Skeleton Notes #9 Flashcards

1
Q

What is a pre-requisite for thriving, functioning, competitive markets?

A

the free-flow of information

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2
Q

What has the power to compromise or destroy markets?

A

Information Asymmetries

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3
Q

Where there is no free-flow of information, and one party might be able to use an information advantage to enter into exchanges that benefit that party at the expense of another

A

Information Asymmetries

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4
Q

What is adverse selection?

A

An information advantage that a buyer/seller has that gives them the ability to misrepresent a good/service/themselves

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5
Q

During adverse selection a person has incentive to _____________ when they buy insurance. Left unchecked an insurer that took on the customers will see that health costs are high and have to ___________. As a result the ________ people will keep insurance while the _____ people will leave. This leads to a _____ where only the unhealthiest people carry insurance.

A

hide costly health behaviors

raise premiums

unhealthiest

healthiest

death spiral

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6
Q

Why does a moral hazard occur?

A

Due to a lack of information about how/why someone behaves in a potentially harmful way – certain services/goods may lower incentives for healthy behavior

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7
Q

Adverse selection arise due to an inability to ______________. For instance if potential buyers do not know the real _______ of any used-car at a dealership

A

trust the quality
quality

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8
Q

In adverse selection a dealer sells cars at market price P. The seller is aware of the varying quality of the cars. At the market price P, they will only offer the cars of ________ that earn them a ____. They will not offer the ________.

A

Lower quality
profit
higher quality cars

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9
Q

over time the market learns that only cars of a certain __________ are available, and demand for these cars falls, leading to _____ P

A

lower quality
lower

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10
Q

When demand for these cars falls, the seller responds by offering only the ___________. Buyers later respond with even less ______. This continues leading to ________

A

lower quality cars
demand
market collape

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11
Q

Market collapse is the problem of ___________, where one party has incentives to __________ of their product

A

adverse selection
misrepresent the quality

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12
Q

(adverse selection prediction) riskier people will seek

A

more coverage

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13
Q

(adverse selection prediction) insurance companies will charge bulk markups for

A

additional coverage

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14
Q

(adverse selection prediction) insurance pools will unravel leading to

A

death spiral

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15
Q

A person who is higher risk is more willing to pay ___________ for insurance

A

more/higher premiums

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16
Q

if only people who participate in an insurance program are all high risk, _____ will rise, ______ will rise, and a _______ is possible

A

costs
premiums
death spiral

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17
Q

Insurers will attempt to account for this risk by _______ the price as someone attempts to buy more insurance

A

increasing

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18
Q

if insurance pulls unravel, this leads to a

A

death spiral

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19
Q

A _________ person is more willing to pay higher premiums for insurance. If the only people who participate in an insurance program are all __________, costs will _____, premiums will _____, and a __________ is possible

A

higher risk
high risk
rise
risk
death spiral

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20
Q

insurers will attempt to account for this risk by ________ the price as someone attempts to buy more insurance. This is a bulk markup where someone is charged more (per unit) when they buy/use __________.
This is unlike the typical bulk discount in toilet paper or other goods in large quantities where you pay______(per unit) the more you buy.

A

increasing
more insurance
less

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21
Q

A death spiral played out at Harvard University. LESS healthy subgroups will select__________ because they are more likely to need it. Healthier subgroups will ________ of higher-priced insurance because they are unlikely to need it.

A

HIGHER-priced insurance
OPT UT

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22
Q

segmenting a pool of unhealthy people into their own insurance is the first step to a?

A

collapse of that market (death spiral)

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23
Q

when it comes to death spirals, the ____________ predicts that the market will survive if there’s demand, a price ceiling doesn’t work, government regulation helps quality.

A

Akoroff Model

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24
Q

According to the Akoroff Model the market will survive as there is a high __________ for the good or service. Even at a very _________, people will spend money on inelastic goods.

A

need/demand
high price

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25
Q

According to the Akoroff Model, a _________ doesn’t work and likely makes the problem worse. THis government law that keeps the price of a good from rising keeps car or insurance prices under a certain level. For used cars, this will only serve car dealers to take out the top quality cars and leave only those under the price cap. The same for insurance companies, they will make the low-risk plan unappealing to high-risk people.

A

price ceiling

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26
Q

According to the Akoroff Model, government regulation can help by having ____________. Having these in the car market would disallow dealers from selling a car unless it meets certain standards. they would have to invest in a bit in fixing the car, then can sell it at a higher price that is indicative of the cars _____________.

A

quality standards
true quality

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27
Q

When talking about unknown quality in the insurance market, we are talking about the __________ of the Market. Just as low-quality care would be rejected in the market, ____________ would be rejected in the insurance market.

A

sick-level
high-risk customers

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28
Q

Despite the problem of adverse selection used-car dealerships still operate and insurance markets do not all __________. There are a number of reasons why markets still function in spite of the _______________.

A

spiral out of control
information asymmetry

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29
Q

Potential insurance customers may believe they are not as _________ as they actually are, they do not attempt to over-insure. OVERCONFIDENCE can be a countervailing force against ___________, since they misrepresent their own risk they underinsure.

A

unhealthy
adverse selection

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30
Q

potential customers know that they are unhealthy, but do not act on their knowledge by trying to get better _________. They may not think it is worth the bother, even if they could potentially find a _________.

A

insurance coverage
good deal

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31
Q

No information asymmetry exists if insurers can _________ the actual health risk of a person. If this is the case, then they can offer prices that account for the added ________.

A

predict
risk

32
Q

If an insurance knows ones ____________, they have a good idea of the future risk of that person.

A

pre existing conditions

33
Q

An insurer may be likely to market and target relatively ____________ for a certain age group, an insurance company is interested in having a ___________ of customers

A

healthier people
healthier pool

34
Q

because people are ____________, they are likely to buy insurance. In fact, if one is risk averse in one area of life, they may be risk averse in ___________, the people who are making the best health decisions may also be the ones most likely to ____________

A

risk-adverse
many areas
buy insurance

35
Q

advantageous selection where the least risky are most likely to buy insurance may also be a ___________ against adverse selection

A

countervailing force

36
Q

A healthy insurance program is __________ having lots of people that are paying into the system and relatively few using it.

A

diverse

37
Q

Adverse selection poses a risk to __________, it helps explain why insurance companies want to know information about ____________.

A

diverse pulling
pre-existing conditions

38
Q

If government outlawed insurance companies from learning about pre-existing conditions then?

A

insurers must find a different way to achieve a diverse, large pool in the insurance

39
Q

One way to create a diverse insurance pool is common in the US, to ____________. All ages, safe/risky, are in the employers pool, ____________ costs.

A

to link insurance to the employer
reducing

40
Q

The US government further incentivizes employees to take __________ from their __________because the value of it is not taxed

A

insurance
employers

41
Q

A second strategy is to have ___________, where everyone is in the same insurance programs. As described by the Rothschild-stiglitz Model, this means that ___________ get a discount and the healthy pay _______ for insurance

A

one-universal pool
frail/risky people
more

42
Q

What ideas all build the concept of adverse selection

A

Pre-existing conditions
universal care
insurance mandates

43
Q

Go back to the previous modeling exercise and look at question 4 (everyone pays premium = $65,000). It turns out that you have 100 people like Lena and 100 people like bree (with their same probabilities of being sick - lena has a 10% chance and bree a 80% chance).

How many people will be healthy in this scenario? how much do you make on them altogether

A

Pg 8 of completed Skeleton 10

44
Q

Go back to the previous modeling exercise and look at question 4 (everyone pays premium = $65,000). It turns out that you have 100 people like Lena and 100 people like bree (with their same probabilities of being sick - lena has a 10% chance and bree a 80% chance).

How many people like lena are sick? how much in premiums do you get altogether? how much do you pay out altogether?

A

Pg 8 of completed Skeleton 10

45
Q

Go back to the previous modeling exercise and look at question 4 (everyone pays premium = $65,000). It turns out that you have 100 people like Lena and 100 people like bree (with their same probabilities of being sick - lena has a 10% chance and bree a 80% chance).

How many people like Bree are sick? how much in premiums do you get altogether? how much do you pay out altogether?

A

Pg 8 of completed Skeleton 10

46
Q

What does a price distortion product created by insurance do?

A

Lower the cost of risky behavior to the individual

47
Q

What kind of demand is price sensitivity?

A

elastic

48
Q

Suggests that one changes decisions when the price of risky behavior changes

A

price sensitivity

49
Q

if one is price sensitive, then they are induced to switch toward _________. it is an incentive to be less _______

A

More expensive treatments (covered by plan)
frugal

50
Q

What kind of information is there about an individual’s risk aversion?

A

asymmetric

51
Q

More risk-seeking individuals are the ones that are more _____________

A

price sensitive

52
Q

Regarding moral hazard, we are interested in instances when insurance and health product/service loosens the buyer’s tendency to _________. It creates an incentive to act _____ and worry less about the ____ of losses

A

avoid risk
riskier
cost

53
Q

occurs when a product/service insuring against an event changes one’s behavior in a way to make that event more likely

A

ex ante moral hazard

54
Q

occurs when a product/service sways one toward more expensive recovery options after an event takes place

A

ex post moral hazard

55
Q

If risky behavior like hang gliding is responsive to the ______ (meaning it is demand ____) then covering such behaviors ______ of getting an injury. This creates a large __________ that will likely be passed on to everyone else

A

price of injury
elastic
lowers the price
social costs

56
Q

Interpret the graph on the left (skeleton 9.14)

A

Moral hazard leads to either greater risky behavior or more costly but unnecessary treatments. This has the effects of lower costs to the individual exhibiting the moral hazard but higher costs to society. (negative externality)

57
Q

Interpret the graph on the right (skeleton 9.14)

A

Likely generates social benefits by a greater number of patients receiving necessary treatment. If the barrier to treatment was income or lack of insurance then the insurance product is increasing access to the treatment, as opposed to inducing moral hazard

58
Q

Many authors make the hard cast for moral hazard, limiting discussion to the price-elastic example that ________________. However this assumes that consumers are acting in the strictest sense of _________

A

insurance lowers price to injury, leading to more risky behavior
rationality

59
Q

People face true constraints to ______. They may not be initially using care because they _______, not because the price is too high.

A

accessing
do not have access

60
Q

_______ become more and more _____ as they go longer without receiving care. Empirical studies show that people in the US do this quite often due to ________ and previous ___________

A

Untreated health problems
costly
uninsurance
catastrophic health expenses

61
Q

What are the effects of untreated health problems?

A

large public cost, costlier emergency rooms, higher insurance and healthcare for everyone

62
Q

Based on the graph on the right (skeleton 9.14) the price of care has _____ to do with the demand for treatment and that demand is created by ______. Rather than leading to moral hazard by lowering price of treatment insurance increases _________ by making it more _____

A

little
inheritance
access
affordable

63
Q

It is perhaps incorrect to assume that people always act _____, looking for opportunities to take advantage of insurance. The policy answer that many come up with is to simply _________________. For example: ______

A

rationally
not allow the price distortion
Narcan

64
Q

Just as there are social costs to moral hazard, there are social costs to?

A

Not treating health issues and leaving them to get worse

65
Q

Remember how I said wouldn’t of bought the nicest sunglasses had they not been ___________? If I have to pay a little, then my overuse of care and their associated costs will _______.

A

covered by insurance
fall

66
Q

Look at graph A on ch9-16, this shows __________ incurs a ______________ (assumed to be from ____________)

A

full coverage
large social cost
unnecessary care

67
Q

In graph B on ch9-16, the patient has a __________… this reduction of the quantity of care demanded ____________.

A

copayment price P, moving the market from Point A to Point B
lowers social costs

68
Q

Compare graph A on ch9-16 with a vertical demand curve to graph C. Effective demand is vertical with full insurance because the patient is ___________. In graph C, the coinsurance percentage rises, and the effective demand shifts towards the ____________.

A

not price-responsive
uninsured demand

69
Q

True or False: When the price elasticity of demand for health care is zero, health insurance coverage induces no moral hazard. Explain?

A

True –> patients will not respond to lower cost of care

70
Q

True or False: An uninsured patient who incessantly visits his doctor because he always thinks he is getting sick is an example of moral hazard. Explain?

A

False –> does not force the price distortion (pays to do this anyways)

71
Q

True or False: A woman who uses her fireplace only after she buys homeowners insurance is an example of moral hazard. Explain?

A

True –> she changes behavior do to insurance (price of colamity falls)

72
Q

True or False: A previously-uninsured man who enrolls in his workplace health insurance plan after being diagnosed with multiple sclerosis is an example of moral hazard. Explain?

A

False –> disease/behavior not related to insurance. But this is adverse selection

73
Q

True or False: if a health insurance company could somehow monitor everything a customer does and thinks, it could create a full-insurance contract with no moral hazard. Explain?

A

True –> Information asymmetry would go away

74
Q

True or False: It would be easy for private health insurances to eliminate moral hazard by redesigning insurance contracts, but they ae prevented from doing so by strict government regulations (at least in most developed countries). Explain?

A

False –>Information asymmetry (not regulation) is the problem, even in unregulated markets

75
Q

True or False: Moral hazard is mostly a problem in countries with universal insurance programs like the United Kingdom.

A

False