the impact of World War II and the methods that enabled the USSR to secure victory Flashcards
1
Q
leadership
A
Gregorii Chichern – peaceful coexistence
Maxim Litvinov – collective security against fascist aggression
Vyacheslav Molotov – pact with Germany
2
Q
foreign policy 1917-1939
A
- Under Lenin, the government believed Soviet Russia required normal relations with the Western world for it to survive. Not only were good relations important for national security, but the economy also required trade with the industrial countries
- However, there were lingering suspicions of communism on the part of the Western powers and concern over the foreign debts incurred by the tsarist government that the Soviet government had unilaterally cancelled
- In April 1922, the Soviet commissar of foreign affairs, Georgii Chicherin, circumvented these difficulties by achieving an understanding with Germany, the other pariah state of Europe, at Rapallo, Italy
- In the Treaty of Rapallo, Germany and Russia agreed on mutual recognition, cancellation of debt claims, normalization of trade relations, and secret cooperation in military development
- After concluding the treaty, the Soviet Union soon obtained diplomatic recognition from other major powers, beginning with Britain in February 1924
- Although the United States withheld recognition until 1933, private American firms began to extend technological assistance and develop commercial links beginning in the 1920s.
- During the 1920s, Germany was the Soviet Union’s major ally – based on the fact that both countries had been ostracised by the Western World
- After being opposed initially to the League of Nations and the notion of collective security, the Soviet Union in the 1930s became the strongest supporter of the League and its philosophy
- The dynamics of Soviet foreign relations changed drastically after Stalin recognised the danger posed by Nazi Germany – from 1934 through 1937, the Soviet Union tried to restrain German militarism by building coalitions hostile to fascism. In the international communist movement, the Comintern adopted a policy of cooperation with socialists and liberals against fascism
- The Communists were prepared to adopt a pragmatic attitude towards foreign affairs in order to prepare and preserve their own interests
- However, the existence of Comintern worked against the possibility of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West
- In the end, the West proved unwilling to counter German provocative behaviour, and after France and Britain acquiesced to Hitler’s demands for Czechoslovak territory at Munich in 1938, Stalin abandoned his efforts to forge a collective security agreement with the West
- Convinced now that the West would not fight Hitler, Stalin decided to come to an understanding with Germany
- The open provisions of the agreement (signed 24 August 1939) pledged absolute neutrality in the event one of the parties should become involved in war, while a secret protocol partitioned Poland between the parties and assigned Romanian territory as well as Estonia and Latvia (and later Lithuania) to the Soviet sphere of influence
3
Q
The War on the Eastern Front 1939 - 1945
A
- Stalin believed that he could not fully trust nor rely on France and Britain (particularly after being left out of the Munich Conference) and in 1939 the Soviets continued to negotiate with Germany
- In May 1939, Molotov replaced Litvinov (who was for collective security), as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and with this a move away from collective security
- Stalin made the Nazi-Soviet Pact (Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact) because Hitler could offer much more than Britain and France
- William Shirer, “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich” (1959)
“For sheer cynicism, the Nazi dictator had met his match in the Soviet despot … the sordid, secret deal … The Soviet despot for years had cried out at the ‘fascist beasts’ and called for peace-loving states to band together to halt the Nazi aggression”. - In addition, it would also avoid a war on two fronts – the USSR was involved in hostilities with Japan
- Soviet armed forces had been hit by the purges and the rearmament programme was nowhere near completion and a pact with Germany would buy Russia more time
- The pact committed both countries to refrain from aggression and to observe neutrality in conflicts involving third parties; defined spheres of influence and divided Poland
- The USSR invaded Poland from the east on 17 September 1939
- The Red Army invaded Finland in November and the Finns managed to resist the Soviets who signed an armistice which allowed them to gain territory around Leningrad
- In June 1940 on the pretext of dealing with acts of provocation, half a million Soviet troops were sent into the Baltic States and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were bullied into petitioning for incorporation into the USSR
- Later more territory was taken when Romania was forced to hand back Bessarabia
- Stalin moved to turn spheres of influence into a more solid defensive buffer
- 22 June 1941 the German army launched Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union taking the Russians by surprise
- Between June and December the Red Army lost 2 663 000 killed in action and 3 350 000 taken prisoner (of which 2 000 000 were dead by February 1942)
- In September the siege of Leningrad, a blockade where the Germans cut off the land link to the city, had begun and lasted 900 days and ended in January 1944
- Government offices evacuated from Moscow and government offices were evacuated to Kuibyshev (Stalin refused to leave)
- Russia started to fight back and the Germans started taking casualties and in December 1941 a Soviet counter-offensive near Moscow pushed them back 150-200 kilometres
- As a result the Germans would not be able to defeat the Russians before the winter set in and the Germans were poorly prepared for the cold
- In the west, factories vulnerable to German takeover were being dismantled and moved along with their workers, to the east (which later helped the USSR out produce Germany in military hardware)
- The strength of Soviet economic and human resources began to make an impression
- By the end of 1942 the command and control were becoming more effective and techniques were developed for conducting mechanised warfare on a grand scale
- Americans had also contributed supply of raw materials, food and transport through the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 which gave President Roosevelt power to give aid to Britain and also to USSR
- According to Corin and Fiehn, “…without the Lend-Lease contribution it would have taken 12 to 18 months longer to defeat the German Army (the Wehrmacht)”
- From 1943 Soviet industry concentrated on producing weapons
4
Q
Siege of Leningrad – 8 September 1941 to 27 January 1944
A
- Leningrad was besieged by the Germans for 900 days but the Russians refused to surrender
- People keeled over dead in the streets by the thousands, malnourished, exhausted, and frozen
- The city was cut off from the remainder of the Soviet Union and, correspondingly, from all food supplies
- By the end of September, the city’s oil and coal supplies were exhausted. This meant that the city was without any central heating, the water pipes froze and broke, denying the residents drinking water
- Food supplies were cut, individual rations were lowered to 1/3 of the daily amount needed by an adult. The city’s population of dogs, cats, horses, rats and crows disappeared as they became the main course on many dinner tables. Reports of cannibalism began to appear.
- Nearly 1 million people starved to death and in addition the city was subject to systematic bombarding and artillery fire
5
Q
Battle of Stalingrad – 13 September 1942 to 31 January 1943
A
- Considered the turning point in the war and after this defeat the German army was in retreat
- The main object of the Nazi offensive in the summer of 1942 were the oil fields of Baku, the seizure of which would have deprived the Red Army – and the rest of the Soviet Union – of its principal fuel supply
- As part of this offensive, the German Sixth Army under General Friedrich von Paulus was supposed to take Stalingrad, strung out along the west bank of the Volga River
- For the Germans, Stalingrad was an important target as it was Russia’s centre of communications in the south as well as being a centre for manufacturing
- Aside from the strategic significance, the symbolism of capturing the city that bore the Soviet leader’s name evidently weighed in Hitler’s decision to divert forces to Stalingrad
- A victory for Russians was needed to boost morale (also named after their leader)
- The Germans commenced its advance on 21 August and after over two months of withering bombardment gained control of nine-tenths of the nearly totally destroyed city
- But with their backs to the Volga and mindful of Stalin’s Order No. 227 (“Not One Step Back!”), the Soviet defenders held on
- The Germans took a great deal of the city but they failed to fully assert their authority and areas captured by the Germans during the day, were then re-taken by the Russians at night
- The Russians then surrounded the city and trapped the Germans in (who had been ordered by Hitler not to leave)
- The Luftwaffe’s attempts to provide food and fuel supplies were thwarted by the Soviet artillery
- Rations dwindled, soldiers froze to death and ammunition ran out
- Compared to an original contingent of 400,000 troops, the Sixth Army contained only 110,000 including two thousand officers by the time Paulus surrendered on 2 February 1943
- The failure of the German Army was nothing short of a disaster with the loss of a complete army group
- With such a massive loss of manpower and equipment, the Germans simply did not have enough manpower to cope with the Russian advance to Germany when it came
- Despite resistance in parts – such as a Kursk – the Germans were in retreat on the Eastern Front from February 1943 onwards
6
Q
Soviet Troops take Berlin 23 April 1945 to 2 May 1945
A
- Stalin was determined to reach Berlin before the allies as considering they had borne the brunt of the war, Stalin and the Soviet commanders felt that they and not their Western allies should capture Berlin
- To speed up his campaign, he split the command of the Berlin operation and effectively triggered a race between his two most senior commanders, Gregory Zhukov and Ivan Konev, as both of them were eager to be credited with the conquest of the German capital.
- Russia’s vast tank superiority counted for little in the debris ridden streets of Berlin as the Germans (which included the old and Hitler Youth) who fought there were issued with portable anti-tank weaponry and could use hit-and-run tactics against Russian tanks resulting in areas that had to be taken street by street and building by building.
- By 2 May, the Reichstag, the old German parliament, had fallen and Berlin surrendered to Marshall Zukhov, who received the honour of being the conqueror of Berlin
- The battle for Berlin had cost the Soviets over 70,000 dead (many of them had died because of the haste with which the campaign was conducted)
7
Q
Stalin’s Role
A
- On 20 July 1941, Stalin took control of the military command
- Time Magazine, 1942 “Only Joseph Stalin fully knew how close Russia stood to defeat in 1942, and only Joseph Stalin fully knew how he brought Russia through” (Stalin was Man of the Year in 1942)
- The purges had a traumatic effect on the army
- The poor performance of the Red Army in the war against Finland in 1940 confirmed this view
- Stalin believed war with Germany would be inevitable but avoided provoking Hitler until they were ready (still traded with Germany under the Nazi-Soviet Treaty)
- Stalin’s priorities in 1941 were to build up the Red Army
- Eighty warnings in eight months of German intentions and the build-up of troops were ignored
- The German attack came when the Red Army and air force were in transition, changing their organisation, leadership, equipment etc…
- Stalin, 3 July 1941, first time Stalin had addressed the people since the German invasion
“Comrades! Citizens! Brothers! Sisters! Fighters of Our Army and Fleet! I address you, my friends” - Stalin’s final hour was in October/November 1941 when he stayed put during the Moscow panic
- Stalin has not been thought of as a great orator and only addressed the Soviet people nine times during the war, but his speeches were effective and inspired their armed forces and civilians to fight on
- In 1941-42 Stalin’s inflexible, standfast mentality prevented tactical withdrawals
- He was also ruthless and imposed harsh discipline and sought scapegoats for the initial disasters (e.g. executing General Pavlov and some high ranking offices in the Red Air Force)
- A special department of the NKVD was set up to lead the struggle against spies and traitors in the Red Army and had the authority to execute deserters on the spot
- Order 270 (16 August 1941) was issued “Commanders and commissars who leave the front or surrender will be considered deserters and their families liable to arrest. The families of Red Army men surrendering to captivity will be deprived of state entitlements and assistance”
- The fall of Rostov, with little resistance, marked the Russian army’s lowest point and Stalin issued Order 227 (28 July 1942) “Not a step back! This must now be our chief slogan. It is necessary to defend to the last drop of blood every position, every metre of Soviet territory, to cling on to every shred of Soviet earth and defend it to the utmost”
- Figes, p310 “The practices of the pre-war terror system were reimposed to keep the soldiers fighting in the war”
- Any officer caught infringing the order would be shot or sent to punishment companies who (in addition to Gulag inmates and criminals) were sent through minefields and other almost suicidal missions
- Blocking detachments were placed behind steady units ‘to shoot on the spot panic-mongers and cowards’ (abolished in 1942 but the NKVD continued to carry on this role)
- The sanctions against waverers were not only to encourage discipline but also to bolster those who inclined to heroism e.g. 13 500 troops shot in the space of a few weeks at the Battle of Stalingrad
- Stalin had the last word on all strategic decisions but had learned to trust his High Command (Russian term ‘Stavka’)
8
Q
Soviet Success
A
- One key factor for success was that the soviet factories in 1942-43 were producing aircraft, tanks, guns and shells faster than German factories
- Industry was geared almost entirely to the needs of the armed forces
- The Soviet Union did not turn the tide on the Eastern Front on its own. Though for decades Soviet historians played down the role of American and British Lend-Lease aid, its real significance has now been acknowledged
- From 1942 a flow of food and raw materials and engineering equipment sustained the Soviet war effort
- There was enough food in the end to ensure a square meal for every Soviet soldier; most of the Soviet rail network was supplied with locomotives, wagons and rails made in the USA; one million miles of telephone wire, 14 million pairs of boots, 363, 000 trucks, all helped to keep the Red Army fighting with growing efficiency
- On the day after the Victory Parade, Stalin offered a toast “to those simple, ordinary, modest people, to the ‘little cogs’…”
- When Stalin praised the contribution of Soviet women to the war effort he only mentioned those at the home front – the million women who had served in the armed forces were omitted
- After the war the official emphasis was on the Soviet woman as mother, wife and builder of society
- Stalin demanded the creation of partisan units in the territory occupied by the Germans
- The Germans were ruthless and an order was issued that between 50 to 100 communists should be killed for every German victim of a partisan attack
- The Partisans may have reduced collaboration with the Germans by the local population
- Orlando Figes singles out the readiness for personal sacrifice as the Soviet Union’s greatest weapon and in addition appeals to patriotism were more successful
- Propaganda machine in full force and over 1000 writers and artists joined the campaign (of which 400 would die in the fighting)
- People were imprisoned for loose ‘defeatist talk’ about the situation at the front
- Propaganda also told their men that “on German soil there is only one master – the Soviet soldier, that he is both the judge and punisher for the torments of his fathers and mothers, for the destroyed cities and villages” (there was looting, rape and plunder as the Soviet forces entered Germany)
9
Q
Impact on the People
A
- The civilian economy was neglected and living standards fell by 2/5 and millions were severely overworked, under nourished and very cold
- Even the countryside had been stripped bare of men, horses and machinery
- The state procurement of food from collective farms was at times more ruthless than during the Civil War but patriotism overrode the peasants’ hatred of the collective farm system
- Some of the nationalities in the Baltic States and the western Ukraine had initially welcomed the Germans as liberators (saw Hitler as the one setting them free from Stalin’s rule as under Stalin they had been persecuted)
- For example, in Lithuania (which had been annexed by the USSR in 1940, they saw the Germans as liberators and they even received support from the Lithuanian militia (possibly thought the Germans would eventually allow reinstatement of their independence) – there were even local collaborators who worked with the Nazis to kill local Jews
- However, Hitler’s fanatical racism had alienated the Soviet people
- According to Robert Service “If it had not been for Hitler’s fanatical racism, the USSR would not have won the struggle on the Eastern Front. Stalin’s repressiveness towards his own citizens would have cost him the war against Nazi Germany”
- Russia paid a terrible price for the war in human lives lost and people incapacitated
o 8 million armed forces
o 17 million civilians
o Over 1700 towns and about 70,000 villages in the western part of the Soviet Union had been virtually obliterated as the war moved back and forth over them - Figes, p305 “Stalin was shaken by the fall of Minsk. ‘Everything’s lost’, he was heard to say that day. ‘I give up. Lenin founded our state and we’ve f***ed it up.’ Stalin must have realised that he was to blame for the disaster. Ignoring the intelligence reports of the German military build-up, he had failed to prepare for war, while his terror had seriously weakened the army. Over 80,000 Red Army officers were executed between 1937 and June 1941 – including more than half the regiment commanders – so that inexperienced juniors had been thrust into positions of command”
- Figes, p306 “Stalin retreated to his dacha, suffering a sudden loss of confidence for the next few days. It was not until 1 July that he returned to the Kremlin and, only two days later, that he made his first war speech to the country”