Task 8

Question 1

Readiness potential (RP)

Answer 1

A scalp-recorded slow negative shift in electrical potential that begins up to 1s before a self-paced, apparently voluntary motor act

Question 2

Libet’s definition of voluntary action

Answer 2

1. It arises endogenously, not in direct response to an external stimulus or cue.
2. There are no externally imposed restrictions or compulsions that directly/immediately control subjects’ initiation and performance of the act.
3. Subject feel introspectively that they are performing the act on their own initiative and that they are free to start or not the act as they wish

Question 3

Basic argument

Answer 3

An argument which appears to prove that we cannot be truly morally responsible for our actions, regardless of whether or not determinism is true. The argument’s
central idea is the following:
1. Nothing can be causa sui - nothing can be the cause of itself.
2. In order to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions, one would have to be causa sui, at least in certain crucial menta l respects.

Question 4

Compatibalist response

Criticism of the basic argument and rebuttal

Answer 4

• One can be a free & morally responsible agent even if determinism is true.
• One can be truly responsible for what one does, when one acts, just as long as one is not caused to act by a certain set of constraints (e.g. obsessional neuroses, desires experienced as alien, threats, instances of force majeure etc.)

But: Because one does things because of the way one is, and one is not responsible for the way one is, then one cannot be justly punished for anything one does

Question 5

Libertarian response

Criticism of the basic argument and rebuttal

Answer 5

• We are free and morally responsible agents and determinism is false.
• Agents in an undetermined world can have free will, because they have the power to make choices which can only & finally be explained in terms of their own wills (i.e. character, motives, and efforts of will).

But: The occurrence of random or indeterministic events does not contribute to one’s being truly morally responsible neither for one’s actions nor for one’s character. This indeterminism can also be considered as luck.

Question 6

S-procedures

Criticism of the basic argument and rebuttal

Answer 6

Conscious & intentional shaping procedures

Question 7

C-features

Criticism of the basic argument and rebuttal

Answer 7

Character features

Question 8

S & CPM

Criticism of the basic argument and rebuttal

Answer 8

• One is free & truly morally responsible because one’s self (S) is independent of one’s CPM.
• For example, imagine that someone is in a situation in which one experiences a difficult choice between A (doing one’s duty) and B (following one’s non-moral desires).
• Given one’s CPM, one responds in a certain way. One’s desires & beliefs develop and interact, constituting reasons for both A and B. One’s CPM makes one tend towards A or B. But S incorporates a power of decision that is independent from one’s CPM

But: When S decides something, this is because of the way S is and eventually due to indeterministic processes, which cannot contribute to S’s responsibility. To be truly responsible, S must be responsible for being the way it is, but this is impossible, because nothing can be causa sui

Question 9

Study: Readiness Potential

Study (Libet et al.)

Answer 9

• Asked participants to voluntarily move a finger
• Wanted to find out where between readiness potential and movement conscious choice happens
• Result: After readiness potential

Question 10

Variables and timeline

Study (Libet et al.)

Answer 10

• W: Time of the decision to move (-200ms)
• W-S: For error correction; S is time between electrical stimulus and awareness of stimulus
• ** M:** Movement (0ms)
• RP1 (-1050ms)
• RP2 (-550ms)

Question 11

Type 1 and Type 2 Readiness Potential

Answer 11

Type 1: Planned movment (e.g deciding on a specific time)
Type 2: Spontaneous but willful movement (not like reflexes)