Syndicated Lending Flashcards

1
Q

In Finance, what is a Syndicate?

A

A group of Lenders who come together to lend to a Borrower.

P. 452.

They are usually gathered by an Arranger and represented by an Agent.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

What is the Commercial Purpose of Syndicated Lending?

A

For Lenders:
* Risk Diversification: Lenders can spread their credit exposure across multiple parties or circument capital adequacy requirements.
* Co-Lending Expertise: Different Lenders can leverage one another’s expertise, leading to superior decision-making.
* Access to Trophy Borrowers: Syndication affords Lenders access to Trophy Borrowers and the opportunity to build relations therewith.

For Borrowers:
* Greater Debt Quantum: Multiple Lenders can aggregately issue sums greater than would otherwise be possible for any one of them.
* Efficiency: Instead of negotiating with each Lender individually, the Borrower can deal with all of them, on the same terms, at once.

For Lenders and Borrowers:
* Reputation: Merely participating in a syndicated loan is a sign of rank.
* Efficiency: Syndication obviates the duplication involed in separate bilateral loans and simplifies the set of terms the Borrower must observe.

P. 451.

Reputational considerations are also relevant for both Lenders and Borrowers, as simply participating in a syndicated loan is a sign of rank.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Why may a Borrower prefer a Syndicated Loan to a Bond Issuance?

A
  • Confidentiality.
  • Access to funds in multiple currencies.
  • Insufficient reputation in capital markets.
  • Ability to nest multiple facilities in one transaction.
  • Access to a revolving structure with short-term advances.

P. 452.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

What is the Textbook Definition of a Syndicated Loan?

A

A series of substantially identical bilateral loans that are, “bound together by an embedded intercreditor agreement.”

P. 454.

There is an inherent paradox in Syndicated Lending — the Lenders act collectively regarding the loan’s formation, administration, and enforcement, but ultimately bear separate rights and liabilities against the Borrower.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

What is the Intercreditor Agreement?

A

The document that governs how the Lenders will administer, and if necessary enforce, the loan.

P. 459.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Are Lending Obligations in a Syndicated Loan transferable?

A

Yes, subject to limitations.

At times, no or very few limitations will be placed because the Borrower understands its Lender will assume responsibility for the entire loan, and afterward, sell off parts on the Secondary Market.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

What is the Arranger?

Otherwise known as the Lead Manager.

A

The party that organizes the transaction by finding willing Lenders and progressing matters to execution.

The Arranger is usually, although not necessarily, also a Lender.

P. 453.

A single transaction can have multiple Arrangers.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

What Governs the Legal Relationship between the Arranger and the Borrower?

A

The Arranger-Borrower Mandate, which is an agreement to, “assemble and bring the transaction to fruition.”

P. 469.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Is the Arranger Liable to the Borrower if it fails to gather a Syndicate?

A

Not necessarily, based on whether it agreed to exercise reasonable efforts, best efforts, or to underwrite.

In increasing order of severity for the Arranger.

Lecture Notes.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Regarding the Arranger’s Liability to the Borrower, what are the distinctions between Reasonable Efforts, Best Efforts, and Underwriting?

A

For each of the following, in fulfilling its duties, the Arranger must:°
* Reasonable Efforts: Do all that is commercially reasonable.
* Best Efforts: Do all that is considered possible.
* Underwriting: Do all that is considered possible, and if it fails, assume the obligation to lend the remainder.°°

° Makdessi v Cavendish [2015] UKSC 67.
°° Re Lehman Brothers [2013] EWHC 2997 (Ch).

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

What are the Steps involved in Arranging a Syndicated Loan?

A
  1. Information Memorandum: Create a ‘prospectus’ on the Borrower, including financial and business details.
  2. Guage Interest: Seek out interested Lenders and ask for an ‘In Principle’ commitment.
  3. Drafting and Negotiation: Draft the contract, negotiate terms with the Borrower, bring it before the Syndicate for comments, repeat until all parties are content.
  4. Execution: Ensure all parties sign the contract.

Lecture Notes.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Regarding Efforts, how much does the Arranger usually agree to apply itself?

A

Reasonable, rather than best, efforts, let alone underwriting.

P. 472.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

In Syndicated Lending, what is the Information Memorandum?

Otherwise known as the IM.

A

A detailed summary of what the Arranger regards as legally, commercially, and financially relevant to the Syndicate’s calculus.

P. 471.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Should the Syndicate assume that the IM contains all Relevant Information regarding the Borrower or Facility?

A

No. It should not be taken as containing, “everything that anyone might think relevant.”

Accordingly, claiming misrepresentation will prove quite difficult.

Raiffeisen v RBS [2010] EWHC 1392 (Comm) at [92]-[93].

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

What is a Market Flex Clause?

A

A provision that allows the Arranger to amend the draft terms in case of adverse market changes that decrease the availability of finance.

P. 470.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

What is the Commercial Purpose of a Market Flex Clause?

A

To enable the Arranger to discretionarily sweeten a deal for the Syndicate if market conditions worsen, thereby allowing it to meet its obligations.

P. 470.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
17
Q

What Qualifies when and how much the Arranger can sweeten the deal for the Syndicate?

A
  • Express limits exacted by the Borrower regarding when the Market Flex activates and which terms it pertains to.
  • Good faith and commercial reasonableness

P. 470.

° Golden Belt v BNP Paribas [2019] EWHC 257 (Comm)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
18
Q

What is a Yank-the-Bank Clause?

A

A provision that allows the Borrower to replace a Lender which blocks a waiver or amendement that requires unanimous approval and would otherwise pass.

P. 458.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
19
Q

What is the Commercial Purpose of a Yank-the-Bank Clause?

A

To provide the Borrower with greater flexibility and control over its financing arrangements.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
20
Q

What is a Snooze-You-Lose Clause?

A

A provision that nullifies a Lender’s vote if it’s not submitted before a specific date and time.

P. 458.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
21
Q

What is the Commercial Purpose of a Snooze-You-Lose Clause?

A

To encourage Lenders to participate in decision-making and ensure decisions are made efficiently and with certainty.

P. 458.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
22
Q

Can a Syndicated Lender cast its vote under the Instruction of a Third Party?

A

Yes, but only if it is to further a contractual obligation to that party.

Carey Group v AIB Group [2011] EWHC 567 (Ch).

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
23
Q

In a Vote, are Lenders liable for the Accuracy of the Information they exchange with one another?

A

Yes, but only if there arose a duty of care between the relevant parties.

Torre Asset v RBS [2013] EWHC 2670 (Ch).

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
24
Q

If a Loan includes distinct Facilities, do Voting Rights extend to all Lenders regardless of Class?

A

No, voting rights are similarly distinct, so as to avoid conflicts of interest between Lenders and classes of Lenders.

Redwood v TD Bank [2002] EWHC 2703 is a cautionary tale.

P. 459.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
25
Q

In a Vote, must the Majority pay mind to the Interests of the Minority?

A

Yes. The Majority owes them a duty of good faith, which entails acting fairly and accounting for their legitimate interests.

BAN Corp. v MJ O’Brien [1927] AC 369.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
26
Q

In a Vote, when may the Majority pursue its own Interests?

A

When, after acting farily and considering the Minority’s interests,° the Majority still finds a bona fide commercial justification for its actions.°°

° RBS v Highland Financial [2013] EWCA Civ 328.
°° Redwood v TD Bank [2002] EWHC 2703.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
27
Q

Can a Syndicated Lender enjoy Disproportionate Voting Powers?

A

Yes, but only if it is transparent and freely negotiated by all parties.

Re Southern Pacific [2013] EWHC 2485 (Ch).

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
28
Q

When is an Inducement to Vote considered Legitimate?

A

If it:
* Is openly and equally promised to all Lenders; and
* Is not intended to unduly influence or unfairly advantage any one Lender or class of Lenders.

Re ST Property Investment Trust [2003] EWHC 2237 (Ch).

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
29
Q

When can the Court intervene in a Vote, or otherwise, on Grounds of Unfairness or Oppression?

A

If the relevant action is both deliberately and manifestly mala fide, although this is a very high bar to meet.

Assénagon v Irish Bank [2012] EWHC 2090 (Ch).

The bar is difficult to meet because of cases like Redwood, which tell us that if the Majority is pursuing a legitimate commercial interest, it will not suffer liability.

30
Q

Technically, is a Syndicate a Partnership, Joint Venture, or some other collaborative endeavour?

A

No.
* All Lenders severally bear their own profits, losses, and liabilities; and
* Can transfer their rights and obligations to other parties.

P. 461-464.

Indeed, Partnership would defeat the purpose of Syndication because it would consolidating credit risk and eliminate the capital adequacy advantages it brings.

31
Q

What is the Agent Bank?

A

The party that coordinates the facility once it has been executed. It usually also acts as the Security Trustee.

P. 453.

A single transaction can have multiple Agent Banks. The role of Agent bank is both highly reputable and allows the relevant party to build a strong relationship with the Borrower.

32
Q

Who is the Agent Bank appointed by?

A

The Syndicate, as their Agent, intermediary, and representative of their interests.

P. 520-522.

33
Q

What are the Duties of the Agent Bank?

A

To act as a payment and information conduit between the Syndicate and the Borrower.

Lecture Notes.

34
Q

If the Agent Bank fails to pass on funds to the Borrower, who is Liable to whom?

A
  • The Syndicate is liable to the Borrower for the funds; and
  • The Agent Bank is liable to the Syndicate for its losses.

Lecture Notes.

35
Q

What if the Security Trustee is based in a jurisdiction that does not recognize Trusts?

A

A parallel debt clause may be used in lieu, wherein the Borrower acknowledges, “a separate and additional debt owed by it to the Security Agent.”

Textbook, P. 453.

This debt would exist in parallel to the facility, and would, “equal… the amount owed by the Borrower to the Lenders at any time during,” its existence.

36
Q

Why is Security awarded to a Trustee as opposed to the Syndicate itself?

A

It facilitates loan transferability, since otherwise, every transfer would require the release and re-establishment of security.

P. 453.

37
Q

Can a Syndicated Lender unilaterally Accelerate its commitment?

A

No. Syndicated loans typically include provisions requiring enforcement decisions to be supported by a majority of Lenders.

P. 455.

That said, if the Lender controls enough of the debt to constitute a majority by itself, then practically speaking, it can unilaterally accelerate.

38
Q

How does the Borrower pay a Syndicate?

A

Through the Agent Bank, who then, “distributes [the sum] on pro rata between the Lenders.”

P. 455.

39
Q

What is a Sharing Clause?

A

A provision that requires a Lender which has recieved superfluous funds to return the surplus to the Agent so that it may amend the error.

P. 455.

Naturally, this entails on obligation on the Agent Bank to gather funds from the Borrower and distribute them pari passu between the Lenders as a matter of course.

40
Q

What is the Commercial Purpose of a Sharing Clause?

A

To maintain pari passu treatment between Lenders regarding payment distribution.

P. 455.

41
Q

What is the Precise Scope of a Sharing Clause?

A
  • It applies exclusively to payments received under the facility, including set-off rights and enforcement of security; however
  • It does not apply to litigation or arbitration recoveries if the Syndicate is not party to the proceedings.

Azevedo v Importacao [2013] EWHC Civ 364, [2015] QB.

42
Q

How are Arrangements that subvert the Pari Passu Principle treated in law?

A

They are void.

§107, §328(3), & Rule 4.181 – Insolvency Act 1986.

43
Q

What are the Arranger’s Legal Exposures?

A

A Claim by either the Borrower or Syndicate in:

  • Breach of Contract.
  • Breach of Fiduciary Duty.
  • The Tort of Deciet.
  • The Tort of Negligence.
  • Negligent Misstatement.
  • Fraudulent Misrepresentation.
  • Negligent or Innocent Misrepresentation.
44
Q

Why would a Borrower Sue the Arranger?

A

It may be unhappy with the Arranger’s performance, especially if a Syndicate has failed to materialize.

Textbook, P. 473.

Nonetheless, a well-drafted Mandate will protect the Arranger if it has acted competently and exercised reasonable care and skill.

45
Q

Why would a Syndicate Sue the Arranger?

A

It may find the final agreement transpires to be riskier than calculated, particularly in a way that suggests it was ill-advised.

Textbook, P. 473.

The Syndicate is the Arranger’s greatest threat because it is well funded, highly motivated, and more inclined to pursue the Arranger rather than the Borrower because it is likely the better capitalized between them.

46
Q

Will an Arranger owe a Duty of Care to either the Borrower or the Syndicate if it acts through an Agent?

A

Yes. The court disallows the delegation of duties of care in this respect.

P. 480; Williams v Natural Life [1998] 1 WLR 830, at [847].

47
Q

In what ways can the Scope of the Arranger’s Duty of Care be Construed?

A

Depending on the facts, contractual terms, and party relationships, either:
* Widely: It must, “ensure the transaction was suitable for [the Lenders]… [or that they] were correctly appraised,” and that the transaction was well-investigated.
* Narrowly: It must only excerise reasonable care regarding specific tasks.

P. 481; Springwell v JP Morgan Chase [2010] EWCA Civ 1221; Torre Asset v RBS [2013] EWHC 2670 (Ch).

An instance of a wide construction is Aneco Reinsurance v Johnson and Higgins [2001] UKHL 51. An instance of a narrow construction is Torre Asset v RBS [2013] EWHC 2670 (Ch). In both cases, the court’s conclusion hinged on the Arranger’s assumption of responsibility.

48
Q

Before Negotiation, who does the Arranger owe a Duty of Care to?

A

The Borrower, since it is acting solely as an agent on its behalf. This eschews personal liability, unless judged otherwise.

The latter point does not apply to the Tort of Deceit.

P. 487.

“Market practice is that Lenders have no claim against Arrangers since each Lender is treated as carrying out its own research and making its own credit decision, a position which is confirmed by the inclusion of disclaimers to that effect,” in the IM.

49
Q

During Negotiation and Drafting, who does the Arranger owe a Duty of Care to?

A

The Borrower, but considering its greater independence, potentially the Syndicate. Although, this is unlikely.

P. 488-489.

Even if a duty arose, the Lenders will have been given time to review the documentation, asked for their comments, and afforded an opportunity to renegotiate, demonstrating competence on the Arranger’s part. If it assumes a responsibility and acts incompetently, though, liability may well await. SeeSumitomo v Banque Bruxelles [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 487.

50
Q

When will the Arranger be taken to owe a Duty of Care to the Syndicate?

A

When it assumes responsibility for the performance of a particular task or policy.

P. 489-491; NatWest v Tricontinental [1993] EWCA Civ 13.

In NatWest, a duty of care to provide accurate information because the Arranger accepted a specific query by a Lender. Importantly, the case is extraordinary because the Arranger possessed information that contradicted its response to the Lender (i.e. provided inaccurate information), made it appear as if the response was its own, and made no effort to limit its responsibilities beyond the IM.

51
Q

Can a Claim in Misrepresentation regarding the contract’s terms be brought against the Arranger if it is not a Member of the Syndicate?

A

No. Such claims require the Defendant to be privy to the same contract as the Claimant.

P. 495.

Taberna Europe v Selskabet (In Bankruptcy) [2015] EWHC 871.

52
Q

Is the Arranger a Fiduciary of the Borrower?

A

Unlikely. Due to the missing elements of trust and confidence, the relationship is more aptly classified as Agent-Principal.

P. 498-499.

53
Q

Vis-à-vis the Borrower, what would an Arranger typically Disclaim?

A

Responsibility for:
* The accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information provided in connection with the loan.
* Providing advice or recommendations, recommending instead independent advice.
* The actions or omissions of the Syndicate.
* Third-party services or products used in connection with the loan.
* Loss or damage suffered due to unavoidable market or economic conditions.
* Representations and warranties, claiming the Borrower has not relied on any.

And the existence of a fiduciary duty.

P. 502.

54
Q

Vis-à-vis the Syndicate, what would an Arranger typically include in a Disclaimer?

A

Responsibility for:
* The accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information provided in connection with the loan.
* Providing advice or recommendations, recommending instead independent advice.
* The actions or omissions of the Borrower.
* Third-party services or products used in connection with the loan.
* Loss or damage suffered due to unavoidable market or economic conditions.
* Representations and warranties, claiming the Syndicate has not relied on any.

And the existence of a fiduciary duty or duty of care.

P. 502.

55
Q

What are the Agent Bank’s Legal Exposures?

A

A Claim by either the Borrower or Syndicate in:
* Breach of Tort.
* Breach of Contract.
* Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

56
Q

Is the Agent Bank a Fiduciary of the Syndicate?

A

It depends on the facts:
* In principle, yes. Unlike the Arranger, the elements of trust and confidence obtain, and the obligation of loyalty is present;° however,
* Because it is not obliged to separate receivables from its own funds°° and the express disclaimers to the contrary,°°° it may well not.

P. 522;
° Titon Hardware v Viridian Housing [2011] EWHC 1367 (Ch), at [50].
°° Henry v Hammond [1913] 2 KB 515.
°°° Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46, at [127]; Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723.

57
Q

To what extent can the Agent Bank limit or exclude its Fiduciary Duties?

A

While it cannot exclude them, it can limit their scope through express provisions, subject to the Reasonableness Test.

Cattles v Welcome Financial Services [2013] EWCA Civ 1111, at [91]; Torre Asset v RBS [2013] EWHC 2670 (Ch), at [301].

58
Q

How does an Agent Bank guard itself against its Legal Exposures?

A

Agency Clauses.

P. 529.

59
Q

What is an Agency Clause?

A

A clause:
* Specifying the nature and scope of an Agent Bank’s obligations, and specifically, their administrative and mechanical nature; so as to
* Minimize the substantive (discretionary) content of its duties.

P. 529.

The idea is that, by minimizing the amount of discretion it has to exercise, the Agent Bank likewise minimizes the number of things it can be held liable for.

60
Q

To what extent are Agency Clauses effective?

A

While they cannot exclude duties and obligations, they can more favourably define them, and thereby facilitating compliance therewith.

Torre Asset v RBS [2013] EWHC 2670 (Ch) at [196], [34], and [163(i)].

61
Q

How are Agency Clauses construed?

A
  • Strictly, with reference to the words’ natural meaning; and
  • Only allowing the limitation of liability when the terms are clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous.

P. 530; Armitrage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241 at, [255]-[256].

62
Q

What is Subordination?

A

The process wherein one Creditor agrees to subordinate its right to payment from a Debtor, partly or fully, behind that of another Creditor.

P. 963-964.

Subordinated Creditors are referred to as ‘Junior Creditors’, and their debt as ‘Junior Debt’. Those to whom they subordinate are referred to as ‘Senior Creditors’, and their debt as ‘Senior Debt’.

Subordination can also refer to the determination of how different security interests rank between Secured Creditors, but for clarity’s sake, such things will be referred to as ‘agreements as to priority’.

63
Q

What is the Commercial Purpose of Subordination?

A

Junior Debt is riskier than Senior Debt, but correspondingly more profitable, thereby allowing Syndicates to appeal to a greater variety of strategies.

P. 965.

64
Q

What are the Two Types of Subordination?

A
  • Structural.
  • Contractual.
65
Q

What is the Difference between Structural and Contractual Subordination?

A
  • Structural subordination predetermines the priority of debt repayment by issuing various classes of debt; whereas
  • Contractual subordiantion artificially creates these distinctions through negotiation and agreement.
66
Q

What are the Two Types of Contractual Subordination?

A
  • Turnover Subordination (by Trust).
  • Contingent Debt Subordination.

P. 966-967.

67
Q

What is Turnover Subordination (by Trust)?

A

The process wherein the Junior Creditor agrees to account for the Junior Debt’s benefits to the Senior Creditor under specific circumstances, e.g. insolvency.

P. 966.

This is usually arranged by means of a trust, called a ‘Subordination Turst’, since while use of a contract is also possible, it would leave the Senior Creditor potentially vulnerable to clawback during in insolvency proceedings.

68
Q

What is a Subordination Trust?

A

A trust wherein the Junior Creditor undertakes to hold its rights and any payment it receives from the Junior Debt on trust for the Senior Creditor.

P. 966; Re British and Commonwealth Holdings [1992] 1 WLR 672.

69
Q

Does a Subordination Trust constitute a Security by Way of Charge?

A

No.

P. 971; Re SSSL [2004] EWHC 1760, at [49]-[51].

Even if it was a charge, it would not be registrable if it were deemed a security financial collateral agreement, which a Subordination Trust may well could.

70
Q

What is Contingent Debt Subordination?

A

A process wherein, during an insolvency, the Junior Creditor is contractually restricted from receiving a payout until the Senior Creditors are made whole, if ever.

P. 967; Re Maxwell Communications [1993] 1 WLR 1402, at [23].

This is achieved through contract. The relevant clause may also prohibit the Junior Creditor from claiming against the Debtor while Senior Debt remains outstanding.

71
Q

Does Insolvency Set-Off between the Debtor and Junior Creditor obtain?

A

No.

P. 969; Re Lehman Brothers [2014] EWHC 704 (Ch), at [7].

72
Q

Does Subordination subvert the Pari Passu Principle?

A

No. This is because:
* The principle prevents the Debtor from creating arrangements that unequally benefit some Creditors, whereas;
* Subordination is an inter-creditor agreement in relation to the Debtor, and is therefore, consensual inequality.

P. 968; Re Maxwell Communications [1993] 1 WLR 1402, at [23].