Test #2 Flashcards

1
Q

Intelligence analysis goal

A

obtain new insights about foreign actions, intentions and capabilities
to help the policymaker increase benefit from intelligence collection

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2
Q

Reqs for analysis

A

Requires substantive knowledge and knowledge of US policy issues

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3
Q

What analysis does to specific pieces of information.

A

Putting specific pieces of information in a broader context to highlight implications:
For US interests
For policy official’s specific responsibilities

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4
Q

How analysis connects information.

A

Analysis builds bridge between raw intelligence and national security official

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5
Q

3 all source analysis centers

A

CIA, DIA, INR (State)

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6
Q

Specialized analysis

A

NGA, DOE labs, Military service units

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7
Q

The analyst is oriented toward

A

substantive issues and expertise

Usually strong interest in area of specialization – focus on an “account

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8
Q

The analyst has a mind to

A

solving problems, puzzles
curious
skepticism

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9
Q

Types of analytic products

A

Basic intelligence

Current intelligence

Ad hoc products
Can be short-term or in-depth

Estimates

In all cases, written products and briefings

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10
Q

Analytic Process

What are the steps

A
Identifying the intelligence question
Looking for information
Evaluating information
Analyzing information
Producing a finished intelligence report
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11
Q
  1. Identifying the intelligence question
A

Not the same as a broad topic

Focus is real-world issues faced by policymakers

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12
Q
  1. example
A

Topic:
“Country X military development”

Intel question:
“What new weapons systems of Country X could seriously threaten US forces in 3 - 5 years?”

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13
Q
  1. Intel question origins
A

Standing requirements
Questions developed by IC agencies
Specific questions raised by policymakers (ad hoc requirements)

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14
Q
  1. Developing hypotheses
A

Usually an early part of analytic process
Once question understood, basic concept of answer developed
Might be largely “data-driven”
Analyst guided solely by available data
But preconceptions usually at work
E.g., analysts’ expertise, past experience
Presents major analysis benefits, pitfalls

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15
Q
  1. Assessing what is already known
A

Information held by analyst’s agency and by IC generally
Data collections, earlier finished products
Might require lots of research

In some cases, finished report done with information at hand

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16
Q
  1. Seeking new information
A

Requesting new collection
Need understanding of collection systems

New information from open sources
Largely analyst’s responsibility

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17
Q
  1. Selecting information
A

Selecting relevant info

Requires knowledge of the intelligence question

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18
Q
  1. The wheat-from-chaff problem
A

selecting info

“The straw in the haystack”
“Volume problem

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19
Q
  1. Evaluating new information
A

Have to look at information critically
Don’t take at face value
Is it really relevant?
How reliable is it?

Source access, reliability, track record

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20
Q

4.

A

Step 4:Analyzing the information

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21
Q
  1. Figuring out what is going on
A

new information together with existing data, knowledge
How significant is the new information?
What is new, changed, or the same

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22
Q
  1. Identifying:
A

Trends, relationships
Patterns in activity; linkages

Discontinuities
Change in existing trend, pattern, or situation

Anomalies
Something at odds with an established pattern, situation, or relationship

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23
Q

Example: trends

A

A growing number of governments are expecting increased flexibility from Maricopa at the next round of trade negotiations next month

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24
Q

Example: discontinuities

A

Country Y has dropped its prohibition against allowing terrorist organizations to seek sanctuary within its borders

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25
Q

Example: anomalies

A

Country X has announced a practice mobilization of its armed forces, but instead of going through their normal procedures, several key units are heading toward the border of Country Y

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26
Q
  1. Interpreting what is going on
A

Explaining “why” something happening
Foreign motivations, objectives behind specific actions or trends
Why trends, relationships, discontinuities occurring
Estimating the future direction
“Forecasts,” not “predictions”
Possible outcomes

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27
Q

Interpreting with best possible judgement

A

based on available information
Despite lots of data . . .
. . . relevant, reliable information is often in short supply
Have to use what is available at the time

Analyst expertise is key factor

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28
Q

Step 5

A

Identifying meaning for policy

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29
Q

5 Policy relevance

A

What does current situation–and its possible future trajectory–mean for US interests, objectives?
What potential opportunities, difficulties or dangers does the US face?

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30
Q

5 Finished products ideally:

A

brief

conclusions first then supporting argument

How we know what we know – and don’t know

facts to support conclusions

clarity, objectively

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31
Q

pitfal using information

A

Noise, too much info.

uncertainty,

focusing on past events

not getting beyond the data, forests and trees,

Not looking at data or sources critcally

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32
Q

Pitfall. Mindsets.

A

Mental shortcuts, concepts.

a psychological analogy.

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33
Q

pitfall mindset stuck

A

Not looking for alternative explanations
Sticking with a hypothesis that seems to fit
Failure to develop multiple “models”

Ignoring/rejecting information
Looking for/accepting only information that supports favored hypothesis
Difficulty in keeping information in view
Especially if it doesn’t fit with favored explanation

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34
Q

pitfall mindsets alot of different

A
Mirror imaging
Assuming others think like us
Stereotypes
Seeing the future as an extension of the past
“They’ve always done it this way.”
Defending past analytic positions
Group think
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35
Q

pitfall clarity

A

the question.
assumption vs. fact.
fact and analytic assertions.
noting when a previous analytic position has changed.

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36
Q

“Linchpin” analysis

A

pitfall. Making key assumptions and knowledge clear.

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37
Q

Alternative hypotheses

A

pitfall. Creating, evaluating several explanations

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38
Q

Scenarios

A

pitfall. Looking at several possible outcomes or trends

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39
Q

Alternative/ “competitive” analysis

A

pitfall. “Contrarian” analysis by design

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40
Q

Linchpin analysis example

A

“Despite yesterday’s announcement that Maricopa is willing to listen to Pima’s concessions, we judge that war is still likely.”

“This is based on our key assumption that because of a variety of economic pressures, Maricopa is determined to attack Pima no matter what.”

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41
Q

Example – Use of scenarios

A

World oil supplies could tighten further in coming months.

a) World oil demand rises at current high rate, no supply disruptions
b) World oil demand rises at current high rate, with major supply disruption
c) World oil demand stops rising

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42
Q

drafting

A

Stating bottom line (“key judgments”) at the beginning.
Keep paper concise.
clear factual argument.

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43
Q

Work pace – crisis support

A

Short deadlines during crises
Much care required against analytic mistakes

Special task forces often created
Within agencies and across agencies

Analysts might work temporarily outside their major areas of expertise

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44
Q

Work pace: short-term intelligence

A

Increased importance of daily and ad hoc intelligence products

Daily (“current”) intelligence can drive much of analyst’s day
Major importance for entire Intelligence Community of key daily briefings
Many other daily, weekly products

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45
Q

Work pace: deadlines

A

Timely delivery is key
“Perfection” vs. getting it there when customer needs it
Increased focus on short-fuse products
Can put pressure on all stages of the analytic process

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46
Q

Top intelligence recipients White House

A
President
Vice President
National Security Advisor
Deputy National Security Advisor
Chief of Staff
They make (or help make) final decisions -- they get whatever support they need
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47
Q

Key intelligence consumers Cabinet

A
State
Defense
Homeland Security
Treasury
Attorney General
Commerce
All receive significant, highly tailored intel support
48
Q

Sub cabinet officials undersecretaries do what

A

May oversee several policy areas

May wield major influence, receive tailored products

49
Q

Sub cabinet officials assistant secretaries do what

A

Run the major policy components

Key players in interagency process, recieve tailored products

50
Q

DAS name

A

Dep. Asst Secretary. under undersecretary and assistant secretary. that order

51
Q

what the DAS does

A

A key driver of policy development within own agency
Major player at lower levels of interagency process
A major intelligence customer
Often tailored support

52
Q

Office Directors what they do where on totem pole

A

Manage basic policy work units
Critical players in drafting, shaping, and implementing policy decisions
Major interaction with intelligence at working level
Less tailored support

53
Q

The interagency process.

A

Policy Development, Interagency policy Committees, Deputies Committee, Principals Committee,

54
Q

Policy development

A

Origination of new initiatives or changes in existing policy
Can involve several levels within single agency or among several agencies
Most basic and frequent opportunity for intelligence support
Goal: regular interaction at working level

55
Q

Interagency Policy Committees

A

IPCs are the workhorse of the interagency process
Usually chaired by top NSC official
Key negotiations, debates, drafting
Moves policies to Deputies level
Major channel for intelligence input
Regular participation, briefings–not voting members

56
Q

Deputies Committee

A

Deputy-secretary level
Chaired by Dep. National Security Advisor
Reviews policy proposals from IPC or from deputies level
Dep. DNI is official intelligence representative
Can provide briefings, clarifications, take new tasking

57
Q

Principals Committee

A
Cabinet secretaries
Chaired by National Security Advisor
Final deliberation
Send to President or reject
DNI is intel rep
Final opportunity for providing input to interagency group, receive new tasking
58
Q

Types of intelligence input

A

Raw intelligence
Finished intelligence

Briefings
Intelligence reps

59
Q

Raw Intelligence

A

Official reporting from various collectors
SIGINT, HUMINT, imagery, open source
Often part of regular briefings
Can be provided by IC agencies or by in-house intelligence units
E.g., Treasury, Energy, Commerce

60
Q

Current intelligence –the PDB

A

Primary regular intel support to President and other key officials
Highly tailored
Inputs from throughout IC
Major source of tasking by top policy leaders

61
Q

Ad hoc products

A

Large growth in such products in past decade

Respond to direct policymaker requests for information and analysis on specific issues
Can be tied to key meetings
“Actionable” intelligence

62
Q

Wider-dissem products

A
Longer-term research, “basic intelligence”
Maintains intelligence expertise
Builds databases useful in crises
Reaches lower-level policy officials
Many who in turn brief their superiors
Usually initiated by IC
(Estimates -- subject of future class)
63
Q

Briefings Substantial growth in use

A

Tailored support for key policymakers

Reflects rise of interagency process

64
Q

Briefings Can provide

A

Can provide rapid, very targeted input
Direct communication
Feedback, tasking, clarification

65
Q

Intelligence representatives

A

Increased number of IC reps
Provide regular briefings to key officials
Convey tasking back to intelligence agencies
Enable more targeted support
Enhance IC understanding of policy concerns, information needs

66
Q

Policymakers world

A

a political environment

Trying to initiate, manage specific policies, programs . . .

. . . whether or not the foreign environment conducive

67
Q

Intelligence world

A

trying to help understand foreign environment
How that environment might affect policy goals
The picture intelligence paints may–or may not–be welcome news

68
Q

How P and I look at things

A

Policymakers: positive, can-do
Don’t like to be told something “won’t work”

Intelligence: tries to look objectively, critically at the foreign situation
Look for both obstacles and opportunities

69
Q

P and I making decisions

A

Policymakers: tend to be decisive
Make many decisions every day
Often prefer clear alternatives

Intelligence: more open-ended
Variables, possible outcomes
Analysis may not clearly support a particular course of action

70
Q

P and I focus on hard data

A

Policymakers: prefer concrete information
For making–and justifying–decisions

Intelligence: may not always have the specific data desired
Or may not be as specific and concrete as could be

71
Q

P and I how they look at an issue

A

Policymakers: many issues at a time
Lack of time – focus on bottom line

Intelligence: diving deeply into an issue
Potential for disconnects on how much detail needed

72
Q

Political environment for P and I

A

Policymakers: may face strong political momentum behind given policy

Intelligence: objectivity vs. being out of step “with the program”

73
Q

Tradecraft pitfalls, Not being clear about:

A
Intelligence question
“Why are you telling me this?”
What is known vs. not known
Level of confidence in sources
What is fact, what is judgment
74
Q

Tradecraft,

Failure to:

A

Carefully draw implications from data
Look at alternative interpretations, scenarios
Indicate level of confidence in a particular assessment
Or being careless in stating it

75
Q

Style addressing things

A

Not getting to the bottom line quickly

Dwelling on details rather than big picture

Dwelling on the negative

76
Q

Style distance to policy/maker

A

Keeping away from policymaker . . .

. . . or trying to get “too close”

Not listening to policymaker objections regarding tradecraft

77
Q

situational awareness,Not knowing policy context:

A

What policymakers trying to do
What real issues and debates are
Background vs. “actionable intelligence”

78
Q

Situational awareness of the policymaker more specifically

A

Not understanding policymaker’s level of knowledge

Failing to adjust to the policymaker’s level of knowledge
E.g., not providing enough new facts if the policymaker is an expert

79
Q

Policymaker pitfalls

A

Selective reading/listening
Using raw intelligence to make own intelligence assessments

Viewing intelligence as having nothing to add to own expertise

80
Q

Policymaker pitfalls when looking at their own policy more

A

Distorting intelligence to support own position
Viewing intelligence as “the enemy” if assessments don’t support own position
Trying to get intelligence to change its assessment

81
Q

Politicization

A

The purposeful slanting of intelligence to support a specific policy or a specific outcome in a policy debate

Corrupts the basic intelligence-customer equation
Crossing the “red line”

Does not include policymaker efforts to change intel conclusions (ignore Lowenthal on this point)

82
Q

Who might politicize

A

Policymakers can urge intelligence to reconsider judgments
For political reasons, not tradecraft issues

This is not politicization
It may or may not be good, but it happens

83
Q

Intel officers and Politicization

A

For reasons of political pressure (or personal belief), not tradecraft

84
Q

How politicization happens

A

Analysts might slant their analysis
E.g., can emphasize certain data or conclusions over others

Managers might revise, reject or “sit on” analysis that they disagree with
Could also fail to defend assessments

85
Q

What covert action is

A

An effort to influence foreign country or group
But US intervention kept hidden or plausibly deniable
In effect, an extension of US policy by non-attributable means

86
Q

CA used in situations where:

A

Other policy tools alone deemed not effective or feasible
. . . but non-action is also unacceptable
. . . and potential benefits are seen to outweigh risks

87
Q

Why covert ?

A

Usually outside normal bounds of nation-state interaction
Less aggressive than open military action; more intrusive than diplomacy
Open acknowledgement potentially seen as a hostile act

88
Q

Plausible deniability

A

Reasonably defensible denial of association with an action if discovered
Permits both sides to save face and avoid open confrontation
A major reason why intelligence organizations are used

89
Q

Substantial growth in Cold War

A

Nuclear standoff made open wars less acceptable

90
Q

First permanent, peacetime CA program

A

Initiated by Truman

Major boost from Eisenhower, Kennedy

91
Q

A long-standing presence CA

A
CA in use since Washington
Tripoli and Jefferson 
Florida and Madison
Civil War
Heavy use in World War II
92
Q

Types of Covert action

A
Propaganda
Psychological warfare
Political activity
Political action
Economic action
Coups
Paramilitary
93
Q

Propaganda def.

A

Efforts to sway opinion of public or specific groups:

94
Q

Propaganda use

A

Use of foreign media
Basic use of the truth
Eastern Europe during Cold War (RFE)
Used in political action

“Black” propaganda

False news reports

Spreading rumors

95
Q

Political action

A
Support to particular political direction or group
Congress for Cultural Freedom
Support to specific political parties
Postwar support to Italian CD’s
Countering Allende in Chile
Countering specific political groups
96
Q

Economic action

A

Attempts to disrupt or weaken economic capacity
Goal is usually to weaken or influence government
Can supplement more overt forms of influence

97
Q

Coups

A
Encouraging and/or orchestrating overthrow of foreign government
Several early successes
Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954)
Not a common approach in recent years
Effort against Allende, 1970
98
Q

Paramilitary activity

A

Military-related support:
Training, equipment for another country’s police, military
Example of “special activities”
Training, equipping of local forces to attack a government or group
Usually not direct US role in combat

Bay of Pigs

99
Q

who is at the center of the process of CA

A

But White House always at center

Increased standardization since 1974

100
Q

Who formally initiates

CA

A

Covert action proposal formally originates with policy officials (NSC

101
Q

Who plans

A

Proposal turned into an actual plan

Usually by CIA

102
Q

How CA plans approved

A

Plan approved via interagency process
President ultimately must approve
Congress then has oversight role

103
Q

The “Finding”Who signs it

A

Requires Presidential approval of covert action, in writing

104
Q

The “Finding”What it is

A
Justification -- how CA supports US policy
Policy and covert action objectives
Plan of action
Risk assessment
Resources required
105
Q

Congressional oversight

A

President must notify Congress of new covert action within 48 hours
A memorandum of notification (“MON”) must be sent regarding CA changes
Congress conducts regular CA reviews
Goals, management
Can alter or halt funding

106
Q

Policy issues

A

CAs objective?
Realistic goal?
CA best approach?
Support broader US policy?

107
Q

The “silver bullet” problem

A

Is it being asked by itself to save a troubled policy or to resolve a crisis? CA

108
Q

Some operational questions of CA

A

How much of the situation is actually understood?
Need for good tactical intelligence data
Need for good analysis
What is likely degree of control over events that a covert action will have?
Potential side-effects: near and long-term

109
Q

Operational issues:

A

Knowing situation, controllability, deniability

Need for analysis to inform CA decisions

110
Q

Potential pitfalls of CA

A
Failure to ask key planning questions
Inadequate understanding of target
Differences in expectations between policymaker and intelligence
Poor linkage with broader policy
Policymakers “fishing” for silver bullet
Unintended consequences
111
Q

Disconnects with Congress

CA

A

Failures in communication

pitfall

112
Q

Accountability CA

A

US laws

pitfall

113
Q

Legitimacy CA

A

Ethical issues
Broader US interests
pitfall

114
Q

Guatemala

A

Anti-Arbenz propaganda Paramilitary

Goal: prompt military to remove Arbenz

115
Q

CUBA

A

oust Castro via exile invasion
Paramilitary invasion of Cuba
Referred to as JMATE

116
Q

Chile

A

Major propaganda campaign against Allende and leftist parties

Goal: evoke popular fear that an Allende victory would bring a Castro-like regime to power
Nixon

117
Q

Afghanistan

A

A decade-long paramilitary operation against Soviet forces

Helps get Soviets to leave Afghanistan
A success for Reagan “roll back
Goal: “harassment” of Soviet forces
Make Soviet intervention costly – but avoid provoking broader Soviet retaliation