Theories of Voter Turnout

Question 1

So we have explored voter behaviour based on preferences for policy outcome (median voter)

and non-policy factors and more so politician quality (probabilistiic voting)

But in practice voters may vote for other reasons (3)

Answer 1

Money (get their vote bought)

Coercion (violence/intimidation)

may not just vote!

Question 2

Is voting a civic right or duty

Answer 2

some countries its duty (compulsory) and some a right (voluntary)

Question 3

How many countries in 2024 have compulsory voting

Answer 3

27

and 10 of them enforce it e.g Australia $20 penalty, $180 if not paid in time

Question 4

issue with voluntary voting

Answer 4

Turnout varies widely across countries

Question 5

When is voter turnout higher? (2)

Answer 5

higher for general elections

sensitive issues too e.g Brexit

Question 6

When would rational voter i participate in elections

Answer 6

if benefits of participating > costs

Question 7

So benefit from election if they can affect the outcome.

what does this depend on (2)

Answer 7

probability of voter i being pivotal: pi
and benefit from outcome: Bi

Question 8

What are costs of participation for voter i (3)

Answer 8

informational, transportation, opportunity costs of voting: (Aggregate into one cost Ci!)

Question 9

So expression for participation of voter i

Answer 9

piBi > Ci

e.g if probability of affecting outcome is low, voter more likely to not vote (abstain)

Question 10

Paradox of voting

Answer 10

Probability of being pivotal pi decreases with number of voters.

Larger the election, less likely to vote! since less likely to be the pivotal vote and be able to affect the outcome with its single vote!

Question 11

eval to paradox of voting

Answer 11

we observe a much higher turnout, esp for large election
(which rationally, as shown, we should see lower turnout!)

Question 12

numerical illustration of paradox of voting:

2 outcomes, 0 and 1. my preference is 0

1M voters.
distribution balanced i.e voters vote for 0 with probability 1/2.

When would my vote matter

Answer 12

My vote is pivotal only if there was 500k for 0 and 500k for 1, so mine is decisive

e.g 499,998 votes for 1 and 500,002 for 0, my vote is not pivotal thus i won’t have to vote and still enjoy my preference of 0

Question 13

Probability of being the pivotal voter in this example? High or low and why

Answer 13

Very low, it would be the probability of getting each policy to 500k each! So unlikely

Question 14

When does probability of being pivotal voter decrease even more

Answer 14

if vote share arent 50/50; highly unlikely IRL that distribution is exactly balanced i.e all have an equal probability of being voted

Question 15

Condorcet on voters paradox

Answer 15

a voter’s influence is small when many voters, thus lose interest as voters increase

Question 16

If piBi > CI
piBi < CI

Answer 16

Then rational people should vote
(Eval: lots of people abstain!)

B) people should abstain…
Eval: lots of people vote!

So the question is who is being irrational?

Question 17

Problem of voter turnout

Answer 17

challenges assumption of rational agents

Question 18

So ones who vote are not rational, as pi falls as numbers increase, yet we see high turnout.

What does this imply

Answer 18

Flaw in voting system

Question 19

4 types of voter turnout theories

Answer 19

Objective function theories (instrumental vs expressive)

voters’ rationality theories

altruistic voters

information-based theories

Question 20

Objective function theory: 2 explanations

Answer 20

instrumental motivations
expressive motivations

Question 21

First explanation of objective function-based theory: Instrumental motivations

B) what does decision to vote depend on

Answer 21

Voter mainly cares about outcome of vote i.e policy of winner

B)
Decision to vote depends on vote value i.e utility which is discounted by the probability her vote will count (pi)

Question 22

Issue with instrumental motivation

Answer 22

Decision to vote depends on vote value;

Which is small in large elections (lower prob of vote counting), so even a small cost should encourage rational voter to abstain (low probability of influencing, so can’t justify the cost even if small)

but in reality we get high turnout! so thus agents who vote are not rational!

Question 23

Expressive motivations

B) How is it expressed

Answer 23

People don’t vote for policy, but vote for the expressive value i.e what a vote says about the voter e.g validating self worth ‘im not a tory!’

B) expressive benefit is given by Di

Question 24

So if expressive benefit is Di, when will a rational voter vote in this expressive motivations model?

Answer 24

Di>Ci (and perceived benefit piBi is near 0)

Question 25

pro (1) and con (2) of expressive motivation

Answer 25

Explains bandwagon effect: more people voting means other people to follow difficult to measure expressive benefit (the happiness of voting) Still doesn’t explain high turnout

Question 26

2nd theory: rationality theory Questions rationality of voters: why are they not rational? (2)

Answer 26

Perhaps not calculate probability of being pivotal accurately (pi) so cost-benefit analysis wrong Learn from previous elections e.g turnout depend on opinion polls, last election etc

Question 27

Cons of rationality theory

Answer 27

They predict a low turnout, but in reality turnout is high! Does not explain this!

Question 28

Altruism-based theory

Answer 28

Utility from voting but also receives ethical value from helping others in their group This way maximises chances of this group to win

Question 29

cons (2)

Answer 29

Do not explain free-ride behavior Unlikely this is the only feature that explains vote

Question 30

Information-based theory as explanation for absentention

Answer 30

When voters dont have information, they delegate decisions to informed voters Abstention is rational for uninformed!

Question 31

What is this known as

Answer 31

Swing voters cost - abstention is optimal and RATIONAL when voters are uninformed (even if voting is costless)

Question 32

Swing voter curse example 2 states of nature: 1 (more likely to occur) and 2 (less likely) 2 candidate: A is better for state 1, B better for state 2 3 voters: 1 informed of state As state 1 is more likely, who should uninformed vote for B) If it is state 1, who does informed agent vote for C) what if it is state 2.

Answer 32

Uninformed voters should vote for candidate A B) informed agent votes for A and A wins. Doesn’t matter what uninformed do C) informed agent votes for B, uninformed better to abstain and let B win, rather than become swing voters and have A win (since better to not vote and risk making things worse - better to abstain!) Thus both examples show it’s better for uninformed agents to abstain!

Question 33

Voting to tell others: experiment (DellaVigna) B) how much is motivation worth

Answer 33

Individual would be motivated to vote because of an anticipation of being asked B) motivation to vote for social image reasons is as large as being paid $5-15 to vote (Extra: voters report being asked 2x as much for presential elections , so could be aggregated to value 2x i.e $10-30

Question 34

Key findings of Della Vigna - voting to tell others (2)

Answer 34

Voters do not feel pride from saying they voted, but non-voters do feel shame Non-voters lie and claim they voted half the time (So supports objective function-based - EXPRESSIVE MOTIVATIONS)

Question 35

Feddersen and Pesendorfer on swing voter’s curse (information-based theory for voting behaviour) (Hint; jars)

Answer 35

Jar 1 has 6 white balls and 2 red Jar 2 has 6 white balls and 2 yellow Some could see the colour, some uninformed. Found informed voters chose correctly, while uninformed abstaining from voting for jars

Question 36

Habit forming in voting - assessing shocks to voting costs (impacting decision to vote) Then see whether future voting behaviour is affected by it Fujiwara findings

Answer 36

Looked at rainfall on election day; found people discourage from voting due to rain in their first election, were less likely to also vote in future I.e initial turnout has a long term impact- voting is habit forming

Question 37

Specific stat in Fujiwara

Answer 37

1% fall in past turnout, decrease current turnout by 0.6-1% If less people turn up initial election, less votes also in future.

Question 38

How to address habit-forming issue

Answer 38

Introducing compulsory voting for short periods, to get people to attend initial elections in order to start positive habits (increased turnout in long run) Since also has multiplier effects - like bandwagon effect, more ppl go so others go too)

Question 39

Findings on age and voting

Answer 39

Big change in turnout from eligible age, so eligible to vote early can allow habit formation early

Question 40

Does compulsory voting affect the policy?

Answer 40

No (see why in part B next FC)

Question 41

Impact of compulsory voting B) implications of this

Answer 41

Increases participation, but interestingly no impact on vote shares between left and right parties, or public spending B) Implying the new voters forced to vote; their preferences aren’t significantly different from voluntary voters (since vote shares did not change) i.e do not have strong policy preferences, so little incentive for candidates to shape policies towards voters. thus explains compulsory voting does not change policy!