The Search For A Solution

Question 1

The executive in operation

Answer 1

1. The power-sharing executive took up office on 1 January 1974. Almost immediately its future was plunged into doubt by events within the OUP:
   - a meeting of the OUPs ruling body, the Ulster unionist council on 4 January voted to reject Sunningdale. Faulkner immediately resigned as party leader and was replaced by Harry West. However Faulkner was able to remain at the head of the power sharing executive.
   - on 28 February a Westminster general election took place. With 80% of the vote, 11 out of 12 Northern Ireland constituencies were one by the UUUC.

The election also resulted in a change in govt in London with labour returning to power under Harold Wilson

2. Strike
   On 14 May 1974 a general strike began in Northern Ireland. It was organised by the Ulster Workers Council UWC a group of Protestant trade unionists who had gained substantial amounts of political and paramilitary support.
   Initially support for the strike was limited but UDA intimidation and improved coordination by the UWC ensured that by the end of the week much of Northern Ireland had came to a standstill. Attempts by some of Northern Ireland’s trade unions to organise a back-to-work demonstration on 21 May met with little support - only 200 turned up.
   Tensions were further heightened on 17 May when car bombs exploded in Dublin and Monaghan. It was believed that loyalists were behind the attacks which claimed 27 lives a five more of the injured later died from their wounds.
3. Wilsons intervention
   Although there were by now 17500 soldiers in the province, the army was hesitant about taking on the strikers, arguing that the strike was political and not a terrorist action. The British prime minister however was losing patience with the situation and appeared on tv on 25 May to denounce the strike and call its organisers ‘spongers’. This speech infuriated unionists and more than anything else, ensured the strike continued. When the govt ordered the army to take over fuel supplies the UWC ordered a total shutdown across Northern Ireland. Seeing no obvious solution and with the British and SDLP still refusing to negotiate with the UWC, Faulkner resigned as chief executive on 28 May. The other unionist members of the executive resigned with him, thus ending power sharing.
   Having achieved its goal, the UWC ended the strike on 29 May. The assembly was suspended on 30 May and, after five months’ absence direct rule was reintroduced.
   It is impossible to know if power sharing could of worked if it had been given more time to establish firm roots. It seems clear that many of those involved in the executive were not as fully committed to its success as was needed. This lack of commitment - coupled with intense opposition from some quarters was enough to endure the failure of this attempted solution and the continuation of political unrest.

Question 2

Developments 1975-80

Answer 2

1. New security policies
   Following the collapse of the power sharing executive, the British govt pursued policies of:
   Ulsterisation - reducing the strength of the army in Northern Ireland whilst increasing the size of the RUC and UDR
   Criminalisation - the end of special category status for those convicted of terrorist offences. This meant those convicted after March 1976 would be treated in the same way as other criminals. They would be housed in a new prison consisting of H-shaped blocks, which had been built at the maze outside Belfast.

Although the numbers of deaths as a result of violence began to decrease in the latter years of the 1970s there were still some appalling incidents such as the IRA firebombing of the La Mon house hotel outside Belfast resulting in the deaths of 12 people.
As a second decade of violence dawned however violence seemed to be on the increase again and a solution to the violence seemed as far away as ever, despite the election in April 1979 of a new conservative govt led by Margaret thatcher.

2. The 1980 hunger strike
   IRA prisoners who saw themselves as soldiers fighting for Ireland’s freedom detested the policy of criminalisation. Their initial reaction was to refuse to wear prison clothes instead covering themselves with blankets.
   This blanket protest was followed in 1978 by the dirty protest, when prisoners smeared their cell walls with excrement rather than having to slop out. By late 1980 over 340 of the 837 republican prisoners were involved in the protest. Public demonstrations in support of the protests met with little success. Even attacks on prison wardens proved ineffective.

By late 1980 the IRA began a group hunger strike as a last method of achieving their demands. The historically-successful tactic was called off in December however without anything being achieved although the the prisoners believed that a deal had been reached on the wearing of their own clothes.

Question 3

The 1981 hunger strike

Answer 3

1 Bobby Sands
On 1 March 1981 a second hunger strike began, led by Bobby Sands, The IRA prisoners officer commanding. This time prisoners joined the protest at intervals making the strike last longer and maximising its impact.
Although the hunger strike gained huge publicity and the sympathy of many in the nationalist community, it did not change govt policy. Therefore when Frank Maguire, the independent MP for Fermanagh-South Tyrone died, republicans saw their chance to increase pressure on the British and put Sands up as a candidate. On the fortieth day of the strike, Sands standing as an anti-H block candidate was elected to Westminster.
Despite huge amounts of international pressure on both sides neither would compromise and on 5 May Sands died. His funeral was attended by an estimated 100,000 mourners. The strike continued until 3 October 1981, by which 9 other prisoners had died. In the same period 61 people died as a result of the violence that erupted in reaction to the hunger strikers’ deaths.

2. Concessions granted
   No concessions were made during the hunger strike. However, within a week of its end a number of concessions were announced. These included:
   - prisoners would be allowed to wear their own clothes
   - the 50% reduction in length of sentence by those involved in protests would be restored
   - a greater number of prison visits would be permitted
   - a greater degree of association among prisoners would be permitted
   These concessions resulted in the protests in favour of the special category status all but ending in October 1981
3. Aftermath
   In the aftermath new problems were emerging for the British govt:
   - increased nationalist alienation from the state resulting from what was seen as prime minister Margaret thatcher’s heavy handed approach to hunger strikers whose demands were viewed as reasonable
   - the growth in support for the republican movement
   - unionists while glad the govt had not given into the demands of the hunger strikers who they saw as murderers and criminals were increasingly voicing their anxieties at the growth in support of the IRA demonstrated by the numbers attending Bobby sands and other hunger strikers’ funerals and the seeming weaknesses of the province’s security provisions which allowed IRA violence to continue.
   - the Irish govt was pushing for the intro of a new political initiative to end the troubles
4. The rise of Sinn Féin
   Sands’ victory in Fermanagh-South Tyrone showed republicans that there was much to gain from involvement in the political process at a time when the British govt was enjoying increasing success in its undercover campaign against republicans. That his victory had not been a fluke was proved when his election agent, Owen Carron won the seat at the by-election following sands death.
   The official adoption of a policy of increasing involvement in politics came at the 1981 Sinn Féin Ard Fheis. Here the delegates approved the movements plan of contesting elections while also continuing to use extra-constitutional methods to achieve its aims. This became known as the ‘armalite and ballot box’ strategy.
   The results of following elections clearly revealed the growth in support for Sinn Féin among nationalist voters. The party was soon winning an increasing number of local council seats. Then in June 1983 Westminster general election the party’s president Gerry Adams, defeated Gerry Fitt for the west Belfast seat. The British govt was growing increasingly concerned that Sinn Féin might even replace the SDLP as the main nationalist party, led since 1979 by John Hume was looking more and more to Dublin for support.
   Now with both govts cooperating ever more closely in the face of Sinn Féins growth, there was the possibility that the SDLP might again have a significant input into the future direction of the province.
   At the same time the levels of violence - while lower than the 1970s still gave a considerable cause for concern. On 6 December 1982, 17 people, 11 of whom were soldiers, died when an INLA bomb exploded in Ballykelly. The INLA had emerged in 1974 from a split in the OIRA.

Question 4

The Anglo-Irish agreement

Answer 4

1. Faced with continuing violence and increasing support for Sinn Féin, the British and Irish govts decided to work more closely together. The outcome was the Anglo-Irish agreement.
   It was signed by thatcher and Taoiseach Garett Fitzgerald on 15 November 1985. Historians have provided different reasons why it was signed:
   - thatcher realised that unless she dealt with nationalist alienation in Northern Ireland, she would not be able to improve the security situation. The IRA’s attempt to kill her at the 1984 Conservative party conference in Brighton brought the problem particularly info focus.
   - the Irish govt’s previous attempted solution, the new Ireland forum 1983-84 had failed due to a lack of unionist engagement, the exclusion of republicans from its discussions and thatcher’s outright rejection of all of its suggested solutions.
   - Fitzgerald hoped that reduced nationalist alienation and reform of the security forces in Northern Ireland would undermine the minority’s toleration of the IRA and support for Sinn Féin
2. What was agreed?
   The key terms of the agreement were:
   - the establishment of an intergovernmental conference headed by the Secretary of State and the Irish foreign minister. This would deal with security, legal and political issues and improving cross border cooperation
   - a permanent secretariat made up of northern and southern civil servants would provide administrative support to the conference.
   - devolution would only occur if there was an agreement on the sharing of power.
   The agreement clearly recognised that the republic had a role to play I. The govt of Northern Ireland. At the same time Dublin accepted a United Ireland’s was a long term goal that would only happen with the agreement of the majority of the Northern Ireland population.
3. Reactions
   While the agreement passed through both Westminster and the Dáil without any real problems it met with a wide variety of reactions elsewhere.

Northern Ireland
Unionists - felt they had been abandoned by their own govt and believed that they were now in the process that would eventually result in a United Ireland. They were annoyed that they had been kept in the dark during the negotiations leading up to the agreement. Only the alliance party did not condemn the agreement outright.

Nationalists - the SDLP had been given more of a role in the creation of the agreement than any other party in the north. Therefore it saw the accord as an opportunity to create a better way of life for those living in the province.

Republicans - Sinn Féin condemned the agreement arguing that rather than bringing a United Ireland closer it actually made the division of Ireland more permanent since Dublin was now recognising the existence of Northern Ireland and accepting a United Ireland was a long term aim that would only happen with the consent of the majority of the population of Northern Ireland.

Republic of Ireland - the Fianna Fáil opposition party led by Charles Haughey condemned the agreement due to the recognition being given by Dublin to Britains right to be in Northern Ireland. A prominent Irish Labour Party senator, Mary Robinson resigned from her party because the agreement was unacceptable to the unionist community

Britain - the agreement enjoyed overwhelming cross-party support at west minister but individual members of the British Parliament were not so happy. Ian Gow, the prime ministers former parliamentary private secretary and now a treasury minister resigned from his position in the govt. he argued that the agreement was won by violence and would make the situation in the province worse rather than better.

Question 5

Campaign of opposition to the Anglo-Irish agreement

Answer 5

Unionist politicians decided that the best way of opposing the Anglo-Irish agreement was by a campaign of non-cooperation with the British govt. however they were also keen to demonstrate the depth and breadth of unionist opposition to what they termed the ‘Dublin Diktat’.
The campaign against the agreement took many forms;
- bonfires burning effigies of Margaret thatcher, Irish foreign minister Peter Barry and other members of the Dublin govt
- marches to the headquarters of the new Anglo-Irish secretariat. On a number of occasions these ended in violence.
- a huge protest rally was held at Belfast’s city hall on 23 November 1985 attended by an estimated 100,000
- all 15 unionist MPs resigned their seats at Westminster but then stood for them again in the resulting by-elections. The aim was to show the strength of unionist opposition through the total number of votes the candidates received
- a unionist ‘day of action’ was arranged for 3 March 1986. Although much of the province was brought to a standstill using peaceful protest, in a number of places the protests ended in violence
- the launching of a campaign of civil disobedience with measures including the shunning of British ministers, the refusal to set rates in unionist-controlled councils and boycott of Westminster

At the same time loyalist paramilitaries engaged in a campaign of violence and intimidation against the RUC who were seen as essential to the success of the agreement. In addition, in November 1986 Ulster resistance, a paramilitary organisation whose aim was the destruction of the agreement was formed

2. Results of the campaign
   By and large however these tactics failed. The unionists gained a total of over 420,000 votes in the January 1986 by-elections; however they lost one of their seats to the SDLP. The absence of fourteen unionist MPs was not noticed at Westminster and since local councils had little power as it was the refusal to use this power made little or no difference. By September 1987 when unionist leaders agreed to talk to British ministers again it was clear the campaign to destroy the agreement had failed.

Question 6

Power sharing

Answer 6

1. A new political system
   On 20 March 1973 the British govt published its proposals for the future of Northern Ireland.
   The plans proposed a new assembly elected by proportional representation. There would also be an executive. However it was not to be given control over security or justice. In addition, the British govt insisted that there would have to be:
   - the sharing of power between Catholics and Protestants
   - the formal recognition of an ‘Irish dimension’ through the creation of a council of Ireland. This would allow for the discussion of common interests.
2. Early problems
   While nationalists were broadly supportive, unionism was divided in its reaction to the plans. Some of the OUP remained loyal to Brian Faulkner who was supporting the plans.
   Other unionists - the remainder of the OUP, the democratic unionist party DUP and the new Vanguard unionist progressive party (set up by William Craig to oppose power sharing) - joined to form the United Ulster unionist council UUUC to oppose the plans. Apart from their opposition to any ‘Irish dimension’, they saw the proposals as undemocratic and believed that power should not be shared with those not loyal to the union. The extent of these splits became clear when the results of the assembly elections were announced in June. They revealed that the number anti power-sharing unionists was greater than unionists supporting power sharing.
3. An executive is formed
   On 21 November Whitelaw revealed the membership of the power-sharing executive. Six ministries were to be held by unionists, four by the SDLP and one by the Alliance party APNI. There would also be four non-voting members of the executive. Two SDLP, one unionist and one alliance. The OUP’s Brian Faulkner would head the executive while the SDLP’s Gerry Fitt would be his deputy.
4. Sunningdale
   The discussions about the council of Ireland took place at Sunningdale in Berkshire. The meeting brought together the leading politicians from Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland. At one stage reverend Ian Paisley and William Craig were asked to attend to give their views. Unsurprisingly they refused.
   Agreement between the parties was finally reached in December 1973.
   The Sunningdale agreement contained the following elements:
   - London agreed not to oppose Irish unification if a majority of the Northern Ireland population desired it.
   - Dublin accepted that Irish unity could only ever be achieved peacefully and with the consent of the majority of people in Northern Ireland.
   - a council of ministers with 14 members was to be established to help with the development of north-south cooperation. It would eventually be given decision making powers.
   - a 60 member consultative assembly would be elected by the Dáil and the assembly at some future date
   - also at some future date control over internal security issues would be returned to the Stormont assembly
   - approval of the decisions made at Sunningdale was to take place at a future conference.
5. Problems for the future
   On the surface the agreement looked promising; the problem was that both sides believed they had agreed to something entirely different:
   - the SDLP saw the agreement as paving the way towards the creation of closer ties between north and south
   - Faulkner saw it as a mere token which he had agreed to as a way to get Dublin to accept the position of Northern Ireland as part of the U.K.

Republicans were also lukewarm in their support seeing the new system as proposing substantially less than what they sought.
In the shorter term, however Faulkner faced more serious problems.
On 10 December loyalist paramilitaries announced the formation of an Ulster army council to resist any significant ‘Irish dimension’. Nor did the IRA seem any more satisfied, setting of a series of bombs in London a week before Christmas.