaving for home. The plaintiff’s adjoining office was flooded with water as a result. Held: The defendant employer was vicariously liable for the damages done to the plaintiff. The use of the toilet is incidental to the clerk’s employment, and the wrong act took place within reasonable time after working hours.
Dunn v Birmingham Canal Navigation Co, (1872) LR 7 QB 244
Acting under statutory authority, the defendants constructed a canal. The plaintiff worked his mines under the canal knowing full well that there was a danger of water breaking into them. In the event, without negligence or default on the part of the defendants, the plaintiffs mines were flooded by water from the canal and he brought an action for damages. Held:
The plaintiff’s claim could not succeed since his injury was due to his own fault and not the defendants.
