Task 9 Flashcards

1
Q

Difference between NCCs and ToCs

A

NCCs answer the easy problem of consciousness
- they seek the brain states and processes that are most closely related to consciousness

ToCs answer the hard problem of consciousness
- explanatory insight into qualia, experience, and subjectivity

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2
Q

Classes of Consciousness: Global States

A

Concern an organism’s overall subjective profile associated with changes in arousal and behavioral responsiveness

–> levels of consciousness
–> connection to Chalmers psychological consciousness/third-person data

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3
Q

Classes of Consciousness: Local States

A

Conscious contents or states of having qualia

–> characterized by what it is like to be in them
–> connection to Chalmers phenomenal consciousness/first-person data

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4
Q

Phenomenal Properties of Consciousness

A

The experiential character of consciousness

–> what it is like

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5
Q

Functional Properties of Consciousness

A

The role(s) that mental states play in the cognitive economy of an organism by virtue of being conscious

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6
Q

Higher-Order Theories (HOT)

A

Core Claim: A mental state is conscious in virtue of being the target of a certain kind of meta-representation

sensory organ –> sensory cortices –> higher-order processing

–> you need to have a conscious thought of being conscious in order to be conscious

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7
Q

Higher-Order Theories (HOT): Classes

A

Focus on explaining why some contents are conscious whereas others are not
–> local state

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8
Q

Higher-Order Theories (HOT): Properties

A

They are primarily accounts of what makes a mental state conscious
–> the phenomenal character of emotion and meta-cognitive states
–> the center of where we decide what something is like
–> ignores function(s) of consciousness

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9
Q

Higher-Order Theories (HOT): Neural Basis

A

Prefrontal Cortex
–> anterior cortical regions

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10
Q

Global Workspace Theories (GWT)

A

Sensory information gains access to conscious awareness when it is ‘broadcast’ within a widespread neuronal workspace that is implemented across higher-order cortical association areas

Access to the global workspace is achieved through ‘ignition’ (= rapid transition from a low to high activity state)
–> this process selects neuronal representations
–> this selected information enters the workspace and becomes conscious

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11
Q

Global Workspace Theories (GWT): Properties

A

Focus on the question of what makes a representation conscious
–> functional properties

Accounts of ‘conscious access’ –> why certain representations are available to be flexibly used by a wide range of consuming systems

Core functional property: the ability of conscious states to guide behavior and cognition in flexible, content-dependent ways

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12
Q

Global Workspace Theories (GWT): Neuronal Basis

A

Prefrontal cortex
–> fronto-parietal regions

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13
Q

Integrated Information Theory (IIT)

A
  • it starts with consciousness as a certainty and works backwards to a physical system
  • if a conscious experience can be fully accounted for by a physical system, then the properties of a physical system must be constraint by the properties of experience

–> consciousness should be understood in terms of ‘cause-effect power’
–> any irreducible integrated information is conscious

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14
Q

Integrated Information Theory (IIT): Classes

A
  • global states are associated with the quantity or irreducible integrated information
  • local states can be understood in terms of conceptual structures –> underpin specific kinds of phenomenal character
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15
Q

Integrated Information Theory (IIT): Neural Basis

A

Posterior hot zone

–> posterior cortical areas

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16
Q

Re-Entry Theories

A

Associate conscious perception with top-down (recurrent, re-entrant) signaling

–> consciousness emerges from top-down signaling that predicts the causes of sensory signals

17
Q

Predictive Processing Theories

A

More general accounts of brain (and body) function that can be used to formulate explanations and predictions regarding properties of consciousness

–> the brain implements a process of prediction error minimization
–> errors in the predictions of sensory signals are constantly minimized by bottom-up signaling

18
Q

Predictive Processing Theories: Classes

A

Address local conscious states in terms of the content of top-down perceptual predictions

–> two competing perceptual hypotheses —> one wins —> perceptual dominance (best guess) —> loser is the prediction error
–> predictive processing can explain the distinction between conscious and unconscious states in terms of whether a mental state is part of a current ‘best guess’ during perceptual inference

19
Q

Evaluation - Unity of Consciousness

A

= the fact that the experiences that a single agent has at a time seem always to occur as the components of a single complex experience

IIT: assumes that consciousness is always unified and consciousness is necessarily unified
GWT: association of consciousness with broadcast within a functionally integrated workspace
HOT and PPT: overlook this property

20
Q

Evaluation - Neural Data

A

Front-of-the-brain perspective: Prefrontal activity is crucially implicated in consciousness/conscious perception
–> advocates of HOTs and GWTs

Back-of-the-brain perspective: posterior cortical processes suffice the perceptual experience, and ‘front-of-the-brain’ processes are not necessary
–> advocates of IIT and re-entry theories

21
Q

Evaluation - Late vs. Early Onset (Event Recording)

A

There is a generalized early-onset response that robustly indexes perceptual consciousness
–> IIT and Re-Entry

Late-onset accounts are motivated by various perceptual phenomena that indicate a temporal delay in frontal brain processing
–> HOTs and GWTs

22
Q

Neural Darwinism

A

= the brain’s development and function are shaped by the principles of natural selection

23
Q

Neural Darwinism: Reentrant Signaling

A

Reentrant signaling, which allows the processing and integration of multiple types of information, is critical for creating a unified conscious experience

–> reentrant signaling is facilitated by the brain’s capacity for adaptive behavior, which is driven by the same principles of selection and variation that underlie Neural Darwinism

–> arises in the thalamocortical system

24
Q

Neural Darwinism and Consciousness

A

The brain’s capacity for flexible, adaptive behavior, which is driven by the principles of selection and variation that underlie Neural Darwinism, is critical for the integration and coordination of different brain regions, and is therefore important for creating a coherent conscious experience