Theories of Voter Turnout Flashcards
So we have explored voter behaviour based on preferences for policy outcome (median voter)
and non-policy factors and more so politician quality (probabilistiic voting)
But in practice voters may vote for other reasons (3)
Money (get their vote bought)
Coercion (violence/intimidation)
may not just vote!
Is voting a civic right or duty
some countries its duty (compulsory) and some a right (voluntary)
How many countries in 2024 have compulsory voting
27
and 10 of them enforce it e.g Australia $20 penalty, $180 if not paid in time
issue with voluntary voting
Turnout varies widely across countries
When is voter turnout higher? (2)
higher for general elections
sensitive issues too e.g Brexit
When would rational voter i participate in elections
if benefits of participating > costs
So benefit from election if they can affect the outcome.
what does this depend on (2)
probability of voter i being pivotal: pi
and benefit from outcome: Bi
What are costs of participation for voter i (3)
informational, transportation, opportunity costs of voting: (Aggregate into one cost Ci!)
So expression for participation of voter i
piBi > Ci
e.g if probability of affecting outcome is low, voter more likely to not vote (abstain)
Paradox of voting
Probability of being pivotal pi decreases with number of voters.
Larger the election, less likely to vote! since less likely to be the pivotal vote and be able to affect the outcome with its single vote!
eval to paradox of voting
we observe a much higher turnout, esp for large election
(which rationally, as shown, we should see lower turnout!)
numerical illustration of paradox of voting:
2 outcomes, 0 and 1. my preference is 0
1M voters.
distribution balanced i.e voters vote for 0 with probability 1/2.
When would my vote matter
My vote is pivotal only if there was 500k for 0 and 500k for 1, so mine is decisive
e.g 499,998 votes for 1 and 500,002 for 0, my vote is not pivotal thus i won’t have to vote and still enjoy my preference of 0
Probability of being the pivotal voter in this example? High or low and why
Very low, it would be the probability of getting each policy to 500k each! So unlikely
When does probability of being pivotal voter decrease even more
if vote share arent 50/50; highly unlikely IRL that distribution is exactly balanced i.e all have an equal probability of being voted
Condorcet on voters paradox
a voter’s influence is small when many voters, thus lose interest as voters increase
If piBi > CI
piBi < CI
Then rational people should vote
(Eval: lots of people abstain!)
B) people should abstain…
Eval: lots of people vote!
So the question is who is being irrational?
Problem of voter turnout
challenges assumption of rational agents
So ones who vote are not rational, as pi falls as numbers increase, yet we see high turnout.
What does this imply
Flaw in voting system
4 types of voter turnout theories
Objective function theories (instrumental vs expressive)
voters’ rationality theories
altruistic voters
information-based theories
Objective function theory: 2 explanations
instrumental motivations
expressive motivations
First explanation of objective function-based theory: Instrumental motivations
B) what does decision to vote depend on
Voter mainly cares about outcome of vote i.e policy of winner
B)
Decision to vote depends on vote value i.e utility which is discounted by the probability her vote will count (pi)
Issue with instrumental motivation
Decision to vote depends on vote value;
Which is small in large elections (lower prob of vote counting), so even a small cost should encourage rational voter to abstain (low probability of influencing, so can’t justify the cost even if small)
but in reality we get high turnout! so thus agents who vote are not rational!
Expressive motivations
B) How is it expressed
People don’t vote for policy, but vote for the expressive value i.e what a vote says about the voter e.g validating self worth ‘im not a tory!’
B) expressive benefit is given by Di
So if expressive benefit is Di, when will a rational voter vote in this expressive motivations model?
Di>Ci (and perceived benefit piBi is near 0)
pro (1) and con (2) of expressive motivation
Explains bandwagon effect: more people voting means other people to follow
difficult to measure expressive benefit (the happiness of voting)
Still doesn’t explain high turnout
2nd theory: rationality theory
Questions rationality of voters: why are they not rational? (2)
Perhaps not calculate probability of being pivotal accurately (pi) so cost-benefit analysis wrong
Learn from previous elections e.g turnout depend on opinion polls, last election etc
Cons of rationality theory
They predict a low turnout, but in reality turnout is high! Does not explain this!
Altruism-based theory
Utility from voting but also receives ethical value from helping others in their group
This way maximises chances of this group to win
cons (2)
Do not explain free-ride behavior
Unlikely this is the only feature that explains vote
Information-based theory as explanation for absentention
When voters dont have information, they delegate decisions to informed voters
Abstention is rational for uninformed!
What is this known as
Swing voters cost - abstention is optimal and RATIONAL when voters are uninformed (even if voting is costless)
Swing voter curse example
2 states of nature: 1 (more likely to occur) and 2 (less likely)
2 candidate: A is better for state 1, B better for state 2
3 voters: 1 informed of state
As state 1 is more likely, who should uninformed vote for
B) If it is state 1, who does informed agent vote for
C) what if it is state 2.
Uninformed voters should vote for candidate A
B) informed agent votes for A and A wins. Doesn’t matter what uninformed do
C) informed agent votes for B, uninformed better to abstain and let B win, rather than become swing voters and have A win (since better to not vote and risk making things worse - better to abstain!)
Thus both examples show it’s better for uninformed agents to abstain!
Voting to tell others: experiment (DellaVigna)
B) how much is motivation worth
Individual would be motivated to vote because of an anticipation of being asked
B) motivation to vote for social image reasons is as large as being paid $5-15 to vote
(Extra: voters report being asked 2x as much for presential elections , so could be aggregated to value 2x i.e $10-30
Key findings of Della Vigna - voting to tell others (2)
Voters do not feel pride from saying they voted, but non-voters do feel shame
Non-voters lie and claim they voted half the time
(So supports objective function-based - EXPRESSIVE MOTIVATIONS)
Feddersen and Pesendorfer on swing voter’s curse (information-based theory for voting behaviour)
(Hint; jars)
Jar 1 has 6 white balls and 2 red
Jar 2 has 6 white balls and 2 yellow
Some could see the colour, some uninformed.
Found informed voters chose correctly, while uninformed abstaining from voting for jars
Habit forming in voting - assessing shocks to voting costs (impacting decision to vote)
Then see whether future voting behaviour is affected by it
Fujiwara findings
Looked at rainfall on election day; found people discourage from voting due to rain in their first election, were less likely to also vote in future
I.e initial turnout has a long term impact- voting is habit forming
Specific stat in Fujiwara
1% fall in past turnout, decrease current turnout by 0.6-1%
If less people turn up initial election, less votes also in future.
How to address habit-forming issue
Introducing compulsory voting for short periods, to get people to attend initial elections in order to start positive habits (increased turnout in long run)
Since also has multiplier effects - like bandwagon effect, more ppl go so others go too)
Findings on age and voting
Big change in turnout from eligible age, so eligible to vote early can allow habit formation early
Does compulsory voting affect the policy?
No (see why in part B next FC)
Impact of compulsory voting
B) implications of this
Increases participation, but interestingly no impact on vote shares between left and right parties, or public spending
B)
Implying the new voters forced to vote; their preferences aren’t significantly different from voluntary voters (since vote shares did not change) i.e do not have strong policy preferences, so little incentive for candidates to shape policies towards voters. thus explains compulsory voting does not change policy!
