42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983 Flashcards
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Basic Principle
Basically 42 U.S.C. 1983 is an Eleventh Amendment workaround to hold local officials and municipalities liable (and state officials but only for equitable relief) for their violations of constitutional rights.
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Overview
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 is a cause of action statute that allows plaintiffs to seek remedies for federal remedies in either state or federal court, but it is key to a crucial federal court function: review of alleged state and local violations of federal law. The Supreme Court has declared that Congress enacted s1983 to “interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights.” 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 works in tandem with the 11th Am. to govern the manner in which federal courts may supervise state officials at the local level. The Eleventh Amendment does not restrict suits against local governments and local officials, so the main barriers to sue these officials comes from s1983.
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 civil cases establish a federal Cause of Action against state actors IF. . .
- Acted under color of state law
- Violated a constitutional right
*Thus, if you get a s1983 claim, then that means a federal question exists and there is no need to go through a federal question statutory analysis. . . BUT YOU STILL NEED TO PROVE VIOLATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT meeting the elements of whatever claim that is.
Blessing v. Freestone
42 U.S.C. Section 1983
Blessing v. Freestone: a litigant can bring a s1983 claim only if their claim rests on a mandatory right against the state that is codified in “right- or duty-creating language” in the law that is being enforced.
- > CANNOT get s1983 relief to enforce JUST ANY violation of federal law
- > Litigant must establish STATUTE provides an ENFORCEABLE right (lower standard than Cause of Action) but requires (1) Congress demonstrates an explicit or implicit INTENT to BENEFIT PLAINTIFF or their class; (2) the right is judicially COGNIZABLE - not “vague and amorphous”; (3) the statute “unambiguously impose[s] a binding obligation” on the government to provide the right.
- > If Congress FORECLOSES private ENFORCEMENT of the right in the statute, then one cannot bring a s1983 claim, and if Congress suggests there is no individual right, by, for example, creating a COMPREHENSIVE ENFORCEMENT scheme incompatible with individual enforcement of s1983, there is no claim.
42 U.S.C. Section 1983
The most significant and most litigated words and clauses are. . . .
- > “Under color of”
- > “person”
- > “Deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”
Under Color Of: Monroe v. Pape
42 U.S.C. Section 1983
Monroe v. Pape stands for the principle that THERE IS NO NEED TO EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES BEFORE BRINGING A 1983 CLAIM. Chicago police officers broke into Monroe home and ransacked the house, stripping them naked and made them stand in the living room, and then detained for ten hours to be questioned about a murder. This was a BROAD view of “under color of” language.
-> Are the officers still acting “under color of” state law even though the state law condemned the officer’s conduct?
* Yes, b/c Congress wanted s1983 to provide a SUPPLEMENTAL REMEDY even if state law remedy also existed, so an offcial can act “under color of” state law even if state law condemns the actions.
> Contrast narrow view that “under color of” means “acting in officially sanctioned way.” See Justice Frankfurter;s Dissent (state courts should be trusted to deal with illegality and unless plaintiff can show official conduct was part of custom or policy).
- NOTE: this is significant b/c this is the position taken in Monell v. DSS.
* TAKEAWAY: Monell overrules Monroe, but what remains is that YOU DO NOT NEED TO EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES BEFORE BRINGING A 1983 CLAIM
Municipalities as Persons: Monell v. Department of Social Services
GENERALLY
42 U.S.C. Section 1983
The Supreme Court has been very specific about who counts as a “person” under §1983, which may seem a bit all over the place; but it is important to remember that the Supreme Court has interpreted §1983’s scope against the background of the Eleventh Amendment, which prevents courts from hearing suits against governments and government officials. So, when thinking about what constitutes a person, it is important to think about the intersection of the Eleventh Amendment and §1983.
Municipalities as Persons: Monell v. Department of Social Services
CASES
42 U.S.C. Section 1983
- > Quern v. Jordan (state officials have the same protection from suits seeking damages under s1983 as the state, if they did not it would be a violation of 11th Am). See Alden v. Maine (extends 11th amendment state sovereign immunity to state court suits).
- TAKEAWAY: CANNOT use Ex parte Young theory to sue state officials under s1983 in federal courts for DAMAGES, only prospective equitable relief. Otherwise a violation of the 11th Am - same protections as the state.
- > But since STATE COURTS can also hear s1983 claims….
- Will v. Michigan (state officials are not “persons” [they are the state] under s1983 when sued in their official capacities for prospective relief; so get same protection as states and CANNOT sue for DAMAGES).
- TAKEAWAY: CANNOT use an Ex parte Young theory to sue state officials under s1983 for DAMAGES in state court. For all intents and purposes, the state officials get the same protections as the state.
- Hafer v. Melo (state officials can be sued for DAMAGES in their individual capacities and can be liable under 1983 if they acted “under color of” law).
- TAKEAWAY: CAN AVOID Ex Parte Young DAMAGES barrier by suing person in individual capacity, so they are no longer protected by state sovereign immunity.
- Will v. Michigan (state officials are not “persons” [they are the state] under s1983 when sued in their official capacities for prospective relief; so get same protection as states and CANNOT sue for DAMAGES).
- > Monell v. Department of Social Services (Municipalities can be “persons” under a1983 and plaintiffs may bring a claim against local governments for damages or declaratory injunctive relief where there is official municipal policy or custom causing the constitutional violation).
- See LA County v. Humphries (Monell covers damages and injunctive/declaratory relief, but no punitive damages for municipalities)
Municipalities as Persons: Monell v. Department of Social Services
“Monell stands for. . . “
42 U.S.C. Section 1983
Monell stands for the proposition that a PLAINTIFF CAN GET DAMAGES AND OTHER RELIEF from a MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT only if the plaintiff can show that the government CREATED A LAW or endorsed or officially acquiesced in a CUSTOM or POLICY that violated the plaintiff’s federal rights.
- When the law comes from a legislative enactment, the enactment speaks for itseld OR
- > A “SINGLE DECISION by a propoerly consituted legislative body” the “constitutes an act of official government policy.” See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati (county could be liable for the single decision of a prosecutor authorizing law enforcement officers to make unconstitutional entry into doctor’s clinic) - In the absence of a legislative enactment that itself constitutes the challenges law, a CUSTOM or POLICY can exist in two circumstances.
a. Where LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY that is delegates to a municipal agency or board results in a generalized action.
i. See Monell (regulations adopted by the city DSS and Board of Education requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves and applied to specific individuals involved officials).
b. Where individuals with FINAL AUTHORITY render an isolated decision that affects the plaintiff.
i. See Pambaur (county could be liable for the single decision of a prosecutor authorizing law enforcement officers to make unconstitutional entry into doctor’s clinic)
1. But see City of Louis v. Praprotnik (refused to hold city liable for alleged 1st Am violations that occurred when two senior supervisors dismissed a subordinate, only major and other select officials had policymaking authority over personnel; no adopted policy that caused constitutional violation)
Municipalities as Persons: Monell v. Department of Social Services
FAILURES TO ACT
42 U.S.C. Section 1983
If certain acts are enough to constitute liability for municipalities, then it is also important to ask what kinds of failures to act are enough to make municipalities liable under §1983. Most cases brought on a FAILURE TO TRAIN and DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE theory (note the CAUSATION requirement).
- > City of Canton v. Harris (in order to demonstrate a policy of inadequate training, plaintiff must prove that the local government actes with DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE and injury must have been caused (MOVING FORCE) by inadequacy of training program itself)
- > Board of Commissioners v. Brown (refined the CAUSATION REQUIREMENT even further and held that plaintiff must establish that municipality’s deliberate indifference led to the risk that the particular injury suffered would occur).
- Rigorous standard of culpability and causation for the case, so single instance of inadequate screening of officer insufficient to establish liability because liability would depend on “finding that the officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by plaintiff.” *Note:nepotism.
Analysis for 1983: WHOM can be sued
- Make sure the 11A does not prevent suit.
a. Probably doesn’t because suing STATE OFFICIALS is a way to get around 11A bar, but just make sure.
b. 11A protects state officials sued under Ex parte Young theory for damages. - No need to exhaust state court remedies for §1983 claim brought in federal court.
a. See Monroe (sets out what under color of is, but severely limited by Monell). - Is the person a local official? Even if entity is not a literal person, is the entity a MUNICIPALITY and thus covered under “persons”?
a. If yes a municipality (or other local official), then Monell claim.
i. Legislation itself or more likely…
1. A “SINGLE DECISION by a properly constituted legislative body” that “constitutes an act of official government policy.” See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati (county could be liable for the single decision of a prosecutor authorizing law enforcement officers to make unconstitutional entry into doctor’s clinic).
ii. CUSTOM or POLICY
1. Board adopts legislation
a. See Monell (regulations adopted by the city DSS and Board of Education requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves and applied to specific individuals involved officials).
2. FINAL DECISION
a. See Pembaur (county could be liable for the single decision of a prosecutor authorizing law enforcement officers to make unconstitutional entry into doctor’s clinic).
b. But see City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik (refused to hold city liable for alleged 1A violations that occurred when two senior supervisors dismissed a subordinate, only mayor and other select officials had policymaking authority over personnel but no adopted policy that caused constitutional violation).
involved officials).
2. FAILURE TO TRAIN HARD TO ESTABLISH
a. No vicarious liability in §1983 claim, cannot sue supervisory officials for actions of their subordinates. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
b. Must be DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE on part of municipality. See Canton (in order to demonstrate a policy of inadequate training, plaintiff must prove that the local government acted with deliberate indifference).
c. Deliberate indifference must have CAUSED the particular injury suffered. See Board of Commissioners v. Brown (rigorous standard of culpability and causation for the case, so single instance of inadequate screening of officer insufficient to establish liability because liability would depend on “finding that the officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by plaintiff”).
d. Must be a STRONG repeated similar pattern for liability. See Connick v. Thompson (repeated failure to disclose Brady material does not establish unconstitutional failure to train case unless pattern of violations are similar).
b. If NOT municipality/local official, then Ex parte Young.
i. Ex parte Young (the king can do no wrong, state officials are stripped of their official state capacity when violating the Constitution).
1. State officials CAN be sued in federal court, but only for PROSPECTIVE equitable relief, not retroactive damages. See Edelman.
a. CANNOT assert qualified immunity because still being sued in official capacity and qualified immunity is when sued in PERSONAL/INDIVIDUAL capacity.
b. Note: state officials can be state actors for 14A purposes but are stripped for 11A purposes.
Individual Immunities to Suit
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
Absolute Immunity:
The Supreme Court’s approach to absolute immunity focuses on an official’s FUNCTION rather than the official’s title. The Court has recognized absolute immunity for individuals performing judicial and legislative functions:
1. President ONLY
- Other executive officials get qualified immunity.
2. Police officers when providing TESTIMONY as witnesses
-Brisco v. Lahue (police officer witness on stand entitles to absolute immunity).
3. Prosecutors when performing a variety of COURT FUNCTIONS
- Emphasis on IN COURT functions to prevent suits by resentful criminal defendants from clogging up the court system.
->Imbler v. Pachtom (prosecutors have same absolute immunity under s1983 as they do under common law in malicious prosecution suits when bringing and pursuing criminal charges). *But in investigative state, qualified immunity only.
4. Judges when dressed in rode and performing judicial functions.
- Stump v. Sparkman (judge not immune if acts in clear absence of all jurisdiction)
- Mireles v. Waco (absolute immunity for judge who ordered police to forcibly seize pltff and bring him into the courtroom)
- Zarcome v. Perry (no absolute immunity for judge who ordered bailiff to handcuff and bring coffee vendor in because he did not like his coffee)
5. Legislators when acting on things central to deliberation and communication AMONG LEGISLATURE members (statements on floor, votes, committee work), but NOT for public statements and press releases.
Individual Immunities to Suit
QUALIFIED (“GOOD FAITH”) IMMUNITY
For officers not performing functions entitled to absolute immunity, qualified immunity is available if officers are sued in their PERSONAL capacity for DAMAGES, not prospective relief. Again, no QI for officials sued under Ex parte Young theory. Typically, it arises in suits involving executive officials. This is a question for the judge.
-> Affirmative defense that must be pled in Answer. See Crawford-El v. Britton.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald (Bivens case because federal officials, not state officials) sets out the standard the Court uses to BALANCE the INTERESTS of the private citizen in receiving compensation for harm done and the governmental concern that officials be able to effectively serve the public interest without being unfairly and unnecessarily burdened by litigation and liability. Qualified immunity depends on two conditions. Ask in this order (Saucier v. Katz), but not required to ask in this order (Pearson v. Callahan).
- Whether officials violates CLEARLY ESTABLISHED statutory or constitutional RIGHTS
a. Officer does NOT bear liability if the duties legitimately required action in which clearly established rights are NOT implicated
b. Clearly established by Supreme Court or Circuits at a high degree of specificity (gerenal assertion that 4th Am rights were clearly established is insufficient)
i. See Safford v. Redding (strip search of schoolgirl violated 4th Am. rights; however defendant protected because “clearly establsihed law” appeared to permit such searches citing New Jersey v. T.L.O. that school search is permissible is measures are “reasonably related to objective of search and not excessively intrusive”)
ii. See Mitchell v. Forsyth (warrantless national security wiretap does not clearly violate 4th Am, Supreme court later said it did)
i. Be sure to ANTICIPATE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 1983 DEFENSE and be sure to put relevant facts in complaint b/c few opportunities to do so later. - Of which a REASONABLE PERSON SHOULD HAVE KNOWN (objectively reasonable)
a. Even if officer violates clearly established law, but claims “extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard”
i. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd (objective qualified immunity standard for reasonably knowing)
ii. See Anderson v. Creighton (qualified immunity protects if conduct is “objectively reasonable” even if it is unconstitutional, about whether it is a reasonable error rather than whether it violates 4a).
i. But see Hope v. Pelzer (tying prisoner to hitching post for hours is something officers should have known not to do based on “objectively reasonable” 8th Am violation, they were on notice)
Qualified Immunity Analysis: Saucier v. Katz (suggested order of inquiry)
- Define the constitutional right and determine whether it was violated
- Decide if the right is clearly established
- Decide qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage of the lawsuit and anticipate this defense.
1983: “DEPRIVATION OF ANY RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, OR IMMUNITIES SECURED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS”
As a COA statute, §1983 is merely a vehicle for enforcing rights. You must determine which rights the courts can enforce when using §1983. There are two areas of litigation for a violation of rights:
- CONSTITUTIONAL WRONGS: seek remedies for state and local violations of the Constitution, s1983 is generally available for this BUT must note that many constitutional wrongs can be characterized as torts under existing state tort law. See Frankfurter’s Monroe dissent (1983 only allowed when state remedies, such as state tort law, are unavailable)
a. To bring 14th Am. violation claim and under 1983, plaintiff can only recover from injury resulting in intentional and authorized acts of official. - FEDERAL STATUTORY WRONGS: created by Congress to regulate a particular area and creates a standard of conduct; often creates a private Cause of Action in order to help enforce the rule, so defendants comply with the laws.
a. Private Cause of Action can be explicity or implied. See Maine v. Thiboutot (allowed to use 1983 as a vehicle to sue state of Maine and its oficers in state court for violations of federal statutes governing welfare benefit calculations)
i. Way to get around restrictive implied Cause of Action standards.
b. But see Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association (cannot use 1983 to circumvent federal environmental procedural requirements that when Congress has IMPLICITLY PRECLUDED 1983 claim by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme in litigation.
c. But see Gonzaga relying on Pennhurst (statute creates enforceable right for purposes of 1983 only if Congress created a right in clear and unambiguous terms). In other words, WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR AN IMPLIED STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION IS THE SAME THING REQUIRED FOR 1983.
