Survival of authoritarian regimes Flashcards
Svolik
The agreements about how spoils will be shared are what Svolik calls..
Authoritarian power sharing.
When a dictator comes to power, he seeks allies and promises to reward their support by sharing with them the spoils from joint rule.
These “spoils” could be financial (e.g., tax revenue, natural resource revenue), or based on compromise (e.g., personnel appointments or policies)
Svolik
What is the “Commitment problem”?
The dictator has an incentive to betray his allies by defecting on his promise to share the spoils of joint rule.
Svolik
For Svolik, there are two features of authoritarian politics that compromise the success of power-sharing. Which are?
Commitment problem
1) Lack of independent authority: Dictatorships do not have an inherent independent authority that could enforce agreements among the ruling elites (there is no higher authority to keep the dictator accountable)
2) Violence: is an ever-present threat and is often the ultimate arbiter of political conflicts.
- The ruling elites will rather keep the dictator than have instability, they will only remove the dictator if he has moved away from their agreement.
As a result: misperceptions of a dictator’s actions can easily breed suspicion, leading to intra-elite conflict. Suspicion can lead to a shorter regime.
Svolik
Why do political institutions help the dictator in alleviating problems with authoritarian power-sharing?
And what makes the institutions better?
1) Because it increases transparency
- Everything that removes uncertainty is good for the stability of the authoritarian regime. The parliament allows for some flow of information.
2) Institutions are going to be better if they are formalised.
Svolik
What are the benefits of formal institutions?
1) Detects dictatorial noncompliance
2) Observes violations: When there is a violation, it is easier to observe compared to when institutions are merely informal.
Svolik
What are the limits of institutions when it comes to constraining the dictator?
Explain the collective-action problem that dictators’ allies face.
Institutions have not always successfully constrained the personal authority of the dictator, because:
1) Boils down to the strength of the opposition and the power of the dictator.
2) The dictator can only be forced to behave properly by the likelihood of successful rebellions etc.
You also have the collective-action problem that the dictator’s allies face. There are several kinds of uncertainty:
* How many other allies will participate in a rebellion;
* The likelihood of the rebellion succeeding (and the high cost of failure);
* The true power of the dictator
Thus, institutional effectiveness is conditional on a relatively balanced distribution of power between the dictator and his allies.
Svolik
When are institutions very important?
When it comes to distribution of power among the dictator and allies.
When the power between a dictator and his allies is balanced (medium). Only then can you have credible power-sharing. This is when institutions are meaningful.
Svolik
Do authoritarian ruling coalitions with institutions (legislatures in this case) last longer than those without institutions?
On average, yes.
But there might also be other factors, such as institutions might reduce intra-elite conflict.
Svolik
Institutions significantly reduce chance of exit through coups and uprisings. True or false?
True.
Gandhi
What does Gandhi use as the unit of analysis when trying to understand how institutions affect the survival of dictators?
She looks at the individual dictator, instead of the ruling coalition spell (which Svolik does).
Gandhi
How do institutions affect the survival of the dictator?
According to her results, there is no statistical significance on institutions. Institutions are important in other aspects, but not when it comes to the survival of the dictator.
Gandhi
Why adopt institutions when this does not help the dictator’s survival?
Gandhis explanation:
There are two types of authoritarian rulers.
1) Those who need to buy the support of the elite: You are weaker and you need to establish institutions. Once they institutionalise they reap the benefit of this.
2) Those who do not need to buy off the elite via institutions: when you are such a strong dictator then you don’t need institutionalisation to survive. You have resources etc.
Criticism: How can we distinguish between leader that need the support of the elite or not? Who is weak and who is strong? Difficult to test.
Do the arguments by Gandhi and Svolik on survival of dictatorship contradict one another?
They might seem to contradict one another but they are taking different variables into account. Gandhi looks at individuals, and Svolik looks at the ruling elite.
Why do Gandhi and Svolik find different effects of institutions on regime survival?
Because they are looking at different units. Institutions might not do much for individual dictators, but for ruling elites.
They measure institutions differently and use different operationalization.
