Supremacy Flashcards
Costa
Introduction of the principle of supremacy, something the treaty was silent about.
Teleological reading of Art 288: community laws were accepted on the basis of national laws –> cannot be inconsistent, they integrally coexist
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft: scope of Costa supremacy - relationship with MS
Primary and secondary EU law take precedence over primary and secondary national law (here, the German Constitution)
Functional argument of Costa (Craig and de Burca): domestic laws cannot contradict EU law “without jeopardising the attainment of the objective of the Treaty
Simmenthal
Every national court must apply supremacy doctrine
Issue in civil law countries: constitutional courts might be solely able to decide on constitutionality of laws –> CJEU doesn’t ask courts to void laws
Winner Wetten
Confirmed Simmenthal principle that supremacy doctrine applied irrespective of whether national law pre-dated or post-dated EU law (EU law renders inapplicable and prevents)
Factortame
UK law at the time did not allow for interim relief against the Crown –> CJEU reiterated Simmenthal ruling on need for effectiveness and automatic precedence of directly effective EU law > national laws
Larsy
Not only national courts but also relevant administrative agencies should misapply conflicting national law
Elchinov
A national rule that rendered lower courts bound by rulings from higher courts could NOT prevent the former from exercising its discretion to seek a ruling (Art 267) where it felt the higher court was contradicting EU law –> lower court would be bound to follow CJEU ruling
SUPREMACY FROM THE CJEU’S PERSPECTIVE
Their power rooted in superior power of EU treaties/caselaw, monist view of supremacy –> emerging as a collective entity with a common purpose (Communautaire reasoning) = teleological reading of Art 288
Germany: supremacy cases
Honeywell Solange I Solange II Brunner 2 BvR Lisbon decision
Honeywell
Acceptance of CJEU supremacy with limitations - ultimately locating EU law’s authority within Art 23.1 of BVerfG (which specifically allows for transfer of sovereign powers)
3 types of limitations on supremacy impose by BVerfG
1) fundamental identity (Solange I and II)
2) competence (Brunner, 2 BvR)
3) constitutional identity (Lisbon decision)
Solange I
Conditions for the acceptance of supremacy: as long as the treaties “lack a codified catalogue of fundamental rights” (like the Grundrechte), German Grundrechte would in theory take precedence in a conflict
RIGHT RESERVED BUT NEVER EXERCISED
Solange II (Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft)
BVerfG was generally satisfied with acceptance of ECHR by all MS - still preserved final authority!
Vosskuhle of Solange II
To attack secondary EU law on the basis of German Grundrechte: MUST argue that the general level of EU human rights fell below the necessary level, compared to Grundrechte
–> high bar!
Brunner
Ultra vires lock: MS = Masters of the Treaties with review power in situations concerning Grundrechte where EU exceeds its competence granted in Art. 235 TFEU (voting procedures)
2 BvR 2661/06
Made it ore difficult to challenge CJEU supremacy based on ultra vires argument: CJEU has to be given opportunity to rule on issue + any excess of power must be MANIFESTLY in violation of given competence, the impugned act = HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT
