Theory of Mind Flashcards
Introduction:
definition
agreement?
A theory of mind refers to the ability to attribute mental states (such as beliefs, desires, knowledge, intensions) to others. Most scholars would agree that this is a universal feature of the human mind however, there is some disagreement among scientists on whether the chimpanzee/non-human primates possess a theory of mind.
Introduction:
different arguments
Tomasello and colleagues argue that the chimpanzees show low level intentional abilities but not full blown theory of mind. Contrarily, Povinelli argues that chimpanzees only look as if they are psychologically similar to us and in fact what they are doing is performing very quick contingency learning - forming associations as according to behaviourist principles. The great challenge for researchers interested in the question of whether any other species than humans can represent the mental states of others is devising empirical tests of mental state attribution that do not require language. This essay, shall use empirical research to argue that chimpanzee/non-human primates do not possess a theory of mind.
What is Theory of Mind?
levels of intentionality
Dennett proposed levels of intentionality in order to formulate clear operational criteria for what an animal with certain intentional states does. Level-0 refers to no intentional states, level-1 refers to possession of mental states about the world, level-2 refers to the first incursion, the possession of mental states about others’ mental states and level-3 is the second incursion (A believes that B believes that A wants X). Monkey A has a theory of mind if she eats a banana while out of monkey B’s sight because she believes B wants the banana and will take it if he sees her eating it. If she does so only because eating bananas near B in the past has resulted in B’s snatching the banana, her behaviour is not based on theory of mind but on associative learning. In terms of classification of intentional states, theory of mind implies level-2 intentionality or above.
Why would theory of mind evolve?
Why would the ability to mindread (i.e., level 2 intentionality or above) have evolved? Humphrey (1978) suggested that by being able to put oneself in the mental shoes of another (simulation theory) a socially intelligent primate could get one step ahead in social competition. Not all mental states (e.g., intentions) are accompanied by distinctive sensations and one of the advantages of a ToM is that one can represent another’s mental state when it is different from one’s own or even from reality (i.e., a false belief). Hence, full ToM involves more than generalising from one’s own inner experiences to others. According to this view, ToM could get an intelligent primate ahead in social competition which suggests an evolutionary benefit. It is therefore, possible that ToM is not a uniquely human ability.
Visual Perspective taking
Hare et al. (2006)
One of the precursors to theory of mind is visual perspective taking. A study by Hare et al. (2006), examined visual perspective taking in chimpanzees and found that chimpanzees avoided to be seen by a human competitor when trying to steal a piece of food from him. In the experiment, the competitor sat in a plexiglas booth and two pieces of food were lying next to him, one on the left and one on the right side. The chimpanzees could approach the booth from either side and then reach through a hole to grab the food. However, when the experimenter was looking, the chimpanzee did not attempt to take the food.
Visual Perspective taking
Hare et al. (2006) - critical transfer test
Hare et al. then presented the chimpanzees different variations of this basic experimental setting (critical transfer test), in which the experimenter turned his body to the left or the right side of the booth. In each condition, the chimpanzees avoided to come near the booth from the side where they could be seen.
Visual Perspective taking
Hare et al. (2006) - interpretations
According to Hare et al., taken together with the previous findings presented in this section, these results strongly suggest that chimpanzees can understand what others see, at least in some situations.
Visual Perspective taking
Hare et al. (2006) - alternative interpretations, criticism
It might be suggested that throughout development into adulthood chimpanzees simply learn that contested food is best obtained when a path is taken to food that prevents them from seeing their competitors face as they approach. This would mean that chimps hid behind visual occluders not because they understood that the experimenter could not see them, but instead because they knew if they went behind the occluder they could not see the experimenter.
It is unclear whether chimpanzees understand how others see things (Level 2 perspective-taking).
False belief:
introduction & definition
False belief is thought to be one of the most important mental states to be able to attribute if one is to say an individual has full blown theory of mind. One must take into account that the other individual has a different belief state from oneself and a belief that contradicts the true state of affairs.
False belief: procedure
Karg… Tomasello, (2016)
Researchers investigated whether chimpanzees can predict the behavior of a conspecific which is holding a mistaken perspective that differs from their own. The subject competed with a conspecific over two food sticks. While the subject could see that both were the same size, to the competitor one appeared bigger than the other. In a previously established game, the competitor chose one stick in private first and the subject chose thereafter, without knowing which of the sticks was gone.
False belief: results
Karg… Tomasello, (2016)
Chimpanzees and 6-year-old children chose the ‘riskier’ stick (that looked bigger to the competitor) significantly less in the game than in a nonsocial control. Children chose randomly in the control, thus showing Level 2 perspective-taking skills; in contrast, chimpanzees had a preference for the ‘riskier’ stick here, rendering it possible that they attributed their own preference to the competitor to predict her choice.
False belief: Alternative explanations of the findings
Karg… Tomasello, (2016)
- One possible explanation for chimpanzees’ preference in the nonsocial control is that they perceived the stick further up as bigger.
- Chimpanzees could also have perceived the stick further up as more attractive for other reasons, e.g., as easier to grab.
False belief: Follow-up
Karg… Tomasello, (2016)
We thus run a follow-up in which chimpanzees did not have a preference in the control. Now, they also chose randomly in the game. However, they were now also not able to correctly predict the behavior of a competitor who was holding a mistaken perspective on the sticks. This could be evidence that chimpanzees, when they do not have a preference themselves, are not able to understand others’ preferences. This would be in line with research on false-belief understanding, in which chimpanzees consistently fail to attribute false beliefs, thus representations that differ from their own, to others.
Conclusion
There is a fierce debate between Povinelli and his colleagues and Tomasello and his.
It seems that non-human primates/chipms are capable of at least lower level mental state attributions however, in every study mentioned thus far, it is impossible to definitively rule out an equally plausible behavior reading explanation. No experimental protocol currently in use is capable of distinguishing genuine mindreading animals from their complementary behavior-reading counterparts. As a result, none of the positive data produced from such protocols could ever provide compelling reasons for saying that animals engage in mindreading rather than some complementary form of behavior-reading
