The Politics of the PRC Flashcards
1
Q
Tiananmen Massacre 4 June 1989: the conservatives win the power struggle… Or not?
A
2
Q
1992: Deng on Tour
A
- “Southern Tour” to Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Guangzhou, Shanghai
- Crucial moment in Chinese history
- Conservatives (anti economic reform) were emboldened after Tiananmen Massacre 1989
- Deng comes out swinging against them
- Deng: “those who do not promote reform should be brought down from their leadership positions”
- Jiang Zemin forced to adopt Deng’s positions
- Deng Xiaoping: “I don’t care if the cat is black or white (socialism or capitalism), so long as it caches mice (achieves economic growth)”
3
Q
The other Deng Xiaoping Legacy: Collective Leadership
A
- Encouraged CCP Politburo Standing Committee to rule by consensus
- Avoid authoritarianism and personality cult of the Mao era
- CCP General Secretary “first among equals”
- Post-Deng era: clear idea of generational shift occurring every 10 years
- Crucial in this: term limits
- Very unusual for authoritarian state
- Widely believed to enhance China’s long-term stability and avoid excesses of other dictatorships and the Mao era
4
Q
“Paramount Leader”
A
- General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
- State Chairman (“President”)
- Chairman of the Central Military Commission
5
Q
Jiang Zemin as General Secretary 1989-2002 President 1993-2003 Chairman of the CMC 1990-2005
A
- “Third generation” leader: after Mao and Deng
- Rose to power as conservative in 1989 but embraced Deng’s economic reforms
- From 1993 Three most powerful political positions in hands of “paramount leader”
- With Premier Zhu Rongji, oversees average 8% GDP growth annually
- Stability and growth vs inequality and corruption
- Proliferation special interest groups and factions
- “Patriotic Education” to combat CCP legitimacy crisis
- 2001: PRC enters WTO on extremely favourable terms
6
Q
1990s/early 2000s under Jiang Zemin
A
- Governance increasingly seen as management rather than politics
- Under Jiang the government’s role seen increasingly as managing economy (many negative side effects like inequality and gap between coastal cities and rural areas)
- For successor Hu Jintao this not enough: sees widespread dislocation and social unrest
- Jiang hands over power peacefully: major achievement for China
7
Q
Hu Jintao as General Secretary 2002-2012 President 2003-2013 Chairman of the CMC 2005-2013
A
- “Fourth generation” leader
- Respects Collective Leadership. “First among Equals”: mediator and consensus builder
- Consistent economic growth (and inequality)
- “Harmonious Socialist Society”
- Harmony involves cracking down on dissent and minorities
- No real success in tackling corruption
- Or economic inequality…
- Praised for handing over power smoothly
- Term limits are respected
8
Q
Xi Jingping as General Secretary 2012- President 2013- Chairman of the CMC 2013-
A
- “Fifth generation” leader
- Son of revolutionary hero Xi Zhongxun, which makes him a “princeling” (privileged class of CCP leaders’ offspring)
- Former governor of Fujian and Zhejiang
- 2007: Politburo Standing Committee
- 2008: Designated as Hu Jintao’s successor
- Fundamentally different leadership style
9
Q
Xi Jinping as General Secretary 2012- President 2013- Chairman of the CMC 2013-
A
- End of “Collective Leadership” style common since Deng era
- Massive centralization of power
- Increasing personality cult
- Strict enforcement party discipline
- Anti-corruption campaign against Xi enemies
- Assertive foreign policy
- “Belt and Road Initiative”
- 2013: National Security Commission
- Social Credit System
10
Q
Xi Jinping as General Secretary 2012- President 2013- Chairman of the CMC 2013-
A
- Oct 2017 19th Party Congress: “New Era”
- “Xi Jinping Thought”
- 2018: Abolition of terms limits
11
Q
Structure of the Chinese Communist Party
A
- General Secretary
- Politburo Standing Committee
- Politburo
- Central Committee
- National Party Congress
- Party members
12
Q
CCP Institutions: The National Party Congress (NPC)
A
- Held every five years
- Makes major personnel decisions
- Revises the CCP constitution to include new ideological directions
- Elects the CCP Central Committee, The Central Military Commission, and the Discipline Inspection Commission
- Not to be confused with National People’s Congress (state)
13
Q
CCP Institutions: The Central Committee (CC)
A
- Responsible for party work when the full Congress is not in session
- Elects the Secretariat, Politburo, and General Secretary
- Constitutes the de-facto personnel pool for all major state-administration positions
- The composition of the CC is often an indicator of political trends in the PRC
14
Q
The Politburo brings together the key figures of party, state and military in the PRC and it is the ‘power centre’ of the CCP
A
Remember that Xi Jinping is only part of the Politburo Standing Committee
15
Q
CCP Institutions: The Politburo Standing Committee
A
- Makes most of the decisions before presenting them to the Politburo
- Probably meets every two weeks
- Discussions are believed to be open
- Decisions are believed to be subject to consensus
- The Committee is chaired by the CCP General Secretary
- Members are officially selected by the Central Committee, but in practice they are selected by other Standing Committee members
16
Q
Members of Politburo Standing Committee:
A
- Xi Jinping
- Li Qiang
- Zhao Leji
- Wang Huning
- Cai Qi
- Ding Xuexiang
- Li Xi
17
Q
Women in Chinese Politics
A
- There has never been a woman on the Politburo Standing Committee
- After October 2022 Party Congress: No women in entire Politburo for first time since 1990s
- Among CCP members, less than 30% are women
- Officially 10% of provincial, municipal, and county-level leadership positions are supposed to be reserved for women; but this is not enforced
- Women occupy a mere 9.33% of county-level posts as head of government or party secretary, falling to 5.29% in cities and 3.23% at the provincial level
- Under Xi Jinping an emphasis on traditional gender roles has returned in order to counter the declining birthrate
18
Q
What is the difference between the president and the premier?
A
- President (Xi Jinping)
– Head of state
– Runs the PRC
— Declares state of emergency
— Declares war
— Appoints all major officials
— Responsible for foreign affairs
— Gathers political support for PRC government policies - Premier (Li Qiang)
– Head of Government
– Runs the State Council and all agencies under it
— Oversees work of ministers
— Responsible for the technical details of implementing policies in the PRC
19
Q
PRC’s Administrative Divisions & Territorial Disputes
A
- Autonomous Regions
– Xinjiang Uyghur AR
– Tibet AR
– Inner Mongolia AR
– Ningxia Hui AR
– Guangxi Zhuang AR - Municipalities
– Chongqing
– Beijing
– Shanghai - Special Administrative Regions
– Hong Kong
– Macau
20
Q
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
A
The PLA is under the command of two institutions:
- National People’s Congress Standing Committee –> Central Military Commission (State) –> Xi Jinping
- Chinese Communist Party Central Committee –> Central Military Commission (Party) –> Xi Jinping
21
Q
Party and State
A
- Mao period: Party and State almost completely intertwined, Party responsible for appointing Nomenklatura and setting policy
– Party Committees in every governmental body at national, provincial and county level
– This weakened the power of State bureaucracy: often specialists
– Bureaucrats/specialists have incentive to distort information to please the principal (Party official) who holds all power. Of course no democratic checks and balances…
– Danger of promotions based on Party loyalty, not expertise/competence
– Party leadership struggles to adequately monitor bureaucratic behaviour - Serious problem in all communist countries
22
Q
1980s: Deng Xiaoping reforms Party-State relations
A
- Party to delegate more responsibility to government bureaucracy, especially in economic policy-making
- Provincial level: Party departments overlapping with government departments were abolished
- Civil service reforms to establish dual structure in bureaucracy:
– Civil servants selected by meritocracy and on professional criteria
– Alongside administrative officials selected by Party - Result: More independent bureaucracy means greater incentive to be efficient, for the bureaucrats but also for the Party itself
23
Q
Disclaimer regarding 1980s Deng Xiaoping Party-State relations reforms
A
- Party still most powerful in the relationship
- Party still sets out general policy and ideology
- These reforms were strongly resisted by conservatives and the relations between Party and State and resulting inefficiency and corruption is still an issue
- Under Jiang Zemin the Party is again strengthened
- Under Xi Jinping Party-State relations resemble the Mao era again
24
Q
Two important visions of the PRC
A
- Zhang Weiwei
- Xu Zhangrun
25
Q
Zhang Weiwei as a Regime Intellectual
A
- Professor of International Relations at Fudan University in Shanghai
- Former interpreter for Chinese leadership (Deng Xiaoping)
- 2012: “The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State” (book)
- Has become famous for his eloquent defence of the Chinese government and its policies, both inside and outside China
26
Q
Zhang Weiwei as a Regime Intellectual
A
- Challenges idea of liberal democracy as pinnacle human development
- Liberal democratic model in crisis: Populism, short-termism, excessive influence of money, incapable leaders
- “Western leadership is showmanship”
- What about Trump?
27
Q
Zhang Weiwei as a Regime Intellectual
A
- Liberal democracy is not suitable for China
- Been there done that: 1912
- Because of large population
- And fear of upheavals
- China would become ungovernable
- Economic growth proves that the current system works
28
Q
Zhang Weiwei as a Regime Intellectual
A
- China has elaborate system of meritocracy
- Creates capable leadership
- Leaders rise through the provinces
- 2012: Very strict term limit for CCP leaders, this is proof that the system works!
- 2023: Who needs term limits?
29
Q
Xu Zhangrun as Dissident Intellectual
A
- Law Professor at the famous Tsinghua University until July 2020
- Rare: chose not to leave the country
- July 2018: “Imminent Fears, Immediate Hopes”
- Feb 2020: “Viral Alarm: When Fury Overcomes Fear”
30
Q
Chinese tradition of courageous intellectuals
A
- Late Ming Dynasty “East Forest Academy” of Confucian critics of bad government
- Scholars movement behind the “Hundred Days Reforms” in 1898
- July 1959 Lushan Conference: ‘Ten-thousand Word Appeal to the Ruler’ by Peng Dehuai criticizing Mao Zedong for Great Leap Forward
- Democracy Wall Movement 1978/9
- Tiananmen Protests 1989
31
Q
Chinese tradition of courageous intellectuals: Xu Zhangrun
A
- Combination of criticizing CCP on own terms and a vision of Chinese history that is larger than CCP narrative
- Very different from liberal pro-western “dissident” writing
- Clearly aimed at Chinese not foreign audience
- “Xu has issued a challenge from the intellectual and cultural heart of China to the political heart of the Communist Party”
32
Q
Xu Zhangrun: “Imminent Fears, Immediate Hopes”
A
- Xi Jinping’s rule threatens the modernizing trajectory that started in mid-19th century (Self-Strengthening Movement)
- This might be the end of the Reform Era and return to Totalitarianism
- Return of “ceaseless struggle”: mass movements, class struggle
- “KGB-style control”: social atmosphere of fear
- International grandstanding and renewed instability
33
Q
Xu Zhangrun: “Imminent Fears, Immediate Hopes”
A
- Compares CCP elite’s habit with (very corrupt) Ming Dynasty imperial family
- They should have nothing to hide and divulge assets
- Stop the new personality cult of Xi Jinping
- Overturn verdict on June 4th
- Does not romanticize the West: US is “degraded civilisation”, Republicans: “crowd of the Ghoulish Undead”
- Subtle equivalence of Xi and Trump
- Describes those who try to flatter Xi Jinping as “a scrum of eunuchs… kissing arse as they flaunted their shamelessness”
