Liability For Animals Flashcards
Buckle v Hommes
Principle: Cat and Dog does not fall under the scope of cattle.
Fact: The defendant’s cat strayed into the plaintiff’s house where it killed thirteen pigeons. The defendants were not held liable for trespass.
Held:
He was not liable for killing the pigeons because there was nothing peculiar to this cat alone. The liability under the scienter rule arises only when the defendant had knowledge. For example, a cat is prone to injure mankind. In such a case, knowledge of the defendant that a cat was prone to injure mankind must be established by the plaintiff and, for this, a single instance of the ferocity of such animal is sufficient notice.
Cox V Burbridge
Principle: the owner of an animal is bound to take care that it does not stray unto the land of his neighbour, and he is liable for any trespass it may commit and for ordinary consequences of that trespass, whether or not the escape of the animal is due to his negligence is altogether immaterial.
Fact: A horse escaped and kicked a child; recovery was not allowed on the basis that it was not in a horses natural nature to kick humans. The alternative claim inscienteralso failed as the animal was not shown to have a prior propensity to be dangerous
Talent v Ben
A dog does not fall under the scope of cattle.
Ellis v Loftu Iron Co, [1874] LR 10 CP 10
Principle: The liability for trespass by cattle is strict, and the plaintiff is not required to prove scienter or negligence of the defendant. Also, the defendant is liable for the natural consequences of cattle trespass.
Fact: The defendant’s horse pried its head and feet over the plaintiff’s fence and bit and kicked the plaintiff’s mare.
Held:
The defendant was held liable for cattle trespass because the liability for trespass by cattle is strict, and the plaintiff was not required to prove scienter or negligence of the defendant.
Warmald v Cole
Principle: for liability to arise under the tort of cattle trespass, there must have been some form of injury. In this case, injury to person was held to be sufficient.
Manton v Brocklebank, [1923] 2 K. B. 212 at P. 219
Principle: A claimant in a cattle trespass action must have an interest in land.
Fact: Mrs. Sarah Manton was accustomed to putting her horse for agistment in a field owned by Mr. Shilito. The defendant, without giving notice to Mrs. Manton, let loose a mare that had been purchased with a warranty of being quiet. The mare injured Mrs. Manton’s horse, resulting in its death, and Mrs. Manton claimed damages for the loss. The Divisional Court upheld the County Court Judge’s decision in favor of Mrs. Manton, but the Court of Appeal later reversed it.
Held:
The Divisional Court based its decision on several grounds, including negligence, trespass, and the fact that a mare is likely to be skittish and may injure other horses. The Court of Appeal, however, stated that an owner is only liable for injuries caused by their animal if they knew of the trait in the particular animal. The liability arises in the tort of trespass, and the extent of damages may depend on whether the act is so alien to the animal’s nature as to make the damage too remote. The liability of an owner also depends on the class of animal and whether it is ferae naturae or mansurtae naturae, with the latter being harmless and domestic animals.
Singleton v Williamson
Principle: Fault of claimant is a defence to cattle trespass. Where the claimant fails to construct a fence where he is required to.
Although, as a general rule, there is no rule requiring fencing.
Smith v Stones
The defence of third party act.
Tillet v Ward, (1882) 10 QBD 17
A butcher purchased an ox and while it was being driven through the streets, it became unmanageable and rushed into a neighboring shop, causing damage. The county court judge held the butcher liable for the damage caused.
Held:
The High Court found that there was no negligence on the part of the butcher or his servants. The court stated that the general rule is that the owner of cattle must keep them from trespassing, and if they do trespass, the neighbor on whose land they trespass has a right to sue the owner of the cattle, regardless of negligence. However, if injury is done in the high road, where parties have a legal right to be, it must be shown that the owner of the cattle was himself guilty of negligence, or that his servant was guilty of negligence under circumstances imposing a duty on the master to use proper care. In this case, since the trespass was off the highway, but immediately adjoining it, the court found that the owner of the ox was not liable for the damage caused by the unmanageable ox, as there was no negligence.
Gayler & Pope v Davies
In the defence of legal right to lead cattle on the highway, the defendant may however be negligent.
McQuaker v Goddard, [1940] 1 K.B. 687
A camel in a zoo bit the plaintiff and his claim to damages turned on whether camels are to be categorized as as wild animals or tame ones
Held:
The court held that camels are not wild animals
Glanville v Sutton, [1928] 1 KB 571
The plaintiff’s claim was for personal injuries caused by the defendant’s horse.
Held:
The proof that the horse tended to bite other horses was insufficient to show a mischievous tendency when a plaintiff was bitten.
Worth v Gillings
Principle: it is immaterial whether the animal has caused that exact type of damage in the past, it is sufficient that it had the propensity to do so. Thus, the “one bite rule” is not entirely right.
Darayani v Njoku
Principle: (1) to establish vicious propensity, it is sufficient that the animal had caused the type of damage before. (2) Knowledge of vicious propensity could be inferred from the knowledge of the wife.
Fact: A dog had previously bitten the maid to the knowledge of the dog owner’s wife. He was held liable under strict liability rule.
Fitzgerald v Cooke
Principle: A display of natural/common propensity towards playfulness or so other non-aggressive behaviour. Eg, the frolicking of a horse.
