Probabilistic Voting Model Flashcards

1
Q

In reality, sometime voters can best elect, but not affect policies. What is this known as

A

Political principle agent problem (agent i.e parties who act on behalf of principles i.e voters, act in self interest)

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2
Q

Why may voters not exclusively consider candidates policy when voting for candidates (2)

(What non-policy factors do they consider) (2)

A

Vote on ideology/sympathy.

May also not have/be able to process the full information

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3
Q

Main criticism of MVT

A

Unrealistic to believe individuals base votes on just policy - Non-policy factors like sympathy exist irl!, likeability, looks!

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4
Q

Similarity between MVT and PVM

A

Both predict policy convergence

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5
Q

Probabilistic voting model main characteristic

A

Introduces voters’ subjective perceptions on top of their preferences for policy

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6
Q

Mechanism of MVT vs PVM

A

MVT - median voter determines policy outcome

PVM - swing voter determines policy outcome

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7
Q

PVM setup:

2 candidates A and B: each opportunistic

Candidates simultaneously but independently choose policy which consists of 2 issues e.g gov size and foreign policy

What can we immediately notice from this that differs from MVT

A

Multi-dimensional unlike MVT which only considers one policy

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8
Q

3 voter groups, poor, middle, rich
Yp<Ym<Yr

Proportion of population is thus
ap, am, ar

Every voter i can differ in ideology

Voting behaviour depends on: (3)

A

Policy
Individual ideology towards a candidate σij
Candidate average popularity before election (the shock) δ

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9
Q

Voter i votes for B if…

A

Uj (Xb,Yb) + σij + δ > Uj(Xa,Ya)

(utility from candidate B’s 2 policies) + individual ideology + shock
has to be > utility from the other candidate A’s 2 policies

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10
Q

Ideology σij (ideology of a voter i in group j.
Key assumption

B) what does σij mean if
>0
<0
=0

A

Assume ideology follows uniform distribution centered on neutral ideology i.e where = 0

b)
σiJ > 0 means voter i is ideologically closer to B.
σiJ < 0 means voter i is ideologically closer to A.
σiJ = 0 means that voter i is neutral.

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11
Q

Scandals δ can reduce one and increase others. Assumption for popularity

B)
δ>0
δ<0

A

Uniform distribition centred on neutral ideology
δ=0

B)
δ>0 = shock favours B
δ<0 = shock favours A

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12
Q

Timeline: step 1 - electoral campaign: candidates announce simultaneously
(Xa, Ya) and (Xb, Yb)

Step 2: shock δ may occur

Step 3: election takes place, voters vote

Step 4: winner implements policy

A
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13
Q

Swing voter

A

The voter who after considering each policy platform, and average popularity (the shock) is indifferent between the 2 candidates

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14
Q

Swing voter expression

A

σj > Uj (Xa,Ya) - Uj (Xb, Yb) - δ

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15
Q

Why is swing voter the most importanst

A

Because a small change in policy platform is sufficient to gain her vote. Easiest to change opinion

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16
Q

Issue candidates face

A

Do not know average popularity is known, i.e do not know who the swing voter is (only know probability of shock)

17
Q

Candidates strategies: they have to set policies before average popularity is known.

So how do they maximise probability of being elected?

A

Consider scandals

18
Q

Who will vote for candidate A

A

People left of swing voter.

19
Q

Area of the voters for A

20
Q

When does A win election

A

When Πa > 0.5

Rearrange to find δ (scandal threshold below which A wins)

21
Q

First result we get:

A

A wins if not hit by a scandal. But they do not know the value of the threshold, so maximises probability of winning

22
Q

So A maximises probability of winning:

A’s maximisation problem

B) what to note about the weightings between groups i.e which groups are given more relevance (2)

A

More relevance given to larger group (higher aj i.e proportion) and to the less ideological group (higher ΩJ density)

(Since more likely contain swing voters)

23
Q

What does B do?

A

Since also unaware of value of shock threshold, Performs same maximisation process to max probability to win, mirroring A

Thus set same policy platform! Xa, Ya = Xb, Yb
Policy convergence!

24
Q

So PVM on why candidates please swing voter

A

Less ideological i.e less care about sympathy, looks etc (no loyalty towards a certain candidate) and more sensitive to policy of candidates, so thus easier to change their vote.

25
1st novelty is swing voter 2nd novelty of PVT
Election outcome could be determined by a scandal shock
26
How to determine swing voters?
Density of a group (ΦJ) - higher = weaker ideological bias, so more sensitive to policy proposals and thus more likely swing group
27
How does empirical evidence align with PVM
We see US presidential candidates visit swing states more often. (E.g trump visiting SS)
28
How many visits in 2004 were to swing states
3/5 visits in 2004 were to swing states e.g Florida, Ohio
29
Do swing states get more funds resources (Swing Voter Hypothesis)
No. Amount of funds allocated does not depend on number of swing voters
30
Electoral battleground hypothesis B) does it hold
Distributive goods should be disproportionately allocated to constituencies where 2 top parties have roughly equal supporters (since more competitive there…) B) no
31
Partisan supporters hypothesis Does it hold
Politicians favour areas that contain a large % of their core supporters B) no
32
Larcinese also tests government spending on vote choice
Find spending has little/no effect on voter choice However ideology has large effects, thus justifying the probabilistic voting model!