Final test GET IT Flashcards

1
Q

Definition of Counterespionage

A

Detects and disrupts espionage usually secretly

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2
Q

Two basic elements of CE.

A

Protecting secrets from disclosure.

Thwarting foreign intelligence ops.

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3
Q

Difference between “security” and “CE”

A

“S”- minimizes vulnerability to espionage some relatively overt. Government wide.
CE- Detects and disrupts espionage usually secretly

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4
Q

Basic functions of security

A

Personnel, physical, information. Common assumption: always a threat

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5
Q

Personnel security

A

Background. polygraph. update checks.

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6
Q

Security information

A

seeks to protect.
Confidentiality of US policy.
Information giving US potential advantage.
Sources methods for future use.

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7
Q

Information Security

A

restrict access based on a need to know basis. Like classified. On clearance system.. Compartmentalization

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8
Q

New challenge of information security

A

need to share

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9
Q

The classification system does what

A

Compartmentation.
Unclassified. Confidential. secret. top secret.
Damage. Serious damage. Grave damage.

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10
Q

Secrets as a public issue

A

open to stay accountable. Secret to keep info safe.

Overclassification. classification time limits.

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11
Q

Challenge of leaks

A

unapproved disclosure of secret information. can also be unclassified.

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12
Q

Challenge of CI

A

Finding people who are trained to stay hidden.
Time foe and helpful.
overlap with HUMINT.
Suspicions into investigations.
Lots of personnel with access to information.
gains as a spy.
Moles double agents.

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13
Q

CI defense

A

Personnel security.
Assessment of HUMINT sources.
Training and retraining of personnel.

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14
Q

CI offense

A

Gaining knowledge of other countries intel services. difficult collect analysis challenges.
Trying to disrupt espionage before anything large happens

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15
Q

People of CI

A

Ames, Hanssen, Walker family. all spies.

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16
Q

Importance of CI

A

Human nature is always a factor.
Foreign gov capabilities unlikely to decline.
Multinational sharing.
Technology risk of putting too much out there and then not enough, balancing.

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17
Q

Reason for Congressional oversight

A

same for rest of gov. external monitoring of intelligence done mainly by congress.
Accountability.
Investigate.

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18
Q

CONG oversight since 1970’s

A

Revolution church and pike.
Bried of Allende made congress feel misled.
Hughs Ryan amendment for CA

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19
Q

Revolution

A

1970’s Church- senate, Pike- house.
time of troubles and crown jewels.
resulted in permanent oversight committee.

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20
Q

SSCI

A

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

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21
Q

HPSCI

A

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

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22
Q

Key hill Committees

A

House and Senate Appropriations Committees(Authorizers vs. Appropriators) Armed Services Committees.
House and Senate leadership.

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23
Q

Means of Oversight.
See this and it equals what?
Also for who?
THrough what>

A
Budget Process. Review programs. 
Review of specific programs
•Including covert action
•Special investigations
•Nomination confirmations
•Regular receipt of intelligence
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24
Q
Budget process
For?
THrough?
Why?
Does what and what?
To promote what?
Bad to others when?
A part of?
Random thing to remember?
Action?
A
Principal means for review
•Hearings, briefings, and “QFR’s”
•How funds being spent
•Direction and management of programs
Principal means for leverage
•Changing budget allocations
•To promote particular programs, ideas
•As penalty for not listening to Hill advice
•Congressionally Directed Actions
•“Fencing” funds
•Holding up funding action
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25
Q

Review of specific programs
Prompted by what?
Through what techniques?
Cases?

A

Done as part of–or outside–budget process
•Often prompted by specific issues
•E.g., 9-11, Iraq WMD; NSA domestic programs
•Staff investigations
•Hearings
•Reports/recommendations

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26
Q

Review of covert action a part of what?
A key what?
What happened in 1991?

A

Part of budget process, but also done on regular basis
•Key role of notification process
•Since 1991, tougher standards for justification, obeying law

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27
Q

What is Receipt of finished intelligence?
To Who?
Example?

A
Congress a major intel consumer:
•Finished intelligence
•Regular briefings to key members
•Ad hoc briefings for other members
•Annual reports and briefings
•E.g., DNI “Worldwide Threat Briefing”
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28
Q

Issues – Congressional side

the issue. The politics of it.

A
Absorbing information
•The monitoring function
•Understanding the issues
•Staying on top of developments
•Seeking a more thorough approach
•Efforts to improve
Keeping politics in its appropriate place:
•Proper vs. improper use of intelligence
•Issue for both Administration, Congress
•Preventing unauthorized release of data
•Impact of the media
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29
Q

Strategic intelligence defined

A

A subset of “national-level” intelligence
•“Strategic” often confused with “national”
•All-source assessment of trends or developments of major importance to US security

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30
Q

“Mysteries”

A

“Mysteries” – questions having no definite answer (yet)
•Developments that may or may not occur
•Foreign actors may not yet know the answer

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31
Q

“puzzles”

A

Puzzles: questions requiring hard info
•Secrets sometimes provide “missing piece”
•Might be more tactical, short-term

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32
Q
History of national estimates (NIE) process
origin
Molded by
Created the what from it
attached to who?
Developed what?
A

Origins: 1948 Berlin crisis
•Molded by warning failures in Korea
•Creation of the Office of National Estimates (O/NE)
•Attached to CIA/Directorate of Intelligence
•Developed the “art form” that exists today

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33
Q

who produces NIE’s

A
National Intelligence Council. 
Chairman reports to the DNI
•National Intelligence Officers (NIO’s)
•Specific regions or functional topics
•Lead drafting, coordination
•Major link with non-government experts
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34
Q

The estimates process

A
Initiation of NIE
•Usually requested by senior policymaker or intelligence official
•Some are part of recurring series
•Chairman/NIC selects NIO to chair
•NIO selects a drafter
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35
Q

What is NIE’s?

A
Estimate” not same as “hard evidence”
•Often focuses on mysteries
•Pushes judgments beyond known facts
•Need caution in how estimates used
•“Assess” vs. “indicate”
•Clearly show how available information leads to informed speculation
36
Q

Degree of Certainty

A

Remote

Unlikely

Even chance

Probably, Likely

Almost certainly

37
Q

Challenges of producing NIE’s

A

Process pitfalls
•Policymaker disinterest
•Policymaker resistance

38
Q

Process challenges NIE

A

Best judgment, or group think?
•Most common denominator
•Less creativity, alternative analysis?
•Compromises, log rolling
•Bureaucratic interests can be at stake
•Competing agendas, philosophies
Defending positions taken in previous estimates
•Potentially a problem in serial estimates
•Process often not good for fast-breaking or rapidly changing events

39
Q

Getting policymakers’ attention NIE

A

Often hard to get key officials to pay attention
•Especially if focused on longer-term issues
•Estimates often lengthy
•Not tailored for specific officials
•Valuable for working-level staffs

40
Q

Adverse policymaker reaction resistance

A

Estimates can arouse negative response
•If high-visibility issues or major programmatic decisions involved
•Political pressure possible
•Can be blunted by IC process . . .
• . . . but not always
•Approach taken by DCI (now DNI) is thus crucial

41
Q

Warning def. ish.

A

most important of intel.
Two warning types: strategic and tactical
•Both help policymakers take effective steps to avert harm to US security

42
Q

Strategic (warning)

A

Strategic warning: alert regarding potential threat

•Varying degrees of probability

43
Q

tactical warning

A

Tactical warning: alert regarding specific threat

•Focus on who, what, when, where, how

44
Q

“Intelligence failure” (Warning) is what?
Whos fault?
Strategic surprise?
Tactical Surprise?

A

Organizational surprise
•Gov’t lacks awareness; intelligence at fault
•Strategic surprise: being unaware that potential threat to US security exists
•Tactical (“incident”) surprise – being unaware that harmful action will occur at specific time, location, and manner

45
Q

Warning vs. strategic analysis

A

Strategic analysis (including NIEs) often identifies threatening trends, situations
•But not as concrete as warning
•Much warning comes from individual IC agencies
•Particularly tactical warning
•NIE process too slow for imminent events

46
Q

Strategic warning objectives - I

A

Alert re: existence and likelihood of potential foreign action that could harm key US interests
•Alert regarding changes in such a threat
•In nature of threat (ability to cause harm) and its likelihood

47
Q

Strategic warning objectives - for US leaders

A

Help US leaders compare relative seriousness and probability of different threats
•E.g., “high impact, low probability”
•Help them prepare for range of possibilities, including tactical surprise
•E.g., defense systems, emergency planning

48
Q

Tactical warning objectives
emphasis on what?
For US leaders?

A

Alert re: impending–possibly imminent–foreign action to harm US security
•Emphasis on specifics: when, against what target, by whom, and by what means
•Give US leaders some time to take countermeasures

49
Q

strategic up to 9/11

A

Strategic intelligence indicated an attack was coming, somewhere
•Threat information rises in Spring 2001
•Series of intelligence warnings

50
Q
9-11: Tactical warning lessons
Failure to what?
The problem?
The issue?
How did this happen?
Second issue?
Barriers?
Others?
A

Failure to link strategic-level indications with tactical intel inside US
•“Connecting the dots” problem
•Often an “assembling the dots” issue
•Leads not pursued consistently, rigorously
Information not always shared or given proper attention
•Issue: law enforcement - intel cooperation
•Legal and bureaucratic barriers
•“Noise” level very high
•Tactical indicators a challenge

51
Q

Tactical warning challenges

A

“Noise factor”

More difficult if lacking strategic warning

52
Q

Efforts to improve tactical warning

A

NIO for Warning
Increased importance of information sharing
•“Fusion” centers: e.g.,

53
Q
Strategic warning challenges
of what?
Through?
Why?
Pitfalls?
Policymakers play into this?
A
A mix of mysteries and puzzles
•Collection
•Uncertainty, incomplete information
•Always a problem, but worse re: warning
•“Mindset” and “extrapolation” pitfalls
•Getting policymakers to pay attention
•“Over-the-horizon” or “not convincing”
54
Q

Drug terror networks challenges more technical
Created for what?
Difficult because?

A

Broad IC technical capabilities
•Created for Cold War
•How appropriate for new types of challenges?
•Illicit groups increasingly sophisticated
•Technology: new challenges for IC
•E.g., internet, commercial encryption

55
Q

Drug terror networks challenges more HUMINT
Difficult against who?
Why?
The Q?

A
HUMINT difficult against small groups
•Working with “disreputable” sources
•Interrogation
•How critical as a source of information?
•What methods are appropriate?
•Question of US civil liberties
56
Q
The analytic challenge of D and T
The focus?
On who?
Assess what?
Problem?
Time?
A
Focus on identifying, assessing networks
•Identify members, potential members
•Assess relationships, roles, abilities
•A bigger “noise” problem
•Increasing volumes of raw information
•Yet less time available?
57
Q

IC response: history to D and T

A

Transnational threats first handled by regionally-focused intel organizations
•Beyond mid-1980s, the rise of the DCI centers

58
Q

Centers for D and T

A

Counterterrorism Center (CTC)
•Counternarcotics Center (CNC)
•Merging of collection, analytic, and covert action disciplines; coordination of IC efforts
National CT center

59
Q

National CT Center D and T
created when?
What is it?
What does to do?

A
Created in 2004
•National-level “fusion”
•Brings CIA, FBI together in one place
•Also brings in other IC, law enforcement personnel, data
•Full coverage across US borders
60
Q

Law enforcement partners D and T

A

FBI – IC member: domestic lead on countering terrorist operations
•Also conducts overseas investigations
•DEA – IC member: domestic lead on counterdrug activity
•But also overseas presence

61
Q
Continuing challenges D and T
Success does what?
Drugs-
Terror-
Together?
where?
Still a problem?
next challenge?
A

Success against larger groups creates smaller, more dispersed networks
•Drugs–greater specialization
•Terror–more independence from al Qaeda?
•A drug-terror linkage?
•Colombia, Afghanistan
How to recognize, thwart network adaptability?
•Still need greater sharing of intelligence
•How far to break down “the Wall” between intelligence and law enforcement?
•A longer-term challenge: multinational intelligence sharing

62
Q

Proliferation: areas of focus questions

A

Intentions– what weapons sought?
•Capabilities– what weapons can foreign actors produce?
•What efforts to acquire weapons or related technology?
•What role for proliferation networks?

63
Q

Proliferation networks questions

A

How structured?
•Who runs them?
•How do they operate?
•How are weapons, technology acquired?

64
Q

Intelligence challenges W P

A
Proliferation activity often kept hidden
•Some weapons activities hard to detect
•Level of activity hard to pin down
•Multiple interpretations
•Dual-use technology
65
Q

Denial and deception (D&D)

A

Keeping other countries from acquiring specific information

66
Q

Denial

A

Keeping information, activities hidden or otherwise restricted

67
Q

Deception

A

Directing intelligence away from information or activities

•E.g., use of disinformation

68
Q

D&D problem

A

A growing challenge for both collection and analysis
•Countries use D&D to keep weapons programs from observation
•For some countries, a long-standing practice

69
Q

Bottom line: of proliferation
of collection?
For analysis?
The information?

A
Proliferation intel a difficult job
•Collection not always easy to get
•Analysis can make mistakes: e.g., 
•Not see it at all
•Misinterpret what it is
•See something that is not there
70
Q

Iraq WMD: the 1991 prologue
What they did?
What we did?

A
Discovery after Gulf War that Iraq was much closer to developing a nuclear weapon than IC had thought
•Iraq had used sophisticated D&D
•False procurement destinations
•Hiding or disguising facilities
•Misdirecting inspectors
71
Q

leading form of strategic intelligence

A

NIE’s

72
Q

Key IC players W P

A

The usual suspects, with strong analytic input from CIA and DIA
•Department of Energy
•The national labs
•Highly technical analysis required

73
Q
IC problems highlighted by 9/11, Iran WMD failures. 
Through who?
Why?
The Information?
Merging?
A

Per 9-11 Commission:
•Intelligence agencies’ counterterrorism (CT) efforts largely uncoordinated
•Allocation of resources to CT uneven
•Information not routinely or quickly shared
•Domestic, foreign intel not easily merged

74
Q
Reform: basic objectives
Echoes?
Need of what>
Need to what?
Through what?
A

Echoes of 1945-1947 debate
•Need greater operational coordination among intelligence agencies
•Need to share information more effectively
•Need to manage IC resources more effectively

75
Q
Key debate (again): centralization
reform
A

Whether someone has to be truly accountable for IC performance . . .
•And thus have much stronger authority over all intelligence agencies
•Key personnel, budgets, programs
•. . . or whether there is a less organizationally drastic approach to improving IC synergy

76
Q

Three models in 2004 debate of reform

A

Weak centralization
•Moderate centralization
•Strong centralization

77
Q
9-11 Commission: strong centralization
Who oversees?
Change who?
control over?
Accountable for?
Is a part of what?
A

A “National Intelligence Director” (NID) to oversee the Community
•(“NID” later changed to “DNI”)
•Would have control over budgets, programs
•Would have control over key hiring/firing, info sharing
•Would be ultimately accountable for IC performance
•Would be part of President’s White House team

78
Q
Counter-arguments: case for moderate centralization
Means?
Against strong?
first argument of leader?
The leaders authorities?
What coordinates?
can change what?
A

New DNI layer means more bureaucracy
•Strong centralization could reduce diversity of effort, increase “group think”
•Don’t separate IC leader from direct touch with personnel, programs
Existing federated structure can be improved
•Enhance DCI authorities–what 1947 law should have done
•DCI can coordinate programs if has budget, personnel authority
•An empowered DCI can change policies and IT systems to enhance info sharing

79
Q
Defense of weak centralization
why?
need what?
first argument against?
what should dominate?
A

Loose federation promotes competition of ideas and analysis
•Less chance for “politicization”
•Various agencies need more, not less, specialized intel support
•Bigger national-level intelligence system not flexible enough for that
•Departmental intelligence should dominate

80
Q

A pitch for “weak centralization-plus”
What leader does?
Where does the budget get through?
Allocations?

A
Let DCI (or DNI) present budget to President, Congress
•But budgets, major resource decisions affecting DoD intel agencies should still come up through SecDef to DCI
•Allocations would go back down through SecDef as well
81
Q
Result: of model of reform: compromise legislation
Senate version?
Who has control?
House version?
Final bill?
This created?
Power to what?
A

Senate version held closer to 9-11 recommendations
•DNI would have major control of many parts of IC budgets, personnel
•House version gave DNI much less resource authority
In conference, both sides yielded ground
•Final bill: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
•Created NCTC
•Gave DNI new power in managing the IC, but not all that 9-11 Commission had proposed

82
Q
Key authorities of DNI
manages who?
not head of who?
Cannot do what?
controls?
stronger control of what>
Funds?
Budget for who?
Program?
People?
Manages>
Controls who>
but not..
Gives DNI what?
Cannot do what?
A

Manages IC
•Does not head the CIA
•Cannot “abrogate the statutory responsibilities” of other IC members
•Budget
•Stronger control of pace of spending
•Can allot funds directly to sub-cabinet units
•Does not control budgets for intelligence support to military
Can reprogram up to $150 million of an IC member’s intel budget
•Can transfer IC personnel for two years
•Concurs in selection of key personnel
•Manages all aspects of intel process
•Controls National Counterterrorism Center budget and programs
•But not joint counterterrorism operations
Clarifies when DNI can make IC members share
•Gives DNI clearer power to decide major purchases
•But DNI cannot “interfere” in DoD chain of command

83
Q

If have loose DNI control . . .
The questions?
Why?

A

Should the current system of stovepipes predominate?
• Or should the system decentralize further?
•More collection and analytic resources from current big agencies allocated to directly serve policy departments

84
Q

If strong DNI control . . .
The questions?
WHy?

A

Keep current system of large agencies, reporting to deputy DNI’s?
•Or reorganize, putting all similar programs into new agencies?
•HUMINT agency, technical collection agency, analysis agency, etc.

85
Q
Management problems of DNId- the big issue-
limited what?
How they look at the Problem?
Key?
Difficulty doing what?
Who's growing?
Demands?
Other growing?
A

Difficulty in coordinating resources on specific intelligence issues
•Limited “synergy” in application of various collection systems to a particular target
•Potentially divergent approaches to same intelligence problem
• sharing information
Difficulty developing IC-wide resource allocation to future development
•Military a growing source of demand
•Yet demands also increasing to provide better, more rapid intelligence to national consumers
•Growing strain on overall IC programs