term 2 - public goods Flashcards
how did research prior to morgan 2000 view lotteries as tax instruments?
they viewed lotteries as tax instruments to be inferior in terms of equity and efficiency
what does morgan 2000 state about the lotteries as tax instruments?
how does morgan 2000 compare lotteries to the voluntary contribution schemes in public good provision?
what are the assumptions for the generic public good provision model?
what are the preliminary results for a benevolent social planner who aims to maximise social welfare
what is the framework for preliminary results from voluntary contributions?
what is proposition 1 for the preliminary results from voluntary contribution?
what is the proof for proposition 1 for the voluntary contributions?
how does the social planner compare to voluntary contribution scheme?
what is the framework for the raffle model of public goods?
what is the expected payoff of a player i in the raffle model of public goods?
what is propositon 2 for the raffle model of public goods?
when consumers have quasilinear preferences, the raffle has a unique equillibrium
what are the proof for the proposition 2?
lemma 1: the existance of a nash equillibrium is granted
Lemma 2: An equilibrium with public goods provision of G :=
x(N ) = x1 + · · · + xn consists of bets xi > 0 for all Gi > G and
xj = 0 for the rest
Lemma 3. Given the equilibrium xi > 0 for all i ∈ N ′ and
xj = 0 for all j ∈ N/N ′, the equilibrium bids and the public
good provision are uniquely determined.
Lemma 4. The lottery is held in equilibrium.
what is the proof for lemma 4?
what is the proof for lemma 2?
what is theorem 1 for public goods?
what is the analysis of theorem 1?
what does theorem 2 state?
what is the important result that theorem 1 and 2 highlight?
