Sino-Soviet Relations Flashcards
What are the two aspects to the role of ideology in Chinese foreign policy.
- Idology is a direct practical expression of Marxism-Leninism which has shaped the ways in which major Chinese decision makers handle Chinese external relations.
- Ideology plays a minor and secondary role and is instead used by leaders to rationalise their decision that have been made on other grounds such as conservation of China’s national interest and security.
Discuss Levine’s (1994) definition of ideology in the context of China.
There are two dimensions in his book.
Formal ideology - a ‘coherent and systematic body of ideas’ that helps Chinese leaders explain the nature of social reality surrounding them. It provides ‘a programme of action for changing that social reality in order to achieve certain desired social goods and values’.
Informal ideology - a ‘complex of cultural values, preferences, prejudices, predispositions, habits and unstated by widely shared propositions about reality that condition the way in which political actors behave’. The idea of sino-centrism falls into this category as this world view works in the background of the minds of these leaders to shape their decisions about China’s external relations.
Discuss Lüthi’s (2008) definition of ideology in the context of China.
Refers to ‘a set of beliefs and dogmas that both construct general outlines…of a future political order and define specific methods…to achieve it’. It can be viewed as a belief system or political tool enabling leaders to pursue their short-term personal or political interest in daily politics. Ideological disagreements are often exacerbated by unsophisticated understandings of theoretical pillars by believers. He goes on to analyse the role of ideology in shaping the relations between China and the SU.
Discuss the origins of the Sino-Soviet alliance, starting with the ‘lean-to-one-side’ statement.
On 30th June 1949 Mao made an important statement crucially arguing that China at that point in time would have to ‘unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equal and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the SU, with the People’s Democratic countries, and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front…We must lean to one side’. The purpose was to form an international united front and this was the image presented to the outside would about Mao’ decision to choose the SU over the US.
However, around that time there were persisting tensions between Mao and Stalin. Stalin qas quite fearful of the prospect that Mao could become a rival leader of the international communist movement, despite the PRC’s levels of poverty and lack of resources. Mao also despise Stalin’s ‘great power chauvinism’ and felt as though he was treated as a little brother by his counterpart.
Describe how the Sino-Soviet alliance began after the ‘lean-to-one-side statement’.
In February 1950, both countries signed an alliance treaty that led to the Alliance formation. SU promised CN that it would maintain privileges in the country’s NE-part and in Xinjiang but would offer CN an increasing amoung of military and material support which was crucial to the new state. Both parties agreed that in the even of an attack on either by a third party, they would come to each other’s assistance.
In 1954 K visited Beijing wher it was decided that the Lushan military base would be returned and it would give up shares in four joint ventures formulated between CN and SU companies. SU gave povisions of loans totalling 520m Rybles and promised technical support for China’s 1st FYP. As a new state with limited resources, these promises were vitally important to CN.
The following year they signed the Sino-Soviety nuclear agreement with SU promising to provide provisions of nuclear technology, purportedly for peaceful purposes. China was not yet a nuclear power so it was in its interest to maintain this agreement as SU technological provisions would enable them to develop their own nuclear weapons systems.
What are the reasons behind the Sino-Soviet Alliance?
There are three key explanations as to the reasons behind the ‘eternal friendship’ - security and strategic concerns, domestic considerations and the ideological factor.
- Security/strategic concerns - it was widely accepted among the party that the alliance relationship was designed to deter against the US threat. CN was desperately in need of various types of assistance from SU to support its political, economic and military developments. SU had a clear security and strategic objective in mind too, namely driven by its intention to enlarge its anti-US bloc.
- From Chen, domestic considerations - Mao wanted to create new momentum for the continuation of the CN revolution. He also wanted to destroy any remaining illusions among the population about receiving assistance from Western capitalist countries. The formulation of the alliance relationship would enable Beijing to ‘occupy a more powerful position to wipe out the political, economic, social and cultural legacies of the ‘old’ China and carry out ‘new’ China’s state building and societal transformation’.
- Similar worldviews and ideologies - Mao and many of his comrades saw themselves as followers of Marxist-Leninism so this proximity with their Russian counterpart would naturally bring them together as allies. Natural that Beijing would move closer to Moscow as leader of the international communist movement. They both also had very converged world views as by 1950 they viewed the bipolar confrontation between socialist and capitalist camps as inevitable.
What was the most important driver for the alliance relationship?
Ideological proximity naturally paved the way of pushing the parties together, even though the actual calculations of their actions were based in interest. However, there were always ideological distinctions which became more apparent as time went on. In terms of economic planning there was a compatibility between the two countries that doesn’t really exist in Western countries, and the alliance was based strongly in how the two operated.
Goncharov et al, 1993, authored by an American, Chinese and Russian after the Cold War. They discovered that neither of the leaders were motivated by ideological concerns when formulating grand strategies for their nations, hoever, they often used ideological elements to characterise and publicise their related policy declarations. By studying private communications we can see a reflected of calculations of military and political interests, and a shared priority for national security considerations.
Ideology has two major functions to some extent. On a general level, especially in the selection and treatment of enemies, ideology really matters and in the dichotomy, communism is considered as good by both leaders, while imperialism is bad. Their joint ideological perspective creates the aim of the disappearance of imperialist states. It functions also on the analysis of country’s domestic situations in other states, so the utilisation of the class concept becomes crucial for both parties.
What are the four causes of the collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance?
There are different levels of analysis of the international relationshiop between the two countries.
1. Discord at the individual level through personality clashes
2. Discord at the bilateral level
3. Discord at the international level due to third-party relations
4. Discord within the Marxist-Leninist framework on the ideological level
Discuss the discord at the individual level.
In an alliance relationship leaders need to make compromises/collaborate with each other to make the relationship work, and the nature of the Chinese and Russian political systems at the time required personal contacts to be established btw supreme leaders for major decision-making. Such summitry became legitimised under Mao and Stalin’s leadership. When there were problems in terms of personal relations, it had detrimental impacts and contributes to the fragility of alliance relations, one example being the personal clashes between Mao and Khrushchev. Their personalities were incomopatible with standard alliance requirements—(Whiting, echoed by Chen, Goncharov, et all) ‘their idiosyncratic behaviour transformed neomal differences of policy into mutual hostility’, and this undermined the foundations of relations between the two countries. Mao had a deep sense of prestige and superiority over Khrushchev because to him, Khrushchev was a more junior leader and he didn’t want to show him any respect
There are many other examples of their personality clashes. In 1958, Krushchev proposed to station submarines in China which was considered by Mao to be a lack of understanding of CN sensitivities over sovereignty. In 1960 Khrushchev compared Mao to an old pair of discarded shoes. Mao claimed that the GLF would enable CN to entrer communism before the SU but Khrushchev was unimpressed by the economic logic that Mao had presented to rationalise his decision to introduce the GLF. In 1963 Mao claimed that the PRC had become the centre of world revolution which was considered arrogant by Khrushchev.
Discuss the discord at the bilateral level.
The scope of CN demands were various types of aid created a problem for SU because the leader was seen as the big brother of the communist bloc and so had to allocate resources to many European allies as well as CN. Both leaders had very different views about the right way for China to develop its economy, Mao believed that the GLF could help CN leapfrog over the developmental stages that were challenging SU, while Khrushchev believed this economic logic was completely wrong.
Both countries had a lot of disputes over joint use of naval, air and comms military facilities in CN in 1958, yet the Beijing summit that year didn’t help them resolve differences. Mao went so far as to describe K as someone similar as counterparts in the US, equating him with leaders of Western imperialism. There were also disagreements over issues pertaining to XJ. There were huge exodus of non-Han Cn during 1961-62 over the border to the SU which China saw as subversion. SU disagreed and argued that domestic economic issues pushed them away. There were also disputes over borders and land since 1963.
Discuss the discord at the international level.
uring the KW Stalin put Moscow’s interests first ahead of anything else which reflects the limitations of proletarian internationalism. The idea was the Mao wanted to persuade Stalin to offer air support before he sent the army in, but Stalin refused because he was fearful of direct confrontation between SU and US troops. Mao’s sense of superiority became elevated because he decided to send troops to KW without SU support, and SU asked CN to pay for much of the military supplies that they had received, exacerbating the economic plight of the country. According to Chen, this makes the SU ‘seem more like arms merchants than genuine communist internationalists.
The next major dispute was over TW and the 2nd Cross-Strait Crisis, 23 August-November 1958. Mao decided to bomb Jinmen island without warning the SU which was very much against the principles of defence that underpin alliance relations as in theory, you must warn the ally in advance of major military action to allow them to prepare. This challenged K’s 1956 peaceful coexistence speech which encouraged the two camps to be in harmony because of the dangers of nuclear weapons. Washington came to Tw’s defence and sent some weapons systems, implying direct military nuclear threat of using weapons against CN.
In private, K attacked Mao very severely for unilateral action against TW without informing them first, and Mao was furious. Subsequently, SU cancelled related exports of nuclear weapons technology to CN as retaliation against Mao’s decision. By October 1959, K went further and encouraged Mao to accept declaration of formal TW independence which really irritated Mao because of how crucial TW was to CN. It further exacerbated tensions between the two sides. SU against military action taken against TW because of emphasis on the peaceful coexistence with the US.
There is another difference in their handling of the US. K made the peaceful coexistence speech and was very willing to make compromises when it came to relations with the capitalist world, however, Mao was very confrontational and believed that the armed struggle should be the mainstream measure to deal with the threat. In addition, there are other disputes over US action such as the marine landing in Lebanon in July 1958 which SU handled cautiously while China called for a more confrontational and militant response.
Both parties were in disagreement over the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In 1959 K met Eisenhower and both parties discussed the Treaty. This made CN unhappy and Mao attacked K for being unable to see the nature of US imperialism. By late September that year, K made a very important speech on the ‘Camp David’ spirit which offended Mao. He saw the SU negotiation with the US on the test ban treaty as detrimental to CN security interests, as if the treaty became reality it would forestall CN possession of nuclear capabilities. By August 1962 Moscow informed Beijing that it had accepted US proposals to stop nuclear proliferation by banning transfer of nuclear know-how to nonnuclear countries, including CN which had a detrimental impact on the continuation of the alliance relationship.
Both parties were in disagreement over the issue of India. In 1959 the Dalai Lama ran way from Tibet to India where he established the exiled government. SU ‘regretted’ the Sino-Indian border dispute at the time and instead gave aid to India despite being CN’s formal and greatest ally. SU side further challenged CN’s sovereignty claim over the border area between CN and India, and criticised their handling of the dispute.
There was also dispute over the 1963 Cuban missile crisis. Beijing supported Moscow in public but was privately critical.
There were also other clashes of interest in Africa and Asia, especially during the second Non-Aligned Conference in 1964. K wanted emphasis on peaceful coexistence and opposed the idea of the production of nuclear weapons but Beijing disagreed which was a huge setback.
Discuss the discord on the ideological level.
Final discord can be analysed within ML framework. There was competition for both parties for influence among the communist states and national liberation movements, and they competed for theoretical influence. In 1956 K made de-stalinisation speech which made Mao unhappy because Mao held Stalin in very high regard. The following year at the Moscow conference Mao made nominal endorsement of the SU leadership position within the entire communist movement. According to Chen 2001, Mao was acting as the morally superior judge over his SU counterpart. Mao’s speech also challenged K’s emphasis on peaceful coexistence.
Both parties competed for influence among communist states - during the Polish and Hungarian crisis, K accepted Mao’s suggestions about how to handle the crisis which made Mao extremely proud. Mao therefore believed that ‘Beijing should enjoy a more prominent position’ in the international communist movement (Chen, 2001). In 1959 Mao we t further to elaborate on the importance of offering radical support for the world revolution as a whole. As Mao became more militant and radical, K was embracing the idea of trying to make peace.
There were other disagreements eg the handling of the Thai Communist Party’s plan to overthrow Bangkok in 1964—Beijing encouraged Thai communist militancy while Russian advice was very different.
