STANDING Flashcards
STANDING Generally
The federal courts CANNOT hear a case brought by a plaintiff without standing. A plaintiff is considered to have standing if they meet the ARTICLE III/CONSTITUTIONL REQUIREMENTS (jurisdictional); but even if they meet the constitutional standing requirements, the Court can still refuse to hear a case under PRUDENTIAL STANDING requirements. It is critical to note that these are judge-made rules, so the Supreme Court can also change these rules by overruling previous standing doctrines and/or adding new doctrines. Standing is determined at the filing of the complaint.
- Must have standing for EACH claim that you’re bringing.
- If you want damages, then you ALWAYS have standing.
- Congress CANNOT change constitutional standing (cannot change injury in fact), but note that they CAN create a COA and thus, impact prudential standing.
I. Congress can CREATE standing as long as it doesn’t violate Article III standing.
A. See FEC v. Akins (voters’ inability to obtain information constitutes an “injury in fact” and FECA seeks to address voters’ injury so also prudential standing).
ARTICLE III STANDING: CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING
YOU MUST HAVE ARTICLE III/CONSTITUTIONAL (JURISDICTIONAL STANDING) TO BRING A CLAIM IN FEDERAL COURT. THIS IS A THRESHOLD QUESTION
- Note: Constitutional standing (injury/causation/redressability) is DIFFERENT than generalized grievance COA prudential standing (merits) because constitutional standing speaks to case or controversy jurisdiction while generalized grievance COA prudential standing is about whether you have properly stated a claim according to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), and can survive a MTD for failure to state a claim.
- See Lujan (all plaintiffs bring claim based on the same injury-in-fact, so not only was suit barred by generalized grievance prudential standing [when plaintiffs tried to bring suit raising general environmental concerns about endangered species]; but also there was no injury in the first place). *Lujan is where constitutional standing test originates.
US v. Windsor
Windsor challenges DOMA and sues United States, but United States is in agreement with Windsor (yay for the gays), so the United States does not really want to defend in the lawsuit. ENTER BLAG to appeal Second Circuit decision that favors Windsor. On appeal:
- U.S. has CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING because of its money at stake (federal estate tax exemption not granted to Windsor) and Windsor’s economic loss was caused by U.S. and redressable by US.
- U.S. agrees with Windsor, so there is NO PRUDENTIAL STANDING (no adverseness between parties).
But BLAG is hating on the gays with real energy, so they bring the ADVERSENESS NECESSARY to meet prudential standing requirements DESPITE no constitutional injury-in-fact standing.
o TAKEAWAY: U.S. brought Article III standing and BLAG brought the prudential standing, so combined there was STANDING to appeal.
Article III Standing Requirements:
“A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” In other words, you need INJURY, CAUSATION, and REDRESSABILITY to have constitutional standing.
Constitutional Standing Analysis:
- Injury in fact: was P personally HARMED by action? IS P FUCKED?
a. FEC v. Akins (standing because injury in fact was denial of info necessary for informed voting was informational injury, not abstract or undifferentiated).
b. Trafficante v. Metropolitan (standing because benefits of living in integrated neighborhood and suffered stigma associated with their neighborhood constitutes injury, also suffered statutory injury in fact because “persons aggrieved” under FHA).
c. Los Angeles v. Lyons (no standing because cannot prove going to be harmed by chokehold in the future).
i. Also a ripeness/mootness issue.
d. Hollingsworth v. Perry (no standing for straight people to defend suit because no direct stake in outcome of suit and no injury, only interest is to vindicate constitutionality of Prop. 8: marriage is only between man and woman). - Causation: is P’s injury FAIRLY TRACEABLE to D’s action? DID D FUCK P?
a. Allen v. Wright (IRS’ failure in its enforcement duties, which led private schools to racially discriminate was not fairly traceable cause to harming public school desegregation efforts). - Redressability: will the remedy sought likely ADRESS INJURY EFFECTIVELY? CAN THE COURT UNFUCK P?
a. Allen v. Wright (addressing the IRS’ failure to enforce tax code will not remedy the issue of public school segregation).
PRUDENTIAL STANDING: THE RULE AGAINST ASSERTING THE RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES
- FEDERAL COURTS CAN STILL SAY NO STANDING EVEN IF YOU MEET ARTICLE III REQUIREMENTS, BUT MUST HAVE ARTICLE III STANDING BEFORE GETTING TO PRUDENTIAL QUESTIONS*
- Congress can grant standing as long as it is not at odds with Article III standing.
- Not jurisdictional, about ADVERSENESS. See US v. Windsor (U.S. alone does not have standing [lacks prudential standing] because US agrees with plaintiff, but with BLAG there is both constitutional and prudential standing and thus, standing required to bring claim).
- Note: this is about the NATURE OF YOUR CLAIM rather than the case or controversy standing (jurisdictional) aspect of your claim.
Some reasons for the prudential standing doctrine are SEPARATION OF POWERS, addressing CONCRETE ISSUES, and DOCKET CONTROL so the courts are not overloaded.
NO GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES
Plaintiffs cannot bring suits about GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES because ALL parties have the same grievance and it is so widely shared that the court in exercise of its PRUDENCE declines to exercise jurisdiction. See Frothingham v. Mellon (no taxpayer standing to chgeallenge federal expenditure); but sometimes, the claim is SO GENERAL, that the court says there is not even an injury-in-fact—generalized grievance can be transposed on to injury-in-fact.
- See Lujan (bars generalized grievance when plaintiffs tried to bring suit raising general environmental concerns about endangered species, and there was no injury-in-fact).
I. Although you first must establish that there is constitutional standing (case or controversy), sometimes the generalized grievance is so general that there is no injury and no claim (rejected on the merits).
TAXPAYER STANDING:
- Generally, there is NO TAXPAYER STANDING because all federal taxpayers have the same standing at stake when attempting to challenge constitutionality of federal tax.
i. See Frothingham v. Mellon (no standing to challenge federal expenditure).
ii. But see Flast v. Cohen (standing where the action challenged federal funding to religious schools alleged to violate Establishment Clause).
a. ONLY case ever to hold taxpayer standing.
b. Taxpayer still has standing to challenge direct government expenditure designated to religious organizations.
CITIZEN STANDING:
- Congress can create standing via a statute, but no standing simply by being a citizen. See FEC v. Akins (voters’ inability to obtain information constitutes an “injury in fact” and FECA seeks to address voters’ injury so also prudential standing).
i. Person has standing to sue under FOIA (Congress created standing via FOIA) for enforcement of a non-exempt document request even if they have no connect with subject matter of documents.
GENERALLY, NO ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING
Organizational standing is different from third party standing, which involves claims where the litigant can show injury: the defendant injured by jury discrimination in Powers v. Ohio (white defendant, discrimination vs. black jurors, BUT THE ACTUAL FEDERAL CLAIM TECHNICALLY BELONGS TO A THIRD PARTY). Here, the organization can show injury AND has its own claim independent of the third party.
ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING REQUIREMENTS:
Test from Hunt v. Apple:
1. At least one of its members would otherwise have STANDING on their OWN BEHALF (constitutional requirement: injury, causation, redressability).
a. Interests the group/organization seeks to protect are RELEVANT to its PURPOSE and GOALS, and claim does not require the participation in litigation by individual members (Congress can override if it chooses).
2. Organization can pursue the claim to the same extend as an individual.
a. Must meet constitutional standing test: injury, causation, redressability.
GENERALLY, NO THIRD PARTY STANDING
In third party standing cases, litigants are seeking to ASSERT THE RIGHTS OF PARTIESnot before the court. There is a prudential bar against such cases. Although the litigant meets the test of constitutional standing, they nevertheless may not assert others’ rights UNLESS there is a SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP between the parties and it would be DIFFICULT FOR THE THIRD PARTY TO EXERCISE RIGHTS ON THEIR OWN BEHALF.
No Third Party Standing Except When:
- There is a close relationship between parties AND
2. It would be difficult for party to exercise rights on own behalf
Powers v. Ohio Test
You cannot raise claims of third parties unless…
- Plaintiff has suffered an INJURY-IN-FACT, and thus has a “sufficiently concrete interest” in the outcome of the issue in dispute.
a. White defendant is injured because racism in jury selection process casts doubt on integrity of process (Powers). *Injury seeps into entire process.
b. Vendor suffers injury of sales being negatively impacted (Craig v. Boren). - Plaintiff must have CLOSE RELATIONSHIP to the third party.
a. Both defendant and juror have common interest in eliminating racial discrimination in jury selection process (Powers).
i. Discrimination undermines the integrity of the process.
b. Vendor and under 21-year-old males have common interest in transaction of buying alcohol (Craig v. Boren). - Some HINDERANCE to the party’s ABILITY TO PROTECT their OWN RIGHTS.
a. Jury member selection challenges are extremely rare, daunting task with many barriers (Powers).
b. Under 21-year-old males kept turning 21 and being mooted out, so unable to bring claims on own behalf (Craig v. Boren).
When Third Party Standing Has Been Upheld:
- Griswold v. Connecticut: contraceptives case where doctors/healthcare providers brought claim on behalf of patients.
- Flowers v. Mississippi (2019): court upheld a Batson challenge to a state prosecutor’s systematic exclusion, using peremptory challenges, of African-American venire members at each of the defendant’s six murder trials.
“ZONE OF INTERESTS” TEST
CONGRESS CONTROLS WHAT IS IN THE ZONE OF INTERESTS AND THEREFORE MAY GRANT COA TO PLAINTIFFS AS LONG AS IT DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE III LIMITS AKA IF CONGRESS DID NOT WANT YOU TO BE PROTECTED THEN THE COURT IS NOT GOING TO HEAR YOUR CASE
By tethering the zone of interests test to the cause of action Congress created, Lexmark makes clear that the judiciary does not control the zone of interests doctrine—Congress does. Congress may grant a cause of action to any person up to the limits of Article III—anyone who has suffered injury-in-fact, whose injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s alleged conduct, and whose requested form of relief (e.g., damages or injunction) will likely remedy the injury. It can be helpful to think about this as a separations of powers concern: the judicial branch should not invade on the legislative branch.
The Zone of Interests Requirement:
- Test guide for deciding whether, according to Congress, there is evident intent to protect plaintiff’s interests.
i. Plaintiff seeks judicial review of federal agency action because it violates her interest, but her interest must be “arguably within zone of interest that the statute protects/regulates.”
ii. Must have complaint in zone of interests protected by law involved (this invokes Congressional INTENT). - Ask: what interests does the statute protect and does plaintiff’s interest fall within those interests?
i. Section 10 of APA allows judicial review of agency action by one “aggrieved by agency action within meaning of relevant statute.” See Association of Data Processing Service Orgs v. Camp.
a. But see Lexmark v. Static Control (Static Control has standing via zone of interests under Lanham Act based on commercial interest, but majority also considers injury-in-fact and causation with emphasis on statutory interpretation). Lexmark shows that constitutional and prudential standing are not clearly separated.
1. Scalia argues that this is not about prudential standing, but statutory interpretation because he does not believe in prudential standing!
2. So what is left of prudential standing after Lexmark? Not clear. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehous (Court declined to consider “the continuing vitality of the prudential ripeness doctrine” while also making clear that Lexmark raised unresolved questions about said vitality). For purposes of the exam, prudential standing still exists.